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

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HISTORY OF THE WAR

VOL. XXI.

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

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CHAPTER CCCII.

THE NAVY'S WORK COMPLETED.

SURVEY OF THE SEA WAR—GERMANY'S FALSE RECKONING—LOSS OF HER OVERSEA SQUADRONS AND COLONIES—ADOPTION OF SUBMARINE WAR ON COMMERCE—NORTH SEA EPISODES—JUTLAND A DECISIVE VICTORY—ALLIED NAVIES IN THE ADRIATIC—NAVAL AND MILITARY COOPERATION—THE NAVIES' SHARE IN THE ENEMIES' COLLAPSE—INTERNMENT OF THE HOSTILE FLEETS—HISTORIC SURRENDER OF THE GERMAN NAVY IN THE NORTH SEA, NOVEMBER 21, 1918—SCUTTLING OF THE GERMAN SHIPS AT SCAPA—KING GEORGE'S TRIBUTE TO HIS FLEET.

IN this concluding chapter of the Naval Operations of the War, it seems desirable to summarize the information given in earlier chapters devoted to events at sea. The first three months of naval war were dealt with in Chapter XXX. (Vol. II.), and the succeeding chapter was concerned with the Navy's work in the outer seas. In the same volume, Chapter XLIII. was devoted to the raids on the East Coast by German battle-cruisers, when Yarmouth, Hartlepool, Whitby and Scarborough were bombarded, in November and December, 1914. The second three months of naval war, from the return of Lord Fisher to office to the Battle of the Dogger Bank, formed the subject of Chapter LIII. (Vol. III.). This narrative of the main Fleet operations was continued in Chapter CXI. (Vol. VII.), dealing with the Navy's work in 1915; in Chapter CLIII. (Vol. X.), dealing with 1916; in Chapter CCXII. (Vol. XIV.), dealing with 1917; and in Chapter CCLXXI. (Vol. XVIII.), dealing with 1918.

The work of the Fleet in connection with the Dardanelles expedition is, of course, described in the articles devoted to that subject. Chapters XCII. and XCIV., in Volume V., contain the early naval attacks and the landing respectively; Chapter XCVIII., in the next volume, events to the end of June, including the advent of the enemy submarines; Chapter CXII. (Vol. VII.), continues the narrative down to the Suvla Bay landing; and the next chapter in the same volume deals with the evacuation. Similarly, the work of the Navy in connexion with other operations of an amphibious character will be found recorded in the articles dealing with events in the theatre of war concerned. As regards Mesopotamia, the operations in the Persian Gulf up to the fall of Kurna are dealt with in Chapter LII. (Vol. III.), entitled "The Invasion of Chaldea." In Chapter CLVIII. (Vol. X.), "The Advance Towards Baghdad," the narrative was continued to the end of 1915, when the forces under General Townshend had retired to Kut, the siege and fall of which place is described in Chapter CXCI. (Vol. XII.) The Navy's part in the capture of Baghdad in March, 1917, and the work of the Tigris flotilla under Captain Wilfrid Nunn, are covered in Chapter CCI. (Vol. XIII.). The capture of Kiaochau will be found recorded in Vol. II., Chapter XLIV.; the naval operations in the Red Sea down to the end of 1914 in Vol. III., Chapter LVIII.; and the naval work on the Syrian coast in the spring of 1915 in Vol. IV., Chapter LXXIII. Later operations undertaken by the Navy in support of, or in conjunction with, military expeditions are dealt with in the chapters concerned with the latter.

Turning to purely naval operations, the

Battle of Jutland forms the subject of Chapter CXL., in Vol. IX. As regards the submarine war on merchantmen, a comparison of our own and enemy methods will be found in Chapter CXCV. (Vol. XIII.), entitled "The Blockades, 1915-17," and a more comprehensive review is given in Chapter CCLVII. (Vol. XVII.), on "The Anti-Submarine War, 1915-1918." An important phase of the subject, however, is treated separately in "Naval Transport and Convoy," Chapter CCXXXIX. (Vol. XVI.), and closely related with these articles are the two on "The Shipping Problem" in Vols. XI. and XV. Special chapters on the organization or material of the Navy include one on the development of the submarine, Chapter LXVII. (Vol. IV.); on the evolution of naval engineering, Chapter CLXXXVI. (Vol. XII.); and on the Medical Service of the Royal Navy, Chapter CXLIV. (Vol. IX.). There are also chapters devoted to the Mercantile Marine in Vols. VII. and XI.; and the work of fishermen in the war in the same volumes. Finally, it may be mentioned that, in addition to many references in the course of the various narratives, the work of the Allied navies has the following chapters devoted exclusively to it:—The French Navy, Chapter CLXXXII. (Vol. XII.); the Russian Navy, Chapter CCXLIII. (Vol. XVI.); and the Italian Navy, Chapter CLXXXIX. (Vol. XII.). On the other hand, the work of the United States Navy will be found recorded in various chapters devoted to America, in particular "America's First Year at War," Chapter CCXLIV. (Vol. XVI.). In the last chapter of Vol. XVIII., on "The Allies in the Mediterranean," there is also much information concerning the American, French, Italian, and Japanese naval forces in those waters. This present chapter contains a survey of the various phases of the sea war, supplemented by information which has been revealed since the armistice; with the important events concerned with the virtual disappearance of the German Navy.

Although the Germans were surprised by Great Britain deciding to come into the war, it was soon evident that they had made every preparation for a struggle at sea with this country. Their naval chiefs, however, were not so ready as the military commanders for a great war, and it has been stated that Grand Admiral von Tirpitz pressed for a postponement. The main reason why this was not granted was the belief, in fact the conviction, that Great Britain could be induced to remain neutral. What such a condition of things would have meant is clear. Germany, supreme on land at the beginning, would have been supreme at sea also, and must certainly have been victorious, whereas the power of the British Navy, exerted against her, proved, in the words of Viscount Grey on May 2, 1919, to have been the foundation of all success in the war. On the occasion of the British naval visit to France in April, 1919, it was pointed out by the Paris *Figaro* that the situation between July 28 and August 4, 1914, was especially complicated because there existed no treaty signed previously between France and Great Britain uniting the two nations in every eventuality which might arise. The French Ministry of Marine, seeing itself on August 2, 1914, forced to depend on its own resources against the German High Seas Fleet, at a time when the French main fleet was in the Mediterranean, sent Admiral Rouyer, at Cherbourg, who had only a weak squadron of six battleships and cruisers, the following memorable order: "Head immediately for the Straits of Dover. Defend the Channel by force of arms against the German Fleet." The French ships accordingly made this "advance to the sacrifice," as it was termed, but before the extreme moment arrived Great Britain had come into the conflict.

Evidence of the readiness of Germany for such an eventuality was forthcoming in the way her mercantile fleet at once fled for safety into neutral ports, in accordance with previous instructions, in the attempted cruise of the minelayer *Königin Luise* to the Thames estuary a few hours after the declaration of hostilities, and in the pre-arranged plans carried out by the German squadrons abroad. The last-named might have been more successful but for the fact, now revealed, that the colliers and storeships for von Spee's fleet were locked up in Manila by the prompt action of the Hong-Kong authorities. Such movements of a naval character as were made by the Germans indicated what might have occurred on a larger scale had they not been robbed of the initiative in the North Sea by the dispatch of the Grand Fleet to its war bases in the north before hostilities began. It was a matter of surprise that they did not attempt to reduce the preponderance of the Grand Fleet by raids in the early days, when there was not a single base on the east coast

THE NAVY'S TIRELESS WATCH ON THE NORTH SEA.
Deck of a British Man-of-War in winter.

defended properly against torpedo attack; but the reason given by the enemy why they failed to take advantage of this state of things was that they did not believe it could be possible. They have also endeavoured to explain the omission by stating that their destroyers and submarines were unfitted for the length of the passage to Scapa, but this is rather an attempt to excuse a want of enterprise than to furnish an adequate or convincing explanation. Lord Jellicoe has stated in his book, *The Grand Fleet*, that he has often wondered why the Germans did not make greater efforts in this direction in those early days. They possessed, in comparison with the uses for which they were required, almost a superfluity of destroyers, certainly a superfluity as compared with ourselves, says the late Commander-in-Chief, "and they could not have put them to a better use than in an attack on

Scapa Flow during the early months of the 1914-15 winter." After April, 1915, however, the situation got steadily worse for the enemy. It was quite well realized in England that everything depended upon the maintenance of the strength and efficiency of the Fleet in the North Sea, and this was the governing principle of the Allied naval strategy throughout the war. It is frequently forgotten that tactics are governed by strategy, and that happenings at sea should be read in light of this fundamental principle.

The history of the first phase of the war, as regards the main theatre of naval operations, was thus remarkable not so much for what occurred as for what did not occur, and attention was diverted to the outer seas, in which a number of German cruisers were at large. The chief of these vessels were in the Asiatic Squadron under Admiral Graf von Spee, which escaped from Tsingtau and kept rendezvous at the Marshall Islands on August 19. After crossing to the South-American side of the Pacific, where Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock on November 1 sacrificed his own ship, the Good Hope, and the Monmouth, in a gallant attempt to delay the enemy until reinforcements from home could arrive, von Spee rounded Cape Horn with the intention of seizing Port Stanley, in the Falkland Islands, as a base. To his surprise, he found there a powerful squadron, including two of the Invincibles, under Sir Doveton Sturdee, who on December 8 fought a decisive action with the German squadron, which was annihilated except for the Dresden. This ship was able to escape, only to be sunk at Juan Fernandez three months later. This victory off the Falklands destroyed the backbone of commerce-raiding by enemy cruisers. A large number of Allied ships formerly occupied in sweeping the Atlantic and Pacific for von Spee were now available to hunt down the remaining raiders. With the arrival at Newport News, U.S.A., of the Prinz Eitel Friedrich on April 11, 1915, all the German vessels formerly at large on the trade routes were accounted for. With their removal, the aspect of the sea war changed. As Lord Sydenham expressed it in an article in *The Times* on April 3, 1915, "The effects of the first six months of the war have been strikingly shown in February and March. Blind fury has replaced calculated naval and military policy." With the failure of the original German schemes for attacking commerce, and the destruction or internment of the vessels used in them, the war of attrition was pursued by means of submarines with an energy and virulence quite unexpected and unprecedented. As regards the war on the

THE SURRENDER OF SAMOA TO THE NEW ZEALAND EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.
Hoisting the Union Jack at Apia, August 29, 1914.

mercantile marine, the course of this need not be followed in the present chapter, as it is dealt with elsewhere. But the determination to whittle down the strength of the fighting fleets

ADMIRAL MEURER,
Who arranged the surrender of the German Fleet.

at every available opportunity was equally marked.

Another important phase of the Navy's operations in the first part of the war was the conquest of the German oversea possessions. Although military force was necessarily employed to seize and occupy these territories, they could never have been taken without the guarantee of open communications by sea, to convey the expeditions, to protect them from molestation, to safeguard their reinforcements and supplies, and to deny such provision to the enemy forces opposed to them. The first of the German possessions to fall was Samoa, which was occupied by an expedition from New Zealand, escorted by units of the Royal Australian Navy, on August 29, 1914. German New Guinea was occupied by Australian forces in the following month, the Union Jack being hoisted at Herbertshohe on September 11 and at Rabaul on the 15th. It was during a coastal patrol of New Britain, as it was renamed, that the Australian submarine AE1 was lost in this month, and the hidden German dispatch boat Komet was captured and added to the Royal Australian Navy as the Una. The occupation of the enemy territories in the Pacific had an important influence on the campaign against the commerce raiders by reason of the destruction of the wireless stations which had formerly kept them supplied with information With the destruction of the station at Nauroh on September 22, the last installation of the kind in the Pacific was put out of action. Mention should be made of Japanese cooperation in the conquest of these possessions, particularly of the Marianne, Caroline, and Marshall islands. With the adhesion of Japan to the Allied cause, not only was there an addition of 18 battleships and battle-cruisers, 34 cruisers and light cruisers, and efficient torpedo flotillas to the naval strength arrayed against Germany, but the capture of the enemy's fortified base in the Far East at Tsingtau, in the province of Kiaochau, quickly followed. Operations were begun against this stronghold by land and sea, and it surrendered on November 7, 1914.

Of the German territories in Africa, Togoland was the first to fall, its port of Lome being seized as early as August 7, 1914, and with it one of the largest of the world's wireless stations, the Telefunken Company having established here an installation capable of communicating with Nauen, near Berlin, a distance of over 3,000 miles. The campaign against the Cameroons came to a successful termination on February 18, 1916, with the capitulation of the German garrison at Mora, in the north of the colony. The much larger territory known as German South-West Africa, although containing a smaller population than the Cameroons, was taken as the result of a

ADMIRAL VON REUTER,
Who ordered the scuttling of the German ships.

brilliant campaign planned and executed by General Botha and General Smuts, with South African forces. Windhuk, the capital, with its wireless station, was occupied on May 12,

1915; and the German forces surrendered unconditionally at Tsumeb on July 8, 1915. Finally, General Smuts and his colleagues turned their energies towards German East Africa. The official capital, Dar-es-Salaam, surrendered on September 4, following operations from the sea in conjunction with the land advance; but it was not until December 1, 1917, that the whole territory of German East Africa was reported completely clear of the enemy. When this consummation occurred, the whole of the German colonial empire, with a territory of 1,006,412 square miles, and a population of 12,192,600, passed into the control of the Allies. It was unquestionably the gift of the sea power wielded with such striking success by the Navies of the Allies.

At the same time that the work of our sea men made possible the taking of these German colonies, it also permitted of the transfer of large bodies of troops to and from our own Dominions and dependencies, and to the m in theatre of military operations in France. In the first six months of war, according to Mr. Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, the Transport Department moved by sea, to and from the Continent, India and Egypt, Australia and New Zealand, Canada, China, and South Africa—in fact, from every fortress and possession under the Crown—a million of men, without any accident or loss of life. The smoothness with which this work proceeded gave no idea of the risks accepted. At the very moment, for example, when the notorious raider Emden was attacking the wireless station at Cocos Island, and the Sydney was directed to intercept her, the latter ship was engaged with the Melbourne in escorting a large convoy of Australian troops. It is unnecessary to do more than mention the subject here, because its significance has been pointed out in an earlier chapter,* yet it must not be overlooked in viewing the work of the Fleet in its right perspective.

Following the destruction of the commerce raiders, by which the Admiralty were able to announce that the enemy's flag had been swept from the oceans, and the successful inauguration of the campaigns against his oversea possessions, the Navy was called upon to take the offensive against Turkey by an endeavour to force the passage of the Dardanelles. As a purely naval undertaking, this was opposed to all previous experience, and violated the principles of naval strategy. Ships were not built primarily to fight land forts, and needed the cooperation of military force if they were to tackle them with fair prospect of success. However, it was clear from later information that such were the conditions in the forts at the Dardanelles with regard to supplies of ammunition, and the circumstances at Constantinople and in Turkey generally, that had the naval bombardment been pressed another day, in spite of the losses sustained from gunfire and mines, it was within the bounds of possibility that it would have succeeded. The prize was such as to be well worth trying for. Turkey had been induced to come into the war largely by the unexpected arrival at Constantinople of the Goeben and Breslau, which escaped from Messina. If she could have been forced out of the war in 1915, as she eventually was in 1918, it would have been a great gain to the world, for the whole course of the struggle would have been altered in our favour. Communication would have been established with Russia, who sorely needed munitions to withstand the German hordes; and we in turn could have received supplies of corn and oil from the Black Sea ports.

Meantime, a decision had been reached by the German High Command to employ submarines for the destruction of merchant shipping. This was, from the enemy's point of view, the natural sequel to the failure of the attack on commerce by cruisers, and was an attempt to regain the initiative afloat which was lost when the British Fleet appeared at its war stations in the North Sea. As the course of the U-boat war has been dealt with in other chapters, it will suffice to mention here that the original campaign, launched on February 18, 1915, attained but a small proportion of success, thanks to the energetic measures of repression which, even with the limited and imperfect material then available, were instituted by the Board under Mr. Churchill and Lord Fisher. On August 26, 1915, or after six months, Lord Selborne, then a member of the Cabinet, was able to declare that the menace was "well in hand." Up to that time, indeed, 122 British merchant vessels had been sunk by submarines, as compared with the 2,475 ships which were destroyed by enemy action during the whole war. But the Germans, having demonstrated the possibilities of this method of attack, set

* Naval Transport and Convoy, Chapter CCXXXIX., Vol. XVI.

to work to develop it with a ruthlessness which brought them into conflict with several neutrals, some of whom, headed by the United States, entered the war against them. The mistake of 1915, so far as the Allies were concerned, was in failing to prepare their counter-measures on a sufficiently adequate scale. Much valuable time was therefore lost, and the U-boats continued their activity right up to the signing of the armistice. As Sir Eric Geddes stated during his visit to America in October, 1918, a great renewed submarine effort on the part of Germany was even then impending.

places in the North Sea, which stood to prevent the attainment of Germany's ambitions. It was a case of history repeating itself once more. Napoleon's Grand Army, so long destined for the conquest of England, was frustrated by "those far-distant, storm-beaten ships" which it never saw, and as the Emperor himself said to Captain Maitland in the Bellerophon: "Had it not been for you English I should have been Emperor of the East; but wherever there is water to float a ship we are sure to find you in the way."

The climax of German efforts in this direction



THE GOEBEN (RECHRISTENED SULTAN SELIM) LYING IN STENIA BAY IN THE BOSPHORUS.

In the second year of the war the centres of naval interest passed from the outer oceans to the North Sea once more. Germany had lost all the naval forces she had abroad when war began, her oversea trade was gone, and her colonies also. The submarine war had given but a doubtful hope of "starving England into submission." It must, then, have become clearer than ever to the German High Command that their only real hope of success lay in being able to undermine or destroy the British Grand Fleet. By this time the combatants on both sides had placed armies in the field numbering several millions, but it was the comparatively small handful of seamen in the Fleet at Scapa Flow, and in the patrol flotillas at various other

was the Battle of Jutland. Before dealing with this action on May 31, 1916, in his book, *The Grand Fleet*, Lord Jellicoe has a chapter entitled, "Attempts to Entice the Enemy." His Fleet continued to dominate the North Sea, paying its price—though not so heavy as might have been expected—for the influence it exerted, in the face of activities pursued by enemy submarines and mine-laying craft, upon all the operations to which this country had by then been committed. An instance of the dangers of mines was afforded by the loss of the battleship King Edward VII., on January 6, 1916. To the meagre details which it was possible to give in Vol. X., page 47, it may be added that the mine which struck the vessel

under her starboard engine-room was laid by the German raider Möwe, during the very bad weather at that time, which made both sweeping and patrol work impracticable. Disguised as a neutral merchant ship, it was probable that the Möwe passed up the Norwegian coast and round the north of the Shetland Islands. She laid an extensive and very scattered minefield between Cape Wrath and a position about north from Strathie Point, on the Scottish coast, her work being facilitated by the necessity of the lights on Cape Wrath and Sule Skerry Island being exhibited for the assistance of the large mercantile traffic using the Pentland Firth and the Minches. About five hours after the King Edward VII. was struck, the vessel then having a heavy list, Captain Maclachlan decided to abandon her for the night, and four destroyers with difficulty took off all on board. Four hours later she turned over and sank. Lord Jellicoe records the fact that the battleship Africa, of the same squadron, passed safely through the mined area a few hours before the King Edward VII. was mined—a very fortunate escape!

A few weeks later, another incident in the North Sea illustrated the difficulties experienced by the British patrols even when they were able to get into touch with such vessels as the Möwe. In Vol. X. (page 64) it was recorded that the German raider Greif was overhauled on February 29, 1916, by the auxiliary cruiser Alcantara, Captain T. E. Wardle, and disabled, her destruction being hastened by another auxiliary cruiser, the Andes, Captain G. B. Young. The Alcantara was herself sunk in the action by a torpedo, and in his book Lord Jellicoe shows how such a raider as the Greif, disguised as a neutral, and armed with torpedo tubes, was a most difficult customer to deal with. It appears that the Alcantara ordered the German ship to stop at 9.15 a.m., when about 6,000 yards distant. The stranger complied and informed the British vessel that she was the Norwegian steamship Rena, from Rio to Trondhjem. She was flying the Norwegian flag, which was also painted on her sides. When about 2,500 yards away, the Alcantara, at 9.40 a.m., began to hoist out a boat for the purpose of boarding. It was then that the German ship opened a heavy fire from her hitherto concealed armament, and at the close



As originally fitted for torpedo-nets.

H.M. BATTLESHIP AGAMEMNON.

On which the conference with the Turkish delegates took place (see p. 14).



THE GERMAN RAIDER MÖWE UNDER SURVEILLANCE BY BRITISH WARSHIPS AT KIEL DURING THE ARMISTICE.

range hitting commenced immediately. Although her communications were cut at the start, and Captain Wardle thus experienced great difficulty in passing orders to the guns, the Alcantara soon returned the enemy's fire, but twenty minutes after the action began the British vessel was hit by torpedo between the boiler-rooms. In another twenty minutes, boats were observed to be leaving the German ship, and the Alcantara ceased firing. Listing heavily, she was abandoned shortly afterwards, and sank at 11.2 a.m., by which time the Andes, which was the first to sight the enemy and to signal her course and speed, had arrived on the scene. The Alcantara's crew were picked up by the destroyer Munster, and the light cruiser Comus, Captain A. G. Hotham, which had also arrived, finished off the Greif and picked up the survivors in her boats. As a result of this encounter, Lord Jellicoe said that every ship had perforce to be treated as "suspect," and neutrals were informed that, when any of our patrol vessels displayed a certain signal, the ship to be boarded should steam towards the boarding boat, which was lowered some distance away. It was not possible to examine a vessel without boarding her, and the experience of the Alcantara showed the danger of closing the ship to be boarded. But in order to carry the new arrangement into effect, the cooperation of neutrals was essential, and this, said Lord Jellicoe, was not always given. As the Commander-in-Chief declared: "Modern blockade work undoubtedly bristles with difficulties which did not exist in the days of our forefathers, not the least being the advent of the torpedo and the submarine."

This was painfully shown a year later, when an armed party from the boarding steamer Dundee, sent to examine a ship which eventually proved to be the German disguised raider Leopard, was lost on that ship being sunk by the cruiser Achilles, which was working in conjunction with the Dundee.

In spite of such great difficulties, however, the British seamen maintained their blockade with increasing effectiveness. The incident of the Greif must have demonstrated to the Germans that the odds against such attempts to place raiders on the trade routes were too heavy to admit of any influence on the course of the war being exerted thereby. Three months later, a more desperate attempt to break down the sure shield of the Grand Fleet, at Jutland, was no more successful, and information from German sources after the armistice showed how narrowly the High Seas Fleet escaped a crushing disaster that day, from whence dated a very real decline in the



A MONITOR TAKING IN SUPPLIES AND AMMUNITION.

moral of the German seamen. As Sir George Aston said in a lecture on the third anniversary of the Battle on May 31, 1919, at the University of London, while the enemy caused serious loss of material and casualties he failed conspicuously in bringing about any loss of moral, and his own moral suffered to such an extent that the crews mutinied when next ordered to sea under conditions that might have led to another battle. The losses in ships suffered by the German Fleet at Jutland were light, chiefly owing to the proximity of its ports, and gave no real indication of the severity of its defeat. Much higher relatively were the casualties in personnel, which undoubtedly undermined the fighting spirit of the men. After this the enemy hopes at sea were again centred on the submarines, and eight months later there was launched what they called the unrestricted U-boat war.

The situation afloat after two years of war found the Allied navies supreme on every sea, and the only menace to the safety of the ocean communications came from the submarine. Even in the Baltic, the Russian Navy, ably led by Admirals von Essen and Kanin, had asserted its superiority. Naturally, officers and men in the battle fleets, having obtained this virtual control, chafed somewhat at the conditions which denied them the inspiration and excitement of action while the submarines played havoc with merchant shipping. One suggestion for the more active intervention of the naval power of the Allies—a revival of Lord Fisher's earlier plan—was to dispatch an expedition to the Baltic, to effect a landing on the shores of Mecklenburg or Pomerania, or even further east, as a threat to Berlin and to cooperate with the Russians on the eastern front. To a party of Russian journalists who visited the Grand Fleet in February, 1916, Lord Jellicoe had said: "Nothing could give us greater pleasure than to be able to fight side by side with the Russian sailors against our common foe. It would be difficult for us to go to the Baltic, but I will not say impossible. I hope the day may come when our ships will engage the enemy together." In his book, Lord Jellicoe shows that the subject of operations in the Baltic was first seriously discussed when Mr. Churchill, then First Lord, with Sir Doveton Sturdee, Chief of the War Staff, and other senior officers conferred with him at Loch Ewe in September, 1914, but at that time, "as no large operations of this nature could be attempted without the assistance of Allied battleships, in order to maintain supremacy in the North Sea during such operations, no steps were taken." It will be seen from this how much was lost to the cause of the Allies afloat when Russia seceded after the revolution of March, 1917, because by that time the change in the situation in the outer seas, the construction of the monitor fleet and other new types, and more particularly the entrance of the United States Navy into the conflict,

had provided a surplus such as would have enabled a large force to penetrate into the Baltic with favourable chances of success had the Russians been ready to cooperate with it. The conditions which prevented this are set forth in the chapter on the Russian Navy in Vol. XVI.

In other theatres of the sea war the Allies improved their watch and guard over the enemy. Light was shed upon the magnitude of the commitments of the British Navy in the Adriatic in a lecture given in London on March 28, 1919, by Captain di Villarey, commanding the Italian cruiser Libia. He showed how considerable was the effort of the British in the Otranto barrage, in which at one time there were the following ships flying the white ensign:

5 light cruisers.	2 monitors.
6 sloops.	35 destroyers.
10 submarines.	52 trawlers.
83 drifters.	2 repair ships.
5 depot-ships.	40 motor launches.
4 torpedo-boats.	

Captain di Villarey testified to the splendid courage of the British fishermen, scores of whom, he said, were now sleeping their last rest beneath the blue waters of the Adriatic; and to the daring exploits of the British submarine and seaplane squadrons. He also acknowledged Italy's indebtedness to the British armoured trains, which, after doing much good service in Flanders, were transferred to the Italian coast, where they commanded a zone varying from 14 to 40 miles with such excellent effect that more than once they compelled the retirement of flotillas of destroyers and other enemy craft. In presiding at Captain di Villarey's lecture, Admiral Sir Cecil Thursby, commanding the British forces in the Adriatic when Italy entered the war, said that he did not think people quite realized the splendid organization of the Italian Navy which made possible the removal, practically without any loss, of over 200,000 troops, refugees, and prisoners in a zone quite close to one of the enemy's principal naval bases.

A phase of the Navy's work in the war which contributed in large measure to the Allied success was the assistance given to the military operations by direct participation therein. This working together of the Navy and Army in actual fighting was something quite different from the ordinary transport work of the Fleet and the protection afforded to the Army's communications overseа. Many opportunities for such amphibious undertakings occurred during the war. Although presenting technical difficulties, and arduous conditions, they were made the most of by the naval units concerned. Some of the highest honours which were bestowed upon British seamen were won in the fighting side by side with their

THE 20th DESTROYER FLOTILLA IN PORT AFTER LAYING MINES IN THE HELIGOLAND BIGHT.

comrades of the land Service. The conquest of the German oversea possessions has already been mentioned. In addition to those territories, for the capture of which amphibious operations were essential, the Navy sent men, ships, guns, aircraft, etc., to practically every other theatre in which the Allied armies were engaged.

Leaving the German colonies out of account, this work of cooperation started on the Belgian coast in October, 1914, after the return of the

H.M.S. SUPERB OFF PERA.

unfortunate expedition to Antwerp. From the hastily-improvised flotilla which assembled in that region on the receipt of the first reports of the German advance to the coast, a naval landing party went ashore from the monitors on October 18. The Severn also landed her machine guns for the defence of Nieuport, and in leading his men Lieutenant E. S. Wise, of that vessel, was killed. The arrival of the German heavy artillery and the development of the operations into trench warfare, precluded a continuance of the work of the naval contingent on shore, but the growth of the operations afloat off the Belgian coast, culminating in the famous raid on Ostend and Zeebrugge on St. George's Day, 1918, is well known. In addition, effective help was given in France and Flanders by various naval units with the armoured train, armoured cars, heavy naval guns, and aircraft, not to mention the Royal Naval Division, which had been raised and equipped under Admiralty auspices. The work of the Royal Marine Artillery in France would form a story in itself. Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, with temporary rank as Colonel-Second-Commandant, Royal Marines, was the first to organize and command the Siege Brigade from January, 1915. This Brigade was provided with 15-in. howitzers, designed and constructed by the Coventry Ordnance Works under Sir Reginald's direction. He commanded them in action until recalled in April, 1915, to become Admiral Commanding the Dover Patrol. The work of the Marine Brigade continued throughout the war. On February 17, 1919, Major H. W. Iremonger, R.M.A., received the D.S.O. for service with a detachment of six 7·5-in. guns in Flanders.

In the war against Turkey it was the Royal Navy which struck the first blow, even before hostilities had been actually declared, when on November 2 and 3, 1914, the Fleet, as a reprisal for Turkish acts of hostility in the Black Sea and elsewhere, bombarded the outer forts at the Dardanelles, and the cruiser Minerva shelled the forts and barracks at Akaba, in the Red Sea. From Admiral S. H. Carden's dispatches, published in the London Gazette on May 2, 1919, it appears that on November 3, 1914, a short bombardment was carried out at the Dardanelles by the British battle-cruisers Indefatigable and Indomitable, and the French battleships Suffren and Vérité, by a run past in close order, at a range of 13,000 yards. The Turks replied to the fire almost at once, and maintained their fire from forts Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 6, until our squadron had completed their run. The only projectiles, however, which fell close were those from the 9·4-in. guns in forts Nos. 1 and 4. A large magazine explosion was caused in No. 3 fort. Heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy, some accounts putting the total at 600. The influence of this bombardment was seen when the Allied Fleet came to open its attack on February 19, 1915. No Turkish fort attempted to reply until late in the afternoon, when the old battleships were sent close in. The enemy apparently kept his men in shelters until the desired moment.

Of the manner in which, at other times and in other places, the officers and men of the Royal Navy cooperated with the Army in fighting the Turk, information is given in previous chapters dealing with the campaigns in Mesopotamia, Palestine, etc. A word, however, may be added here concerning one of

the most brilliant achievements of the seamen in this respect, the building, organization, and dispatch from England of a flotilla of light-draught gunboats for the Tigris. In January, 1915, the Admiralty were asked to provide some gunboats for service on this river, and Lord Fisher, then First Sea Lord, immediately ordered 24, giving a free hand to Messrs. Yarrow and Co., to provide the boats themselves or through sub-contractors, in order to save time. The firm built 12 themselves, and delivered them in three consignments—the first one, of four boats, after being tested on the Clyde, being taken to pieces and shipped to Abadan, Mesopotamia, which was reached on August 18, 1915. The first gunboat, Firefly, was erected, commissioned, tried, and proceeded up the Tigris on active service on October 29, 1915, or nine months after the date of the Admiralty order. The whole programme was completed by the following April. The splendid work of the flotilla under Captain Nunn constitutes one of the brightest pages in the chronicle of the war. The gunboats had an important share in the capture of Baghdad in March, 1917. During the Turkish retreat from Kut, five of them made a dash up the river past the Turkish rearguard and attacked the main army with such good effect that what was previously an orderly retirement was converted into a rout. Major A. Corbett-Smith, R.F.A., has the following comment on the Tigris fighting in his book, "The Seafarers":

> And rarely, if ever, in military history can there have been such perfect cooperation between Fleet and Army. To say that they fought side by side is to tell just the exact truth. The gunboats themselves formed a part of the land force, for they actually chased the Turkish cavalry across the desert—with their guns. (Who said that the Horse Marines were a myth?) They acted as storeships and as floating forts; and when they were not worrying the enemy on the land they set to against his river craft and recaptured several gunboats of ours taken during the earlier campaign.

Other instances where the sailors and soldiers fought together against the common foe could be given if necessary, equally illustrative of the indomitable perseverance and unfailing resource of our seamen. Witness the surprise of Colonel L. S. Amery, M.P., who, visiting Belgrade in the spring of 1915, found the Danube at that place in command of a British naval contingent under Admiral Troubridge, "with a British warship which had been taken there by a truck, and which had succeeded in sinking an Austrian monitor in her moorings." In the Adriatic it was the same. British monitors came to the support of the Italian army in the Trentino, repeating their performances against the Germans off the Belgian coast, the Turks off Gallipoli, and the Bulgarians off Dedeagatch.

It has been said that the war was brought to an end by the military collapse of the Central Powers. If this was entirely true, it is evident from the foregoing that the British and Allied navies had a direct as well as an indirect influence in bringing it about. The story has been told elsewhere of the lightning success

[*Official portrait.*

ADMIRAL SIR REGINALD BACON.
Commanded the Dover Patrol, 1915-1917.

which attended the offensive taken by the Allies on September 15, 1918. By the 26th, British troops had entered Bulgarian territory on the road to Strumnitza, and next day Bulgaria applied for an armistice. On being referred to the Allied Commander-in-Chief at Salonika, General Franchet d'Esperey, she lost no time in surrendering unconditionally, and the military convention regulating the conditions of the suspension of hostilities was signed on the 29th and came into force at noon next day. The Serbian Government immediately made arrangements to transfer its seat of government to Uskub from Corfu, and the power of the Navy, which at an earlier stage in the war had transported 150,000 Serbian soldiers and 10,000 horses to this place, and had maintained them there, was again utilized for the happy return of the Ministry.

Next in chronological sequence was the withdrawal of Turkey as the result of the brilliant achievements of General Allenby's troops in

Palestine. On October 20, General Townshend, who had been a prisoner in the hands of the Turks since the fall of Kut, was liberated, and proceeded to Mitylene in a motor boat under the white flag in order to inform the British Admiral in the Ægean that the Turkish Government asked that negotiations should be opened immediately. The General was brought from Mitylene to Mudros in the destroyer Forester, Commander R. T. Down. A reply was sent that if the Turkish Government sent fully accredited plenipotentiaries, Vice-Admiral the Hon. Sir Somerset A. Gough-Calthorpe, British Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, was empowered to inform them of the conditions on which the Allies would agree to a cessation of hostilities and sign an armistice. The Turkish representatives arrived at Mitylene on October 26. They included Raouff Bey, Minister of Marine, formerly captain of the Turkish cruiser Hamidieh, Rechad Hikmet Bey, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and Lieutenant-Colonel Saadullah Bey, of the Turkish General Staff, acting under authority from the Turkish Government. The delegates were conveyed from Mitylene to Mudros in the light cruiser Liverpool, Captain G. N. Tomlin, and on the 30th the conference was held and the armistice signed on board the British battleship Agamemnon, Captain F. S. Litchfield-Speer.

At noon next day, Admiral Gough-Calthorpe, who had signed the armistice on behalf of the Allies, transferred his flag from the light cruiser Foresight, Commander F. G. G. Chilton, to the battleship Superb, Captain S. H. Radcliffe, to assume command of the Allied Fleet which was to proceed through the Dardanelles in accordance with the armistice terms. Mine-sweeping was at once begun, and during the first few days of November an imposing naval force, representing Great Britain, France, Italy and Greece, gathered in Mudros Bay. The second in command of the British contingent was Rear-Admiral M. Culme-Seymour, in the Lord Nelson. The French Commanders, Vice-Admiral Amet and Rear-Admiral Lefay, were on board the battleships Diderot and Justice respectively. The Italian Rear-Admiral was on board the Vittorio Emanuele, and the Greek Rear-Admiral in the cruiser Georgius Averoff. On November 8 a landing was made in Gallipoli by six airmen, and on the 9th British troops landed on the peninsula. On November 11 it was announced that Vice-Admiral Gough-Calthorpe had been appointed High Commissioner at Constantinople for the purpose of maintaining contact with the Turkish Government during the transitional period, and of protecting British subjects and interests in Turkey. Rear-Admiral Richard Webb was appointed Assistant High Commissioner.

The preparations completed, the Fleet weighed anchor at Mudros on the morning of November 12, and arrived off the entrance to the Dardanelles about mid-day, when the ships all hoisted their largest ensigns. Escorted by aircraft, they proceeded up the Straits, the crews being much interested in the famous points at which fighting had taken place. The wrecks of the River Clyde and other vessels were

THE LAUNCH OF THE FIREFLY AT ABADAN ON THE TIGRIS.

seen. British and Indian troops occupying the forts were paraded as the vessels passed. It should be added that General Sir Henry Wilson, commanding the garrisons of Allied troops in the forts of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, was on board the battleship Temeraire. During the night, the Fleet was manœuvred in order not to arrive off Constantinople before 8 a.m. next morning. The ships proceeded during the day to the Gulf of Ismid, the British squadron anchoring first and the French, Italian and Greek squadrons arriving later.

On the morning of November 25 the Allied Fleet proceeded up the Bosphorus, into the Black Sea. Arriving off Balaklava about nine o'clock next morning, the vessels proceeded into Sebastopol independently, anchoring about noon. The Agamemnon, and one British and one French destroyer, proceeded to Odessa, and the following Allied warships were detached from the forces opposite Constantinople to carry out missions on the Black Sea coast :—The French destroyer Dehorter and the British destroyer Beaver to Sulina and Kilia ; the Italian torpedo boat Angelo Bassani and the British destroyer Nereide to Varna ; the French cruiser Ernest Renan, the British cruiser Liverpool, and the Australian destroyers Yarra and Torrens, to Novorossisk, Poti, and Batum ; and the French cruiser Jules Michelet, the British cruiser Sentinel, and two destroyers, to Trebizond, Samsun, and Sinope.

On December 5 the Admiralty announced that all the Turkish warships had surrendered to the Allies and were interned at the Golden Horn, Constantinople. They included the ex-German battle-cruiser Goeben, which was lying at Stenia, in the Bosphorus, with a Turkish crew under a Turkish admiral, Arir Pasha. The Germans had left her on November 3, taking with them all the plans of the ship and her engines, so that the Turkish crew on board could only find out details of the working of her machinery by actual inspection. The Germans also took away all fire-control and scientific instruments.

The influence of sea power in the downfall of Austria-Hungary was especially marked. She had felt severely the effect of the blockade, and her anxiety for peace at all costs was suggested by the Note addressed on September 15, 1918, to all the belligerents, including her own ally Germany, inviting them to a conference on neutral territory. For the six weeks which followed, the Allies maintained ever-increasing pressure against the Austrian coast and ports and made several attacks by small craft, the chief of which were described in Vol. XVIII., page 445. The effect of these was heightened by the seizure, on October 25, of the Hungarian port of Fiume by Croatian rebels, whose example was followed at the dockyard port of Pola. On October 28 Austria-Hungary, "without waiting the result of the other negotiations," asked

REAR-ADMIRAL RICHARD WEBB, C.B.,
Assistant High Commissioner at Constantinople.

President Wilson to negotiate peace and an immediate armistice. This was signed on November 3, and came into force on the following day.

Meantime, the Emperor had issued a manifesto promising a Federal State for each race under the monarchy, and the claims to separate nationality of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Yugo-Slavs had been recognized by President Wilson National executives were set up for the former at Prague and the latter at Agram. To the Agram Government several naval officers gave their adherence before the fall of the Empire. On October 29, the same day as that upon which the Austrian *parlementaires* appeared before the Italian lines to plead for an armistice, the Emperor and his Government telegraphed to the national council of Agram making a gift to Yugo-Slavia of the whole Austro-Hungarian Fleet, and delegates were invited to Pola and Cattaro to receive the ships. These delegates met representatives from Vienna, and on the 30th the Fleet was handed over with due ceremony. The transaction aroused bitter feeling in Italy, and evidence of this was given on October 31, by the destruction of the late Austrian flagship Viribus Unitis Engineer-



WARSHIPS OF THE ALLIES IN THE SEA OF MARMARA (FRENCH BATTLESHIPS IN FOREGROUND).

Commander Raffaele Rosetti, of the Naval Construction Corps, and Surgeon Sub-Lieutenant Raffaele Paolucci had both determined to enter Pola harbour single-handed with an explosive apparatus shaped like a torpedo, the front part including two detachable mines each with about 350 lbs. of trotyl. It was by this apparatus, at which Rosetti had been working in secret for some time, that they encompassed the destruction of the Austrian battleship.

The Yugo-Slav Admiral, Dragutin Prica, declared that no mutiny occurred in connection with the transfer of the Fleet, which was simply ceded to Yugo-Slavia by Imperial officials. The Italians, however, alleged that the Fleet was seized, and held only by "right of revolution." Concluding an article in Lord Brassey's *Naval Annual*, published on June 17, 1919, Captain C. Rey di Villarey, of the Royal Italian Navy, said: "After accepting the Naval terms of the Armistice, which included the complete surrender of many ships, and the disarmament of the rest of the fleet, on lines similar to those which were shortly afterwards imposed upon Germany, the dying Empire tried to escape the loss of the Fleet by handing it over to the Yugo-Slavs. The Allies have since taken the necessary steps to restore the enemy ships to their proper status under the conditions." The Allied and Associated Powers could not recognize any naval settlement effected between the late Imperial Government of Austria-Hungary and the Agram Government, and therefore on March 24, 1919, the ex-Austrian battleships Tegetthoff and Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand, and the light cruiser Saida, were taken over by the Italians, and arrived at Venice under escort of a squadron commanded by Admiral Cagni and the Prince of Udine.

Events in Germany, as distinct from fighting operations, which led to the conclusion of the armistice on November 11, 1918, were certainly shaped more by the situation at sea than was at first apparent. The blockade had slowly but surely done its work. Lord Jellicoe said in his book, *The Grand Fleet*, that "the decisive effect of the blockade did not become apparent until the end, when the final crash came, and it was seen how supreme an influence on the result of the war this powerful weapon had exercised." Prince Max of Baden, coming into office as Chancellor at the beginning of October, had at once begun a "peace offensive," and a month later negotiations were still proceeding. On November 5 Mr. Lloyd George announced in

the House of Commons that complete agreement had been reached as to the terms to be submitted to Germany for acceptance. Then it was that there occurred the dramatic incident which was the first real sign of inevitable defeat. The German High Sea Fleet was ordered out to endeavour to break the blockade. Even at the moment when they were talking peace, the Berlin chiefs were planning this last desperate challenge to avert their doom. The stroke was anticipated at the British Admiralty, as Sir Eric Geddes showed in his speech at the Mansion House on November 9, 1918. "Those of us who were charged with the responsibility," he said, "waited hourly for the possibility of a naval Armageddon. The whole stage was set for a great sea battle, but something went wrong. The arm that was going to try a last desperate gambling stroke was paralysed. The German Navy was ordered out and the men would not go." The revolt of the sailors started the revolutionary movement all over Germany. Kiel and Hamburg, which were known by November 7 to be in the hands of workmen and soldiers' committees, were the first places affected, but others followed their example very quickly. The origin of the outbreak in the Fleet was significant. It was subsequently revealed that the moral of the German seamen had been steadily declining ever since the severe handling they received at Jutland. As Mr. John Leyland wrote in a letter to *The Times* on June 25, 1919: "That engagement will probably be regarded by the historian as one of the decisive battles of the world, because it took the heart out of the German Fleet, which never thereafter issued to sea until it came over to the Forth to surrender. In this way the Grand Fleet was the great compelling force which drove the Germans to defeat."

In accordance with the 23rd clause of the armistice signed on November 11, 1918, the light cruiser Konigsberg put to sea on the 13th with the plenipotentiaries of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Council of the German Fleet, to meet the British naval representatives and arrange for the surrender of the vessels of the High Sea Fleet, which were to be interned and placed under the surveillance of the Allies and the United States of America. The chief of the High Sea Forces, Admiral Hipper, took part in this cruise as expert adviser for the deliberations concerning the execution of the naval conditions of the armistice. On the afternoon of November 15, off Rosyth, the British Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir David Beatty, conferred on board his flagship, the Queen Elizabeth, with Rear-Admiral Hugo von Meurer and four officers of the latter's staff, who were brought from the Konigsberg to

LANDING OF GENERAL SIR H. F. M. WILSON AT CONSTANTINOPLE.

the flagship in the British destroyer Oak. The British Commander-in-Chief refused to meet the Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates.

On November 20 the Grand Fleet was reviewed in the Firth of Forth by King George. Next morning it left harbour at daybreak and at 8.30 a.m. sighted the German Fleet, which was brought under escort into the Firth. On the return journey to port the escort of Allied vessels was disposed in two columns in single line ahead, the German ships being between the two lines. The composition of the British Fleet on this historic occasion, in the order in which the squadrons returned, was as follows :

NORTHERN LINE.

1st Light Cruiser Squadron (Rear-Admiral W. H. Cowan).—Caledon, Royalist, Galatea, Inconstant.

6th Light Cruiser Squadron (Captain B. S. Thesiger).—Calypso, Cassandra, Ceres, Caradoc.

1st Cruiser Squadron (Vice-Admiral T. D. W. Napier).—Courageous, Glorious.

5th Battle Squadron (Vice-Admiral A. C. Leveson).—Barham, Malaya, Warspite, Valiant.

6th (U.S.) Battle Squadron (Rear-Admiral H. Rodman).—New York, Texas, Arkansas, Wyoming, Florida.

2nd Battle Squadron (Vice-Admiral Sir M. de Robeck, Rear-Admiral W. E. Goodenough).—King George V., Ajax, Centurion, Erin, Agincourt, Orion, Monarch, Thunderer, Conqueror.

Admiral Sir David Beatty, Commander-in-Chief.—Fleet Flagship, Queen Elizabeth.

1st Battle-Cruiser Squadron (Rear-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver).—Repulse, Renown, Princess Royal, Tiger.

Vice-Admiral Sir William Pakenham, Commanding Battle-Cruiser Force.—Force Flagship, Lion.

4th Light Cruiser Squadron (Rear-Admiral A. F. Everett).—Calliope, Constance, Cambrian, Comus, Cordelia.

SOUTHERN LINE.

3rd Light Cruiser Squadron (Rear-Admiral A. T. Hunt).—Chatham, Southampton, Chester, Birkenhead.

2nd Light Cruiser Squadron (Rear-Admiral J. A. Fergusson).—Birmingham, Yarmouth, Sydney, Melbourne.

2nd Cruiser Squadron (Rear-Admiral E. F. Bruen).—Minotaur.

Flying Squadron (Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Phillimore).—Furious, Vindictive.

4th Battle Squadron (Vice-Admiral Sir Montague Browning, Rear-Admiral D. R. L. Nicholson).—Hercules, Neptune, St. Vincent, Colossus, Bellerophon.

1st Battle Squadron (Admiral Sir Charles Madden, Rear-Admiral W. C. M. Nicholson).—Revenge, Resolution, Canada, Royal Sovereign, Royal Oak, Emperor of India, Benbow, Iron Duke, Marlborough.

2nd Battle-Cruiser Squadron (Rear-Admiral Sir Lionel Halsey).—Australia, New Zealand, Indomitable, Inflexible.

7th Light Cruiser Squadron (Rear-Admiral G. H. Borrett).—Cleopatra, Penelope, Aurora, Undaunted.

Between the two lines of ships, six miles distant from each other, the light cruisers Cardiff, Blonde, Fearless, Boadicea and Blanche, with the armed merchant cruiser King Orry, were stationed. The first-named, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral E. S. Alexander Sinclair, was towing a kite-balloon, and her duty was to direct the movements of the German main force, and order them to proceed, if possible, at a speed of twelve knots. The other vessels acted as repeating ships. There were also present, escorting the 49 German destroyers, the Castor, flying the broad pennant of Commodore H. J. Tweedie, Commanding Grand Fleet Flotillas, and 150 British destroyers.

An hour before noon on November 21, 1918, Sir David Beatty signalled by wireless to the Germans that their flag was to be hauled down at sunset that day, and was not to be hoisted again without permission. A protest was made by Rear-Admiral von Reuter against this order as unjustifiable and contradictory to international custom, but Admiral Beatty replied that an armistice suspended hostilities, but a state of war still existed between Germany and the Allies ; under the circumstances no enemy vessel could be permitted to fly the national ensign in British ports while under custody. At 6 p.m. on the 21st, by the Commander-in-Chief's order, a service of thanksgiving was held on board the flagship, and every other ship was recommended to do the same.

As regards the delivery of German submarines —which, unlike the larger ships, were surrendered completely and not merely for internment—20 boats were delivered to the Harwich Force under Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt on November 20, and similar batches on succeeding days. The operations for the surrender were conducted by Captain A. P. Addison, R.N., who on November 26 received the following telegram from Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt : "I wish to congratulate you and your officers on the exceedingly well-organized and smart manner in which the taking over of the German submarines has been conducted. I particularly admired the fine handling of the submarines in the harbour. It impressed the Huns as much as it did me." The last of the submarines to be surrendered, the 158th, came over in the first week of April, 1919. Before being dispersed among the Allied Powers, these boats formed what was known as "U"-boat Avenue in the River Stour. It is difficult to imagine the impression which this event made on the British officers and men who were present.*

*A Naval Lieutenant, 1914–1918, by "Etienne," said : "It is impossible to describe in words the feelings of the officers and men who witnessed this amazing sight. Try and imagine what you would feel like if you were told to go to Piccadilly at 10 a.m. and see 20 man-eating tigers walk up from Hyde Park Corner and lie down in front of the Ritz to let you cut their tails off and put their heads on—and it really was so. Add to these impressions

[Speaight.

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR DAVID BEATTY, G.C.B., O.M.

To ensure that the Germans were complying in full with the terms of the armistice, an Allied Naval Commission was appointed, consisting of Vice-Admiral Sir Montague Browning (Great Britain), Rear-Admiral Robison (U.S.N.), and Rear-Admiral Grasset (France). This Commission visited Wilhelmshaven, Kiel, and other

the fact that many of those present had been hunting Fritz for over four years, in which period a man who could boast, 'I have seen six Fritzes and heard them four times on my hydrophones,' was accounted favoured by the gods, and you may get an insight into what British crews felt."



U-BOATS MOVING TO THEIR MOORINGS AT PARKESTON QUAY, HARWICH.

German bases and establishments, and sub-commissions were delegated from it to investigate particular questions such as the building of submarines, the disarmament of ships, etc.

On the day after their arrival in the Firth of Forth, the interned German ships proceeded to Scapa Flow, which had been the main base of the Grand Fleet throughout the war. In the surrender there were nine battleships, five battle-cruisers, seven light cruisers, and 49 destroyers. These numbers were short of those named in the armistice terms, and, to make up for the deficiencies, on December 4 a battleship, light cruiser and destroyer were sent to Scapa. The lists being still one short, on January 10, 1919, in place of the Mackensen, battle-cruiser, which was not finished, the battleship Baden was sent to Scapa, making altogether 74 vessels interned there. On the afternoon of Saturday, June 21, 1919, by order of the German rear-admiral, the ships were scuttled and abandoned by their crews. The vessels all foundered except the Baden, which was beached, with the three light cruisers Emden, Frankfurt and Nurnberg, two at Swanbister Bay and one off the small island of Cava. A few destroyers were also beached off Fara Island. On the same morning, the British squadrons at Scapa under Vice-Admiral Sir Sydney Fremantle had put to sea for torpedo practice, and when the Germans were observed from the patrol craft to be leaving their vessels the ships were recalled, but most of the German warships had foundered by the time they returned. The officers and men were taken into custody on board the British Fleet. Some boats from the German vessels refused to stop when ordered and were fired on, a small number of those in them being killed and wounded. On the afternoon of the 24th, Admiral Fremantle had the whole of the German officers and men paraded on the quarter-deck of the flagship Revenge and delivered to them a short address, which was translated by a Marine officer.

Addressing the Admiral he said:—"Before I send you ashore as a prisoner of war I would like to express to you my indignation at the deed which you have perpetrated and which was that of a traitor violating the action of the arrangements entered into by the Allies. The German Fleet was, in a sense, more interned than actually imprisoned. The vessels were resting here as a sort of goodwill from the German Government until Peace had been signed. It is not the first occasion on which

the Germans have violated all the decent laws and rules of the seas. We have had on many occasions to regret the fact of having to fight a nation which takes no notice of civilized laws on the high seas." To this Admiral von Reuter replied: "I take entire responsibility for what has been done. It was done at my instigation, and I feel that I was perfectly justified in doing it, and I feel sure that in similar circumstances every English sailor would have done the same."

In the House of Commons on June 24, Mr. Long said that Admiral von Reuter ordered the ships to be sunk under the impression that the armistice ended at noon on the 21st. There would be no difficulty in his circulating orders, since he was allowed to visit his own ships for the purpose of maintaining discipline, and in doing so he was conveyed in a British boat. It was incorrect that the crews of the interned ships had been changed periodically. Only sick men had been changed as circumstances arose. The total number of the care and maintenance party had been reduced from 4,700 to approximately 1,800. The First Lord added:—

As regards the question why precautions were not taken by the Admiralty to prevent the Germans scuttling their ships, the answer is that this was impossible, as the ships were interned, not surrendered, and the Admiralty had therefore no power to guard them. It is not correct that the naval advisers of the Admiralty were in favour of internment. Their views were clearly and definitely expressed at the time, but the decision of the heads of the Allied Governments was in favour of internment, and this has, of course, controlled the situation ever since and made the prevention of this scuttling impossible. I desire to deprecate attacks made in certain quarters upon Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, for which there is not the slightest justification.

Sir David Beatty also referred to the matter in a speech at Oxford on June 25, when he said that, although the fiasco could not fail to provoke a sense of humiliation in the minds of those men who strove so nobly to acquire those fruits of victory which had been taken from them, all thinking people would realize that no part of the blame could justly be attributed to the British Navy

H.M.S. QUEEN ELIZABETH,
Flying the Flag of Admiral Beatty; to the right the Destroyer Oak.

Admiral Reinhold Scheer, the late commander-in-chief of the High Sea Fleet, expressed in an interview at Weimar, quoted in *The Times* on July 1, 1919, his satisfaction at the sinking of the German Fleet at Scapa. "It would have been painful," he said, "for our good ships after sailing the seas for years to come under enemy flags. This humiliating and painful

sight is now spared us by the brave deeds in Scapa Flow. I rejoice that the stain of surrender has been wiped from the escutcheon of the German Fleet. The sinking of the ships has proved that the spirit of the fleet is not dead. This last act was true to the best traditions of the German Navy. The deed was spontaneous, and I am convinced was not ordered or inspired by Berlin." This utterance was characteristic of that curious bent in the Germans' mentality which prevented them from seeing their cruel and odious crimes from the standpoint of civilized peoples. As Admiral Sir Percy Scott said in a letter to *The Times*, opening a valve and letting a ship sink, when there was no one to stop it, and with an assurance of personal safety to the perpetrator, was considered by Admiral Scheer to be a brave action!

The late German Commander-in-Chief also took this opportunity to disseminate some insolent lies concerning the naval events in the North Sea. He disclosed the plans for a naval attack on Britain which were frustrated by the mutiny of the sailors of the fleet.

It was never our intention (Scheer affirmed), to send the High Seas Fleet out to certain death. At the beginning of the November revolt we were on the eve of undertaking a naval operation from which we promised ourselves the utmost success. This operation, after nearly two years, had at last been made possible by the discontinuance of our submarine warfare during negotiations leading up to the armistice.

For nearly two years we had been unable to undertake an operation on a large scale with the High Seas Fleet, because the fleet was essential to protect the base of our submarine warfare, and because while our submarine warfare was carried on, we lacked all strategic flank protection for a long-distance naval operation. Our fleet attack could proceed only from the narrow Wet Triangle behind Heligoland. To this base alone we were always forced to return. An operation of the High Seas Fleet against any point on the British coast left both our flanks exposed.

The Battle of Jutland proved that we were not afraid of encountering the British Grand Fleet on a fair field. In an operation against the British coast our strategic left flank was always exposed to attack by British naval forces coming from the Channel and our right flank to attack from the north.

With the suspension of submarine warfare this un-



SCAPA FLOW.



GERMAN DESTROYERS SCUTTLED AT SCAPA.

favourable strategic situation suddenly changed. We now had plenty of submarines to use for the flank protection of our High Seas Fleet. With our hands thus freed we decided at the beginning of November that our fleet should strike a hard, perhaps a decisive, blow. We decided that while our armies were stubbornly and heroically resisting, our fleet could not remain idle. Our plan offered every chance of success. It was not one to send the High Seas Fleet out to death, but to attack the coast of England in the direction of the mouth of the Thames, employing submarines as a flank protection.

By this plan we hoped to draw the British Grand Fleet out of its Scottish lair down towards the mouth of the Thames to give us battle, in which case the Grand Fleet would have run into our flanking submarines. Our plan carefully worked out, offered the certainty of success if the Grand Fleet came out. The one chance of failure, we thought, was that the British Fleet might not be coaxed out by our Channel attack.

No good purpose would be served by refuting these suggestions in detail, but it may be said that such a plan as that described by the German Admiral had been taken into account

THE SCUTTLED HINDENBURG.



THE NURNBERG SINKING.

by the British Navy and preparations made accordingly. Why our enemies never thought of attempting it until too late Admiral Scheer does not explain. A reasen may be found, however, in the readiness, efficiency and devotion to duty of the Grand Fleet, exhibited all through the war, and particularly at Jutland. Referring to this Fleet, Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon has said: "There it lay in the North Sea at Scapa, with every muscle strained and nerve vibrating. It was like a spear poised in the hand of a giant ready to be hurled at the wild beast offending humanity should he venture from his den. Once he crawled out, and Lord Jellicoe's great victory of Jutland dealt him a blow which sent him snarling back with many wounds, which, eventually festering from inactivity and broken bones and lowered pride, led to his dishonourable and inglorious end."

The British Navy, in fact, had once more been the mainstay of civilization and the foundation of all the Allied efforts. Writing in *The Times* American number on July 4, 1919, Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the United States Navy, said that the naval operations of the war justified again the old principles that underlie the control of the seas.



THE SEYDLITZ, ONE OF THE LARGEST GERMAN BATTLE-CRUISERS SUNK AT SCAPA.

"Naval power," he said, "is just as effective if it prevents the enemy from coming out as if it were victorious in actual battle." There could be no better concluding word for this chapter than that given by King George in his message to the First Lord of the Admiralty on armistice day :—

"Now that the last and most formidable of our enemies has acknowledged the triumph of the Allied arms on behalf of right and justice, I wish to express my praise and thankfulness to the officers and men of the Royal Navy and Marines, with their comrades of the fleet auxiliaries and mercantile marine, who for more than four years have kept open the seas, protected our shores, and given us safety.

"Ever since that fateful Fourth of August, 1914, I have remained stedfast in my confidence that, whether fortune frowned or smiled, the Royal Navy would once more prove the sure shield of the British Empire in the hour of trial. Never in its history has the Royal Navy, with God's help, done greater things for us, nor better sustained its old glories and the chivalry of the seas.

"With full and grateful hearts the peoples of the British Empire salute the White, the Red, and the Blue Ensigns, and those who have given their lives for the Flag. I am proud to have served in the Navy. I am prouder still to be its Head on this memorable day."

CHAPTER CCCIII.

FISHERMEN AND THE WAR (III.).

THE HAZARDS OF MINES—DEMOBILIZING FISHING VESSELS—AN ADMIRAL'S TRIBUTE TO FISHERMEN STORIES OF HEROISM AND RESOURCE—THE RESTRICTION OF FISHING AREAS—ABNORMAL EARNINGS—A GREAT CHANGE AT BILLINGSGATE—IMPERFECT STATISTICS.

THE hard and dangerous work of the fishermen* continued long after the Armistice was signed and peace returned. To the original body of toilers of the deep who had served so well in minesweeping, patrol and escort work men from other classes had been added, and all shared in the perils of clearing the seas of the mines which infested them. Fishermen remained peculiarly liable to the hazards of explosion, for while big craft could keep to defined routes, the trawler, drifter, smack, and sweeper were forced by the nature of their duties to operate in unsafe areas. This compulsion involved unavoidable risks, and so it happened that fine vessels were lost with all hands. Very soon after the Armistice was concluded two trawlers were mined while fishing off the Tyne. These were the Ethelwulf and the T. W. Mould, each carrying a crew of ten. In the middle of a December night terrific sheets of flame were seen and loud explosions were heard, and it became known that the little ships had been blown up by mines and that the twenty men had perished. Though these craft were fishing they still carried members of the Royal Naval Reserve, two gunners and a wireless operator being lost with the rest. This tragedy, a mere after-the-war episode which passed almost without public notice, made 18 wives widows and more than 60 young children orphans. It was part of the price that was somewhat grudgingly paid by the public for their fish.

* *See* Chapters CXXI. and CLXXII.

The North Sea, which had been the danger-centre throughout the war, continued to be the area of greatest danger and of minesweeping enterprise, for vast fields of mines remained to be cleared and to this colossal task was added the work of dealing with drifting mines everywhere. As early as possible regular fishermen were released so that they might return to their own industry, and steam trawlers and drifters were set free for the same purpose. Minesweeping then became largely a voluntary undertaking, and as the officers and men engaged in it were exposed to risks which other ratings were no longer called upon to bear a special rate of pay and treatment was created. As extra pay officers of all ranks and service denominations received £4 weekly, chief petty officers and petty officers £2 10s., and all other ratings £2. For every German mine that was destroyed £10 was paid, and £1 for every British moored mine, the total amount earned being pooled amongst officers and men alike. The new organization became known as the Mine Clearance Service.

At the end of January, 1919, the total number of trawlers to be returned to owners was 1,175, and of drifters 1,350. The demobilizing, reconditioning and returning of the vessels was at the rate of between 80 and 100 trawlers and between 130 and 150 drifters a month, consequently about twelve months were needed to carry out the scheme. The demobilization came as a most welcome relief to fishermen who had been serving abroad for prolonged periods

without leave. The activity and success of minesweepers was shown by the fact that the Humber sweepers alone accounted for 3,000 enemy mines during the war, and that the Humber authorities had supplied to the mine-sweeping services no fewer than 800 trawlers and 10,000 men. And what applied to the great Yorkshire port related to other bases on the East Coast and around the British Isles generally.

In addition to the immense fleet of small craft which the Admiralty had acquired for sweeping and other purposes great numbers had been specially constructed for the work, and at the end of hostilities these were put on the market and disposed of. While not perfect for fishing needs, these handy ships served a very useful purpose, in view of the heavy calls on the resources of shipbuilding yards. Some of the demobilized vessels were of necessity returned the worse for wear and far less fit than previously to carry out the hard work of deep sea fishing, but the Admiralty could not be accused of niggardliness in connexion with a matter that was obviously not easy of adjustment. As an illustration it may be mentioned that a steamer which had been taken over was returned to the owners with the option of an allowance of more than £6,000 to put her in order again—she had been considerably altered for naval purposes—or of letting her be reconditioned by the authorities. This vessel was 20 years old, but was still good for much strenuous work in North Sea trawling. In some instances trawlers and drifters which had been equipped with wireless apparatus were returned to their owners with this valuable auxiliary, so that, as a result of the war, British fishing vessels were supplied with a needed equipment which had been provided for German trawlers in the days of peace.

Many official tributes were paid to the work of fishermen in war time, and specially warm praise was given to them by officers who had had uncommonly good opportunities of estimating the value of their work. "I have seen our fishermen calm and collected when the ship was sinking beneath our feet," said Rear-Admiral B. M. Chambers, in a public address. "I have seen them unmoved when the parting of a hawser allowed the craft in which we were to be swept down between two little islands over the rocks; I have seen them come into harbour with one half of a ship, but I have never seen them give



[Official photograph

A DRIFTER FLEET AT SEA.

MINE-SWEEPERS AT WORK.

Showing the explosion of a mine caught in the sweep.

trouble. I have never seen them give trouble even when they knew the other man was making something like a fortune with the crazy old craft the Admiralty had not thought good enough to pre-empt, while their beautiful new craft had been taken up on strict business lines, and they were making just enough to keep the home together. . . . The fisherman in my opinion is a rare good sort."

Innumerable stories became known of the heroism and devotion of these men to whom the Navy and the country owed so much. Two old-time fishermen, Skippers Watt and Crisp, were awarded the Victoria Cross, Crisp's honour being posthumous; and lesser, but high, distinctions were conferred upon a large number of the sweepers, patrollers and escorters who either came from the fishing community or worked with it. In connexion with armed trawlers particularly, some rousing tales were

told, and examples of them may be given as showing what was being constantly done by these little vessels and their crews. The deeds were reminiscent of the old days of danger on the Dogger.

A trawler lad was in a vessel that had been mined, and like the rest of the crew he was struggling in the water. He had no lifebelt, but he kept cool and did his best to help his comrades to remain afloat. Near him was a seaman, face downward, and the lad turned him over, so that he could breathe, but the seaman was already dead. The youngster then turned his attention to a deck hand who was not able to swim and was collapsing, and he was the undoubted means of saving his life.

A ship had been mined in a dangerous area where at any moment any other vessel might have met with the same fate, but despite this peril the officer commanding a trawler lashed her to the doomed craft and managed to remove all the wounded to his own ship. This was a very fine achievement and added to the renown which this unnamed officer had won, for he had already brought in 256 survivors from no fewer than eight vessels which had been mined in his area. These brief details indicate how great the danger was that constantly menaced all who were engaged in sweeping and otherwise in mined areas. There were North Sea fishermen who had been in vessel after vessel that was mined, and still undauntedly went about their business of clearing the seas of the pests to navigation, and there was a Lowestoft fisherman who had been in five torpedoed ships.

There was another case of a torpedoed steamer which was sinking and had been abandoned by the crew. A trawler deck hand heard that three men were still in the vessel, and, determined that they should not perish without some attempt at least being made to save them, he insisted on boarding her. His noble purpose was not fully realized, but in part he was successful, for he rescued one man from under a heap of wreckage, barely managing to escape with his own life.

On one occasion when a seaplane had fallen into the sea a trawler came up, just in time to find that the exhausted pilot and observer were clinging to the upturned floats. True to the tradition of the North Sea, that life was the first thing to be saved, these trawlermen rescued the two men, then they set to work to try to salve the machine. In this effort the wide experience of handling complicated fishing gear undoubtedly proved helpful. Difficult though the task was, and it was made harder by a rough sea, the crew succeeded in passing a wire round the wrecked seaplane, which was under water. To them the job was very much like getting the well-filled trawl on board in bad weather, and when at length they hoisted the wrecked seaplane on to their little vessel's rail it must have been a repetition of many a hoisting inboard of a promising cod-end, packed with fish. The enterprise and resourcefulness of these trawlermen was rewarded by the safe taking of the seaplane into port, where it was found that the engine was intact.

A steamer was attacked by a submarine on the surface, and this was observed by a trawler which was escorting another steamer. Ordering her convoy to proceed in a given direction the trawler attacked the enemy and soon had the range so accurately that a shell caused dense black smoke to rise from the U-boat, which instantly ceased fire and disappeared. By this prompt help the steamer was saved and the triumphant trawler resumed her task of convoying. This was a very good example of the fearless way in which trawlermen, in their stout little vessels, met the constant peril of the submarine and made their craft and themselves particularly dreaded by the Germans, who had been guilty of so many cowardly crimes against fishermen throughout the war, and especially in its earlier stages.

A typical desperate encounter between a German submarine and British trawlers became known. Two armed trawlers, the Mannofield, Skipper Hume, and the Maurice, Skipper Cook, were accompanied by a third trawler, which was without guns, when a U-boat opened fire upon them at a distance of two miles and then bore rapidly down upon the vessels. Instantly the two armed trawlers opened a smart fire and an hour's fight went on. By that time one of the plucky trawlers had been hit, the wheelhouse and funnel had been carried away, and the chief engineer and the gunner had been wounded. For another hour the unequal fight continued. In the course of it the submarine fired not fewer than 200 shells. The Maurice fired 36 and her skipper was confident that both armed trawlers got in a hit, as the enemy broke off the engagement and steamed away. The Mannofield had been so severely damaged that her cabin was full of water up to the deck, but the courage and resourcefulness of her crew

resulted in her safe arrival in harbour, with her two companions, after covering a distance of 130 miles. This was a fine little affair of the sea, one of many such—and there were many as fine of which no one was left to tell the story. In recognition of their bravery Hume and Cook were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, the Distinguished Service Medal being conferred upon Leading Deck Hand J. W. Hambling, of the Mannofield, and Deck Hand G. Tulk, of the Maurice.

Even at an early stage of the war the areas in which fishermen were allowed to carry on their work were enormously restricted, and the fisherman being what he was such stringent orders as came into force were by no means unnecessary. Given a free hand he would readily have ventured into the most hazardous regions—as indeed he often did, in spite of the law. With the exception of an area between Cromer on the Norfolk coast and Kinnaird Head, Aberdeenshire, the whole of the North Sea was closed to British fishermen, the Channel was similarly barred as far as Portland, and the entire West coast of Scotland was a forbidden region, as well as the North coast of Ireland. Compared with pre-war freedom the fisherman's scope was crippled, yet in view of the immense drain on his class and craft there was still left to him ample room for the continuance of his calling, and taken altogether he did wonderfully well not only for his country but also for himself. Even some of the fisher lads made wages which compared favourably with the incomes of affluent munition youths. A Grimsby police court case showed that two lads of 17 years, who were fined for not rejoining their vessel, had in one trip of eight days made £10 each, this sum being made up of their wages and a bonus on the vessel's catch. Afterwards, when restrictions were relaxed, a lad who had made the Faröe voyage, and had been absent from port only twelve days, took as his share of the £4,000 which the vessel's catch realized the comfortable sum of £32, the skipper's share being no less than £400.

The fishermen who had been engaged in trawling, drifting and lining maintained their abnormal earnings, and there were numerous cases of skippers and others who were on the share system, and so reaped an assured part of the sea's wonderful harvest, securing fortunes in two or three years and retiring upon them. On the other hand, there were many fishers who did not get such a proportion of the exceptional prosperity and had to be content with a bare living, while still risking all the added dangers of the deep arising from mines and submarines.

A romantic instance of the luck of fishing was that of the Grimsby steam trawler Battle Abbey. Sunk through collision in the Humber



[Aerial photograph.

A TORPEDOED SHIP ON FIRE SINKING BY THE BOWS.

she lay at the bottom of the river for many months, seemingly a hopeless wreck, but with great difficulty she was salved by a hopeful buyer who made her serviceable at considerable expense. By that time two years had passed and now the Battle Abbey, a fine name in itself,

was abandoned in favour of the Ensign. The resurrected steamboat went forth, and the result of her first venture was a catch which realized the large sum of £4,888, establishing a Grimsby record in earnings for her owners and the skipper and the mate. The official settling table showed that the skipper received £471 8s. 9½d. and the mate £385 14s. 7¾d., all for three weeks' work. This was by no means an isolated case of extraordinary profit made by single trips, there were many such strokes of good fortune, and never in the history of fishing had there been such great success. A drifter working from a Scottish port, Peterhead, earned more than £4,000 during the 1918 season, motor boats were headed by one at the same port, which scored the amazing sum, for such a craft, of £4,400, while even sailing boats ranged from £860 to £2,150. It was believed that the fishing would have been even more profitable if influenza had not raged. The prevalence of this disease and the calls of the war greatly affected the man-power available for the fishing and some of the small yawls had crews of old men.

The great change which the war had brought about in the fishing industry was emphasized at Billingsgate early in May, 1919, when the carrier Quickly arrived at the market direct from the North Sea. She was the first of these famous little ships to come to Billingsgate since the early days of hostilities, and she reached a market where the old conditions had entirely changed. Labour troubles arose and were not settled for a day, then the cargo of about 26 tons of fish was marketed and speedily sold, but before that was done the "shorers"—the men who carry the trunks of fish from the steamer to the auction stands—had received a retainer of 3s. 4d. a day, in addition to 6d. per trunk. This payment was a very great advance on pre-war rates, which averaged between 2d. and 3d. per trunk, and there was no retaining fee.

The coming of the Quickly was a sign of the resumption of the fleeting system on the North Sea, but that plan was being employed again with much caution, for not even the most experienced owners could do more than guess at the probable developments of the industry and the best means of getting and disposing of the fish. Though six months had passed since the signing of the Armistice, yet only one of the four fleets which had been working the North Sea Banks had resumed operations. This fleet was of very small dimensions, ranging from 12 to 17 vessels, less than half the number constituting a pre-war fleet. Its earlier operations were conducted about 100 miles from the English coast and were under the direction, as Admiral of the Fleet, of Skipper Foot, a veteran fisherman 74 years of age. Mines occasionally came up with the fish, and as the present writer was leaving the fleet after a visit one of the vessels close by brought up a mine in her trawl. The gear was instantly cut away, a practice followed by men who knew from long experience what the perils of the mines were. A fine Grimsby trawler, homeward bound with 500 boxes of fish, was never heard of, and doubtless struck a mine. The trawlers and "cutters" carried rifles and ammunition for use against mines when seen or brought up, but trawled mines mostly went back to the bottom untouched.

A remarkable circumstance in connexion with fishermen was that no precise and comprehensive statistics were published of their war work. From time to time statements were made in letters and speeches which contained figures, but there was nothing like a clear and complete return of the total number of actual fishermen engaged and the number of actual fishing vessels. At the end of 1918, however, the President of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries issued a letter of Christmas greeting in which he said that there had been no readier volunteers than fishermen and that no industry had contributed a larger number of men to the fighting forces. The President added that 3,000 steam fishing vessels had been requisitioned for service in the war and chiefly manned by fishermen, to whose invaluable help he paid a warm tribute. The number of fishing vessels lost through enemy action was 672 and 416 men had lost their lives.

To these totals there were to be added the lives and vessels lost through other means than active enemy action, many fishing vessels and fishermen being lost through mines, which everywhere remained a constant peril and one which often enough no human foresight could avert.

CHAPTER CCCIV.

AUXILIARY PATROLS.

SMALL CRAFT AND THEIR PERSONNEL—THE QUEEN ALEXANDRA—THE DOVER PATROL—THE NORTH CHANNEL PATROL—THE PLAN OF PATROLLING—MOTOR LAUNCHES—ORGANIZATION OF M.L.'S—THE HYDROPHONE—A SEAPLANE ATTACK—THE BLACK DEEP—THE LONGING FOR THE "OLD GAME."

IN addition to what might well be called the Grand Patrols, those splendid naval units on whose incessant vigilance and resource so much depended, a vast fleet of small craft of various sorts and capabilities was organized into Auxiliary Patrols. These employed men of all classes who were not sailors by profession, but who, with some knowledge of the sea and ships, unhesitatingly responded to their country's call and became valued and most useful members of the Navy.

Only a maritime nation like the British could have brought into being the wondrous assortment of vessels with which the Auxiliary Patrol work was done. No type seemed too strange, nor age too great, to incorporate in the all-embracing scheme of the Auxiliaries. The rolling "rabbit boat" which had plied between Ostend and London River became a familiar sort of patrol in the Northern mists, and the cruising hospital steamer of the North Sea fishing fleets was transformed into a most successful national service vessel.

An instance of the personal generosity which characterized the determination of Englishmen to win the war was that of Sir Charles E. H. Chadwyck-Healey, Bart. On behalf of the Council of the Royal National Mission to Deep Sea Fishermen Sir William F. A. Archibald, the Chairman, put at his disposal the fine hospital steamer Queen Alexandra, which was run and maintained by Sir Charles at his own expense for nearly the whole period of the war and some time afterwards, he himself being in command as captain, R.N.R. This little ship discharged with perfect success many varied tasks, and in none was she more successful than in executing cross-Channel duties which had been assigned to her. Throughout her commission she carried most of her original North Sea crew, with her old skipper—Shipp—ranking as a sub-lieutenant, R.N.V.R., and Surgeon-Lieutenant F. W. Willway, R.N.V.R., the Society's Home Superintendent, as a surgeon.

A comprehensive understanding of the work of patrols was given by the facts relating to the Dover Patrol, on which a very heavy burden was thrown by the war. The trawler and drifter patrol consisted of 256 vessels. The total casualties in the mine-sweeping patrol from mining, bombing and collision were 38 vessels. More than 600 miles were swept daily by the patrol vessels. In addition to these craft 25 motor launches were used, 14 of these being damaged by shell fire, collision and other causes. Four of the little launches were total losses, but the remaining ten were salved.

Those plain facts showed to some extent the nature of the Dover Patrol's war services; but an even clearer indication was given by the remarkable figures of merchant ships which safely passed through the dangerous zone on which the Germans concentrated so much of their desperate attention. From August 5, 1914, to November 11, 1918, no fewer than 62,400 merchant ships passed northward;



THE QUEEN ALEXANDRA AS A HOSPITAL SHIP.

26,500 passed westward, and 36,200 passed through the Downs across the Channel, making the truly impressive total of 125,100. Out of that enormous fleet, such was the vigilance and courage of the Dover Patrol, only 73 ships were lost through various causes—mines, torpedoes, bombs, aircraft and gunfire.

During the whole of the time the Dover Patrol was in existence from 10,000 to 15,000 men were engaged. There were from 1,000 to 1,200 ratings in the mine-sweeping patrol, and of these brave men no fewer than 295 were killed. English sweepers destroyed 1,507 German mines in the Dover area, and French sweepers destroyed 427.

The nation was not slow to appreciate the heroism and endurance of the officers and men of this Patrol when the facts were published, and a prompt and generous response was made to appeals on behalf of a Dover Patrol War Memorial—a monument which was to perpetuate not only the devotion of our own men, but was also to be a tribute to the sailors of France and the United States, who had shared with them the perils of an uncommonly dangerous sea.

Such was the glorious record of the Dover Patrol, a record which was in every way maintained by the rest of the patrols around the British coasts.

The North Channel Patrol carried out work which the Commodore, in a farewell message, described as not only praiseworthy but also of remarkable interest. The majority of the larger and more important ships had passed through the area in convoys, of which there had been 71 homeward and 58 outward. More than 800,000 troops had been carried by the homeward convoys, and in no case had there been a successful enemy submarine attack on these convoys in the area. This immunity from attack had been enjoyed also by the outward convoys. The steamship Indore was torpedoed, but through the prompt help of the Larne Auxiliary Patrol vessels and tugs she was successfully beached in Loch Indail and salved. During the Commodore's command no men-of-war or merchant vessels, either in convoy or under individual escort, had been sunk by enemy action in the area. There had been two completely successful attacks on the enemy in the area, and about six attacks which resulted in the enemy being damaged, while thirteen other attacks were delivered which were "commendable for their promptness and good cooperation." These enterprises, if not attended with the entire success which was hoped for, at least kept the submarines under and prevented them from operating.

Special interest attached to the two great Patrols which have been mentioned, embracing, as they did, the important North Channel and the still more important Dover Straits, two narrow waterways which witnessed some of the most stirring scenes of the naval warfare, and in connexion with which there was inces-

sant work of the most momentous and hazardous description.

For patrol work, as it was extensively conducted by swarms of small vessels, a system was adopted which was a tribute to the vast resources and ability of the Navy and a lasting menace to all forms of German craft that tried to operate openly or by stealth. A given area of sea was charted into squares of three miles, an area being divided into, say, 54 such squares, numbers running consecutively from one to 54. Squares from one to six and 49 to 54 contained patrol vessels, squares seven to 12 and 43 to 48 hydrophone vessels, and other squares hydrophone vessels and patrol vessels alternatively, so that over a great space of water there was ceaseless vigilance by officers and men in craft against which enemy vessels, especially those operating under water, had but the poorest chance of success. In connexion with submarines especially, these patrol arrangements proved of incalculable value, and many a lurking German pest, with all hands, met a terrible but well-deserved end. The time came when a U-boat commander realized that he was doomed, sooner or later, when he once entered a narrow waterway or other area where this system of patrol was in full operation. In this work again the fisherman proved his uncommon value because of his exceptional knowledge of the North Sea and other neighbouring seas and of various types of fishing craft.

In such days as those which quickly followed the outbreak of war, when all the chivalry of the sea went by the board so far as Germans were concerned, every trick and device that a degraded and fearful enemy could conceive was adopted. Naval officers themselves were the readiest to admit their want of some of that knowledge which was peculiar to fishermen and other auxiliaries, and so it not seldom happened that the captain of a warship would call on to the bridge a fisherman member of the crew to identify a vessel which had aroused suspicion in the purely naval mind, but was instantly properly classed by the fisherman as a craft from his own or some other port known to him.

The patrol work which was carried out was done under the most severe conditions, including all imaginable forms of bad weather and hindrances to navigation, and much of it was accomplished successfully because of the thorough understanding skippers had of their craft, trawlers and drifters in which they had safely encountered many dangers of the deep in times of peace.

A great part of the general patrol work of the Auxiliary Patrol was done by the motor launches, which became famous as the "M.L.'s." These little vessels, conceived as they were in haste, and born to ridicule, yet fully justified their existence and performed tasks which it was reasonable to suppose they could not accomplish. There was the greatest possible contrast between these fragile and shoddy looking craft and the stout, fine, seaworthy trawlers and

MEN OF AN AUXILIARY PATROL COLLECTING MINES WASHED ASHORE.

MOTOR LAUNCHES LYING ALONGSIDE AT COLOGNE DURING THE ARMISTICE.

drifters with which so much of the patrol work was carried out. An opprobrious nickname was given to the launches, which were called the navy of a certain music hall comedian, to the great indignation of the newly fledged "subs" who were then training at Southampton.

America was largely responsible for the building of the motor launches, which were sent over the Atlantic in considerable numbers The earlier examples developed defects which had to be remedied before really effective work could be done with the craft, and to the last they maintained their reputation as hungry consumers of petrol. An almost unconscionable quantity of the spirit was necessary to develop the maximum speed of 20 knots, and even the ordinary cruising rate required a supply which seemed quite disproportionate to the size and weight of the vessel. In one respect, however, these launches were in favour, and that was because of the spaciousness of their cabin accommodation. The quarters for the lieutenant commanding and his "sub" were light, airy and ample, far more so than the corresponding accommodation in many of the larger craft which were engaged upon the same class of work. In another respect also the launches were in favour, for by reason of their limited size and 6 ft. draught they were able to go, with considerably less risk than trawlers or drifters, amongst, and if need be, over, our own minefields, and use was invariably made of them on such occasions.

The ridicule referred to had a short life, and it did not need the Zeebrugge affair to prove how invaluable the launches could be and how splendidly their officers and men could rise to any occasion and what heroic sacrifices they could make. After Zeebrugge, at any rate, gibes at the "M.L.'s" were heard no more, for the average M.L. officer of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, generally a yachtsman of sorts before the war, soon fell into the Service way of carrying on, and quickly proved that he had a real aptitude for the special kind of work which he had been called upon to do. In its particular way the knowledge which many of these ex-yachtsmen possessed of shallow inshore waters was as useful as the peculiar familiarity of the deep sea fisherman with his own haunts.

The tasks that M.L.'s were detailed to carry out were many and varied, but the principal purpose for which they were commissioned was anti-submarine patrolling, and Admiralty records showed that notwithstanding the great handicap of being too small and unable to keep

the sea in bad weather, their functions were performed with consistent credit.

For patrol purposes the M.L.'s were usually organized in divisions and sub-divisions, each division being under the command of its senior officer for the time being. Weather permitting one division would be at sea and remain there until relieved by its opposite number. The sight of a relieving division steaming out in line ahead, and in what always appeared to be a very leisurely speed to the man who was anxiously awaiting relief, was an uncommonly welcome one, especially in winter, when there had been, as there often was, three or four days and nights of incessant rolling, pitching, twisting and jumping, and the impatience was accentuated if the relief happened to be late. The uncomfortable motion of the little vessels was one of the greatest of the minor hardships which those who served in them were compelled to endure.

The division having reached its patrol area, or headquarters, the senior officer would report to the Senior Officer Patrols, usually a commander aboard a destroyer or torpedo boat, who would issue his orders for the day. Nine times out of ten the order would be "Patrol independently," but occasionally this was varied.

At one period, before our own minefields became as closely placed as they were in 1918, it was a standing order that every vessel on patrol—destroyer, torpedo boat, trawler, drifter or motor launch—was to tow her single sweep, and as a result of this more or less casual sweeping many German mines went up, thus disclosing the approximate locality of enemy "nests." Incidentally many a patrol's larder was replenished with fine fat cod or other welcome fish, stunned by the concussion and discovered floating belly upward on the surface of the sea.

At many bases where the patrols worked in deep or comparatively deep water, the hydrophone was a most important adjunct, and a great deal of time was spent in listening for the sound of the submarine's electric motors, easily distinguishable, with practice, from other engine noises. There were not a few instances of German submarines whose destruction could be credited to the hydrophone.

The value of this most helpful detective instrument was naturally minimized by the fact that the enemy's submarines were also fitted with hydrophones, thus making it impossible to approach him without his knowledge.

DROPPING DEPTH CHARGES ON SUBMARINES;
"Stand by to release charge."

In the shallow waters of the North Sea the hydrophone was of very limited value; but in those regions it was necessary to depend on the ear for warning of the approach of Germans in another sort of craft—those of the air. Seaplanes and aeroplanes from the Belgian Coast were fairly frequent visitors during 1917 and the early months of 1918, and crews of M.L.'s could always anticipate the possibility of a fight with a seaplane.

The first instance of a seaplane attacking a motor launch occurred early in 1917. The 13 pr. Vickers gun had been removed to make way for a high angle 3 pr. Hotchkiss, and for a time most of the M.L.'s were without a gun of any description. On that occasion a division of four launches was under way near the Kentish Knock light vessel when a seaplane was seen approaching from the direction of Harwich, and was accordingly assumed to be a British machine. M.L. 118 was leading the division, and was the only launch armed with the high-angle gun. The identity of the aircraft was not long in doubt, for, approaching head on, thus preventing his distinguishing marks from being seen, he dropped two bombs which fell one on each side of the M.L., so close that her deck was splashed by the spray arising from the explosion. Lieutenant P. B. Wodehouse, R.N.V.R., who was in command of the launch, quickly cleared his gun away and fired a round of shrapnel sufficiently near to the enemy to drive him off.

The shipping in the Black Deep was a constant attraction to the German airmen, who usually came over with three seaplanes and two land machines to carry on their craven work of bombing merchantmen. These attentions became so persistent that a monitor, armed with 6-inch high-angle guns, was detailed to escort the shipping up and down that particular channel.

Our own seaplanes worked in conjunction with the patrols as much as possible, and many important messages were received from them as to the whereabouts of submarines. The usual method of communication during the last few months of hostilities was by dropping a message written on a board attached to a tricolour float, something like a Chinese lantern, the means of signalling from seaplanes having been found too uncertain.

The work of these lesser patrols proved arduous and exacting, but it was carried out in that fine spirit which characterized all branches of the Navy. Glad though most of the officers and men of the M.L.'s were to return to civil life and to resuscitate professional or business connexions which had suffered grievously because of their absence, yet the inevitable reaction came, the longing returned to be again afloat and accepting such adventure as the day produced. The matter was well summed up six months after hostilities ceased by a demobilized M.L. officer, who wrote:—"Ask an M.L. officer who got all the 'dirty' jobs on patrol what he thinks! Nowadays he will probably smile as he recalls the days when he 'groused' at getting all the 'dirty' jobs to do, but then it was the thing to grouse. Everybody groused, and curiously enough nearly everybody had something different to grouse about—but most of them would give a good deal to be back at the old game now."

BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY.

CHAPTER CCCV.

THE AMERICAN CAMPAIGN 1918

CANTIGNY ACTION—BELLEAU WOOD—BATTLE OF CHATEAU THIERRY—MARNE DEFENCES—SOISSONS-MARNE OFFENSIVE—MARNE-VESLE ADVANCE—AMERICANS CROSS THE OURCQ—JUVIGNY—ST. MIHIEL—ARGONNE-MEUSE DRIVE—KRIEMHILDE LINE—BEGINNING OF THE END—SITUATION AT ARMISTICE.

IT was at the taking of Cantigny by the 28th Infantry Regiment of the 1st Division on May 28, 1918, that the Germans, looking out across the verdant open country then smothered with the smoke of a creeping-barrage fire, first saw from the heights of the village the sturdy American men in full battle formation and array. Over a year had passed since America declared war. It had been a year well spent in raising a gigantic army from the youth of America, of transporting it fully equipped overseas to France, and of instructing and training it in quiet and appropriate sectors on the western front. There had been a bitter local fight at Seicheprey, beneath the frowning blackness of Mont Sec, in the Toul area. There had been raids and gas attacks north of Luneville in the Baccarat zone. Around Verdun and on the British front the Germans had experienced to their cost that impetuosity, that anxiety to prove their mettle in combat, which always marked the efforts of the Americans. Chasing the enemy out of "No Man's land," converting the most sombre of sectors into the noisiest of furies, ever alert and ever quick to learn the great game of war, the Americans astonished all by their reckless audacity, their enquiring assurance and the much more valuable military asset of accurate long-distance rifle fire. The French, in consternation at the daring willingness to take a chance with death which the Americans showed in all sectors, posted up many warnings quaintly worded, in the front-line villages. "If you want to be killed, walk down this street," "Fritz in his balloon can see you, so keep your head down," these and many other admonitions were addressed to the curious, but they had little effect. The Americans had come to Europe to fight and to see all that could be seen; the war to them possessed much of the attractiveness of a great adventure and a great tour, and they chafed at any restraints. Young, enthusiastic, willing to take any risks, they talked war, lived war and dreamt war. They were soon to be immersed in the sterner side of battle.

Meanwhile the organizing genius of America, transplanted back to Europe, had constructed a complete service of supplies replete with docks, warehouses and railways from the ports of Bordeaux, St. Nazaire and Brest, which, had the Channel ports ever fallen to the enemy, would have served as the Allied armies' main line of communication from the sea. Of all the accomplishments of the Americans in France this was one of the greatest, a revelation in point of speed, thoroughness and conception.

Then came Cantigny, the first blow. The 1st Division, fresh from the Toul training sector, had relieved the 45th French African Division



AMERICAN OPERATIONS IN THE MARNE SECTOR.

The figures and arrows indicate the American divisions and their sectors in the Marne Soissons fighting of July, 1918, and the advances of the 32nd Division at Juvigny in August, 1918, and of the 2nd Division at Somme Py in October, 1918. The black line shows the front on July 15, 1918, and the dotted line, the advance made by the Germans in their offensive.

from north of Mesnil St. Georges to just north of Cantigny in that sector, facing Montdidier and south of Amiens, where the undulating country broken here and there with sparse woods afforded the opportunity for a fierce defence after the open vastness of the Somme valley. They had, after the Amiens drive settled down into the game of exchanging shells across the green, stood up to a daily bombardment of every kind of cannon. At last the chance, welcome after much sitting in trenches. Cantigny, small but proud on its green eminence, overlooking with a mouth of fire the whole countryside, was to be taken. Never did men rise so eagerly out of trenches to go forward than those Americans. Through

GOING "OVER THE TOP" AT CANTIGNY.

gas, through a cloud of machine-gun bullets, following close behind their barrage they steadily ascended the slopes of the village and sheltered themselves in the cemetery when the village was theirs. Cantigny was a small isolated action with little immediate significance. But the village was the first ever captured by American troops in Europe, and the lesson that the Germans learned was the first they had received from the youth of America.

A few days later and the Americans, scenting battle with all the eagerness of untried and expectant troops, from General Pershing himself down to the soldiers of the line, were turning their faces towards the Marne. They had heard how the Germans in a sudden drive, for which the Allies were totally unprepared, had driven some resting British and French divisions from the shell-strewn heights of the Chemin des Dames to the green coolness of the valley of the Marne. The opposition to the Germans had faded away in face of the tremendous impetus which their drive had gained, and they had moved more with the assurance of a procession than with the fluctuating fortunes of troops in action. The *moral* of the troops opposing them was naturally very low when the Americans of the 2nd Division, composed of one brigade of marines, the 5th and 6th Regiments, and another brigade of infantry, the 9th and 23rd Regiments, appeared on the scene. They had arrived at Meaux on the last day of May. A city choked with refugees and the wounded, with all the confusing transport of war, greeted them. The next evening only a thin line of French infantry, still holding out with all the valour of their race, stood between them and the Germans. The enemy with diminishing speed and evaporating enthusiasm were seeking to push their way along the Paris-Metz highway where it leaves Château-Thierry for the capital. Meanwhile the machine gunners of the 7th Regiment of the 3rd Division had gone into the streets of Château-Thierry itself. The Germans had once before been surprised at this spot by meeting a new foe. Then the British drove up from Coulommiers to the Marne in 1914. Now it was the Americans, the new hope of the Allies and the new menace for Germany. Through the streets of the pretty Marne town the Americans fought with a desperation that surprised the Germans.

THE WRECKED BRIDGE OF CHÂTEAU-THIERRY.
Destroyed by the French, while Germans and French were still fighting in its centre.

Half an hour before the Americans had stood on a height viewing for the first time in their lives the sight of exploding shells. Now they were cut off in the streets of the town—a mined bridge, their direct avenue of retreat, having been blown up with Germans and French fighting hand to hand in its centre. It was the testing time for young troops. But coolly and sagaciously they retreated along the valley of the river, fighting when they could and finding protection wherever it offered, until they reached the next bridge and safely crossed. To the east of Château-Thierry the Germans were endeavouring to envelop the Paris road by a southward sweep and it fell to the Americans to re-establish liaison between two French corps in the Veuilly, Prémont and Coulombs line and then, the next day, June 3, to crush a German attack at Veuilly. The night of the 3rd and 4th the remaining scattered French units, who had fought without food or rest for six days in retreat, passed through the Americans' lines, who now held a 12-kilometre front. The German offensive, dragging to a close, came to a standstill with a shock. It shivered under the Americans' fire and enthusiasm, and when on the sixth the Americans counter-attacked on the Bois de Belleau the Germans once more learned what the coming of the Americans meant. From the 6th to the 25th the Marine Brigade battled daily through the Bois de Belleau. Through the crags and thicknesses, where German ingenuity in machine-gun fighting had every opportunity of displaying itself against the Americans still in the school of war, the marines with their splendid rifle fire and with their yet more splendid determination and endurance stalked German machine-guns. Slowly the woods were cleared. Bouresches was captured by an officer and 24 men and the name of the Bois de Belleau was changed to that of Bois de la Brigade Marine, a happy though unenduring change by the appreciative French. On the right Vaux had been captured by the 3rd Brigade, but it afforded more an opportunity for the Americans to reveal their prowess in artillery fire than in actual infantry fighting. The village was reduced to a skeleton, but as it was dominated by Hill 204, which the French were attacking, the Germans could well afford to lose it without any real anxiety. This they did with the loss of 200 prisoners cut

off in the village by the tremendous American artillery fire. The whole action of the 2nd Division is a bright page in American history. No one subscribed more in generous enthusiasm to their deeds than General Degoutte, the commander of the 6th French Army, who, when left with practically no infantry, saw the Americans come to his relief as a mass of strength. It has been questioned whether the Americans, however, should have troubled to fight through Belleau wood, but this much is certain, that the experience which the Americans gained there, the tricks of war that they had learned—tricks only to be learned in the fire of battle—were invaluable in the later fighting of the 2nd Division. In the ravines of Soissons, the plains of Champagne and the thicknesses of the Argonne, the experience of Belleau wood was always reflected in the tactics and initiative of the division. Nor did the Germans forget their experience with the Americans on the Marne. To the right of Château-Thierry the 3rd Division had gone into line after the drive. In that quiet, restful country flaunting all the beauties of nature, the nights were nights of wonder as American raiding parties, some in small boats, some swimming, crossed the river, raided a village like Blesmes or Gland, brought back a few helpless but protesting prisoners. The keenness of troops to participate in these raids gave the staff more trouble than the raids themselves. The Americans were passing along the road which was to bring them to a decisive battle and enduring glory.

While medals were being presented for the fine work of individual heroes on the Marne, Americans of the 33rd Illinois National Guard Division, most of whom came from Chicago, were proving to their British and particularly their Australian friends with what verve and dash they could fight. It was Independence Day, July 4, an appropriate occasion for Americans to wipe out old enmities fighting the common enemy of all. General Rawlinson, commanding the Fourth British Army, was disinclined to use the willing Americans; but General Sir John Monash, commanding the Australians, insisted upon their linking up with the Australians in action, although only two companies took part. But these, together with those who, making opportunities for themselves, borrowed Australian hats, quickly proved to the men who more than any other nationality approximate to the fighting characteristics of the Americans that America had sent the right kind of men over to Europe. It was in the Villers Bretonneux sector, north of the town and south of the



PLATFORM OF A LONG-RANGE GUN SOUTH-WEST OF BREGY,
That shelled Meaux and Coulommiers July 15, 1918, at a range of 30 miles.

AMERICAN MARINES CLEARING BELLEAU WOOD WITH THE BAYONET.

river Somme, that the Australians with the Americans captured Hamel and Vaivre wood.

A new drama, however, was about to open. It was known that the Germans were preparing for another Marne drive. The 42nd Division was brought from the Baccarat sector to Suippes, to the east of Rheims in the rolling plains of the Champagne. The 26th National Guard Division from New England, moving from the Toul zone, relieved the 2nd Division to the west of Château-Thierry. Others were held in reserve for the coming offensive, which, with its menace to Paris itself, hung like a cloud over the Allies' hopes. On July 14 the Americans had been celebrating Bastille Day in the French capital. The men of Belleau wood and the Marne had marched through the city to the accompaniment of the anxious cheers of the populace. That night people arose from their beds to hear the dull and threatening roar that came from the direction of the Marne. They knew what was happening. The German drive was being heralded with an avalanche of shells. At six the next morning the fifteenth Big Bertha opened fire on Paris and a large siege gun mounted on a turntable in a forest near Brecy shelled Meaux, Coulommiers and La Ferte sous Jouarre with 380-centimetre shells. For 10 hours the bombardment preceded the attack across the river and in Champagne which was made early on the morning of the 15th. Happily General Gouraud, commanding the French Fourth Army, was well prepared for the drive on his front east of Reims, and a daring raid on the night before the attack provided him with such valuable information that he was enabled almost to paralyze the drive before it started. The prisoners captured in the night raid revealed how in two hours the German artillery preparation would commence and how at that moment the trenches from which the Germans were to depart were the scene of thousands of men staggering along in the dark finding their places ready for the attack. It was a time of great anxiety for General Gouraud, but the artillery was quickly informed and half an hour before the German barrage opened the French anticipated it with a concentrated fire on the front and rear areas that took the heaviest of tolls of German life and brought the greatest of confusion to the German Army. Men and horses were plunged into death beneath this unexpected barrage. Ammunition trains and wagons, all the transport and paraphernalia of war, were shattered by the fire. The roads became confused masses of wreckage where none could pass. The dream of taking Chalons and Epernay with which the Germans had lined up for the attack was fast fading away. But the Germans nevertheless launched the drive. General Gouraud had prepared a system of elastic defences by which the front line was only lightly held with a few troops who, after fighting a delaying action, would retreat to the intermediate line. If too hard pressed in the intermediate line the men could farther retreat to a third line, and there make a stand against the German onslaughts. The 42nd, the Rainbow Division, so called because its four regiments came from various parts of the United States, occupied the intermediate and third lines in the sector between Aubérive-sur-Suippe on the west and Perthe les Hurlus on the east, with the famous Roman road traversing the length of it. This was to the west of Reims, where observation over an extensive countryside is uninterrupted. As the Germans came out of their trenches to the attack they could be seen at some points three miles behind the front. The delaying detachments in the front positions, small though they were, fulfilled their duties with unexpected success. Nearly three hours were wasted by the Germans before they reached the combat line at 7 in the morning. Shattered by the counter barrage though they were, the Germans nevertheless strove manfully on and attacked with a determination that won the praise and admiration of both the French and the Americans. One battalion of American infantry drove off seven frontal attacks in four hours. As the end of the day came into sight the German assaults became weaker and weaker, less and less resolute, until the next morning only local attacks could be mustered by his defeated and staggering forces. The Americans, well satisfied with their stand at a cost of 450 killed and 1,350 wounded, had once more proved to the Germans that to belittle was not to defeat the men from the United States; that a high spirit, invincible courage and the pride of achievement which belongs to troops more or less new to warfare, even when not accompanied with a wealth of experience, had an infinite value in decisive warfare. All that the Germans had to show was a multitude of dead and dying and the intended town major for Chalons a prisoner in American hands. But

to the west the Germans had crossed the Marne, and on the 3rd Division front from Mézy to the east of Château-Thierry another drama was being played. With Montmirail on the Paris-Chalons road as the main objective the Germans had struck with every arm from Mézy on the Marne through Dormans up to the front of General Gouraud's army. The extreme right flank of the German attack fell upon the 30th

GUARDING THE GRAVE OF LIEUT. QUENTIN ROOSEVELT (killed on July 17)
At Chamery, on the Ourcq.

and 38th Regiments of the 3rd American Division, who had been in the line since the beginning of June. A tremendous concentration of artillery fire preceded the attack. Every area was well covered by the Germans. Their artillery plans were scrupulously thorough. But the American and French artillery in this sector anticipated the Germans. At a quarter of an hour before midnight on the 14th they poured into the German battery and front-line positions a counter barrage of all available strength with telling effect. At midnight the German artillery fire commenced. Their 84 batteries in this sector plunged all their fury into the 31 batteries of the French and the Americans. The result was that the Americans faced a storm of shell that threatened to wreck all their communications, isolate their lines and pierce their front. But with a smiling "take a chance" resolution the Americans awaited the attack in front, while men struggling with ammunition wagons, supplies and artillery all under the enemy fire, which, increasing with violence as the hour for attack dawned, wrought untold epics in the immediate rear. At 3.20 the German infantry advanced to the attack. With their ingenuity that never flagged, the Germans had placed a series of steel platforms held up by cables across the river. About an inch thick, they were concealed just beneath the water but allowed perfect freedom of movement for advancing troops whose only trouble was wet feet. Canvas boats and the usual pontoons were also employed all along the river, which still shone clear and glistening through the dust and dirt of bursting shells and the smoke screen with which the Germans covered their movements. The French, under the weight of a mass of men and a tornado of fire, were forced to retreat. To the right of the Americans from Mézy eastward along the river the French front was driven in and left the right flank of the Americans exposed to enfilade fire from the Germans. It was on this extremity of the American line that the Germans attempted to cross the river and in some places succeeded. There is a little farm by name le Ru Chailly farm, just north of Fossoy, where the river turns to Mont St. Pere. Near by there is a dam in the river which affords a risky and very precarious crossing of the Marne. But the Germans, undaunted by machine-gun and artillery fire, crossed in single file, although few of those who set out ever reached the other side. As they crossed they could look down upon the dead bodies of their comrades who, swirled in the waters, were caught in the dam. They succeeded, however, in reaching the farm and took Fossoy, but as further progress was impossible they suddenly turned eastward and following the bend of the river reached Mézy. Just north of them the Germans had crossed in the arch of the river with Jaulgonne at its summit. They had also seized the heights to the east of the Surmerlin river which runs south from the Marne. Thus from three sides the Germans were pouring a promiscuous fire into the Americans, the burden of which fell upon the 38th Regiment, under Colonel Ulysses Grant McAlexander. The gap between the Americans and the French became wider and wider. A desperate situation demanded desperate measures. Either there was to be a general retreat or a stand to the death. The Germans, had they been

able to organize another attack rapidly, would doubtlessly have flung the Americans back and have pressed on to Montmirail, if they had not succeeded in cutting off the Americans altogether and found a clear way to Paris should they have desired to go there. But the Germans had few reserves. Their strength had been over-estimated. Reorganization proved to be impossible in face of the American resistance, and happily Colonel McAlexander, together with some units of the 7th and 30th Regiments, in spite of orders fought a decisive action of his own with all of his flanks exposed. At eight o'clock in the morning the Germans were held on the American front, and disorganization, the result of the failure of their plans, had begun to appear. The next day the Germans half-heartedly renewed their offensive, but the splendid stand of the Americans had broken the spirit of the Germans and the plans of their staff, and only a small stretch of ground remained in German hands south of the river on the American front. The last German offensive of the war, heralded with so much enthusiasm in Germany, had failed completely. Yet another phase of a great drama was being prepared.

That a counter-offensive by Marshal Foch was inevitable no one doubted. The Americans, still fresh, still eager, still anxious to prove or confirm their fighting prowess on European battlefields, together with the Moroccans were selected as the main driving force of the drive, the "shock troops" of the advance. The 1st and 2nd Divisions with the Moroccan Division were sent to the line that ran on the left boundary of the Soissons salient. The 26th, 3rd, and 28th Divisions were kept on the Marne, while parts of the 4th Division were assigned to the French command near Lizy sur Ourcq. Each division was approximately 28,000 men strong. The two forests of Villers Cotterets and Compiègne form the green sentinels of Paris on the north-east. Graced with a mass of tall, elegant and shady trees, they make a perfect cloak of concealment for the concentration of troops and artillery. It was through the forest of Villers Cotterets that the American 1st and 2nd Divisions had to pass to reach their positions of attack for the morning of July 18. The 1st had moved up from near Beauvais, where they had been receiving some instruction, later to be completed under machine-gun fire in the tactics of open warfare following their entrenchment in the Montdidier area. The 2nd Division came from the region of the Marne. It was a terrible night that preceded the dawn of attack. The forest roads, always moist, became almost impassable under the torrent of rain. While the thunder helped the tanks to reach the lines without detection by the enemy, the darkness and insecure foothold were obstacles in the way of the movement of troops, artillery and supplies that nothing but the greatest of endurance and the enlivening prospect of advance could overcome. Happily, the two American divisions, with the Moroccans, reached their assigned positions just before the hour of attack. On the heights that rise from out of the Villers Cotterets forest, running from just in front of Laversine to just south of Dommiers, overlooking the ravines towards the plain that extends south of Soissons, the 1st Division moved forward at 4.30 in the morning, preceded by a six-minute curtain barrage. The beetroot and wheat fields through which the men had to pass, in the trail of light tanks,

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN A. LEJEUNE.
Commanded the 2nd Division.

A BATTERY OF AMERICAN HEAVY GUNS SOUTH OF SOISSONS.

were clustered with machine guns that took a great toll of American lives. But the Germans were surprised by the suddenness and energy of the attack and staggered under the startling sight of Americans swarming over into their lines with a recklessness that was little to their liking or comfort. Some of the Germans quickly left the scene for the rear, but those that stayed, and they were the great majority, fought with fanatical desperation until the dead still lying on their machine-guns were thick on the battlefields. From where the Americans were they could see the tall poplars of the Paris-Soissons road, their day's objective, but lying in between was the Missy ravine covered with a stream of bullets and receptive of nothing but shells. The town of Missy aux Bois itself was a death trap; but the Americans, meeting with increasing resistance as the Germans recovered from the first shock, pushed steadily on and gained the road for the night. The 1st Division had taken 2,000 prisoners, a number of guns, and thoroughly alarmed the Germans. The spirit of the men in spite of severe losses was wonderful.

On the right of the 1st Division the Moroccan troops tod had made an excellent day's progress, while farther to the right, in the sector from the Montgobert woods to north of Longpont, the 2nd Division had, in spite of exposed flanks that cost them hundreds of men, pushed far into the German line. The division had encountered the greatest of difficulties in reaching the line.

When the French commander enquired, five minutes before the time to attack, whether the Americans were ready, he was told that only the 9th Infantry Regiment had arrived in line, that the 23rd Regiment were running along the road for over a mile to get to their positions, that they were without machine guns, Stokes mortars, one-pound cannon, or grenades, that their only arms were the rifle and bayonet, but that they would attack to time. The Americans kept their word. Under the clearest of skies and the brightest of sunlight, wet to their skins, nearly exhausted from the hardships of the last 36 hours, they waited for the few brief minutes before the attack to pass by. Silent were the German lines, unsuspectingly silent. There was no preliminary fire, the cannon were still. A nightingale singing in the air alone distracted the men from the scenes around. Suddenly the artillery opened, rising to a crescendo. The men went over with its fire, two battalions of marines changing from column marching formation into attacking order without even so much as a halt. The speed and dash of the Americans on that morning were as unforgettable as amazing. So eager were the men that they chased and passed under their own barrage. The stupefied Germans could only throw up their arms and surrender, so surprised were they. At Beaurepaire farm, a strongly organized and strongly held position, however, the Germans offered a determined resistance with machine guns and artillery, but the 3rd Brigade charged the position with the bayonet, passing through their own barrage fire to get at the enemy. Although enfiladed by machine-gun fire from the front of the Moroccan Division at Maison

Neuve farm, the Americans, swinging slightly to the south-east, took Vauxcastille in their stride, in spite of the Germans' resistance, and at eight in the evening had captured Vierzy, the most desperately defended town in the whole sector. Eight kilometres had the Americans passed, and they had driven a menacing salient into the German lines that affected the whole Soissons-Château Thierry positions. 2,965 prisoners, hundreds of machine guns, 75 guns, nearly all the artillery of two German divisions, were the spoils of the 2nd Division for the first day.

Nothing the Americans accomplished in France could better their work on July 18 in the Soissons sector. The 2nd Division was reduced to half its strength, but it was not in losses that the work of the two American divisions was to be estimated, it was in the overwhelming surprise that their dash had brought down upon the Germans. The enemy never recovered; and although plans in other sectors did not materialize, yet the Americans' feat had wrought lasting effects. On the Marne front the 26th Division, holding the Belleau Wood-Vaux front, was to act as the pivoting division for the whole counter-attack of the day. Although the movement was very difficult, owing to the fact that the different regiments had to attack in slightly different directions, Belleau, Torcy and Givry were in the hands of the division by nightfall, but the thickness of the terrain, the hills on the left from which enfilade fire cut into the American flanks, had made it a costly operation.

Meanwhile the 39th Infantry Regiment of the 4th Division, attached to the French to the north-west of Belleau wood, took Buisson de Cresnes and Noroy, while the combined French and Americans of the 58th and 59th Infantry Regiments of the same division took Hautevesnes and Courchamps. Chevillon and the Sept Bois south of Montmenjon fell to the Americans also. It was a great day in American history of which every American might well feel proud.

The following day the attack was resumed. The Germans, now thoroughly realizing the full menace of the strategy of Marshal Foch, fought desperately for time, and there was of course nothing like the progress of the opening day. Nevertheless, the Plossy ravine half-way between the Soissons-Paris and Soissons-Château Thierry roads was captured by the 1st Division

AMERICAN SNIPERS ON A FRENCH HIGHWAY NEAR SOISSONS.

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troops, who also beyond Chaudan approached Chazelle. All the tanks on this front were disabled at the close of the day, after as valiant and as valuable service as it is possible to conceive. The infantry certainly were most appreciative and admiring of their audacity and their work. South, in the 2nd Division area, the 6th Regiment of Marines, in spite of the resistance of reinforcements that the Germans had brought up during the night, won two kilometres in the direction of Tigny. The whole division, which had only had tinned tomatoes for water and little food for 72 hours, was relieved during the night. The units of the 4th Division at the southern extremity of the salient, fighting with the French and under their command, captured Priez and La Grebouillère farm, while the 26th Division halted while the French seized a difficult position on their left. The third day the heaviest of the American fighting fell to the 1st Division. They commenced an attack at 2.20 in the afternoon towards Berzy le Sec and Buzancy. The Germans, provided with a deep line of machine-guns, fought with all their customary skill and determination, and it was only the still great impetus which the 1st Division had that carried them to within 500 metres of Berzy le Sec. The artillery had followed the infantry into battle. The gunners made their own barrage tables as the infantry advanced. The next morning the attack was continued. Brigadier-General Buck himself went over with the first wave, and the Americans reached Buzancy and cut the Soissons-Château Thierry highway. That night they were relieved by the 15th Scottish Division, to whom it fell to take Buzancy. The 1st Division had taken 125 officers, 3,375 men, 75 guns and 300 machine guns, but they had lost in total casualties 285 officers, 7,655 men—a terrible price to pay for victory.

But the Germans, alarmed for the safety of their forces in the Marne salient, had already commenced to withdraw. On the 20th the 26th Division had made an attack on the Bois de Bouresches, while the 4th Division units had captured Sommelans farther north. The following morning the Americans found that the Germans were with great skill and coolness extricating themselves from the difficulty that the counter-offensive had placed them in. Crossing the Marne to the right of Château-Thierry, the 3rd Division advance units ascended the heights on the opposite side of the river, while the 26th Division, to the left of Château-

A BARRICADE IN CHÂTEAU-THIERRY.

IN THE RUINS OF CANTIGNY.

Searching parties examining hiding-places and underground shelters.

Thierry, pursued the Germans with patrols followed by columns of marching infantry, until in the evening heavy machine-gun fire from near Trugny and Epieds called for a halt for the night. But the event of the day was the evacuation of Château-Thierry. It was the first large town to be retaken in the counter-drive. To all the fighting men it signified the change of fortune, it told of success and pursuit.

The next few days saw the Americans determinedly following in pursuit of the enemy towards the Ourcq and the Vesle. They had to pass through dense woods, every inch of which was known to the Germans, and to search through ravines and hill-sides for the machine gunners who poured fire into them. The Germans had adopted a system of rearguard tactics, later to be developed to an organized and skilful means of defence, which gave them what they needed most, time to evacuate their main forces. The machine-guns were concealed in woods and trees, and the Americans slowly moving forward were ever on the alert for the sound of fire. Sometimes they came upon a heavily defended farm, and artillery preparation followed by an organized attack would have to be called for. Then the Germans would gas the woods and shell all the roads. It was a strange adventure, but to men going forward it had a certain attractiveness that not even the possibility of death and wounds could completely kill. At last the 26th and 3rd Divisions, moving forward from the Marne through the Forest de Fere on the left and le Charmel on the right, reached the highway from Fère en Tardenois to the Marne, and the 3rd Division, passing it, crossed the Ourcq at Roncheres. Then came the 42nd Division to relieve the 26th. It had arrived at the right moment for a desperate fight. The Germans had found that the Americans were pressing them too closely. There was the possibility of their being overrun, and they made a temporary stand on the low open hills that rise from the Ourcq east of Fère en Tardenois. For this purpose reinforcements were brought up and the 4th Guard Division coming from Metz was held ready for battle.

Everything favoured the Germans for a defensive action. They had the advantage of position, and could sweep the surrounding hills and ravines with machine-gun and artillery fire. To eject them became the task of the American divisions, the 42nd, 28th and 3rd, from left to right. It was a contest solely between the Americans and the Germans, for, for the first time in France, three American divisions were in line without any intervening French troops. And a mighty contest it proved to be. On the dawn of July 28 the 42nd Division attempted to cross the Ourcq river, which, normally a mere stream, had swollen to

THE CAPTURE OF MEURCY FARM ON THE OURCQ.

15 metres wide. From the village of Sergy and from Meurcy farm the Germans poured a steady and very disconcerting fire into the American flanks, and the crossing of the river was only achieved by the force of sheer audacity. But the Americans dashed forward to capture Sergy, which they found only placed them in the best of positions for receiving the full effect of German cross-fire from the edge of neighbouring woodlands. Once they were swept back to the river bank, but they charged again and this time met the 4th Guard Prussian Division of the Germans. A desperate fight ensued. The bayonet had its quota of victims. Little quarter was given on either side. Sergy changed hands nine times in the day and the New York Irish Regiment held it for the night. On their left the 28th Division were vainly endeavouring to capture Hill 220. The 3rd had reached Roncheres and were advancing towards Cierges. The next morning the American line again attacked. The 42nd, driven out of Sergy early in the morning by a German attack, returned again with some troops of the 4th Division to the village and finally made it theirs. Then on the plateau between Sergy and Meurcy farm, through the wheat fields concealing machine-guns, the Americans once more moved forward. Meurcy farm was captured, but only by the bayonet. The Germans, like the Americans, were thoroughly aroused. Few were the prisoners and they were all wounded. The rival troops seemed only content to plunge the bayonet into one another. The little village of Seringes, mounted on a hill, was taken at the point of the bayonet after the Americans had taken Hill 184 at its rear, and the Germans were driven into the Forest de Nesle. On the right the American line was held. No progress was possible. On the 30th the Americans again attacked. Over the hills and plateau, green in the summer sun, they faced all that the Germans had to offer. The whirr of machine-gun fire would set up in one place and then die down. Then it would recommence at another point. Every movement of the Americans was seen and fired upon. Life was indeed cheap. At Seringes the Prussian guardsmen, tall, ferocious and angered, strove to retake the village. They succeeded in the afternoon, but the Americans surrounded Seringes at night. It was a combat of death. Good progress was made by the three American divisions that day, the 32nd being on the extreme right in place of the 3rd, and by the 1st of August the Americans stood with their faces towards the Vesle.

The 32nd Division, however, spent a very exhilarating first of the month attacking Bellevue farm, which lay poised on a slope, Reddy farm, where Prince Eitel Friedrich had made his headquarters some time before, and the Bois de Jomblets with two other woods. But they succeeded, and winning breathing time stood on the hills that looked across the plains to where the heights of the Vesle rose once more. They could see the Germans retreating in the distance and watch the smokes and fires of exploding ammunition dumps. With the 42nd and accompanied by a brigade of the 3rd Division they pressed on to the Vesle, the heights of which on the southern side were attained by the Americans without much resistance. The losses of the Americans from the Marne to the Vesle had been particularly heavy. The men had fought with such contempt for exposure, with such fierce anxiety to show the Germans what they could do, that casualties had mounted up, and it was only when the divisions relieved counted up their losses that they realized with what cost they had succeeded in so soundly thrashing the Prussian Guard and driving the Germans to the river. The 4th Division relieved the 42nd at Mont St. Martin, and together with the 32nd endeavoured to cross the Vesle and take Fismes. But the river, although very narrow, lay in a wired-in hollow exposed to both machine-gun and artillery fire, and the attempt to reach the opposite bank was frustrated again and again. The 77th New York National Army Division and the 28th took over the sector later, and finally crossed the plateau and the river until they came within sight of the Chemin des Dames. But meanwhile the 32nd Division had won new glory just north of Soissons in the Juvigny sector.

On August 20, General Mangin, of the Tenth French Army, had commenced a flanking drive on the German positions north of Soissons, thereby threatening the enemy hold on the Chemin des Dames and Laon. At Juvigny, a village lying at the bottom of a ravine, the French advance was being held up, and it was decided to use the 32nd Division as a shock element to eject the Germans and press on to Terny Sorny. On the morning of the 26th the Americans attacked. They speedily seized the Soissons-Crecy au Mont railroad that ran diagonally through their sector, but found themselves exposed to a deadly fire. The

Germans counter-attacked, but were driven off, and the next morning the Americans were once more moving. But the terrible wealth of fire from the ravines around Juvigny, where artillery could not reach the German machine-gunners amid the trees, stopped the attack, and no progress was made that day. The Americans, with bitterness in their hearts and determined to vindicate themselves as shock troops, attacked again in the following afternoon, and, although their left was held back owing to their neighbours' inability to move forward, they finally reached the village by passing it on one side and then entering from the rear. The fourth day saw the Americans, supported by the artillery of the Moroccan Division, once more press on. This time the Germans gave way under the tremendous strain, and at eight in the evening the Americans were in Terny Sorny. The Moroccans followed them into line, and made one of the most spectacular attacks of the war in face of terrific fire. Slowly the German opposition was worn down; and the Germans, evacuating their positions on the Vesle, gave the Americans there the opportunity to move forward.

Early in August the 33rd Division again found itself fighting by the side of the Australians on the Somme. This time it was in the region of Chipilly.

A new chapter in the history of the American forces now opened. The Americans had always offered their troops, whatever their experience or training, to the Allied High Command with a willingness and freedom from conditions that proved particularly happy for the Allies. They had but one idea, to end the war in the shortest possible time by the only way possible—decisive victory. If the opportunity came, they were ready to fling all into the furnace. Losses did not appal them; they argued that a short war, even if costly, is less costly than a long war of attrition. They were right, and in conformity with this policy offered their all to the Allies. But they nevertheless desired to create from out of their large mass of men in Europe an army command, and to direct and control, so far as it should prove expedient to direct and control, the operations of such an army. The scheme put forward by the French Command that they should distribute their troops throughout the whole front and fight as individual units under various British and French Army Commands had not the slightest attraction for them. If



THE FORTIFICATIONS OF THE CHÂTEAU OF NESLE.

an emergency demanded the placing of one, or several, American divisions under such commands for a short action, they were willing to conform with the Allies' desires; but they could not agree to the whole of the American troops being transferred anywhere at the will of others. General Pershing interpreted this sentiment of the American people and the American Army to the Allied High Command; and after the various corps had been established he started on the work of forming an army. The Americans, in accordance with their lines of communications, were chiefly to be found *en masse* in the sector extending roughly south from Pont à Mousson, on the Moselle river. It was natural, therefore, that the St. Mihiel salient, formed in 1914, should beckon to them as requiring reduction preliminary to a further assault on the stronghold of Metz, but particularly on the iron mines of Briey, from which the German Army was deriving tremendous benefits. The attack was at last decided upon, and the First Army, under General Pershing's command, gathered together the best of the American divisions for the assault. Every possible preparation was made for the attack. The towns behind the lines became Americanized with signs, clubs and troops. On the night of September 11 everything was ready for the morning's drive. The American 82nd, 90th, 5th, 2nd, 89th, 42nd and 1st Divisions were to drive in the southern line of the salient, while the French colonial corps, facing the bend at St. Mihiel itself, were to stir the Germans with raids and then follow behind when the salient was closed. On the northern extremity of the salient the 26th and 4th American Divisions, together with 15th French Colonial Division, were, under the 5th American Army Corps, to drive in the northern edge, and finally meet the southern American divisions across the salient. The whole salient, if defended stubbornly, would demand the utmost efforts to reduce. Les Eparges, in the north, was the name that French troops spoke of with bitter memories, while the French attacks around St. Mihiel itself had been driven off with heavy losses. Now it was the Americans' turn. With abundant troops, with all the guarantees for success in the way of assembled artillery, they advanced at five in the morning on September 12, following five hours' artillery preparation. The Germans were only lightly holding the salient, expecting at any moment to evacuate it, and when the Americans heralded their attack such divisions as could be moved were hurriedly ordered to leave the area. But so impetuous was the American attack, so well did the plans work in action, that the Americans broke through the German defences, and, bringing confusion around Thiaucourt, which the 2nd Division captured on the first day, took prisoners the very men who had been ordered to leave. The Germans had decided not to defend the salient, but they

AMERICANS IN A SHELL-HOLE WITH A CAPTURED MACHINE-GUN.

had no intention of losing any prisoners. Yet nearly fourteen thousand Germans fell into the Americans' hands, a haul that was as unexpected as it was satisfactory. Early the next morning the salient was closed by the meeting of the 1st and 26th Divisions at Vigneulles, and St. Mihiel was in French hands. General Pershing, with Marshal Pétain and Mr. Baker, the Secretary of War, visited it during the day, and were all received with great enthusiasm by the freed people.

Even before the lines had become stabilized after the St. Mihiel drive the Americans, with their characteristic restlessness, were preparing to strike another blow at the Germans. Anxious that America's might should be arrayed in its fullest strength against the enemy, proud of what had already been achieved, but determined to do even more, General Pershing had enquired of Marshal Foch where he now desired the American Army to fight. The Marshal, with the caution of experience, pointed out the difficulties of the various sectors where fighting was to be done. All the salients had been wiped out. We had now to make frontal attacks. To the surprise of the Marshal, General Pershing selected what was to his mind the


SEDAN
R. Meuse
Givonne
Villers-Cernay
Florenville
Donchery
Villers-sur-Bar
Bazeilles
Chevenges
Brévilly
Osnes
Matton
Tremblois
Williers
Mairy
NOV. 7
42
77
Euilly
Carignan
Puilly
Ambumont
NOV. 6
42
77
Bulson
Margny
Mouzon
Vaux
R. Chiers
Vendresse
Chemery
Raucourt
Maisoncelle
NOV. 11
77
Villy
Sapogne
Moulins
la Ferte-sur-Chiers
la Neuville
Vonco
NOV. 5
Olizy
Avioth
Mont Quintin
Sauville
la Bessece
Stonne
NOV 4
Inor
Chauvency St Hubert
Mepvant
Ecouviez
Beaumont
Poilly
Martincourt
Luzy
NOV. 5
89
Montmedy
Tannay
80
78
77
Brouenne
Le Chesne
Cervisy
Oches
les Petites Armoises
Othe
Stenay
90
NOV. 10
NOV. 11
Verrieres
NOV. 3
80
Laneuville sur-Meuse
Flassigny
Juvigny sur-Loison
Marville
Mouzay
Chatillon
Beauclair
89
NOV. 9
Autruche
NOV. 2
Villefranche
NOV. 11
Nouart
Montigny
1 REGT. 32 DIV
NOV. 8
Jametz
AMERICAN SECTOR
R. Bar
ARMY OF
EASTERN LIMIT



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE ARGONNE-MEUSE OFFENSIVE: FIRST, SECOND AND LAST PHASES.

most difficult sector of all on that front. It was that running from the Meuse river, just above Verdun, to the western extremity of the Argonne forest. "Very well, go ahead," the Marshal said; "your men have the devil's own punch."

The Germans at the close of September, 1918, had come to realize that any hope of victory had been shattered, that the counter-drive of Marshal Foch and the renewed energy of all the Allied troops had reversed the whole war situation. The two main arteries of retreat that were in the possession of the Germans were the one through Liége from Lille in the north and the other through Metz and Luxembourg in the south. Between came the Ardenne forest behind the Chemin des Dames. The two termini of these retreating lines were strongly fortified by a system of defence to the south of Lille at one point and extending from the fortifications of Metz at the other. Connecting them ran the Lille-Metz railroad, passing through Mezières, Sedan, Montmedy and Longuyon, which the Germans had in some places built up to the extent of four tracks, and by which they had been enabled to move troops from one front to another with a facility that was never enjoyed by the Allies on the outer side of the ring. To cut this railroad, then, was of first importance to the Allies, since it would considerably lessen the value of the man-power of Germany, and at the same time threaten the orderliness of any German retreat to a second line running from Belgium, near Brussels, through Luxembourg to Metz. But first in importance came the railways around Sedan and Montmedy. The pivot of a whole German retreat, swinging back through Belgium, was here. If the pivot gave way before a complete evacuation had taken place in the north disaster would result. Then, again, the Briey ironfields would have to be given up, and as four-fifths of the iron ore of continental Europe was derived from these fields, it can be imagined how vital it was to the enemy to defend the pivot with all his power. It was this pivot that the Americans set out to attack, and eventually, after a bitter struggle, succeeded in breaking.

The Germans believed that the Americans would attack east of the Meuse, in the direction of the Meuse as an exploitation of the St. Mihiel success. Some very clever and ingenious wireless messages, sent out by a fictitious army commander in charge of a phantom American army to the east of Verdun, all of which were tapped by the German wireless service and decoded, and which resulted in a sudden growth of anxious information-seeking raids on that front, confirmed this impression in the German mind. Hence the order issued by General von der Marwitz, commanding 15th German Army. Dated September 15, 1918, it read: "According to information in our hands, the enemy intends to attack the Fifth Army east of the Meuse in order to reach Longuyon.

TRANSPORT DIFFICULTIES: ROAD-MAKING IN THE ARGONNE-MEUSE SECTOR.

AMERICANS WITH TANKS IN THE ARGONNE.

The objective of this attack is the cutting of the railroad line Longuyon-Sedan, which is the main line of communication of the Western Army. Furthermore, the enemy hopes to compel us to discontinue the exploitation of the iron mines of Briey, the possession of which is a great factor in our steel production. The 5th Army once again may have to bear the brunt of the fighting of the coming weeks, on which the security of the Fatherland may depend. The fate of a large portion of the Western Front, perhaps of the nation, depends on the firm holding of the Verdun front. The Fatherland believes that every commander and every soldier realizes the greatness of his task and that everyone will fulfil his duty to the utmost. If this is done the enemy's attack will be shattered." He, while attributing the attack to the east of the Meuse instead of the west, correctly divined the Allies' intentions, and emphasized the importance of frustrating those intentions. The story of the Argonne-Meuse drive is the story of this desire unfulfilled.

The day that the St. Mihiel salient was closed the Americans began, under the thickest of cloaks of secrecy, to hurry their artillery and reserve divisions to the sector to the west of Verdun. Time was of the utmost importance, for delay rips off disguise, and blows to be successful must be in rapid succession. The Americans, however, with the energy characteristic of the people, erected hospitals, built prison cages, improved railheads, mended roads, and transported all the troops and material of war to the new sector in an amazingly short time

The Americans, however, were faced with a task such as few armies in the history of any war were called upon to face. The Meuse-Argonne sector, though the scene of desperate fighting from time to time, particularly during the battles for Verdun and

the French attempt to capture the Argonne forest in 1915, had for a long spell lived in that quietude which the French, with a wise regard to the necessity for preserving what they could of shattered France, had no intention of disturbing. The consequence was that no light railroads to the front lines ready for an advance

THE CROWN PRINCE'S OBSERVATORY IN MONTFAUCON.

The loft here seen wrecked was fitted as an observatory: the end of a periscope can be seen on the roof, looking like a third finial.

had been built, and the road communication still depended upon the only direct artery, the Clermont-Varennes highway, and the lateral road from Verdun, through Dombasle to St. Menehould. A more poorly supplied sector for communications it would have been impossible to find on the whole Western Front. The Americans, too, had never seen the sector before. Not one inch of the ground was known to them. At the last moment they endeavoured to surmount some of the difficulties of communication, but they were forced to trust to what could be done after the offensive had started and the Hindenburg Line, facing their whole front, had been pierced. To this sector the Americans transported a whole army, which, entering the line only the night before the attack, went over the top in the morning.

The night before the drive commenced the front of the First American Army extended from where on the extreme left it joined General Gouraud's Fourth French Army at La Harazee, across through Boureuilles and Vauquois, to just north of Avocourt and south of Malancourt, Bethincourt, and Forges, where it crossed the Meuse to Beaumont and Ornes. On the left was the Ist Corps with the 77th 28th and 35th Divisions in line, then came the Vth Corps with the 91st, 37th and 79th Divisions, followed by the IIIrd Corps of the 4th, 80th and 33rd Divisions, whose right rested on the Meuse. On the right bank of the river the XVIIth French Corps was placed under General Pershing's command, but they were to mark time until the action developed.

The general plan of attack was that the Americans, in concert with the French Fourth Army on their left, were to press northward, leaving the Argonne forest itself to fall by the process of driving up each side and meeting around Grandpré at its northernmost extremity. It was, in military phraselogy, "to be pinched out," the 77th Division in the forest just following up as the two wings went forward. Five German divisions were in line opposite the Americans the night before the attack, two of which were the 3rd and 5th Guard Divisions. The activities behind the American front had not passed unobserved by the Germans, and they had made all preparations for the attack when it dawned.

The night was dark and misty. The troops found every difficulty in reaching their assigned positions, and the transport problem was already serious when at 11.30 the artillery, with a sudden and startling roar, poured forth its message of a new attack on the enemy lines. The Americans felt that they were participating in the greatest event of the war, and a determination to make the morrow a success seized everyone. At half-past five on the morning of September 26 the barrage lifted, and the infantry, climbing out of the trenches, were quickly crossing No Man's Land, with its barbed wire and shell-holes, to the maze of deep trenches and concrete fortifications of the Hindenburg line. They were surprised to find so little resistance where they expected so much, but the Germans had withdrawn most of their main troops from the front line, leaving garrisons at strong points and dominating heights to check the American advance until reinforcements could arrive to hold a new front. Yet, even so, the Germans

were surprised, as the haul of 5,000 prisoners on the first day showed. In some places the Americans penetrated to a depth of seven miles on the first day. Vauquois, where it had been expected the Germans would have defended their elaborate defences with some tenacity, fell to the 35th Division almost without a shot being returned, while Varennes, famous as the scene of the arrest of Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette, when they sought to escape from Paris to Germany through Montmedy, was taken by the 28th Division with little loss. These two heights overlooked the Hindenburg line, but they in turn were overlooked by the supreme height of all, Montfauçon. From the observation tower on its highest point, built of concrete and fitted with the highest powered of telescopes, from which the Crown Prince had anxiously watched the futile efforts of his legions to take Verdun, it was possible to view the whole sector from the Meuse to the Argonne. The forest, black, forbidding and thick, lay on the west; the eastern Meuse heights, where the Germans had stationed their long-range artillery and were enfilading with shells of all calibres the flank and front of the Americans, frowned to the east. The Meuse sloped away on one side and the valley of the Aire, hugging the Argonne forest as far as Grandpré, where it turned towards the Aisne, on the other. To seize this height was one of the first and the most important tasks of the Americans. To defend and hold this wonderful observation post was vital for the Germans. It was natural, then, that the fighting on the first day should converge towards this point. Montfauçon lies in the direct line of advance of the 79th Division, new to fighting as it was. Up from Malancourt, through the woods clustered around the Hindenburg line, the men fought their way and then commenced moving along the climbing road that led into Montfauçon. It was foggy in the morning, but the afternoon cleared, and at six in the evening the 79th Division had captured part of the forward slope of Montfauçon. One regiment, with the aid of two tanks manned by Americans, then pushed on after dusk to the village, with its church standing on the top, but, unsupported by artillery, which, owing to the impassable condition of the roads, was unable to advance with as equal rapidity as the infantry, was driven back to the northern edge of Montfauçon wood, where it spent the night.

On the extreme right, where the Meuse river

OPEN WARFARE: AMERICAN SNIPERS UNDER HASTILY CONSTRUCTED COVER.

formed the Americans' flank, the 33rd Division carried out their part with much skill. The Forges brook runs from the Meuse westward through the town of Forges, long since obliterated by fire during the Verdun battles. It passes beneath Le Morte Homme, the famous Dead Man's Hill, devoid of all vegetation, then nothing but a vast sepulchre. Across the brook rises a steep incline partly covered to the right by the Bois de Forges. The Germans, viewing the marshland of the brook, decided that the Americans would never attempt to cross except at the village of Forges. But the staff of the 33rd Division, with characteristic audacity, decided to cross at the foot of Dead Man's Hill. To bridge the marshland was a task that might have appalled the most experienced. But the engineers of the Division, who, under the British, had learned to bridge the Somme, placed buckboards over the barbed wire and bundles of bracken in the marshes, and then built a number of trestle bridges over the brook which they held up as the troops crossed. The men swarmed up the hill to the wood, meeting with increased machine-gun resistance as the surprised enemy slowly recovered. But many were the Germans, including a number of officers, caught in their concrete dugouts before they had a chance to escape. "You people are mad," one German officer exclaimed, when as a prisoner he saw where the Americans had crossed. "But you have captured the woods," he added with a smile. At the close of the day the Division was facing the opposite heights of the Meuse, having made a complete right wheel.

That night the Americans already found themselves confronted with both expected and unexpected difficulties. The one road from Clermont to Varennes proved wholly inadequate for all the traffic to and from the front. The Germans had mined it a one point, and, although the Americans worked feverishly to bridge the mine, it caused a serious delay. But to the right the roads around Esnes, Malancourt and Avocourt, where the Hindenburg line had cut its way, were in the worst plight of all. The roads soon became blocked with the traffic, and it was only with the greatest difficulty that the transport moved at all. The Americans, however, tackled the problem energetically and the construction of light railroads from Clermont was immediately begun by black troops.

The next morning the Americans found that the Germans had recovered. Throwing in three fresh divisions down the Aire valley, they endeavoured to stay the American advance there and counter-attacked at some points with every determination. But the Americans moved forward down the valley of the river, while on the right the 37th and 79th Divisions around Montfauçon were engaged in a pitched battle with the Germans. The 37th took Ivoiry and Hill 258, south-west of the town, but they had to withdraw under fire, so heavy was the German resistance. Then, together with the left regiment of the 79th, the 37th made a concerted attack on Montfauçon. In spite of all the German machine-gun and artillery barrages, they reached and took the town at 11 in the morning, and at night established themselves on the road running across the hill. But it had been the bitterest of fights and the casualties of the heaviest It left two very exhausted divisions sitting on the summit and the immediate slopes. During the next few days, up to October 1, the Americans, faced with a resistance which every moment became more and more determined, found progress considerably slower and considerably more difficult. Wherever they attacked they found the German machine-gunners, cleverly concealed in woods that lay on the side of hills, ever ready to respond, and the enemy artillery always prepared to support the infantry. Meanwhile their own difficulties were daily increasing. The enfilade fire of the Germans from the heights opposite the Meuse river was particularly harassing, while the transport situation, instead of improving, was only becoming more congested. Then some of the divisions new to action owing to their lack of experience were not functioning with the same ease or effect as the other divisions, although a very notable exception was the 91st Division, which, although never under fire before, went 12 kilometres in one day. Unfortunately, their great efforts were not always fruitful, owing to the divisions on their flanks failing to make as much progress as themselves. The Germans, meanwhile, were rushing up reinforcements from Metz, and when October 1 dawned the Americans were about two kilometres ahead of their first objective in the Argonne forest, while their line ran from three to five kilometres south of their objective to the Meuse.

The first phase of the drive was over. The

AMERICAN INFANTRY ATTACKING TO THE CRY OF "LUSITANIA."

increasing resistance of the Germans called for a halt and breathing time until, with roads once more in order, artillery could be brought forward to support further attacks. The line then ran from the left of Binarville, in the Argonne forest, through Aprémont, on a height of the Aire, across to just south of Gesnes, to Brieulles-sur-Meuse, and then, turning sharply to the right, followed the bank of the river down to Forges The Americans had not progressed as rapidly as they had expected; but, with a harder task in front of them than they had ever anticipated, with difficulties almost insurmountable clogging their footsteps at every turn, with all the burden of inexperience and newness to bear, they had fought remarkably well and remarkably bravely. The condition of the roads, particularly when it rained, became more wretched as the days went by. On the road from Malancourt to Avocourt the transport was held up for 18 hours without a wheel turning owing to a large, heavy armoured ammunition truck falling through a bridge into one of the trenches of the

Hindenburg line. Men died in the ambulances from exposure; while the Germans, had they counter-attacked with any strength, would have captured hundreds of guns and miles of transport. But, except for shelling the ends of the road in attempts to discover American batteries, the Germans appeared to be entirely without knowledge of conditions behind the American front. The soldiers, impatient though they were with the congestion, nevertheless worked with every will in the world to ensure the movement of transport. The Americans were at last compelled to send Major-General Wm. G. Haan, of the 32nd Division, on his horse—for that was the only possible way to move—to take charge of the transport around Avocourt, and within 12 hours the camions and mules, the artillery and ammunition trains were once again on their way. When, on the night of October 3, the Americans faced the Germans for yet another drive forward, the enemy was firmly established on his fourth line of defence, the Kriemhilde Stellung. This line ran along the heights north of Beffu, Landres et St. Georges and Bantheville. At one point near Cierges, which had been evacuated, the Americans were in close contact with the Germans. The 1st Division had been brought from St. Mihiel to relieve the 35th, the 32nd had relieved both the 91st and the 37th; while the 3rd, fresh from the Marne fighting, took the place of the 79th. The Americans now had eight divisions in line. With the exception of the 2nd Division then on its way to Champagne to fight an isolated but brilliant action at the taking of Mont Blanc, a German stronghold in front of Gouraud's army, and the 42nd, still resting, the best that America could place on the fields of battle was arrayed against the Germans for the second phase.

On the morning of October 4 the general attack was resumed. The Germans, however, refused to be shocked into retirement this time. They stood where they were and fought, coolly, skilfully and resolutely. Their machine-guns, cleverly placed and artfully concealed, poured the deadliest of fires into the American lines. The total advance for the day was barely a kilometre, the heaviest fighting taking place around Exermont and Gesnes. The American 1st Brigade of Tanks astonished the infantry by their reckless contempt of danger and surprising audacity. One American officer, leading his tanks on foot in the fog, fell down a trench and was captured by the Germans. A few minutes later he was rescued by the sudden arrival of another detachment of tanks, and then set out on foot to find his own tanks. On his way he was knocked unconscious for about an hour by a shell, and later, his mask being torn off by concussion, he inhaled the fumes from a gas shell. Slowly his lungs were being burned away, but he fought on, until at seven in the evening he returned in a pitiful state to report to his commanding officer. "Gee, I wouldn't have given two cents for my life out there!" was all he remarked before being sent to a hospital. But his endurance and pluck was not exceptional among those tank men. They were in truth the best of Americans. The infantry, too, on that memorable day fought with a bravery that the heavy losses could not subdue. They were men of the 1st Division, proud of their record, determined to support the honour of the Division. No matter how sullen the fire, no matter how desperate the enemy resistance, they had to advance, and advance they did. But when night fell their losses had been terrible.

In the centre of the line the 32nd Division had found that the Germans had no intention of giving up the Kriemhilde Stellung without a costly struggle. They had endeavoured to take the village of Gesnes, which once before had been entered by the men of the 91st Division, only to be evacuated. But the 32nd suffered a similar fate. The village became theirs, but under the encircling fire that the Germans thrust upon them they were forced to retreat. Meanwhile on the extreme right the 80th Division were surprising the Germans in the Bois des Ogons with a combined tank and infantry attack which succeeded completely.

But it was to the Argonne forest itself that all the eyes of the command now turned. The Americans there were in the greatest of difficulties. The 77th Division, composed of every possible nationality and recruited mainly from the east side of the city of New York, had been called upon to fight under the most difficult circumstances imaginable. They had started off from La Harazee, near the Four de Paris, in the forest just to the east of where the road from Les Islettes to Vienne le Château crosses that from Varennes. There they found a steep wooded ravine and the lines of trenches climbed through the trees to the opposite heights. The Germans had constructed a complete system of light railways running through the entire

forest, and their dug-outs, snuggly clasping the sides of the ravines or nestling away in sheltered valleys, resembled miniature and picturesque villages. It was obvious that any frontal attacks through such a wilderness would demand the heaviest of costs, and, in fact, the French had found the Argonne an insoluble problem by direct attacks. It was the plan, of course, to let the forest fall like a ripe plum to the 77th Division, but the Germans realized that if they held any of the two forces on each side of the forest nothing could eject them from the forest itself. They naturally fought with great stubbornness along the Aire valley on the right of the forest and around Binarville against the French on the left. But they had a plan of defence for the forest itself which proved to be as effective and as efficient as anything they had ever put into force. The first day the Americans had advanced through the forest they had met with a weird and mysterious opposition. The trees seemed as if they were automatically pouring out lead into the advancing Americans. Through the shady glades of the forest the men, like pioneers of old, pressed on their way from tree to tree not with a hatchet but now with rifle in hand. The spirit of the early settlers of America was there, varied though the nationalities of the troops appeared to be, and the uncanniness and adventure of a forest fight appealed to many who had lived close to nature in America. Yet the Americans in the forest progressed as the two wings moved forward. At last, however, they were ensnared. The Germans, under cover of night, had put their infiltration tactics into effect. Knowing every nook of the forest, acquainted with every trench, they passed through the American lines at night and the next morning poured a disconcerting fire into the Americans' backs. The men of the 77th Division were forced to withdraw and, reorganized, attack the isolated German forces. But almost before the withdrawal had taken place the Germans had retreated by the way they had come, and reserved themselves for another penetration of the American lines the following night. Every attempt was made to close up these mysterious avenues by which the Germans entered and left at their free will. But to the immediate left of the American 77th Division was a regiment

American official photograph.

AMERICANS IN THE ARGONNE RESTING IN A SECOND-LINE TRENCH AFTER BEING IN ACTION.

of black troops of the 92nd Division commanded by black officers. General Pershing had expressed his doubt as to the efficacy of niggers commanded by niggers, and his prevision unhappily proved to be correct. The unknown of the forest had no attraction

occasional shells into where they thought the niggers were and made occasional night raids. With the aid of a few gas alarms they soon had the niggers contemplating the murkiness of the forest with staring eyes and gaping mouths. Under white officers the niggers might have

[Vandyk.

GENERAL PERSHING.

for the niggers, and the strongest discipline was needed to keep them there. The Germans, with a swift insight into the situation, and measuring all the latent possibilities of forest fighting the moment they discovered that the niggers were in the forest, commenced what was probably the most wonderful yet one of the most effective manœuvres of the war. They merely lit up the forest with Very flares and lights, fired

fought off the fear of realities and the fear of superstition, but the black officers were black the same as themselves, and therefore to their minds as ignorant and as helpless as themselves. The result was that one night the niggers disappeared, and left the flank of the 77th Division exposed to all the accomplished cunning in forest warfare of the Germans. The enemy did not fail to take every advantage of the situation.

Binarville, on the western edge of the Argonne

Forest, was before the war a pretty little town situated amid the most charming of surroundings. It had been reduced to two cellars by the ruthlessness of shell-fire, but the summer-houses and gardens in its vicinity were still maintained and extended by the Germans, whose officers, less than four miles from the actual zone of combat, could sit out on elegant verandahs enjoying the shady coolness of the forest ravines. It was in one of these ravines that an episode in American history, moving in its tragedy, sublime in its heroism, immortal in its endurance, was enacted by just over a thousand men. The main highway from Binarville to Apremont passes through one of the most wooded parts of the forest. Three kilometres east of Binarville it suddenly crosses a creek and steadily climbs the side of a steep and thickly covered ravine. It was here, and not at Charlevaux, as it has been stated in official reports, that the 1st Battalion of the 308th Infantry Regiment, nearly a company of the 307th, and some elements of the 306th machine-gun company, under Major Charles S Whittlesley, dug themselves in along the road and the side of the ravine. On the night of October 2 they suspected that they were in difficulties, for they found it impossible to establish liaison with either their right or left flanks. When they endeavoured to communicate with headquarters the runners never came back, and at last it was discovered that the Germans, under cover of the darkness, had penetrated to their rear through a concealed trench. Every attempt to re-establish contact with the flanks or rear was frustrated by the Germans, and when dawn broke the Americans found that the top of the ravine at their backs was manned by German machine-guns and that the opposite height above them was lined with Germans ready at any moment to turn trench-mortars and machine-guns down upon them. By carrier-pigeons the Americans communicated with headquarters, giving, however, what proved to be an inaccurate co-ordination, so that when aeroplanes were sent over to drop supplies to the besieged men all they saw was the food and ammunition intended for them floating calmly over to the German lines. Soon the food ran short, and the Germans began the attack. At the foot of the ravine lies a small creek filled with green-coated water. Volunteers had to descend down a precarious pathway through the trees to get water, but the Germans, ever alert, fired on every movement, and soon but a trail of dead Americans covered that pathway to the water side. With every German attack, all of which were beaten off, the casualties increased. The men did what they could for the wounded; but as the days passed food was exhausted, and the men themselves became weaker and weaker in physique, but not in resolve. Major Whittlesley passed around among the men, cheering them with the prospect of early relief, which they felt was certain to come. That competition of nationalities which ensured a splendid standard of bravery in the American Army, that rivalry between Italian and Turk, Jew and Russian, Greek and Armenian, Pole and German, Czecho-Slovak and Austrian, to prove that they were as good soldiers as anyone else, that endurance and bravery were no monopoly of any one race, and that the taunts of others were unjustified, was never better illustrated than along that lonely and deathly road. Jew and Greek, born, maybe, in the slums of New York, were as valiant as Macpherson or Casey, bred in New England or the far West. None were willing to give in, and when the Germans finally sent back a prisoner with an offer to surrender couched in terms of the most sickly phraseology and appealing for the wounded in the sacred name of humanity, a very vigorous and typical American reply, accompanied by a volley of fire, was all they received. It was later revealed in Germany, when a German officer present at the action was questioned, that the Germans had intended to burn out the besieged Americans with flame throwers. Such was the humanity to which they appealed. On the morning of the fifth day, when hope was fast dying, when the soldiers wrote what they thought must be their last letters, when the dead lay unburied because their comrades were too weak to dig graves, when the wounded were dying for want of medical supplies, the men heard the approach of barrage-fire, and guessed that succour was near at hand. At last some khaki-clad figures appeared through the trees of the ravine, and a few minutes later a round of handshaking and distribution of food brought smiles to the white, emaciated and unshaven faces of the besieged. Many of the men could hardly stand, and to keep them free from shell-fire on their way back the Americans purposely diverted their traffic from a road that, observed by the Germans, was under fire. Half of the force had

been lost in casualties, and several aeroplanes which had attempted to assist them lay in the forest, wrecked by German anti-aircraft and rifle fire. But the story of their glorious stand filled the whole Division with a pride and spirit that was reflected in every future action of the Division.

Their relief was made possible by a splendid attack that the Americans had made on a series of hills that sloped down from the Argonne Forest to the Aire and formed a menacing barrier to Grandpré. It began on October 6. The 28th Division turned its left flank, so as to face in a westerly direction, while the 82nd Division on its right also wheeled to the left with one brigade. But a regiment was missing, and a gap existed between the two divisions. The valley of the river running along the foot of the two hills between which Chatel Cherery nestles was very exposed to fire, but the Americans forded the Aire, speedily built a footbridge, and passing across the open fields under the direct machine-gun and artillery fire of the Germans, stormed the village, without, however, taking either of the two heights on its sides. From the summit of Hill 244 to the left, or south-west, of the village the Germans poured forth a particularly heavy fire into the advancing Americans, who, lying on its forward slope, were forced for some time to halt and reorganize for a further attack. At last the Americans of the 28th Division, having slowly sapped the Germans' strength by systematic wiping-out of machine-gun emplacements, stormed the summit, and driving the Germans before them, captured the hill. The other hill, perched on the right of the village, was left unmolested for a long time by the Americans, as the regiment to whom it had been assigned had not arrived in time. The enfilading fire, however, which the 28th Division was receiving from this height made it imperative that they themselves should send a battalion to seize this Hill 223, which was later handed over to the 82nd Division. Higher up the river, opposite Fleville, the 82nd Division stormed Cornay and Hill 180 just to its left, and all the heights that peered down into the Aire in that sector were held by the Americans. This bold operation, unexpected by the Germans, brought immediate results. Within four days the 77th Division, in the forest, had advanced as far as Chevières on the northern extremity of the forest just to the east of Grandpré itself, an advance of eight kilometres. On the right of the line the 1st Division fought its way through to the Kriemhilde Stellung along the hills to the right of the Aire, but to their right the Americans were experiencing the hardest of problems in breaking through the German defensive system. Attack after attack was planned, only to meet with partial success. The Germans resisted every attempt to eject them with a stubbornness which was surprising, and their machine-gun fighting, always excellent, piled up the American casualty list with melancholy speed. In numbers of men and in artillery they were certainly outclassed, but they were defenders ensconced on formidable defensive positions, experienced and skilful in the craft of machine-gun warfare, who, taking full advantage of every favourable turn of the countryside, coolly and sagaciously fought where it was worth while fighting and retreated when it was necessary to retreat. On the morning of October 9 the Americans attempted to break through the lines of hills on the left of the Bois de Valoup and to reach the Tranchée de la Mamelle, thus encircling the village of Romagne. But the attack did not obtain all the success it was anticipated. In the Argonne forest the 77th Division were meanwhile pushing on to the hills opposite Grandpré, passed through the Bois de Negremont, and, together with the 82nd on their immediate right, sent out patrols across the river. The French Fourth Army on the left of the American front had, after three unsuccessful attempts to move ahead from Binarville, pushed very rapidly ahead, and they were ten kilometres ahead of the Americans right up to November 1. Still facing the Kriemhilde Stellung all along their front right of the Aire river, the Americans determined to wear down the opposition by constant attacks. Divisions reduced to skeletons by casualties were relieved by fresh troops, and every preparation was made to break through the German line. On the 14th the advance was resumed in face of determined and cunning opposition. When the American artillery preparation ended, and the infantry were moving out of their fox holes (as the Americans described the holes in the earth where they sought shelter), the Germans laid down a counter-barrage that, catching the 5th Division, which was passing through the lines of the 3rd, depleted its ranks before it saw the enemy. But the men went on steadily,

and finally, when the day was closing, the Kriemhilde Stellung had been pierced. The 32nd Division took Romagne, while the 42nd captured Hill 288 in the Bois de Romagne. The 5th cleared the Bois Pultière, and a total advance of two kilometres was made for the day. The next morning the advance was continued, in spite of the severe losses of the 5th Division. But the Germans had thoroughly organized the Bois de Rappes, north of the village of Cunel, and this wood was the scene of much heavy fighting by this division. One battalion did reach the northern edge of the

bayoneted the Germans still kneeling at their guns. Men long after remembered that terrible day, and such Germans as did survive looked upon the Americans as if they had been savages from another world, so vividly impressed were they with that final charge of the 42nd Division men. Across the Aire the 78th Division, who had relieved the 77th, captured Grandpré after working around it, by storming the hill above it from the left. But the Bois des Loges could not be held, for, although captured, the Germans filled it with gas, and then, three days after the Americans left, infiltrated into



A MINED RAILWAY.

woods, but, cut off, it had to retreat, and during the next few days, while the 32nd were able to get through the Bois de Bantheville without taking the village, which was their objective, the 5th again and again thrust their troops into the woods. At last on the fourth occasion the 5th finally succeeded in capturing the woods, but there was only a ghost of a division, mustering less than one brigade in strength, that was relieved by the 90th Division. Then, on October 16, the 42nd Division won new glory at the Côte de Chatillon, defended by the 3rd Prussian Guard, though it was only after a continuous fight for 48 hours that the Americans, bayonet in hand, jumped out of their positions, scrambled through the wire and

it and occupied their old line. On October 23 the same Division captured Talma Farm after severe fighting, and drove the Germans out of Grandpré, while Champigneulles, north of Grandpré, was held by the Germans in spite of the efforts of the Americans.

The Americans were now in a position to make another assault on the German lines with some hope of driving the enemy everywhere beyond the Meuse and bringing the Mezières-Sedan-Montmedy railroad under the fire of light artillery. The naval guns and coast artillery were already pounding away at Montmedy from long range, but, of course, observation was imperfect, if not impossible, and the need was for a shorter range and

a wealth of artillery. The Americans had passed through the stiffest fighting they were ever to experience in Europe. The strain on the men, and particularly on the staffs, new to this kind of warfare as they were, was very heavy. Events had not progressed as rapidly as it had been expected, but in face of the very determined fighting of the Germans, in view of the configuration of the landscape, which gave every advantage to the enemy and none to the attackers, and in spite of the poor communi-

AMERICAN NAVAL 14-INCH GUN SHELLING THE MEZIÈRES-MONTMEDY RAILWAY.

cations, which the Americans had attempted to relieve by building lightning railroads, they had good reason to be satisfied that they had pierced the German lines of defence and stood ready to deliver a final and crushing blow. Rumours of peace had begun to run through the army, and the commanders, anxious that the men should not be influenced, issued strict injunctions that there was to be no slackening of effort or vigilance. Such injunctions were hardly necessary, for losses could not damp the soldiers' spirits, and they had but one desire, to drive out the enemy. The Germans, on the other hand, came to believe that the Americans would postpone a final attack until it was seen whether the Armistice feelers brought any results. They were mistaken, and every preparation was made for the assault. The 2nd Division, which had been fighting in Champagne under Gouraud, arrived to relieve the 42nd for the new attack. Marshal Foch had asked at the close of September for an American division to help the Fourth Army in the severe fighting around Somme Py in the Champagne. The French line, when the 2nd Division arrived, was just one kilometre north of Somme Py, and as the men moved up to the lines they saw nothing but dead lying in every direction and a shattered, treeless, chalky waste for miles around. The men said that they had never seen anything so horrible as that sector. In front of them was Mont Blanc ridge, manned very heavily by Germans and supported very effectively with artillery. The Americans were called upon to advance on one side in a north-westerly direction, pushing through the Grand Bois de Somme Py to the crest of the ridge, and on the other side in a north-easterly direction, through the Bois des Pines, also to the crest of the ridge. Medeah Farm here was the Germans' stronghold, and their fire from this point and all along the ridge was holding up the advance. The attack at 5.30 in the morning of October 3 was preceded by a five-minute intense barrage, and then the shock troops of the division moved on their way. Never before or since, the men declare, did they meet such desperate fighting Germans as on that day. No man wanted to give in. Death or wounds alone placed a man out of the front. As the Americans pressed in on the

enemy the Germans engaged in a hand-to-hand fight. Dying at their guns, they saw the triumphant Americans sweep down upon them with bayonet and knife, relentlessly wiping them out one after another. Then the Germans counter-attacked and poured barrage after barrage into the Americans. Both sides held grimly on, and it was not until October 6 that the 2nd Division gained all its final objectives. It was then relieved by the 36th American Division, after having astonished the French by its amazing dash and impetus. The division advanced nine kilometres and captured 2,296 prisoners from nine different German divisions, while they suffered 5,435 casualties.

Now this great fighting division with a splendid record came to win fresh laurels in the Argonne Meuse sector.

They went into the sector immediately opposite Landres et St. Georges where the Germans were resisting the heaviest.

The new attack was launched at 5.30 in the morning of November 1. The artillery fire of two hours which preceded the attack was probably one of the most terrible of the war. Far away on the left the Americans were pouring thousands upon thousands of gas shells of yperite into the Bois de Bourgogne, until it was so thoroughly drenched that nothing could possibly live there. This was one of the largest and most complete gas attacks seen. It accomplished its mission with every effect. Then in the centre the Americans were trying a new gas, which, penetrating through any mask, made the soldier vomit. He then removed his mask, and a lethal gas quickly finished the work. But the most terrifying of all sights was the thermite that the Americans used. Amid the flashes of the miles upon miles of artillery, giving the impression of a whole range of munition factories on fire, there suddenly appeared several blood-red bursts in the sky, that hung for a few minutes overhead, and then with a gigantic trail of red, hurled themselves to earth. The troops watched this uncanny and enthralling sight with curiosity and amazement, joking all the while at the terrible time that the enemy must be having.

The new American attack achieved a swift and decisive success. The Germans, under the constant battering of the Americans, had begun to waver, and it was decided to commence a retreat that was to be protected by delaying detachments. But the Americans, like dogs loosed from a leash, the moment they found that the Germans were leaving, pursued them with all possible speed. They quickly passed through the German lines and advanced to a depth of from five to six kilometres, capturing a number of villages and 3,600 prisoners on the first day. On the second day the gains were even greater The enemy was in full retreat, and the Americans were rushing their patrols up in motor trucks in pursuit. Buzancy fell to the 80th Division. Fosse, eleven kilometres from the starting point, was captured, and the Freya Stellung had been pierced at Bayonville. There was a slight delay on the right, but the 89th took Barricourt, and Beaufort was captured on the 4th, when a crossing of the Meuse, over the partially destroyed bridges, was effected. But it was the stirring advance of the 2nd Division that stood out from the achievements of those days. On the night of November 3, after the Marine Brigade had broken through the enemy positions, the 9th and 23rd infantry regiments, composing the other Brigade, were placed in column formation and marched along the road leading north to Beaumont. It was a hazardous and audacious manœuvre. There were, of course, the usual advance guard and flank patrols, but beyond this flimsy protection there was nothing to prevent the Brigade being cut off. The men marched all night long, covering eight kilometres. Through the Bois de Belval, the Bois du Four, and the Bois du Fort Gerache the Brigade passed. A few machine-guns opened fire on the column, but were quickly silenced, and the enemy in the morning was too completely taken by surprise to offer any resistance. It was a night of high adventure. At La Tuilerie farm the advance guards captured a party of German officers sitting around tables with the lights burning, while machine-gunners were found asleep at their posts, and many details of German troops, passing up and down the roads in what they thought was perfect security, were to their astonishment made prisoners by the audacious Americans.

Meanwhile the German artillery continued to fire to the rear of the Americans, thinking that the Americans were well south of the guns, but their surprise was comical when they and their artillery were surrounded in the morning. A more daring and at the same time skilful night march it is impossible to imagine. It was typical of American initiative and disregard

[American official photograph.

ENGINEERS PREPARING TO EXPLODE A MINE LEFT AS A TRAP BY THE ENEMY.

for the copy-book, and a splendid feat of American arms. The result of the march was that the flanks which had been stayed were released, that the German retreat turned swiftly to rout, and that for mile after mile the Americans had merely to chase the Germans as fast as motor transport would carry them. In the Argonne the Germans retreated 17 kilometres, the French and Americans joined hands at Chatillon sur Bar, and the forests of the west of the sector had been completely cleared. On the extreme right the Americans hastened down the left bank of the Meuse, where they captured an enemy messenger who was sent from a point 20 kilometres behind the front to find out why it was breaking. In three days the Americans had advanced 18 kilometres and captured over 5,000 prisoners and over 100 guns.

The Montmedy-Sedan Railway was under light artillery fire. This was the achievement of over a month's fighting.

Meanwhile the progress of the 29th, 33rd, 79th, and 26th Divisions on the east bank of the Meuse—in spite of the stubborn opposition of the Germans, who fought every yard of the way, and who, when the 33rd bridged the river at Brabant and Consenvoye early in October, flung ninety shells a minute into the American engineers—threatened to hem the Germans in. These divisions had, by a series of vigorous attacks, driven the enemy back to Damvillers and assisted in an invaluable degree in facilitating the advance of the rest of the line.

It was now the turn of the Germans to become immersed in a multitude of difficulties. So rapid and unexpected had the American advance become, so shaken were the Germans by the swift initiative of the Americans, that their immediate rear became one mass of confusion. The transport could not move, the infantry were thrown back on the supply units, and extrication became almost impossible. There was but one course for the Germans to follow, and that was to make a stand until their forces should be safely on the other side of the Meuse. It was on the heights just south of Beaumont that the Germans made a temporary stand, and then retreated across the Meuse. The 5th Division followed with an attempt to cross the river at Breuilles on the night of November 3, and succeeded in face of severe fire in getting two companies across who dug themselves in. The next day another crossing was attempted. But the bridges were destroyed by the German artillery, and the attempt failed. Then the

two companies of the 5th Division already over the river made a surprise attack across the canal which ran along the Meuse and organized the bridgehead. Another unit crossed the river by duckboard rafts directed by poles and cables, while many swam across. They established themselves in the Bois de Chatillon, and soon the whole Division was over the river with its artillery, and Dun sur Meuse and Milly were in their hands. The whole line of heights from Milly to Vilosnes was now held by the American.

But attention was suddenly transferred to the Meuse higher north, where one of the strangest and, in many respects, most amusing incidents of the war took place.

The 80th Division, on the extreme left of the American sector, had been relieved by the 1st on November 6, and the 78th by the 42nd. These two divisions, making one Corps, reached the heights overlooking the Meuse from west of Remilly, through Aillicourt to Mouzon. Suddenly the promise of the taking of Sedan loomed in view. It had been arranged that the French should enter the city in just revenge for 1870, and they readily accepted the offer of the 42nd Division that some of their troops should accompany them. But suddenly the commanding General of the 5th Army Corps, arriving in person, instructed the 1st Division to go ahead and take Sedan, while an Order was issued saying that it was the personal wish of General Pershing that boundaries were not to be recognized and that Sedan should be taken. The 1st Division swung rapidly to the left and passed through the sector of the 42nd. The latter was naturally very indignant and wanted to know where the 1st was going. Suspecting that the 1st were trying to get to Sedan before them, they issued all kinds of ominous threats, but they had not the slightest effect on the 1st Division. Sedan was never taken, although the Americans, in desperate rivalry, tried energetically to seize it. The Americans spent most of their time advancing on villages which the Allies already held, and the next day a stream of men of the 1st Division wandered down through the French zone anxiously enquiring where their Division was. The confusion was only eliminated when the 1st Division was withdrawn from the line. Meanwhile the 42nd Division established themselves at Wadelaincourt across the river from Sedan about one kilometre distant, and this was the nearest point that the Americans ever came to Sedan. There was a whole stretch of country between Buzancy, Vouziers and Sedan which was never touched by a shell. As the Germans retreated white flags were hoisted over the houses to show that civilians lived there, and the Americans just moved ahead without using their artillery. The French civilians, prisoners for over four years, welcomed them with curiosity and enthusiasm.

On the right the 5th Division was pushing forward its attack at high speed. Following the road due east from Dun, they captured Murvaux and descended into the valley right across the two heights of the Meuse. On November 9 its patrols reported that the enemy were in general retreat and an attack was ordered all along the line. The villages of Louppy and Remonville were easily captured, and in the evening the troops of one regiment swam the Loison and captured Jametz. The French, on their right, captured Damvillers, while two companies on the left of the 5th pushed north, capturing Mouzon. Then the 90th Division captured Stenay, advancing across the river and the canal through deep marshes till they reached the main road, while farther north the 2nd Division, the night before the armistice was signed, crossed the Meuse under the heaviest of opposition near Mouzon and Letanne. It was the final American drama of the war. At Mouzon the bridges were shot away as fast as the engineers laid them, and the Germans, taking a last revenge on the division that had fought them so well at the Marne and St. Mihiel, in the Champagne, and now in the Argonne Meuse, poured a deadly machine-gun fire into the troops. Yet they crossed. Lower down the river at Letanne, where the Germans only suspected but did not know that the Americans would cross, there were not at first the same difficulties. The Germans throughout the night maintained a constant fire on the roads, but the river was more or less clear of fire. The Americans here rowed over rafts, and securely lashing the first one to the other side joined them together with ropes so as to form a perfect bridgeway. The exploit was carried out with clockwork precision, each man having his appointed task, and the Germans fired harmlessly over their heads. The Germans quickly discovered what was happening, and the bridges became almost impassable under the hail of bullets that covered the river. But the 2nd Division crossed and silenced the Germans ensconced on the heights of the river.

When the order came for fighting to cease on November 11 all the positions had been maintained and the 5th Division was knee-deep in mud in the wilderness of the Woevre forest. The 32nd moved up to the right of the 5th Division on November 10, and advanced several kilometres west of Brandeville that day in a fog and was ready for a new attack when the armistice was signed.

The signing of the armistice and the cessation of hostilities came as a great surprise to the American troops, despite all the rumours of approaching peace. The men in the line in many places were more inclined to think that the order to cease firing at 11 in the morning of November 11 was a new form of strategy than the actual termination of fighting. In the Argonne-Meuse sector the Americans viewed with joy in their hearts the measure of their accomplishment. There had been a time when the ultimate cutting of the Montmedy-Sedan railway had seemed like a far-off dream, and many a prayer had been offered that they would finally succeed. Succeed they did after a mighty struggle, reflecting nothing but credit and glory on American arms, that lasted 47 days at a total cost to the Americans alone of 115,529, of whom 15,599 were killed. They had fought 607,212 Germans with a force of 631,405 Americans and 138,000 French; killed, wounded or taken prisoners 126,500 of the enemy, penetrated 47 kilometres into the German lines, and liberated 1,550 square kilometres of territory for the French, with 150 villages and towns. In prisoners they took 316 officers and 15,743 men, while 468 guns, 2,834 machine-guns and 177 trench mortars fell into their hands. On September 26, the first day of the drive, the First Army fired 313,087 rounds of ammunition from 2,775 guns.

What part the Americans played in the achievement of the capitulation of the Germans it is, of course, difficult to exactly estimate. But of this there is not the slightest doubt. The Americans startled the Germans by their audacity and willingness to learn all that was to be known in the great game of war and by their persistency and determination to impose their will on the enemy. The Germans, in a document issued during the Meuse-Argonne fighting, had remarked that it was not difficult to repulse the waves of Americans providing their troops did not become intimidated, but, unfortunately for the Germans, intimidation was inevitable. Hence the retreats and their humiliation. But it was in cutting the railway from Montmedy to Sedan that the Americans contributed inestimably to the victory of the Allies, and it was in the promise of what was yet to come that the Americans frightened the Germans into the armistice. No army in Europe was stronger than the Americans at the close of the war. What they required in experience they compensated for in numbers and freshness. On November 10 the First Army had been turned over to Major-General Hunter Liggett, while a Second Army under Major-General Robert L. Bullard had been formed. General Pershing became commander of the first American group of armies. The Second Army made a one-day attack on the front from north of St. Mihiel to the Moselle north of Pont à Mousson and captured St. Hilier, while with the British the IInd Corps, composed of the 27th and 30th Divisions, at the end of September assaulted and broke the Hindenburg line where the St. Quentin canal passes through a tunnel under a ridge, while the 37th and 91st, in Belgium with General Mangin's army, drove the enemy across the Escaut river and reached Audenarde. Then the Germans undoubtedly knew that the Americans were prepared for a further attack. November 14 was the day selected when the cream of the American forces, in what would have been the greatest drive of the war, were to shatter the Germans in an attack through Lorraine and Alsace, and that day would indeed have been a great day in American history. Fighting with a freshness that none could equal, with an ardour that only troops new to warfare know, with an intelligence that is given to few, the Americans, although their artillery, aeroplanes and tanks were almost all French and only the transport, equipment, ammunition and rifles were American, were the great hopes of the Allies, the force that was to swing the balance against Germany. In saying that that hope was more than fulfilled, that the weight in the balance was indeed heavy and decisive, we have expressed what every impartial Englishman associated with the American forces in battle can emphatically affirm. America did justice to her greatness. Her sons were the sons of a virile and fruitful nation, and those sons fought with a spirit, a nerve, and a power that saw the end of the war and the defeat of Germany.

CHAPTER CCCVI.

BRITISH MISSIONS IN AMERICA

DEVELOPMENT OF DEPARTMENTAL MISSIONS—MR. BALFOUR'S VISIT—CO-ORDINATION INTO BRITISH WAR MISSION BY LORD NORTHCLIFFE—SOME FUNCTIONS OF THE MISSION—LORD READING'S APPOINTMENT—AMERICAN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE—MUNITIONS AND FOOD—THE SHIPPING PROBLEM—BRITISH PUBLICITY WORK.

ANY record of the assistance rendered by the United States to the Allies naturally divides into two parts. The first ran from August, 1914, to the entry of the United States into the war, and the second thereafter until the signature of the Peace Treaties. Each period contained its own special difficulties for the numerous Allied Missions in the United States

The existence of a politically, economically and numerically strong section of the population of the United States of enemy origin or descent, naturally hostile to the Allies, was a formidable obstacle in the way of those who sought help for the Allies Backed by, and backing, an energetic and unscrupulous propaganda campaign of misrepresentation, which unfortunately had a long start, these friends of the Central Empires succeeded in some measure in creating an atmosphere of antipathy to the Allies, and especially towards Great Britain, the effects of which were only overcome after the United States had taken up arms. Hyphenated Americans were not slow to work upon the historical suspicion with which England and the English were regarded—a suspicion which it took a world war to dispel. A veil of secrecy, manufactured only too completely by British officialdom, enshrouded all British operations and effort. But for faithful friends in the United States the work of Allied agents would have been gravely hampered by these conditions.

The entry of the United States into the war killed the aggressively active hostility of the German- and Austrian-American community, As war enthusiasm grew, and sacrifice upon sacrifice and effort upon effort became insistently necessary for the American people themselves, they began to realize the immensity of the scale upon which Great Britain, with her huge military, naval and financial commitments, had answered to the call of desperate need by consecrating all her human, financial and material power to the cause of Freedom. While this growing appreciation removed or rarefied the atmosphere of unconcern, and often unfriendliness, toward Great Britain, other difficulties presented themselves.

Potentially the resources of the United States were seemingly inexhaustible. Munitions could be produced, money could be raised, food could be grown and raw materials could be supplied, all in huge quantities. But the demand for supplies for the great U.S. army, which was rapidly filling great training camps and later being shipped across to France, grew until, combined with similar demands for the Allies, even the colossal output of the American factories proved insufficient, and huge measures had to be organized to cope with the necessities of the situation.

But, however great the output in America, the nearest theatre of war was 3,000 miles away, and the usefulness of these resources of men and material was measured by the rate at which they could be carried across the Atlantic. Great Britain's vast mercantile marine was

largely occupied in transporting her millions of men and necessary supplies from the Mother country and the distant Dominions to the many theatres of war in which the British Empire was bearing the brunt of the fighting. Nevertheless she provided shipping for the transportation of many hundreds of thousands of tons of supplies and foodstuffs per month from America. As the need for supplies grew, the loss of tonnage through the sinking by submarines increased, and from the spring of 1917 until the end of the war every day was fraught with anxiety on account of this growing need and decreasing capacity.

The problem passed through varying phases after the entry of the United States. First, it was recognized, in view of the fact that perhaps a year might elapse before her contribution in fighting men would weigh in the scale, that the supreme need was for munitions. Then the winter of 1917-18, with its food shortages, awakened a fear of famine in Europe in the early months of 1918, and the cry was changed to "Food first." As will be seen from details given later, food was shipped in amazing quantities until there came that desperate call for men to stem the advance of the Germans in their terrible gamble with human lives for victory. No one who crossed from the United States to England during the critical months which followed March, 1918, will forget the crowded ships, with holds crammed to the utmost capacity with cargo, and yet with all possible accommodation arranged for troops. The number of men transported from the United States to Europe *per mensem* grew from 48,000 in February to 276,000 in June, despite the limited tonnage available.

These factors complicated the work of the Allied Missions, each of which had its own special problems. From isolated units which had been sent to the United States for specific purposes, such as the flotation of loans or the purchase of some particular kind of material, vast and many-tentacled organizations had evolved. The history of the British War Mission in the United States (the designation of the British departmental missions after being co-ordinated into an organic whole by Lord Northcliffe) was similar to that of the delegations of France, Italy, Russia, Belgium and other Allied countries, although on a larger scale.

In the early years of the war, the British Government made huge purchases through the Export Department of Messrs. J. P. Morgan & Co., the famous banking house of New York. This task was ably directed by Mr. E. R. Stettinius, one of the great business organisers



THE MAURETANIA CROWDED WITH AMERICAN TROOPS.

of the United States, who had previously been president of the Diamond Match Company, and was afterwards appointed Surveyor-General of (U.S.) Army Purchases. General Pease, who had been purchasing in the United States for the British Government, remained to assist Messrs. Morgan as technical adviser. He was succeeded in 1916 by Sir Ernest Moir, Bart., of the British Ministry of Munitions, who extended the organization of the Production Department of the Ministry of Munitions, with which was combined the Inspection Department, then under Brigadier-General F. F. Minchin, C.B. Sir Ernest Moir returned to England about the middle of 1916, and Sir (then Mr.) Henry Japp, who had been actively engaged in the work since July, 1915, assumed charge. Upon the subsequent departure of General Minchin, the Inspection Department was separated, being placed in charge of Brigadier-General (then Colonel) L. R. Kenyon, R.A., C.B. The primary function of the Production Department, which had been initiated by the late Lord Rhondda (then Mr. D. A. Thomas) during his visit in 1915, was to promote the rapid and efficient production of munitions by skilled advice; to record statistically the progress of production, and to deal with the weighing and checking of consignments at the seaboard. The Inspection Department had resident officers in the chief centres of munition production to examine munitions and raw materials for the Ministry of Munitions and other departments.

Another important department was started by the late Brigadier-General W. Ellershaw, of the British War Office, who went to the United States in 1915 with General Hermonius, K.C.M.G., the head of the Russian Mission in London. Their duty was to arrange for enormous supplies of munitions and railway material for Russia to be purchased in the United States by the British Government through Messrs. J. P. Morgan & Co., for the Russian Government.

As the British Government not only undertook responsibility for the placing and for the payment of these orders but also for the shipping to Russia, Brigadier-General Ellershaw was accompanied in 1915 by a British shipping expert, Mr. T. S. Catto, who had had long experience in shipping matters in England, Russia and the United States. Mr. Catto organized a department in New York City to take charge of the work of receiving the deliveries from the factories, arranging the railway transportation to the ports, and the shipment to Russia. This developed into special agreements between the British and Russian Governments for the supply of British and Russian tonnage, and the supervision of all Russian shipments from the United States and Canada by Mr. Catto

VISCOUNT NORTHCLIFFE.
Chairman of the British War Mission.

as representative of the British Ministry of Shipping on the Russian Transportation Committee in New York.

In 1916 great difficulties arose in the United States in regard to some of the orders for shells placed by the British Government for account of the Russian Government. To settle these difficulties the Anglo-Russian Committee was formed, of which Mr. John Sampson and Captain T. E. Crease, C.B., R.N., were the first British members. The former was succeeded by Brigadier-General F. F. Minchin, C.B., who returned to New York specially for the work of this Committee. Captain Crease returned to England early in 1917, and General Minchin in June, 1917, and they were succeeded by Captain William A. Burton and Lieut.-Col. J. Giffard.

Before 1916 there was no direct supervision of British shipments from the United States, and various representations were made to the Admiralty Transport Department (afterwards the Ministry of Shipping) upon the subject. In the summer of 1916, Sir (then Captain)

Connop Guthrie was appointed to take charge of this great and important work. This department undertook the organization of the railway arrangements for the transportation of war and food supplies from all parts of the United States to the various ports and their shipment to Great Britain, working in close relation with the Inter-Allied Traffic Executive.

In the early part of 1917 the Ministry of Shipping invited Sir (then Mr.) Ashley Sparks, head of the Cunard Line in New York, to represent the Ministry in connexion with the purchase of steamers in the United States and the placing of building orders. The Ministry also invited Sir Thomas Royden, Bart., Deputy-Chairman of the Cunard Line, to represent its important interests at Washington. In February, 1918, Sir Connop Guthrie was appointed by the U.S. Government to be a member of the American Shipping Control Committee. He was succeeded by Sir Ashley Sparks as head of the New York office of the Ministry of Shipping.

One of the earliest and most important departments was known as the Wheat Export Co., Inc., this form of organization being



SIR HARDMAN LEVER, K.C.B.
Supervised British Finances in U.S.A.

adopted for reasons of convenience. The company, which was under the direction of Mr. G. F. Earle and Mr. H. T. Robson, operated without profit as an official administration, purchasing grain supplies for the Allies, and had branches in many different cities of the United States and Canada. It acted in close cooperation with the United States Food Controller, and also with French and Italian representatives.

Finance, the foundation of the whole structure, was the special care of Sir Hardman Lever, K.C.B., who was appointed Financial

[Russell.

SIR ERNEST MOIR.
Organized the Production Department of the Ministry of Munitions.

Secretary to the Treasury. He had the supervision of all financial interests of the British Government in the United States, and worked in close cooperation with Messrs. J. P. Morgan

BRIGADIER-GENERAL L. R. KENYON, R.A., C.B.
Succeeded Brigadier-General Minchin in the Inspection Department.

& Co., the financial agents of the British Government.

All these missions, as well as others of less importance more or less independent of each

other, acted under direct instructions from their respective Ministries in London.

Then came the historic visit of Mr. A. J. Balfour to the United States immediately following the entry of that country into the war.

SIR CONNOP GUTHRIE, K.B.E.
Head of the New York Office of the Ministry of Shipping

The Mission consisted, besides Mr. Balfour and his staff, of Lord Cunliffe, Rear-Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair, Major-General G. T. M. Bridges, and their respective staffs. The Mission reached Washington on April 22, 1917; and two days later the French Mission, headed by M. Viviani, the French Minister of Justice and former Prime Minister, and Marshal Joffre, arrived in the United States. Both Missions were received with the greatest enthusiasm and were fêted everywhere they went. New York accorded Mr. Balfour a splendid reception. He drove through the streets literally packed with cheering crowds, and the Mayor (Mr. Mitchel) and Mr. Choate welcomed him on behalf of the city. Mr. Balfour, in reply, declared that he had never been so moved by any public demonstration in the whole course of his career as he had been by the enthusiasm of the New York populace. One of Mr. Balfour's most important engagements was his address to the United States Senate; but the great part of the time he spent in the United States was taken up in conferences with President Wilson and the members of the United States Government. The effect of his visit was briefly summarized at the time in the following language:—

President Wilson's League of Nations plan was discussed formally, but not conclusively. No definite diplomatic decisions are known to have been made, Germany's plan of a great Middle European Empire was discussed, and attention was directed to the necessity of a complete restoration of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro as a counter. New Russia's opposition to conquest and indemnity was not considered antagonistic, as all the changes proposed were on the basis of nationality or the return of lost provinces. The British expressed confidence that all would turn out well with Russia. The restoration of Poland and the situation in Ireland and Mexico were also discussed.

Far-reaching understandings were arrived at regarding trade matters in general. The United States will give the Allies preferential treatment in commerce. A joint Allied buying commission is expected to result from the conference, assuring uniform prices among all the Allies, to prevent extortion, and distribute supplies scientifically and economically. The United States will cooperate in maintaining the British blockade of Germany and will participate through her Consuls in rationing Holland and Scandinavia, but probably will replace the present British system of "letters of assurance" by a system of export licences. As far as possible the British system will be maintained, and means will be taken to prevent American products reaching firms dealing regularly with the enemy.

A definite understanding has been reached covering the sale of American and Canadian wheat to the Allied



SIR ASHLEY SPARKS.
Represented the Ministry of Shipping in connexion with the purchase of steamers.

Wheat Executive. The control of the munitions output has been similarly centralized.

The United States Government is considering an invitation which the British Government has issued to all the Allied Governments and their permanent representatives to sit in commission in London on questions of wheat, munitions, shipping, and general supplies.

In his farewell address to the American people Mr. Balfour warmly expressed his thanks for the kindness and sympathy with which the Mission had been received. The

Sir Henry Japp. Sir Eric Drummond.

Sir Hardman Lever. Sir George Foster (Canadian Minister of Commerce). Mr. Balfour. Major-General Bridges. Rear-Admiral de Chair.

SOME LEADING MEMBERS OF THE BALFOUR MISSION.

message was delivered through the Washington newspaper correspondents, who were gathered together at the National Press Club.

Mr. Balfour in the course of his speech said :—

I came with high hopes to Washington. These hopes have been so far surpassed by the reality. I expected that I should be received with kindness, courtesy, and sympathy, but the kindness, courtesy, and sympathy which I have received have been far in excess of anything I can pretend to myself ever to have deserved. It is a sad thought to me that the moment for parting has come with those upon whom I looked as friends before I knew them, and who have become my friends in very truth. I shall be separated from them at all events during the continuance of the present war. After that it may be my happy lot to return in a less responsible official position to renew those connexions which, for the moment, are severed by the tragic events in which we all are equally concerned.

But, gentlemen, the Mission could not stay for ever. It has received a welcome which none of its members will forget, and to me falls the pleasant duty, on my own behalf and on behalf of my friends, of saying to you, and all whom you can reach, how deeply we thank the American public for what they have done. There are those who have said that the preparations of the United States are proceeding slowly and haltingly, and that a country which has been in the war some 40 days ought to have done far more than has actually been accomplished. For my own part, I think that those who speak in accents like these know little of the actual way in which public life is and must be carried on in free countries.

At the beginning of the 40 days for which so little preparations had been made the country was anxiously indeed watching events. It had not begun to make any preparations necessary for taking part in the gigantic struggle. I think what has been performed in those 40 days is most remarkable. It is quite true that the action of the Executive Government may have been delayed by the fact that certain measures placed before Congress took some time to pass, and some of them have not yet been passed, but I have lived with representative assemblies all my life, and who is it that supposes that representative assemblies are going to make great and new departures in public policy solely at the waving of a wand ? Such expectations are vain, and it is useless to entertain them.

I am quite confident that Congress will not refuse the President and the Government all the powers, great as they are, which are absolutely necessary if the war is to be successfully pursued. I am not only persuaded that it will give these powers, but I am persuaded that when these powers are given they will be used to the utmost and with as little delay as the imperfection of human institutions and human beings will allow to throw the great, and I believe the decisive, weight of America to the full extent into the great contest.

In that belief I shall leave these shores. In that belief I shall make my report to the Allied Governments, so far as I can reach them, on the other side of the Atlantic ; and in that belief I look forward with cheerful confidence to the days which will, undoubtedly, be days of trial and difficulty, but beyond which we surely can see the dawn of a happier day, coming not merely to the kindred communities to which we belong, but to all mankind, and all nations which love liberty and pursue righteousness.

In the interests of his personal safety it was thought well by the U.S. State Department that Mr. Balfour's journey West to Chicago should be cancelled, and so he returned at the end of May to England ; but various experts who went out with his Mission remained to aid the American Government. The presence of Mr. Balfour and his subordinates was a great help to the President in his task of awakening the country to the war The Mission gave the U.S. Government much useful information relating to the drafting of war measures

MR. BALFOUR IN AMERICA.

regarding naval and military matters. Satisfactory schemes of cooperation were worked out and adequate plans were formulated for dovetailing American commercial policy when the necessary laws could be obtained from Congress. Nothing in the shape of written agreements was settled, but much was done to bring Washington and London to see more nearly eye to eye regarding questions both economical and political.

Such was the position when, on May 31, 1917, Lord Northcliffe was appointed by the War Cabinet to take charge of these departmental activities (thus following the example of France, which had appointed M. André Tardieu as High Commissioner to the United States). It was felt that the time had arrived to co-ordinate their activities in order to prevent overlapping. New questions were arising every day between the Missions and (1) the various Ministries in London; (2) the corresponding U.S. Government departments; and (3) the representatives of the Allies. The British Government was of opinion that many of these questions could be dealt with more efficiently and promptly in the United States, and large powers for this purpose were given to Lord Northcliffe, as head of the British War Mission.

Lord Northcliffe made his headquarters in New York, that city being the centre of

HON. R. H. BRAND, C.M.G.
Deputy Vice-Chairman of the British War Mission.

commerce and finance, from which are organized the operations connected with the purchasing of steel, copper, oil and food-stuffs; shipping; railway transport; news; and finance. Another office was opened in Washington, where Sir Charles Gordon, G.B.E., Vice-Chairman of the Mission and representative of the Minister of Munitions, made his headquarters. Other prominent members of the Mission were the Hon R H. Brand, C.M.G. (Deputy-Vice-Chairman), Sir (then Mr.) Andrew Caird (Administrator), and Lieut.-Col. Sir (then Major) Campbell Stuart. The two offices were connected with each other and with the important branches of the Mission by private telegraph wires.

The functions of these offices were officially described under the following heads:—

1. The performance of the executive duties of the Chairman of the Mission in accordance with the terms of reference drawn up by the War Cabinet.

2. The re-organization of various parts of the Mission, and the guidance of new departments set up in accordance with instructions from home.

3. The formation of a central organization to which were referred all matters of major importance which arose in connexion with the work of the various missions throughout the United States.

SIR CHARLES GORDON, G.B.E.
Vice-Chairman of the British War Mission.

4. The co-ordination of the various parts of the Mission so as to eliminate duplication of work.

5. The reception and guidance of various specialists who, from time to time, arrived from home with definite missions. These gentlemen were informed of the rules and regulations set up by the United States under which their business must be carried out, and they were placed in touch with all the different British and American departments with which they ought to cooperate.

6. Supply of news and views to the American press *when asked for.*

7. The reception and bringing together of distinguished and influential Americans and Britons.

8. The interviewing of innumerable applicants for information as to British war methods.

9. Bringing over experts to supply information asked for by Americans.

10. The direction of countless inventors to the proper channels for the investigation of their ideas.

Notwithstanding the many calls made upon his time by the direction of these multitudinous duties in New York and Washington—the work of purchasing alone was so great as to involve the expenditure of between £10,000,000 and £15,000,000 every week—Lord Northcliffe found time to supplement the work of the British Bureau of Information (which was in charge of Sir Geoffrey Butler, and is described

in detail later) by delivering speeches at innumerable gatherings in New York and by undertaking tours in the Middle West and Canada, giving facts and figures of the extent of the effort of Great Britain and the Dominions in the land fighting, in the work of the Navy, and in the provision of money, shipping, coal and other vital necessities of her Allies, while herself recruiting huge armies. He seized all opportunities to acquaint the people of the United States with the immensity of the British effort, and especially during his tour in the Middle West he emphasised the necessity for food conservation and the acceleration of shipbuilding to meet the submarine menace, then at its height. He visited Cleveland, Chicago, Kansas City, St. Louis, and Dayton, among other places, and he and members of his Mission visited many important establishments connected with the war in these districts. At Dayton he pr sented to Mr. Orville Wright the medal of the Royal Society of Arts, awarded in recognition of his pioneer achievements in aeroplane construction.

One of the most spectacular gatherings Lord Northcliffe addressed was the final meeting of the British recruiting week in July, 1917, in Madison Square Garden, New York, which was attended by 12,000 people. He said :—

We, who are here to-night, have taken a fresh step towards realizing the idea, hitherto considered a dream, of a federation of the two English-speaking peoples, who between them occupy so vast a proportion of the globe. The idea of such a federation has not only been pronounced a dream, but has also been denounced as an undesirable, even a dangerous dream. A few years ago the thought of a temporary alliance for definite purposes would have been considered outside the range of probability; it would have been dismissed as an idle, unprofitable and Utopian speculation. If anyone had foretold three years back that British troops would have been cheered as they went through American cities he would have been laughed at. Anyone who had prophesied that these Canadian Highlanders would march up Bunker Hill would have been a source of anxiety to his friends as a likely inmate of a madhouse.

Here to-night for the first time in history an appeal is being made to men of American and British birth to enlist in the armies which are to fight side by side for the common aims of their two countries. Here to-night we have what we never had before—American and British speakers on the same platform with the same object in view, and that object the raising of forces to uphold the ideals which underlie our common civilization. We want you to volunteer. Do not wait for compulsion. Although a volunteer is not worth more than the pressed man to the Army, he is worth a great deal more to himself. He is his own man. He has the proud and happy consciousness that he has done his duty and has proved his manhood of his own volition. The chief factor which is delaying the Allies in attaining their aims is the U-boat warfare. The way to beat the U-boats is to organize and equip speedily armies which will break and destroy the evil forces of militarism, reaction, and

"KILTIES" RECRUITING IN BOSTON FOR THE BRITISH ARMY.

savagery, and which will lay the basis of a brotherhood of nations, and pave a road towards lasting peace.

Under Lord Northcliffe's direction many developments of the British War Mission were initiated. One important change, necessitated by the entrance of the United States into the war, was the creation of a new Purchasing Department under Sir (then Mr.) J. W. Woods, a well-known Canadian business man. This department took over the difficult and exacting work of purchasing supplies, previously performed by Messrs. J. P. Morgan and Co. Commissions sent from Great Britain from time to time to purchase special commodities acted in cooperation with this department. The vitally important work of arranging for the purchase and shipment of oil supplies from the United States for the British Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry and Board of Trade was entrusted to an Oil Committee in charge of Sir Frederick Black, K.C.B. A strong Food Mission, headed by Mr. Owen Hugh Smith, arrived in New York to organize the purchase of foodstuffs other then cereals, *e.g* meat, butter, cheese, lard, bacon, hams and canned provisions, in conjunction with the Allied Provisions Export Commission. Sir Guy Granet became chairman of this commission and represented the British Ministry of Food in the U.S.A. The Royal Commission on Sugar was represented by Sir Joseph White Todd.

Of great importance was the organization of the Aeronautical Supplies Department, first under the late Lieutenant-Commander B. O. Jenkins, R.N.V.R., and subsequently under Brig.-General J. D. Cormack, C.M.G., to deal with the supply of aircraft of all kinds and of the engines, parts, materials and equipment needed for aircraft. Lieut.-Col. R. M. Beckett acted on behalf of the Timber Controller (Board of Trade) as adviser in connexion with the purchase of timber on British Government account, and especially of timber for aeroplane construction.

Military missions were already in existence for recruiting and the purchase of remounts. The Recruiting Mission, commanded by Brigadier-General W. A White, C.B., C.M.G., had charge of all enlistments in the United States for the British and Canadian Armies and of all questions of exemptions from service of British subjects. Recruiting offices were established in all the more important cities and many thousands of British subjects were recruited for service. The Remount Commission under Brigadier-General Sir Charles Gunning, Bart., C.M.G., although having its headquarters in Montreal, conducted purchasing operations on a large scale in the Middle West. An additional mission, appointed early in 1918 by the Ministry of Munitions and commanded by Major-General J. W. Headlam, C.B., D S O., dealt with the supply of guns, machine-guns and small arms.

An important feature of the work of the Mis-

BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. A. WHITE, C.B. (on right).
Head of British Recruiting in the United States.

sion was the provision of experienced British officers for cooperating with and advising the United States authorities on questions of training and methods of naval, military and air forces. This educative work was generally performed by wounded and disabled officers, who were stationed at the various training camps throughout the United States.

Notable help was rendered by Sir Berkeley Moynihan, the eminent Professor of Clinical Surgery at Leeds University, who was assigned by the British Government to advise the U.S. Army Medical Corps in its preparations. One of his chief engagements was an address to 1,500 medical men in New York. Of different character, but also greatly successful, was the Labour Mission headed by Sir Stephenson Kent, which, under U.S. official auspices, visited Pittsburg, St. Louis, Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland,

BRIG.-GENERAL SIR CHARLES V. GUNNING, BART., C.B., C.M.G.
Chairman of the Remount Commission.

Buffalo, and Boston, meeting representative gatherings of employers and employees to discuss Labour matters and to give information as to the methods of meeting similar problems adopted in Great Britain.

During Lord Northcliffe's tenure of office problems arose which made it, in his judgment, desirable that Great Britain should have the best possible authority to advise on international finance and legal matters, and Lord Reading paid his second visit to the United States since the outbreak of war—the first being in the autumn of 1915 in connexion with the Anglo-French Loan. Lord Reading arrived in September, 1917, and undertook the difficult and delicate task of assisting in the adjustment of questions of Anglo-American and Canadian finance.

Lord Northcliffe and Lord Reading returned

SIR STEPHENSON KENT, K.C.B.
Director General, Munitions Labour Supply.

to England in November, leaving Sir Frederick Black as acting-Chairman of the British War Mission. Lord Northcliffe, on being received by the King, was requested to convey His Majesty's thanks to the members of the Mission for their admirable work. A few days later it was announced that the King had conferred an earldom upon Viscount Reading and a viscounty upon Lord Northcliffe. On January 8, 1918, the official announcement of Lord Reading's appointment as British Ambassador at Washington and High Commissioner in the United States was made in the following terms:—

On the departure on leave of Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, his Majesty's Ambassador at Washington, the King has been graciously pleased to appoint the Earl of Reading, G.C.B., K.C.V.O., Lord Chief Justice of England, to be his High Commissioner in the United States in the character of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary on Special Mission.

Lord Reading, as High Commissioner and Special Ambassador, will have full authority over the members of all British Missions sent to the United States in connexion with the active prosecution of the war, and the labours of such Missions will be completely under his direction and control.

Lord Northcliffe will remain in London as Chairman of the London Headquarters of the British War Mission to the United States.

In an interview Lord Northcliffe gave the following interesting details concerning the task which confronted Lord Reading:—

The nation is indebted to Lord Reading for taking up the tremendous task of representing the War Cabinet, the British War Mission to the United States, the Treasury, the Ministry of Munitions, the Air Board, and in fact all British interests in the United States at a time when the interdependence of the United States and the United Kingdom on each other's war efforts has assumed a scale little imagined by the public.

The speed of the Anglo-American war effort has been impaired in the past by the need of one controlling head

SIR FREDERICK W. BLACK, K.C.B.
Acting-Chairman of British War Mission after Lord Northcliffe's return.

of all British affairs in the United States. Precious weeks have been wasted in correspondence and equally precious hours in cabling.

From the Embassy at Washington Lord Reading will be in touch by private telegraph wires with all the great departments of the Mission in New York.

I am not in the secret of his instructions from the Cabinet, but no doubt he has been given the same full authority to act promptly and on his own judgment that he possessed during his last momentous visit to the United States and Canada.

The diplomatic and financial aspects of Lord Reading's mission are only part of it. He will be in charge in the United States of an enormous organization. While I was in New York the purchasing department alone celebrated its 50,000th cable.

The daily difficulties in Lord Reading's task will be mitigated by the great goodwill extended to him by the Government and people of the United States, and by the President himself. His knowledge of languages will facilitate discussions with the Ambassadors and heads of Allied War Missions at Washington.

It is no reflection upon our Ambassadors abroad that it is in these times necessary to reinforce embassies by High Commissioners and Missions. Up till 1914 the British representatives in the United States were housed in one substantial mansion at Washington. To-day our combined establishments demand buildings which would make a very considerable showing in Whitehall.

The task of supervising the London establishment of the British War Mission, which I have willingly accepted, is growing daily with the constant arrival of the heads of American Government Departments and others requiring information and assistance. We have found it necessary to keep Crewe House open night and day, seven days a week, in order that there may be no delay in our communications with the United States.

Lord Reading arrived back in Washington in February, 1918. His principal assistants were Sir Hardman Lever, who was Assistant Commissioner for Finance, Sir Henry Babington Smith, K.C.B., C.S.I., who acted as Assistant Commissioner in other departments of the Mission; Major-General Swinton; Sir Grimwood Mears, K.B.E; and Major Craufurd-Stuart, D.S.O. After completing the reorganization of the British Embassy staff in co-ordination with the British War Mission, Lord Reading devoted himself to the food problem, which was then so acute and urgent. One of his first acts was to meet all the most influential correspondents in Washington and to establish cordial relations with the American Press—a most wholesome and essential thing. The result was to remove a widespread misapprehension existing in the United States about Great Britain. The impression was abroad that England was maintaining her own trade, despite the war, but Lord Reading made it perfectly plain that Great Britain was not doing "business as usual," but had sacrificed virtually all trade non-essentials and had adopted the most drastic measures for the release of shipping for the Trans-Atlantic war service and was carrying nothing but food and war supplies.

From the time the United States entered the war the tendency was always toward inter-Allied organization and co-ordination. In August, 1917, Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Belgium, and Serbia entered into an agreement not to make purchases of materials and supplies except through, and as approved by, a commission, composed of Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, Judge Lovett and Mr. R. S. Brookings, of the Council of the War Industries Board. This commission undertook to supply the Allies' needs promptly and cheaply without interfering with the United States requirements.

Gradually an elaborate system of controls and licences was organized, as a result of which the Allied Missions received priority in obtaining supplies for war requirements next after the U.S. forces and Shipping Board. Somewhat complicated at first, the defects were remedied

as speedily as possible, and the system was continued successfully until the end of the war. One striking development was the organization in London in December, 1917, of the Inter-Ally Council on War Purchases and Finance, which had been under discussion in America since the visit of Mr. Balfour. The following delegates representing the various countries were present at the meeting at which the completion of the organization was arranged:—

GREAT BRITAIN.—The Right Hon. Austen Chamberlain, M.P., Lord Buckmaster, and General Smuts, K.C.

FRANCE.—M. Clementel, Minister of Commerce; Major Hausser, representing M. Loucheur, Minister of Munitions; and M. Bignon, member of the Chamber of Deputies, special delegate of the French Government to the Council.

ITALY.—Baron Mayor des Planches and Professor B. Attolico; Italy's third delegate, General A. Mola not being able to be present.

UNITED STATES.—Mr. Oscar T. Crosby, who was the sole delegate of the United States, and at the request of the other delegates was President of the Council. With Mr. Crosby was Mr. Paul Cravath, of New York, acting as advisory counsel.

After the meeting it was announced that the further meetings of the Council were to be attended by M. Klotz, the Finance Minister of France, or delegates representing him, and also by the Finance Ministers of Great Britain and Italy or their delegates. The Council would hold its sessions alternately in Paris and London, and the office of the Secretary would be in Paris. There would also be a London office in charge of a London Secretary.

This was the first permanent inter-Allied body in which the United States was represented. It resulted from efforts initiated some months previously by Mr. McAdoo, and had for its primary object the consideration of the needs of the Allied Governments for purchases in the United States. By reason of the necessary connexion between the proper determination of these needs in the light of the possibility of obtaining goods in neutral countries, purchases in those countries likewise received consideration from the Council. A co-ordinated study of these needs was therefore made, and when conclusions were reached the corresponding financial needs were considered. The recommendations of the Council then went to the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States and the Allied Governments concerned. The Council at the same time indicated the priorities as desired by the respective Allied Governments. The final decision as to priorities as between these demands and the demands of the United States for their own purposes were made at Washington. To facilitate the British part of the work, the branches of the Mission in the U.S.A. dealing with war supplies were grouped into a Department of War Supplies, of which Sir Charles Gordon became Director-General, in May, 1918. Mr. C. F. Whigham, of Messrs. Morgan, Grenfell & Co., acted as Deputy-Director-General.

In surveying the vast and varied activities of the Allied Missions, those connected with finance were pre-eminent, taking precedence

THE EARL OF READING.
High Commissioner and Special Ambassador to the United States.

even of such vital matters as munitions, shipping, food, oil supplies and aircraft. Without the necessary credit, none of these supplies could have been obtained.

From those critical days at the end of July, 1914, American finance was intimately concerned in the war. The sudden outbreak of hostilities found the United States a debtor to Europe for loans and great supplies of goods received in the spring. Normally the debt would have been worked off by the summer and autumn agricultural shipments, especially of cotton. War took America by surprise. Consternation reigned at the prospect of the drain of gold to Europe to meet American liabilities, the liquidation into money of foreign-held American securities, and the

THE UNITED STATES TREASURY BUILDING, WASHINGTON.

consequent rises of foreign exchanges. Cotton became a drug on the market.

In great haste the leading banks of the country organized a gold pool of $100,000,000 to furnish exchange on Great Britain. At the same time the U.S.A. Treasury Department invited the British Government to send representatives to this country for a conference on ways to meet America's further obligations to Britain. These two steps seemed to create a new confidence. Convinced that America meant to pay what she owed, her foreign debtors forewent most of their demands for immediate settlement, and the gold pool operated mainly as a moral influence. By the time Sir George Paish and Mr. B. P. Blackett, the British commissioners, reached the United States, late in October, the crisis had passed. Its passing was hastened by the rapid extension of the British Navy's control of the Atlantic shipping lanes.

For the United States there was the dawning of a new day. With August, 1914, there was the last adverse balance in international trade. In September there was a favourable balance of $16,341,722. It advanced by leaps and bounds until at the end of the fiscal year in June, 1915, it stood at over a billion dollars. Of the $2,768,589,000 exports in the first year of the war the United Kingdom took $911,792,000, and France $369,397,000, where together they had taken $750,000,000 in the preceding year. The shipment of explosives and firearms was then in its infancy, though it had grown from $9,000,000 a year to nearly $50,000,000. Cotton—but largely because of the reduced price—fell off from $610,500,000 to $376,200,000. Foodstuffs were far and away the largest factor in bringing about the change, the exports of these commodities increasing more than half a billion dollars over 1913-14.

In 1914 the chief influence of these orders was in supplying a much-needed stimulus to industry. There was unemployment all over the United States, but they speedily set that right. They did more than that, too, for they allayed a great apprehension. This was the fear that as the war went on Europe would flood the United States with American securities and absorb all her liquid capital, leaving none for the needs of American business. But when it began to be seen, through the orders for munitions and raw materials, that however many American stocks and bonds Europe disposed of in the United States, she would need all the proceeds of them, and more, to pay for what she had to buy in the United States, there was a notable change of feeling.

This problem, in fact, of how to pay for all they must buy in the United States was one of constant concern to the Allies throughout the war. They sold their investments in America

to an estimated total of three billions of dollars; publicly and privately they borrowed in the American market a sum equally great before the United States entered the war.

After the first shock of the war had been withstood, there began, early in 1915, the movement of gold from Europe to the United States. Altogether upwards of $1,200,000,000 was sent. The consequent upsetting of exchange was followed by the offer of American securities to American investors. During the year 1915 there was taken up by the American people a $500,000,000 joint loan of England and France and the bankers supplemented this by a $50,000,000 credit. In 1916 the United States took $550,000,000 in secured loans of the United Kingdom, $100,000,000 in loans of the French Republic, and $110,000,000 in loans of the French cities. By December 31, 1918, the total of Great Britain's war issues in the U.S.A. was $1,308,400,000, those of France totalled $845,000,000, those of Russia $160,000,000, and those of Italy, $29,000,000.

To understand the significance of these figures it must be remembered that American investment in the securities of foreign Governments before the war was almost negligible. About $125,000,000 of Russian and Japanese bonds had been bought during the war between those countries in 1904-05, but most of them had been disposed of again in Europe. All the more important banks supported the European issues with a determinatiom that worked wonders with investors. A publicity campaign of education was inaugurated and cooperative measures were taken. Subscriptions to loans in France and England were received by the banks and cabled abroad as a corollary service. Every effort along these lines was, of course, opposed and impeded by the very active agents of Germany, and there was a very large body of adverse opinion in the U.S.A. at the start which had to be overcome. It was overcome, however, and the psychological effects of that accomplishment were of immense value to the Allies as well as to the United States when it took up arms later on.

The entry of the United States into the war had been foreseen for months. A Council of Defence, made up of the leaders in the nation's great industries, had given long consideration to the probable necessities of the Government when hostilities should actually begin, and was prepared with plans for mobilising the country's resources for the prosecution of the war.

In the common interest of the United States and the Allies, it was thought desirable that prices of the commodities most in demand for purposes of war, including some foodstuffs, as well as iron and steel, copper, coal, &c., should be fixed at a certain maximum for each which, while serving on the one hand to prevent "profiteering," should, on the other, encourage quantity production. Notwithstanding the controversy which raged over this proposal, it was adopted. In this connexion the Council of Defence and its subordinate agencies made

MR. W. G. McADOO,
United States Secretary of the Treasury.

valuable use of their technical knowledge of the several industries affected, and by appeals to patriotism, judiciously mixed with threats of requisition, succeeded in establishing maximum prices for many commodities which were considerably lower than the prevailing market figures.*

It was, of course, realized that it would probably be a year, or more likely 18 months, before the United States could land an army of reasonable size in France. Meanwhile, it was plainly her work to do all she could to help the Allies. It was an open secret that they were almost at the end of their resources in the United States. The first thing to do was to lend them the credit of the United States. Congress acted promptly. In less than ten days after the declaration of the war it had authorized

* In June, 1917, the New York correspondent of *The Times* reported that various Government Departments had secured reductions of price in copper from 1s. 4d. per lb. to 8d. and in oil from 7s. 8d. per barrel to 3s. 7d. In September, 1917, President Wilson fixed steel prices at a reduction of from 40 to 70 per cent. on previous market rates.

the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. McAdoo, to sell $5,000,000,000 in bonds and up to $2,000,000,000 in Certificates of Indebtedness. Of the proceeds it authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to advance up to $3,000,000,000 to Governments at war with Germany. Large amounts were at once placed to the credit of the Allies. As the war progressed this authorization was successively increased, until at the time of the armistice it stood at ten billions of dollars, and up to the end of May, 1919, all but $600,000,000 of this sum had been passed over to America's "associates" in the war.

The following table shows the respective advances to each of the Allies :—

Great Britain	$4,316,000,000
France	2,802,477,800
Italy	1,571,500,000
Belgium	341,500,000
Russia	187,729,750
Czecho-Slovakia	50,330,000
Greece	43,412,966
Serbia	27,268,608
Rumania	25,000,000
Cuba	10,000,000
Liberia	5,000,000
	$9,380,219,124

No outline of the financial support given to the Allies by the United States would be adequate without references to the many indirect services rendered by the banks. With England and France concentrating their financial resources upon the production of munitions and supplies and the sustenance of their armies and navies, a large portion of the burdens imposed upon their finances by the requirements of commerce fell upon the United States. The financing of commercial transactions brought the U.S.A. increased wealth, it is true; but it also relieved the hard-pressed older countries by so much as it enabled them to direct their fiscal energies elsewhere. It was, therefore, a real service to the Allied cause, the essential thing being to get shipments financed.

Before war had waged for three months it was announced in New York that £50,000,000 had been spent in America by the belligerents for submarines, projectiles, entrenching tools and boots among other things. Reliable estimates compiled in August, 1916, gave the following remarkable increases which had occurred in the value of exports of material from the U.S.A. during the previous three fiscal years (ending June 30) :—

	1914 Million $	1915 Million $	1916 Million $
Iron and Steel	251	226	618
Explosives	6	41	473
Copper Manufactures ..	146	109	170
Brass and Manufactures	7	21	126
Motor-cars and Parts ..	33	68	123
Cotton Manufactures ..	51	72	112
Leather	37	65	80

Exports to the United Kingdom alone reached $1,500,000,000 in the year ending June 30, 1916, an increase of 66 per cent. over 1914–15, whereas to Russia the corresponding increase was to $325,000,000 from $61,000,000.

In the following twelve months the U.S.A. exported war material—practically all going to the Allies—to the value of $2,127,000,000 against $1,329,000,000 in 1915–16. The 1916-17 total included :—

Explosives	$800,000,000
Chemicals	187,000,000
Copper and Brass ..	120,000,000
Firearms	95,000,000
Motor-cars	90,000,000
Horses and Mules ..	87,000,000
Metal working Machinery	84,000,000
Barbed Wire	27,000,000

During fifteen months (August, 1917—November, 1918) of the existence of the U.S. Purchasing Commission, the British War Mission spent $800,000,000 in war supplies alone. Some idea of the colossal scale of operations will be gathered from the following table, which gives the quantities of some of the commodities purchased by the Mission in the U.S.A. during the war :—

Guns and Ammunition :	
Shells	33,000,000
Shell forgings	7,000,000
Fuses and fuse parts	66,000,000
Small arms ammunition	1,360,000,000
Rifle bayonets	2,135,000
Metals :	tons.
Aluminium	28,000
Brass (rods)	125,000
Copper	350,000
Iron	300,000
Lead (pig)	112,000
Shell steel	1,765,000
Steel (miscellaneous)	200,000
Zinc	77,000
Chemicals, Explosives, Etc. :	lbs.
Acetone	70,000,000
Cordite	46,000,000
Gun cotton	22,000,000
Sulphur	115,000,000
Nitrocellulose powder	368,000,000
Trinitrotoluol	27,000,000
Tanning extracts	68,000,000
Machinery :	
Ploughs	30,000
Tractors	10,000
Motor trucks and cars	23,000
Miscellaneous :	
Lumber	200,000,000 ft.
Tobacco	3,700,000 lbs.
Cigarettes	250,000,000
Barbed wire	82,000 tons

Vast new factories sprang up over the United States to turn out the huge munitions supplies required by the Allies. A correspondent of

The Times gave a remarkable description of some of these factories in September, 1916, in the following words :—

In the past six months I have seen more than a little of what they have accomplished ; and it struck me as a remarkable record of American energy and adaptability. I went, for instance, over one plant at Bridgeport, Connecticut, owned by the Remington Arms and Ammunition Company, where the first sod was turned in December, 1914, where work began on the main buildings in the following March, and where, by the middle of last November, in spite of labour troubles, a factory with a floor area of about 1,500,000 square feet had been erected and 75 per cent. of the machinery was installed and in operation. I went over another at Ilion, New York, owned by the same firm, and given up to the manufacture of rifles. They got the contract in November, 1914, they bought the necessary land the day after, within a week work had begun, and by the middle of the following April everything was ready, and 400,000 square feet of new plant had come into existence.

I went, too, over the Baldwin Locomotive works in Philadelphia, which had taken on some 2,000 extra men for making shells, and was in addition building two considerable factories elsewhere in the city. I visited also the Midvale Steel Company close by, the head of which, Mr. W. E. Corey, is one of the first steel men in the country. This firm has sunk not far short of £2,000,000 in the manufacture of shells and howitzers. I likewise visited Eddystone, a few miles away, where the Eddystone Ammunition Company have put up a factory that in full operation will employ 5,000 men in turning out shells ; and where also another vast rifle plant, employing ultimately some 15,000 people, has been erected by the Remington Arms Company of Delaware.

Besides this, I was shown over the Du Pont Company's works opposite Wilmington. They comprise some 300 different buildings, and cover an area of six square miles, and the firm as a whole, on account of the war, has invested nearly £10,000,000 in new machinery and plant, employs over 60,000 men where two years ago it employed fewer than 5,400, and, as its president publicly announced a little while ago, is now producing 375,000,000 lb. of military powder a year. And finally, I went to Bethlehem, where Mr. Charles M. Schwab, the steel genius of the United States, with 53,000 men in his employment, is turning out shells, guns, and forgings at a rate and in quantities Krupps' might envy.

When the war broke out, America, broadly speaking, was innocent of the art of making munitions. A few companies here and there were engaged in the manufacture of war material as a side-line. The situation was that the United States, while enormously rich in the raw material of munitions, was short of the necessary machinery, and shorter still of the tools for making the machinery ; and that the Government arsenals monopolized most of what there was of the munitions industry. To the majority of the manufacturers who have taken it up in the United States, the business was a new one. This accounts for some inevitable failures and delays. It also helps to explain why, as a whole, American manufacturers, in spite of all the tales to the contrary, have not reaped any extravagant profits.

ANZACS ON THE WAY TO FRANCE IN MAY, 1918, MARCH UP FIFTH AVENUE TO "BOOM" LIBERTY LOAN.

For most of the manufacturers the estimated profits soon became subject to very substantial discounts. They had to build new factories ; they had to devise large and expensive systems of protecting their works ; they had to get together, to train, and to weld into a harmonious whole a vast body of labour ; they had to pay "through the nose" for the indispensable raw materials, tools, and machines ; they had to meet repeated demands for higher wages ; they were engaged in a ceaseless, grinding fight against time, which is by all odds the most expensive of industrial commodities ; and the industry into which they had ventured is one conducted on the most rigid

specifications, with the smallest possible allowance for error, with every item in the output obliged to stand the tests of a most vigilant inspection by foreign experts, and demanding machinery a very large proportion of which, being useless for any other purpose, will have to be scrapped when the war is over.

About 500 officials were continually employed by the Production Department of the British

LORD NORTHCLIFFE TRIES A FORD TRACTOR.

War Mission, the functions of which have been already defined. Some conception of the work will be gained from the fact that as much as 50,000 tons of munitions per week were checked by this department. Valuable work was carried out by members of this department regularly visiting all plants doing British Government work and reporting on the conditions of deliveries. A number of officers trained in this work who were American subjects were subsequently employed by the United States Army on similar duties for the U.S. Ordnance Department. This department had the supervision of deliveries of supplies ranging from thermometers to locomotives. The following list of goods supplied shows the extreme variety:—copper, acetone, flying boats, tractors, aluminium, six-inch shells, nickel, howitzers, nitro-cellulose, aeroplane engines, magnetos, locomotives, trucks, thermometers, spelter, sulphur, pig-iron, motor spares, crank shafts for aeroplanes, ball bearings for aeroplanes, fuses and motor chassis. The shipments of these supplies ran to several hundreds of thousands of tons each month.

The work of inspecting munitions and supplies and passing them for shipment necessitated the employment in the Inspection Department of a large and highly trained staff, numbering nearly 1,000. Some of these inspectors and examiners were military officers who had been trained in arsenals at home, and others were civilians with engineering training and qualifications. The stores inspected included guns, shells, steel forgings, explosives, brass, spelter, optical instruments and fuses; mechanical transport stores; aeronautical supplies and machine tools. Complete statistics of inspections, rejections and shipments were recorded. Friendly relationship was maintained with the United States departments, and much valuable cooperation—official and unofficial—took place. So widespread were the districts in which munitions were manufactured that it was necessary to divide the manufacturing areas into sections, and district inspectors were stationed at Bethlehem, Pittsburg, Cleveland and New York, while various experts held travelling commissions.

Of vital necessity to the efficiency of the British Navy and the flying services was the supply of oil. Here especially was the problem one of shipping. The supply of tank steamers was altogether insufficient to meet the demand. It was not a question of thousands of tons but of hundreds of thousands of tons of oil a month to provide for the requirements of the British Navy. It would scarcely be over-estimating the figure to say that towards the end of the war it was necessary to ship from America to Great Britain half a million tons of oil per month for naval and aviation requirements; and this

INSPECTING AND TESTING SHELLS.

in addition to meeting vital requirements for war and ordinary purposes in other parts of the world, which often involved long sea journeys and required the sole services of much tank tonnage. Many expedients were adopted to free ocean tankers from coastal work and to make their voyages between America and Europe as short and therefore as frequent as possible. Barges were used for coastal work, repairs of tankers were expedited, and on the

European side canals and pipe lines were used to these ends.

Towards the end of 1917 the food situation in Europe began to look ugly. But for the whole-hearted cooperation of the U.S. Government, supported by the honourable voluntary self-sacrifice of the American people, famine must have laid hold of many European countries.

contract was signed by the representatives of the Government concerned. By these means competition was eliminated, but only the credit of the Government concerned was involved. The Belgian Relief Commission acted in cooperation with the Allied Provisions Export Commission. It was found convenient to extend the scope of the Commission to Canada



WINDING 128 MILES OF ½-INCH SQUARE WIRE ON A 14-INCH GUN.
In Watervliet Arsenal, New York.

In August, 1917, at the request of Mr. Hoover, the United States Food Controller, the Ministry of Food, in conjunction with France and Italy, arranged for all purchases of food supplies other than cereals and wheat to be made through single buying organizations. Accordingly an Inter-Allied Meat and Fats Executive was set up in London, and a similar body was organized in New York, under the title of The Allied Provisions Export Commission. Great Britain was represented by a strong delegation headed by Mr. Owen Hugh Smith. Particulars of the articles to be purchased through the Commission were submitted to Mr. Hoover for his approval, and in all its negotiations he acted as agent for the country wishing to make the purchase, but the actual

and operations were conducted in conjunction with Mr. Hanna, the Canadian Food Controller.

Mr. Hoover, on his part, established a department for co-ordinating purchases on behalf of the Allies, United States Food Administration and the United States Army and Navy, and a scheme was evolved by which the requirements of the Allies were purchased on the same basis as those for the United States. Some idea of the scale of operations will be derived from the fact that in the first two months of the Commission's operations about 30,000 tons of bacon alone was purchased, and this at a price lower than the market price which obtained before the institution of the Commission. Mr. Alfred Bigland, M.P., acted as adviser to the Com-

mission on matters affecting raw materials for oils and feed and cattle-cake.

Early in 1918 the U.S. Government issued new export and import trade regulations so as to cut down non-essentials and save tonnage for war purposes. This led to the question whether England was making equal sacrifices. Lord Reading, in a frank and free discussion, made it quite plain that Great Britain had sacrificed

MR. OWEN HUGH SMITH.
Principal British Delegate to the Allied Provisions Export Commission.

everything to win the war in the shortest possible time and to relieve the world from the menace of German domination.

A great improvement in the shipping situation was brought about by Great Britain's drastic concentration of all ocean-going shipping upon carrying supplies from the United States to British, French, and Italian ports. In the spring of 1918, for the first time for months, shipping in Atlantic ports awaited cargoes of food from the Middle West, and this despite the fact that six trains loaded with meat products and 5,000 truckloads of grain were being moved to the coast daily for export to the Allies. During February, 1918, the colossal quantity of 553,429 tons of grain, cereals and flour was exported to the Allies. In the same month 144,000,000 lb. of pork and beef were shipped, the two following months' corresponding quantities being 395,000,000 lb. and 357,000,000 lb. respectively. How these enormous increases were attained was graphically described by Sir William Goode, the liaison officer between the Ministry of Food and the U.S. and Canadian food administrations. From July 1, 1917, to April 1, 1918, he said, the United States exported to the Allies 80,000,000 bushels of wheat and wheat products, although it was officially estimated that, owing to the short crop, only 20,000,000 bushels would be available for export. Mr. Hoover calculated that 50,000,000 out of the 80,000,000 bushels represented the individual sacrifice of the men, women and children of the United States, who either gave up eating white bread or reduced their consumption of it.

In March, 1918, the amount of pork and pork products exported to the Allies from the United States reached the enormous figure of 308,000,000 lb., more than six times the normal and 50 per cent. greater than in any previous month in the previous seven years. In addition there were over a billion pounds of pork and pork products in American storage. In January, 1918, the Allies asked Mr. Hoover for 70,000,000 lb. of frozen beef a month for the following three months. In March the United States shipped 86,000,000 lb. of beef and beef products to the Allies. That was over 20 per cent. larger than any previous month in seven years. The increased export was provided by the reduction of domestic consumption. By voluntary economies the saving on sugar for the year in the United States would amount approximately to 400,000 tons.

Since the United States Food Administration came into existence the cost of food production, so far as the chief commodities were concerned, had increased 18 per cent., while the price of those commodities had decreased 12 per cent. to the domestic consumer. In May, 1917, the wholesale price of flour at Minneapolis was $16.75 per barrel of 196 lb. It was predicted that it would go to $20, or more. In the early part of May, 1918, however, the price had fallen to $9.80, a decrease of 41 per cent. The statistics he had given, Sir William Goode said, showed that idealism was not dead. Non-combatant Americans had been inspired to deny themselves in the midst of plenty for the sake of those who, thousands of miles away, died, suffered or just endured.

Mr. Hoover supplemented these facts in a speech a few days later. He said that under the pressure of the war the United States had been in a position to make large exports. In 1917 they exported over 10 million tons of food,

and in 1918 he expected that they would send about 18 million tons without trenching on their own consumption very much. They had a great reserve behind that 18 million tons in the fact of the high standard of living in the United States, and they were able and prepared to reduce their consumption at home to almost any degree that was necessary beyond what they had done, stopping short only at the point of the maintenance of public health. The total import of the Allied nations was 21 or 22 million tons. North America would be practically able to support the whole of the Allied nations during the coming year, and he could safely assert that there was no problem in the matter of supplies.

There were certain governing factors, one of which, of course, was shipping, and one of acute importance was their port capacities. For instance, during the last year they had increased the discharge of foodstuffs from their ports from 200,000 tons a month up to over one million tons, and in order to export the whole 18 millions they would have to go to 1½ million tons a month, and he did not know that they would stand that strain, but they were providing such wide margins that one need not have any anxiety as to the volume of supply.

A wonderful story of the way in which America saved Allied Europe from starvation during the years 1916, 1917 and 1918 is told by the table on page 94, for the Allies received the great bulk of the exports chronicled there. To take only one instance, the export of condensed milk in 1918 was no less than 33½ times the amount of the average for the five years up to June 30, 1914. During the year ending June 30, 1918, this one commodity was carried at the rate of 10 million lb. per week. Meat and meat products were exported at the rate of over forty-three million pounds per week, and the quantity of sugar exported was in 1916 twenty-three times that of the pre-war average.

How the great work of transporting all these supplies was organized is worth telling. In the early years of the war responsibility for the provision of shipping for war purposes was vested in the Transport Department of the Admiralty. The gradual diminution of tonnage, caused by marine losses, torpedoings, the increasingly large number of ships under repair consequent upon the abnormal maritime conditions prevailing, and the falling off in the production of new steamers, and the increasing demands for direct naval and military purposes, were factors which caused the Government to reconsider the whole question of the transportation of supplies. In view of the increasing quantities of munitions and food supplies from North America, the Transport Department of the Admiralty appointed Sir (then Captain) Connop Guthrie, in July, 1916, to develop their organization in the U.S.A. to meet the growing requirements.

SIR WILLIAM GOODE, K.B.E.
Liaison Officer between the Ministry of Food and the U.S. and Canadian Food Administrations.

The practice followed by the Transport Department of the Admiralty had been to receive from the different Government Departments in England particulars of their purchases of supplies in the United States, and then to requisition from shipowners the necessary space to carry the cargoes. This in itself was comparatively simple. But the supplies consisted of anything from a cask of nails to enormous quantities of shells and food, coming from innumerable points of production in the United States, and the more complex task was that of getting the supplies to the seaboard to meet the ships that had been allocated for their conveyance.

Sometimes the volume of space requisitioned from shipowners was in excess of the quantity of supplies that reached the seaboard, and when the space was abandoned it was difficult for the shipowners to obtain other cargo at the last moment, and a loss was therefore sustained. At other times it happened that the volume of

EXPORTS OF DOMESTIC FOODSTUFFS FROM THE UNITED STATES.

Reports of Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, United States Department of Commerce,

Article exported.	Year ending June 30.					Annual Average 1910-1914.
	1918.		1917.	1916.	1915.	
	Amount.	Per cent. of 1910-1914.				
Wheat .. .. bu.	34,118,853	59·9	149,831,427	173,274,015	259,642,533	56,913,228
Wheat flour .. .. bu.	21,880,151	204·9	11,942,778	15,520,669	16,182,765	10,678,635
Oats .. .. bu.	105,881,233	1,275·0	88,944,401	95,918,884	96,809,551	8,304,203
Rye .. .. bu.	12,065,922	1,411·6	13,260,015	14,532,437	12,544,888	855,765
Barley .. .. bu.	26,408,978	334·5	16,381,077	27,473,160	26,754,522	7,895,521
Corn .. .. bu.	40,997,827	103·0	64,720,842	38,217,012	48,786,291	39,809,690
Total (including miscellaneous cornstuffs)	317,933,492	—	386,880,263	419,258,518	517,360,227	161,831,264
Sugar .. .. lb.	576,415,850	812·1	1,248,908,286	1,630,150,863	549,007,411	70,976,908
Dairy Products—						
Butter .. .. lb.	17,735,966	414·6	26,835,092	13,487,481	9,850,704	4,277,955
Cheese .. .. lb.	44,330,978	901·9	66,050,013	44,391,301	55,362,917	4,915,502
Milk, condensed .. .. lb.	529,750,032	3,358·4	259,141,231	159,577,620	37,235,627	15,773,900
Total	591,816,976	—	352,026,336	217,459,402	102,449,248	24,967,357
Meat and Meat products—						
Canned beef .. .. .. lb.	97,366,983	1,036·7	67,536,125	50,803,765	75,243,261	9,392,122
Fresh beef .. .. .. lb.	370,057,514	1,256·5	197,177,101	231,214,000	170,440,934	29,452,302
Pickled beef .. .. .. lb.	54,857,310	166·8	58,053,667	38,114,682	31,874,743	32,893,172
Oleo oil .. .. lb.	56,648,102	20·2	67,110,111	102,645,914	80,481,946	280,224,505
Bacon .. .. lb.	815,319,424	446·8	667,151,972	479,808,786	346,718,227	182,474,092
Hams and shoulders .. .. lb.	419,571,869	251·5	266,656,581	282,208,611	203,701,114	166,813,134
Pickled Pork .. .. .. lb.	33,221,502	68·8	46,992,721	63,460,713	45,655,574	48,274,929
Lard .. .. lb.	392,498,435	82·7	444,769,540	427,011,338	475,531,908	474,354,914
Lard compound .. .. lb.	31,278,382	46·5	56,359,493	52,843,311	69,980,614	67,318,857
Total	2,270,829,521	—	1,871,807,311	1,828,111,120	1,499,628,321	1,291,198,027

Government cargo was in excess of the space requisitioned, necessitating further requisitioning at the last moment at the expense of commercial cargoes which had been sent forward. The cargo excluded in this way caused congestion in the terminals and the holding up of railway trucks, which were ever decreasing in quantity.

A further complication resulted from the variations in the delivery clauses of contracts for Government purchases. Some provided for delivery at the manufacturers' works in the interior, some for delivery on the railway trucks at the seaboard, and others for delivery on board ship. Each contractor was naturally anxious to make delivery of his supplies as soon as they were ready in order that the terms of his contract might be fulfilled and he become entitled to payment. But it will be seen that without a central control to organize the movement of such an enormous volume, nothing but congestion, confusion, and delay would result.

It was, therefore, determined to co-ordinate the movement of supplies internally in the United States with the shipping arrangements. A Traffic Department was created, and operated first under the Production Department, being subsequently incorporated in the organization of the Ministry of Shipping. No contractor was permitted to put his contract into movement on the railways without the permission of the Traffic Department; the port of shipment was decided by the central organization, and where it differed from that provided for in the contract differential railway rates were paid or received. Instead of bringing the bulk of the supplies to New York, as had previously been the case, the whole movement was decentralized throughout the country, and all the ports on the Atlantic seaboard and the Gulf of Mexico were brought into the range of use.

AMERICAN LABOUR MISSION LEAVING BUCKINGHAM PALACE.

The advantages of the new system soon became apparent. The constantly changing priority orders received from London were given effect to in a manner which, without such central control, would have been impossible. One day munitions were urgently required, the next day a foodstuff or some special commodity was needed with greater urgency on account of the changing conditions of the war. By the complete control of all railway movement, and through an efficient "Car Record System," the position of all railway trucks carrying sup-



A CUNARD LINER AS OIL CARRIER.

The photograph shows the tanks in the double bottom of a liner in course of construction. Oil was carried in place of water ballast.

plies for the British Government was known, and their movement could be expedited according to the needs expressed in the cables from London. The outstanding object, however, was to get the best use of shipping, and through control of the railway movement it was known almost to a ton what quantity of supplies would reach the seaboard in any given number of days. The quantity of ships required became, therefore, almost a mathematical certainty. There was no over- or under-requisitioning of space, and no sending of steamers through the submarine-infested areas unnecessarily.

By consolidating the railroad and steamship movement enormous economies in shipping space resulted, as well as very large monetary savings to the British Government in the scientific "routing" of cargo over the railways of the United States.

None of the things mentioned could have been done without the assistance of the United States railway companies. To help the Allies they subordinated many private interests—they lent technical men to the Traffic Department, they allowed the Traffic Department to usurp duties and functions which properly belonged to them as private companies, they agreed to a central "Permit Office," which proved of enormous advantage in the correct handling of British and Allied Government traffic. In a thousand other ways the presidents, vice-presidents, and officials of the United States trunk railways showed their practical sympathy.

In the middle of 1917 a serious shortage of fuel oil in England became apparent, causing the naval authorities great anxiety. Instructions were received in New York that fuel oil was to be shipped in the double bottoms of practically all steamers. Realizing the tremendous urgency of the matter, Lord Northcliffe personally associated himself with the arrangements that were made to meet England's requirements; difficulties which appeared to be insuperable were in time overcome, and the Admiralty recorded their appreciation of successful efforts which avoided something amounting almost to disaster. The Oil Department which was created to deal with this emergency remained a permanent unit of the organization, and performed excellent service up to the time of the armistice in controlling the shipment of oil in tankers and double bottoms.

Other departments that were created as the organization grew were those dealing with convoys, commercial cargo division, statistical, accounting and auditing, ships' movements and dispatch, and cables and private wires. Branches were established at Portland, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Newport News, New Orleans, Galveston, and the most important of these, kept in touch with the central office in New York by means of private telegraph wires. A branch office was also maintained in Chicago to handle Middle West traffic and act as a link with the arrangements on the Pacific coast.

Close working arrangements existed between the Ministry of Shipping organization in Montreal, and the frequent transfer of ships to Canadian ports or of Canadian cargo into American ports was carried on with excellent results. An office was maintained in Washington for the purpose of cooperating with the several United States Government Departments concerned in shipping matters.

As the result of the efforts put forward between July, 1916, and July, 1917, a machine was brought into existence which not only carried the current load, but which its creators believed would be capable of carrying any additional strain that might be put upon it.

In April, 1917, the United States entered the war, and up to October of the same year their shipping arrangements were concerned only with the transportation of a limited number of men and a corresponding quantity of supply for the maintenance of those men in the field. The department in the Ministry of Shipping office in New York which handled embarkation matters lent assistance to the United States authorities. Subsequently, as the world knows, one-half of the American troops that came to Europe were transported in steamers under the control of the British Government. When the intensive movement of men from America developed in April, 1918, this department carried out the enormous task which the transportation of such large numbers involved with satisfaction to both the United States as well as the British Government. Here was an example of how the organization could stand the test of a strain suddenly thrown upon it.

But the movement of men from point to point in so vast a country as the United States, and the movement also of all the supplies that were required for their maintenance, caused a slowing up in the process of transportation of the supplies increasingly required by the Allies. By the end of October it was seen that some arrangements would have to be organized whereby the whole of the facilities of railways,

CUNARDER AS OIL CARRIER: THE BOILER SPACE.
Showing the plates forming the tops of the oil tanks.



piers, warehouses and terminals would have to be used more intelligently if the best results were to be obtained and unnecessary competition between the United States and the Allies avoided in the movement of their respective supplies.

The minds of those concerned with the problem were fully occupied with possible improvements when climatic conditions in the United States in December, 1917, and January, 1918, brought the urgency of the matter to the notice of all. It was generally considered to be the worst winter ever experienced. Traffic was entirely suspended—ice blocked the harbours on the Atlantic seaboard, ships were unable to move, and in the great railway concentrating points such as Buffalo complete trains were lost in heavy downfalls of snow, and in time everything became paralyzed.

LANDING MEAT IN ENGLAND.

Cablegrams from England urged the immediate requirements of food and munitions, and it was clear that arrangements that had had to be made between Great Britain and her Allies had left the former in a very precarious position, especially so far as food was concerned, and the other European Allies appeared to be in equally dire straits.

It was in these difficult circumstances that Lord Reading arrived as Ambassador in February, 1918. He immediately addressed himself to the question of increasing the shipment of food supplies, so that when eventually weather conditions permitted vast trainloads, consisting solely of food, were moved through one after the other over the railways to the several points where an augmented fleet awaited them. The danger passed, but the experience left its mark. The United States authorities saw how easily a comparatively satisfactory situation could be converted into one of real danger. Cooperation, therefore, became their watchword.

Months before, the British, French and Italian authorities concerned with transportation in and out of the United States had realized the need for avoiding competition in getting their supplies to the seaboard. The war was a common effort, and nothing could be gained by one securing a small advantage at

the expense of another if in the end the common objective was not reached. Under the name of the Traffic Executive a body had been created under the chairmanship of the French representative (M. Level), with Sir Connop Guthrie as Director-General, which controlled the internal movement of the British, French and Italian traffic, and, so far as the British was concerned, was linked up with the shipping arrangements.

The United States authorities took formal recognition of this body, and after the difficulties referred to they appointed representatives from their Railroad Administration, Food Administration, Shipping Board, as well as from the Navy and War Departments. The result of their association brought excellent results, and many of the disabilities under which all had previously laboured began to disappear.

In January, 1918, the United States Government created the Shipping Control Committee, which was invested with absolute and complete powers over the whole of the then existing and the potential mercantile marine of the United States. The duties of that committee were not only to arrange for the transportation of the American Army to Europe in such American ships as could be made available, together with the supplies for their maintenance, but also to maintain the essential export and import trade of the United States. The chairman of this committee was Mr. P. A. S. Franklin, president of the International Mercantile Marine. His two colleagues were Mr. H. H. Raymond, president of the Clyde and Mallory Steamship Line and chairman of the American Shipowners' Association, and, with the consent of the British Government, Sir Connop Guthrie.

In May, 1918, the work of the Shipping Control Committee had greatly increased, partly owing to the growing American Army in Europe and partly due to the difficulty of maintaining the United States war and civil shipping programmes with a mercantile marine inadequate to the demands that were being made upon it.

Up to that date Sir Connop Guthrie had continued to administer the vast organization of the British Ministry of Shipping as well as attend to his duties as a member of the Shipping Control Committee. It was considered desirable to release him from the burden of the executive work of the Ministry of Shipping, and he was therefore appointed

A BRITISH TANK IN THE LIBERTY LOAN PARADE, OCTOBER 25, 1917.

Special Representative of the British Shipping Controller in the United States. The duties which he previously performed in the Ministry of Shipping were undertaken by Sir Ashley Sparks.

From the small beginnings in July, 1916, the British Ministry of Shipping organization grew until it had a staff of over 700 in New York alone. Some idea of the scope of its work will be gathered from the fact that the quantity of tonnage handled monthly by the Ministry of Shipping office in New York approximated two million tons. The correct handling of so large a fleet of steamers, their loading and dispatch, the commercial side of the arrangement for their convoying across the Atlantic, all the mechanism connected with the advices to Europe of the classes of cargo shipped, and the infinite detail inseparable from steamship management, all demanded the most intelligent effort not only upon the part of the staff of the Ministry of Shipping but also of the local representatives in the United States of the British steamship lines, whose ripe technical experience and excellent local organizations ministered so largely to the success of the whole undertaking.

Hardly of less vital importance than the foregoing activities was the remarkable work of the Publicity Branch of the British War Mission. During the war with double energy and before the war with systematic thoroughness, the German Government subjected the people of the United States to a campaign of propaganda, carried on by methods in part gross and clumsy, in part subtle and unsuspected. The circulation through the U.S. post by an obviously foreign agency of a mass of tendencious literature, printed often in slightly foreign type on slightly foreign paper, may not have been highly efficacious in converting unbelievers to the ideas of *Deutschtum*. Some one person or body in Germany, however, had thought out far more skilful means of approach to the ear and eye of several different sections of American public opinion, and of this school there was no representative more dexterous than the German Ambassador at Washington, Count Bernstorff. He knew well the value of exploiting from the German point of view that liberal acquisitiveness in matters of the academic curriculum, that passion for *Lehrfreiheit*, which is the glory of the transatlantic universities. Exchange professorships, the interchange of students, the blandishments of interacademic courtesies, the encouragement of the transplantation of the ἦθος of the modern German student corps into the historically uncongenial soil of the American Greek-letter fraternity; all these devices, harmless enough in themselves, if spontaneous, were fostered and directed by the German diplomats at Washington, acting under instructions from headquarters at Berlin.

The course pursued in academic was followed also in other spheres. The object aimed at was not alone constructive, directed, that is to say, at the consolidation of German-American goodwill. Behind almost every move might be detected the design to foster British-American misunderstanding, and no step was omitted which could provoke that misunderstanding or reopen wounds which the process of time and a happier dispensation had begun to heal. The personal charm of Count Bernstorff, which was very great, and his quick sympathetic adjustment to the mental processes of the American Press and general public proved to be the source of almost daily rumours hostile to Great Britain or its leaders, and these rumours quickly spread through the exchanges, the clubs, the drawing-rooms, and the streets. Other sections of *The Times History of the War*, in treating of the nature of the United States and its inhabitants, have explained the geographical, racial and political considerations which played into his hands. Misunderstandings over the Panama Canal, a divergency between American and British lawyers in certain questions of maritime law which had come up for discussion at the Hague and London Conferences, the Ulster crisis in 1914, all provided opportunities for adroit manipulation. Even the most trivial possibilities were utilized. The stillborn experiment in the reform of American spelling, making as it did for the minimising of the language tie between the United States and the British Empire did not go, so it has been said, without German assistance or, at least, encouragement. The failure of this Teutonic campaign, for the Austrian officials were willing if lagging partners, was due to the innate common sense with which the American people is endowed. The victory, however, was not asserted before great harm was done to American relations with the Empire, harm, indeed, of which the effects have not yet been entirely removed; and in the check given to German propaganda, a British publicity campaign, undertaken in the merest

self defence, played a not unimportant part. It is perhaps time that the story of this campaign, concerning which no mystery exists, should be better understood.*

Early in the war the need for the Government to bestir itself was felt, but the warnings which reached it from America as to the danger of an excess of zeal and as to the sensitiveness of an officially neutral United States to any errors in a professionally conducted propaganda, rightly or wrongly, confined its efforts to two channels. In the first place, a body, which took its name from its location at Wellington House, undertook the distribution in the United States, among other countries, of a series of pamphlets of which the most famous was the Bryce Report. In the second place the News Department at the Foreign Office placed itself at the disposal of the American Press representatives in London, studied their needs, endeavoured to procure—not always from fully sympathetic officials—their satisfaction, and supplied upon demand official explanations, drawn up to meet the legitimate enquiries of a neutral public, of the various vexed questions of belligerency

The mailing list of Wellington House, being carefully compiled, was expanded till it contained over 200,000 names of influential persons throughout the Union, and there can be no doubt of the efficacy of the distribution based upon it in meeting the widespread demand among educated Americans for greater information as to British ideals and as to British practice. The efforts of the News Department formed the basis of all subsequent developments, and, in securing from Lord Robert Cecil and Sir Frederick Maurice, the then Director of Military Operations at the War Office, a weekly and in each case characteristically personal interview with the foreign correspondents resident in London, it may claim to have played

BRITISH TROOPS IN THE FOURTH OF JULY PARADE, 1918.

* Mr. De Valera, the Sinn Fein leader, has asserted more than once in the United States that vast sums were spent by the British Empire on "American propaganda," particularly in the direction of poisoning the mind of the United States against Ireland. In 1919 a firm of American publishers published what purported to be "evidence of the greatest conspiracy ever attempted to be perpetrated on the United States." This forgery took the shape of an alleged report by the "head of the British Secret Service in U.S.A." to Mr. Lloyd George detailing certain policies indicative of a desire to transfer the allegiance of American citizens to the British Crown. In giving an account of the actual publicity steps taken by the British War Mission it is not perhaps uninteresting to mention these two statements, if only to indicate to what lengths hatred of the British Empire will go, even in absurd misrepresentations of this nature.

BRITISH AND GERMAN PRISONERS
102,000 GERMAN PRISONERS
taken by the British during the War
43,000 BRITISH PRISONERS
(INCLUDING INDIAN TROOPS)
taken by the Germans during the War
Total prisoners captured by British 131,776
(GERMANS, AUSTRIANS, TURKS & BULGARIANS)
BRITAIN'S OUTPUT OF SHELLS FOR HEAVY GUNS
IS NOW
423 TIMES THAT OF MAY 1915
and Greatly Exceeds Germany's Output
BRITAIN HAS A RESERVE OF FIFTY MILLION SHELLS
A MILLION TONS OF SHELLS USED IN 6 MONTHS
BRITISH NAVY NEARLY 4,000 SHIPS
During the War the British Navy has Transported 8,000,000 Men, 1,000,000 Horses and Mules, 500,000 Tons of Explosives, 48,000,000 Gallons of Gasoline etc., and has searched 25,000 Ships for Contraband of War.
Despite Submarines, about 5000 Ships Enter or Leave British Ports Every Week.
739 GERMAN GUNS
HAVE BEEN CAPTURED BY THE BRITISH DURING THE WAR
96 BRITISH GUNS
HAVE BEEN LOST DURING THE WAR
BRITAIN'S ARMY IS MAINTAINED
AT
5,000,000 MEN
ENGAGED ON THE VARIOUS FRONTS
2,000,000 MEN
ARE FIGHTING IN FRANCE,
OF WHOM
1,670,000 Are from The British Isles
No Fully-Trained men Are Serving in The British Isles or in India.
1,670,000 SOLDIERS FROM THE BRITISH ISLES FIGHTING IN FRANCE
139,000 FROM CANADA
139,000 FROM AUSTRALIA & NEW ZEALAND
12,000 FROM INDIAN EMPIRE
6,000 FROM SOUTH AFRICA
209
GERMAN AIRPLANES
have been brought down by the British in two months of War
at a cost of
147
BRITISH AIRPLANES
BRITAIN'S VOLUNTEER ARMY BEFORE CONSCRIPTION EXCEEDED 4,750000
BRITAIN IS NOW ONE HUGE MUNITIONS AREA
WITH
4,000,000 WORKERS
BEFORE THE WAR BRITAIN HAD 3
SHE NOW HAS 90 WORKING DAY & NIGHT
MORE THAN A MILLION BRITISH WOMEN ARE WORKING IN THE MUNITION FACTORIES & SHIP YARDS.
GREAT BRITAINS DAILY WAR BILL IS
$35,250,000
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT
July 1917
PAY TO One Days War Expenses
$35,250,000
John Bull
THE BRITISHER WITH AN ANNUAL INCOME OF $2500
CONTRIBUTES ABOUT $1,000 YEARLY TOWARD THE COST OF THE WAR.

A GIGANTIC POSTER EXHIBITED AT WAR RELICS EXHIBITIONS IN AMERICA.

some part in the practical demonstration of a truism, not sufficiently comprehended in the early stages of the war, that the objects of officialdom and of those charged with the task of providing for the public reliable and solid information are not of necessity opposed. However that may be, work that could be undertaken through these channels, if valuable, was severely limited. The entry of the United States into the war removed many of the objections to the conduct of further experiments, while the value of publicity as a means of national education had been brought home to the British public by countless undertakings drawn from the domestic history of the period.

In April, 1917, Mr. Balfour visited America. Perhaps even more important than anything he accomplished in the actual negotiations which he conducted with the United States Administration was the foundation which he was able to lay for a legitimate policy for British publicity within that country. His visit, the natural friendliness of his appearances in New York and in the South as well as in Washington, provoked an outburst of enthusiasm which bore immediate fruit in a fuller comprehension by Americans of both British aims and British sacrifices in the war. While fully sensitive to this, Mr. Balfour was perfectly aware of the unwearied machinations of unfriendly elements. He knew that their misrepresentations of Great Britain found themselves only opposed by the unorganized and spasmodic efforts of overworked British officials in America or by the excellent but infinitesimal work which under existing arrangements could be done in England. Acting on the advice of men of large experience, British, Canadian and American, drawn alike from official and non-official circles, he left behind him in New York, on his return, the nucleus of a staff which, in June of the same year, opened office in Fifth Avenue at 43rd Street as the British Bureau of Information. Shortly before this date the War Cabinet had reorganized the News Department of the Foreign Office, which, under the new name of the Department of Information, became the home office of the New York branch.

The New York office was to pass through two other changes, one at least of which was to be significant. To continue the work inaugurated by Mr. Balfour's Mission the British War Mission was formed in the United States, with headquarters in New York and Washington, with Lord Northcliffe at its head, as has been described. In co-ordinating the various activities necessitated by Franco-British, American, and other Allied cooperation and in building up a huge concern for this purpose, Lord Northcliffe soon realized the necessity of forming a publicity department which should handle the British Mission's dealings with the Press and public. Accordingly the absorption of the Bureau in the Mission was decreed, and in time satisfactorily accomplished, an arrangement continued by Lord Northcliffe's successor, Lord Reading, who was to accomplish great results with the machine which was the creation of his predecessor. Shortly after, the London office also was reorganized, being incorporated in the new Ministry of Information, with the direction of which the Cabinet entrusted Lord Beaverbrook. Both changes were in the interests of greater uniformity, and the Bureau gained immediately by close contact with the Mission's sympathetic head and his active departmental chiefs. Its rule of action was first, last and foremost rigid abstention from interference with American affairs. Its development was dictated primarily not by its own ideas, but by the demands to which it was subjected by Americans. It was hard indeed to keep pace with these demands. By the end of 1918 there were branches of the Bureau of Information in Washington, Chicago and San Francisco. The staff in all comprised little short of 100 persons. It was divided into 12 departments.

It is not an easy task to describe the various activities of the Bureau of Information in America without slipping into the monotonous clichés of an official catalogue. Undoubtedly the most serious obstacle in the way of mutual Anglo-American comprehension lay in the fact that, through circumstances which could not have been avoided, an impassable barrier had been erected between the two countries, a barrier which had interrupted the usual flow of ideas, commercial, political, journalistic and literary, from each side of the Atlantic to the other. In part this barrier was caused by the prohibition of steamer traffic, in part by the congestion of the cables by official messages, in part by the absorption of individuals in both countries by tasks and interests of an abnormal character. To give no other instances, it will be remembered that the war interrupted the celebration of the centenary of peace between

BRITISH AND CANADIAN OFFICERS IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE DAY PROCESSION TO THE ALTAR OF LIBERTY, OCTOBER 1, 1918.

Great Britain and the United States, an occasion in all probability for publications and pronouncements of great moment. Again during the period of neutrality at least Mr. Page and other prominent American citizens had been perforce tongue tied, as tongue tied as were Sir Cecil Spring-Rice or Sir Robert Borden in America. While it was interesting to note in the world of literature that the war poetry of Rupert Brooke and other younger poets, which provoked such immediate response throughout Great Britain and which were later to provoke scarcely less cordial response across the Atlantic Ocean, were in 1917 hardly known and seldom quoted in the United States.

It was then the first task of the British War Mission and of its Information Bureau to obviate, so far as that was possible, this unfortunate condition of affairs. Throughout the country there were bodies only too anxious for a reinsulation of the international electric current. The Bureau could in a secondary way assist the process by helping distinguished speakers from Great Britain to fulfil their engagements or accept their invitations in America. With each case the assistance needed and given varied. The list, too, of those who came is varied enough to prove of interest. There were members of the Labour party, there was a deputation from the British Universities, there were men of religion like the Archbishop of York, the Bishop of Birmingham, Sir George Adam Smith or Dr. Guttery. There were travellers like Sir Walter Lawrence or Sir John Foster Fraser; sailors like Captain Carpenter of the Vindictive, soldiers and airmen and war correspondents. Lord Birkenhead did a lightning tour. Names famous in British medicine and surgery are on the list, such as Mackenzie and Arbuthnot Lane. There were evangelists like Gipsy Smith, inventors like Major-General Swinton, authors like Lord Charnwood, Ian Hay or John Masefield, representatives of the British Rotary Club movement and of the Y.M.C.A; last, but not least, two tours by the incomparable Harry Lauder. The Dominion Ministers passed through on their way to and from England, and were good enough to speak in public. Australia sent also a State Premier and ex-Premier.

It was felt, however, that the process must be reciprocal. England must keep in touch with what was said and thought across the seas, and the list of those Americans whose path was smoothed upon their European journey is not shorter than the corresponding tale of Europeans. Especial interest in England was roused by five separate parties, each consisting of about twenty-five component persons, comprising editors and owners in control of papers other than the metropolitan daily papers of the Atlantic seaboard. Some of these papers were daily journals; others

were monthly. Some were drawn from the technical or business publications; others from the religious Press. Helped at every turn by bodies like the Pilgrims or the English-speaking Union or the Association of Foreign Correspondents in New York, these individuals in their several ways did as much as by artificia means it was possible to do to re-create the intercourse between the nations which had been unfortunately interrupted.

Most of the work which the British War Mission was called upon to perform consisted in taking up the British share of work falling jointly upon all the representatives of the Allied co-belligerents in America. In making purchases of war supplies, in shipping or in transportation questions, this was, of course, particularly true. Fortunately it was in great measure true of questions of publicity. In bringing home to American citizens the enormous nature of the demands made by war upon the civil population, in indicating the cost of war, in showing the necessity of loans, in emphasising the necessity of food economy, the United States Administration quickly realized that the Allied nations could furnish much vivid and illustrative material useful for it "to point a moral or adorn a tale."

The first indication of this fact came in an invitation to the British and French Governments from the United States Treasury, seconded by the United States Committee of Public Information, to send out speakers to aid in the approaching "Liberty Loan Campaign." Some thirty wounded British officers were dispatched from England and were, by the United States officials, allotted to different sections of the country. Through the length and breadth of their allotted districts these officers told in simple words their war experience and the experience of Great Britain under war conditions. They were carefully selected and they served their country and the common cause with great ability, finding for their part, in the warm-hearted hospitality with which they were everywhere received, a welcome change of interest and occupation after their exacting and nerve-racking experience upon the fields of battle. The lecturing department of the Bureau of Information had its hands full, for at the American Government's request this party was succeeded by others.

In quite a different line, too, it found itself fully occupied in examining the credentials of all the itinerant lecturers upon the war who claimed to be ex-soldiers of the British forces. With the aid of the British and the American provosts-marshal and with the aid of special legislation by Congress, many impostors were removed from the chance of doing considerable injury to British-American good feeling. On the other hand the American public is, or was, insatiable in its appetite for

BRITISH MARINES IN THE LIBERTY LOAN PROCESSION, OCTOBER 1, 1918.

addresses on war questions. Few days passed without a dozen applications for speakers reaching the British Bureau. Sometimes it was from the organizers of a general meeting of chambers of commerce or of Bar associations or of bankers; sometimes it was for the anniversary of the admission of a State into the Union, sometimes for a Raleigh commemoration, the yearly gathering of a great trade association, or the annual banquet of the American Academy. As far as it was possible to meet such demands they were met, and the chart of British speakers in operation upon any given day, which was daily most accurately kept by the Bureau officials, came to resemble a target fired at by a shot-gun.

It was not only for speakers that the American Committee of Public Information asked. At its request three exhibitions of war relics were kept in circulation through the country, no easy task when the paramount importance of in no way adding to the congestion upon the railroads is considered. The collection of large naval photographs, which drew so much attention in London, was shown in Washington to fifty thousand persons in a fortnight, including all the high officials. Afterwards it also went on tour, while finally three splendid collections, two of war lithographs and one of war oil paintings including those of Orpen, destined finally for the Imperial War Museum in London, spread through the thousands of spectators in the various cities a wider knowledge alike of British valour and of British artistic genius as of the enterprise which enjoined upon the one portrayal of the other

The Bureau of Information in New York was naturally the channel through which the Government war photographs and war moving picture films were placed before the public in America. It is not necessary here to elaborate the details of this operation. The organizing genius of the late Sir Bertram Lima had provided the British Government with an unrivalled series of war photographs. Through the British Bureau using every means of reaching distribution, alike through the big Metropolitan dailies as also through the syndicates and associations, the Press of the United States was covered. The final machinery of distribution,

"COLOURED" DAY AT THE BRITISH WAR EXHIBITION IN A SOUTHERN TOWN.

THE FLOAT BRITANNIA IN THE FOURTH OF JULY PARADE, 1918.

adopted after considerable experiment, was copied, in whole or in part, by the publicity bureaux of the other Governments. A weekly budget of topical war pictures was also being shown throughout the country in conjunction with those of the American, French and Italian Governments.

A Press department circulated to the Press of the United States occasional articles whenever these seemed legitimate or timely. One such article, for publication on August 4, 1918, containing simple statistical statements of British effort and of British achievement in the four years of war, obtained twenty-six thousand columns of publicity. Other articles were very widely inserted in the Press, while, by agreement with the big syndicates which supply the smaller up-country papers with matrices or "boiler-plate" (stereo), groups of newspapers sometimes numbering as many as thirteen thousand were enabled to make use of the material supplied. In all articles information alone was aimed at. It was the aim to issue none tendencious in their character, and, therefore, most were very widely used.

Such, in the main, were the functions of the British Bureau of Information, the publicity department of the British War Mission. It is not easy to describe its manifold minor activities. It was always prepared to act from its four centres as a British Empire reference library upon consultation by editor or leader writer. It had to be ready to handle the legal and administrative questions involved in the driving of a British tank along Fifth Avenue or in the erection of a captured German submarine in Central Park. It had to participate in New York's monster Hero Land bazaar for Allied charities and set up in one corner of it a replica of the Fleet Street "Cheshire Cheese," complete with the special Wednesday-pudding and the London cooks to cook it. It handled no small portion of the exhibitions at Chicago, San Francisco, and elsewhere. It had to produce the British "floats" in the gala street processions in New York. British firms using nation-wide U.S. publicity put at its disposal their American advertising space and inserted in it, instead of notices of goods they could not ship, the firm's war record drawn up for them by the Bureau. These are samples only of what constituted the calls for its activity in the legitimate publicity work of explaining to America what the British Empire fought for and how the British Empire fought.

Publicity work in the United States cannot be adequately described by giving the record of

any one organization. Every speech in Parliament, every letter in the papers, each move of a political party had its reaction in the United States. Much for cementing good relations was accomplished by private effort. Many causes of friction were avoided by the self-restraint of editors-in-chief upon both sides. To describe in full the action and counter-action of the many forces affecting international relations through these years of war would be an exacting task. It is not exaggerating to say that these forces centred and eddied round the British War Mission as no doubt round one of many points. At least it was due to the War Mission and its chiefs that a policy in publicity matters was followed keenly alive and respectful to the full of legitimate American susceptibilities, but protective of the good name of Britain by and with the aid of all that was most truly American in the United States.

AT THE HERO LAND BAZAAR.
Miss Sinclair as a piper in Lady Aberdeen's booth

CHAPTER CCCVII.

WORK OF THE MERCANTILE MARINE.

ORGANIZATION IN 1918—TRANSPORT OF AMERICAN TROOPS—TONNAGE STATISTICAL POSITION—MEASURES TAKEN TO MAINTAIN ESSENTIAL IMPORTS—SHIPPING ASSISTANCE FOR THE ALLIES—EFFECT OF THE ARMISTICE—REPATRIATION OF TROOPS—REDUCTION OF FREIGHTS—DEMOBILIZATION OF SHIPPING—SYSTEM OF VOYAGE LICENSING—SHIPS BUILT TO ORDER OF THE GOVERNMENT—DISPOSAL TO THE SHIPPING INDUSTRY—SHIPPING LOSSES OF THE MARITIME NATIONS—THE UNITED STATES DEVELOPMENT—TRIBUTES TO THE MERCANTILE MARINE—THE THAMES PAGEANT—WAR RECORDS OF REPRESENTATIVE OWNERSHIPS.

IN an earlier chapter (vol. XI., Chapter CLXIX) was described the gradual process of mobilizing the British Mercantile Marine from the outbreak of war, with all the difficulties which had to be encountered and all the mistakes that were made, until the establishment of the Ministry of Shipping in the beginning of 1917. The creation of the Ministry marked a new stage in the utilization of all our resources for war purposes, and showed that the paramount importance of putting all shipping to the utmost possible use was at last realized. Another chapter (Vol. XV. Chapter CCXXXIV) traced the work of the Ministry of Shipping during 1917, when practically the whole of British shipping was brought into a system of State requisition, and recorded the measures taken by the State for increasing the production of ships, which had then drifted into a condition of the utmost urgency.

When considering the work of the Ministry of Shipping it should be remembered that none of the authorities who worked there would wish for an undue measure of credit for what was achieved by the Mercantile Marine. All would at once admit that unless they had had first-class material upon which to work, they would have been helpless. The material was represented by the pluck and dogged endurance of the sailors and firemen; by the courage, imperturbable calmness and skill of the officers and engineers of the British Mercantile Marine; and by the fleet of merchant ships of every type, from the monster greyhound liner to the humble little collier, which were at the service of the nation by reason of the business ability of the private ownerships which contracted for them and the technical knowledge and craftsmanship of the great shipbuilding establishments which constructed them. What the Ministry of Shipping did—and it is important to remember that many of the ablest managers of shipping in the country gave their services to it—was to try to put the tonnage available to the best possible use. That mistakes were made was, of course, true, but the competing claims which had to be considered were all of the most insistent kind, and the broad, impartial view of all men who had reason to know the almost overwhelming character of these claims was that the work was well done.

Well it was that by the beginning of 1918 the Mercantile Marine was highly organized. The greatest strain came in the spring of that year during the German offensive. The demand on the cross-Channel service was itself not so very serious, and it was successfully met; but the great burden thrown on the Mercantile Marine was in the transport of the largest possible

number of American troops across the Atlantic. Before this great development occurred the Ministry had already started to concentrate shipping in the North Atlantic trade in order to bring foodstuffs from the nearest producing sources, and between March 31 and August 31 no fewer than 124 extra ships were put into that route. Transports were turned round in port in extraordinarily quick time, and for a long period American troops were poured across the North Atlantic at the rate of about 5,000 a day. The performance of utilizing the shipping to the best possible advantage in that route reflected very great credit on those concerned in the work. A large staff was maintained in New York concentrating on it.

In absolutely disinterested fashion ships were diverted from every trade. No consideration of preserving trades which had been built up at great cost over many years was allowed to prevail. Wonderful opportunities were made for foreign ownerships, which these were quick to seize to the utmost limit of their capacity. The Armistice found foreign shipping firmly entrenched in many trades. The fact that British vessels had had to desert those trades was bad for British shipping and bad for British trade. The end of the war found both having to fight an uphill fight. The full price which had to be paid for the diversion of shipping to the purpose of transporting troops was probably never realized. If it was, it is doubtful if any other course would have been adopted than of placing the whole of the shipping resources of the country at the service of the Allied and Associated Nations.

Taking into account only steamships of over 500 tons gross, there were in the service of Great Britain before the war 18,500,000 tons. Of this total from 10,000,000 tons to 15,000,000 tons were employed in trade with the United Kingdom, which may be regarded as equivalent to about 12,000,000 tons. By January 1, 1917, the total had been reduced to 17,750,000 tons, showing a reduction of about 750,000 tons. At the date of the Armistice the total was only 15,000,000 tons, a reduction of 3,500,000 tons as compared with the pre-war figures. By January 1, 1918, the amount had crept up to 15,250,000 tons, including all new construction and all purchases. This figure, it will be seen, shows a reduction of 2,500,000 tons as compared with the beginning of 1917, and it was during the intervening period that the demand for tonnage was most acute.

Besides actual losses, there were always very large amounts of tonnage out of action owing to heavy damage due to war and marine causes. As compared with 100,000 tons under repair on January 1, 1917, there were on January 1, 1918, no fewer than 1,000,000 tons under repair. During 1918 2,000,000 tons of shipping were allocated to the naval services as Fleet auxiliaries, armed merchant cruisers and colliers, while 1,850,000 tons were employed on military services alone. There were 2,600,000 tons allocated to the Allies, 400,000 tons were allotted to the British Dominions overseas, 1,600,000 tons were employed in trading abroad and in coasting services (as compared with 3,670,000 tons on January 1, 1917), and only 6,000,000 tons were available for ordinary commercial services. A qualification must be made to the extent that many ships on naval, military, Allied and Dominion services brought imports on the return voyage.

In the result, it was estimated that, as compared with 12,000,000 tons which were employed in import trade before the war, approximately 7,500,000 tons were so engaged at the beginning of 1917, and 6,250,000 tons at the beginning of 1918. Yet the decline in imports was only as shown in the following figures. In 1913 the imports amounted to 54,500,000 tons; in 1916 to 46,000,000 tons; in 1917 to 38,000,000 tons; and in 1918 to about 35,000,000 tons. Before 1917 certain commodities had been selected, on which it had been decided that the greater part of the deficiency should fall. During 1917 nearly 70 per cent. of the reduction fell on these selected imports, and in spite of the low level of these imports during 1917, nearly 20 per cent. of the reduction of the imports in 1918 as compared with the 1917 level fell upon them. The total reduction of these commodities, which included pit-props, other timber, paper and paper-making materials, jute, fruit, certain foodstuffs and other non-essential cargo, amounted to 5,421,000 tons in 1917, as compared with 1916, and to 547,000 tons in 1918 as compared with 1917. The reduction in imports of these commodities in 1917 amounted to 53 per cent. as compared with 1916, while the reduction in 1918 amounted to only 5 per cent.

The effect of letting the reduction of imports fall upon certain selected commodities was to maintain extraordinarily well the importation of essential commodities. Thus, as compared

with 5,900,000 tons of wheat and wheat flour imported into the United Kingdom in 1913, there were 4,100,000 tons imported in 1918. As compared with 1,150,000 tons of meat, including bacon, imported in 1913, the importation of these commodities in 1918 amounted to 1,200,000 tons. The corresponding figures for sugar were 1,950,000 tons in 1913 and 1,350,000 tons in 1918; for iron ore, 7,450,000 tons and 6,600,000 tons; for other metallic ores, 1,800,000 tons and 1,650,000 tons; for oil, including fuel oil for the Navy, 1,850,000 tons in 1913 and as much as 5,200,000 tons in 1918. Before the war a large proportion of the imports had been brought in foreign vessels. Thus of a total of 54,500,000 tons imported in 1913, 34,500,000 tons were imported in British bottoms and 20,000,000 tons in foreign vessels. During the period of the ruthless submarine warfare the quantity of available neutral tonnage declined very seriously. In 1917, out of a total of 38,000,000 tons imported, 31,000,000 tons were brought in British ships and 7,000,000 tons in foreign vessels. In 1918 the total importation was about 35,000,000 tons, of which 30,000,000 were brought in British ships and 5,000,000 in foreign vessels. It must be recorded that a proportion of the neutral tonnage was only maintained in British service by means of pressure brought to bear by coaling facilities at British bunkering stations. By means of this pressure the country secured the services of about 1,500,000 tons of neutral shipping, of which about one-half was employed in trading outside the real danger zone. Obviously at a time when miners were being exempted from military service because they were engaged in a trade essential for the welfare of the country, and there was the greatest difficulty in providing ships for the transport of British coal to foreign ports, it would have been absurd to have allowed these supplies, placed abroad in the face of great difficulties, to be at the service of neutrals without some compensation. On their side the neutrals obtained very high freights. It was one of the features of the war at sea that from the outbreak of hostilities neutrals were able to maintain a privileged position of ability to secure higher freights. This privilege remained with them long after the conclusion of the war



[British India S.N. Co.

S.S. SEALDA'S GUNS AND GUNNERS.

In 1917 the convoy system was instituted, which, coupled with the fact that voyages were being prolonged by diversion of ships from the normal routes, meant that from these causes the effective supply of tonnage was reduced, as compared with that available in 1916, by approximately 20 per cent. During 1918 the effective reduction in the tonnage from the quantity available in 1917 was about



Balmoral Castle. Dunluce Castle. Briton. Guildford Castle. Goorkha. Kenilworth Castle.

UNION-CASTLE LINERS, CARRYING TROOPS FOR EUROPE: LEAVING TABLE BAY, AUGUST 27, 1914.

10 per cent., while the reduction of imports in British vessels was only about 3 per cent.

The very great improvement brought about in the importing capacity was due to a number of factors, of which the following may be cited as the chief: (1) An improvement in the distribution of shipping to services for which it was best adapted, as in the case of vessels allotted to military, naval, Dominion and commercial services. (2) An improvement in loading, partly due to the better distribution of shipping. During 1918 the quantity of cargo carried per net ton of loaded vessels entering British ports was approximately 40 per cent. more than in 1913. (3) A speeding-up of loading and discharging. (4) Shipping was concentrated on the shorter distance routes, especially in the North Atlantic. Thus as compared with the pre-war period, there was a reduction of 55 per cent. in the number of vessels employed in the trade between the United Kingdom and India, and of 75 per cent. of those employed in Australasian trade. The reduction in the number of ships engaged in the Far Eastern trade was nearly 100 per cent., and in the South African trade nearly 80 per cent. These reductions show the disturbance which had to be made in the British shipping services. They were essential for the prosecution of the war, but how serious they were for British commerce, allowing such wonderful openings for foreign vessels, has already been indicated.

Much British shipping was placed at the service of the Allies. In 1918 France had the equivalent of over 1,000,000 tons gross of British shipping in her service. The quantity allotted to France varied substantially, and during 1917 and 1918 was somewhat greater than during the early part of the war. This tonnage was employed mainly in the carriage of essential foodstuffs. coal and munitions to France. It was estimated that in 1918 about 45 per cent. of the total imports into France were carried in British ships, Of her total imports of coal of about 1,500,000 tons a month, about 50 per cent. was carried in British ships, and of her cereal imports about 60 per cent. Besides the direct assistance of the allotment of British ships to carry cargoes to French ports, France secured indirect tonnage assistance in other ways, namely, by having the benefit of coal at bunkering stations abroad which were supplied by British ships, and by the use of neutral tonnage obtained for Allied service through British bunkering pressure. Arrangements were also made whereby after the Armistice a very large amount of tonnage was to be built in British yards for French ownerships.

Italy also secured tonnage assistance. At the end of 1918 there was the equivalent of about 750,000 tons gross of British shipping in her service, and about 45 per cent. of her total imports were carried in British ships. In the earlier years of the war the average was nearer

COLONEL LESLIE WILSON.
Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Shipping.

500,000 tons gross. The main requirements of Italy for tonnage were for coal and cereals, and Great Britain in practice assumed responsibility for the provision of such tonnage assistance as Italy required to ensure for herself an adequate supply of these commodities. At the end of 1918 about half of her total imports of both commodities were carried in British ships. Italy also received a large degree of British assistance in the transport of munitions and raw materials both from the United States and the United Kingdom, and, like France, she received valuable indirect assistance from Great Britain in the form of neutral tonnage and bunker supplies from British ships.

With the conclusion of the Armistice the strain on the supply of tonnage did not relax. Instead of the authorities having to exert themselves to the utmost to carry troops from the United States and other countries to Europe, they had to repatriate troops and to endeavour to release as much tonnage as possible for commerce. By the end of May, 1919, more than 300,000 Dominion troops were repatri-

ated, in spite of a very unfortunate strike of ship-repairers. Yet it was not possible to transport troops fast enough to satisfy the wishes of all the men, and feeling on the subject grew so strong that disturbances took place at certain camps. The trouble was much aggravated by labour difficulties, which meant that in some cases, after orders had been given for troops to embark by a certain date, the arrangements were cancelled. By the end of July most of the Australians,

Efforts were made, as already indicated, to return shipping to its normal trade routes. By the end of January 400,000 tons of shipping were returned to the Australian and Eastern routes. One of the first actions of the Shipping Controller after the conclusion of the Armistice was to effect a reduction of about 25 per cent. in practically all the general cargo rates. At that time all the liners were under a system of State requisition which meant that, after the rates of hire had been paid to the shipping



[Western Newspaper Union.

MAURETANIA TAKING HOME AMERICAN TROOPS, DECEMBER, 1918.

Canadians and New Zealanders who were available for repatriation had left the United Kingdom. By the end of April about a million British troops had been transported from France to the United Kingdom for demobilization. More than 800,000 had been brought home on leave and sent back; 366,000 United Kingdom and Dominion troops had been moved homeward from overseas, and 120,000 United States troops had been taken back to America. It was possible to meet all the demands made for the repatriation of prisoners of war, and by the end of January, 160,000 prisoners of war had been repatriated from Germany, and all the men then available in Turkey had been brought home

ownerships, all the profits accrued to the State. When, early in 1919, vessels were returned to the individual ownerships the Shipping Controller intimated that a further reduction of freights would be desirable. Shipping companies were quick to adopt this suggestion, and further reductions were at once put in force, some amounting to 10 per cent. and some to much more. During the war the system of detailed scheduled rates had been abandoned, and simple flat rates had been instituted on the ground, largely, of simplicity and labour-saving. The effect of these flat rates had told hardly on rough cargo. In fact, there had been no desire to encourage these shipments of heavy cargo



[P. & O. and B. I. Companies.

BUILDING SIX 90 ft. BARGES FOR MESOPOTAMIA AT MAZAGON DOCK, BOMBAY.

during the war. There simply was not room for them. When the flat rates were abandoned and the graded scale rates were introduced, which showed very large reductions for rough cargo, the immediate effect was to stimulate trade. The Lines agreed that the rates should remain stable for several months in order to give merchants that sense of stability which they claimed was essential. It may be mentioned here that a sudden reduction in the rates from the United States to India caused very serious disturbance. In view of the heavy depreciation of the value of the existing stocks held in India, caused by the reduction in freights on goods then coming forward for shipment, merchants refused to take delivery. This case was, however, exceptional; losses were known to have been caused in the Far East, Australia and elsewhere, but refusal to accept delivery of fresh merchandise was not general.

The impetus given to the export trade was short-lived. It seemed but a flash in the pan Soon deadly quietness supervened, and it became common for ships to leave the country, either only with a complement of troops or in ballast without any cargo There had, in pre-war times, always been little cargo for export from the United Kingdom to the United States, although ships from the United States to the United Kingdom had been fully laden. It was, however, altogether unsatisfactory that throughout the greater part of 1919 ships bound to Australia, New Zealand and the Far East should proceed empty. The lack of cargo meant, of course, that the freight on imports had to bear the cost of the round voyage.

The demobilization of shipping was indicated by the fact that at the end of May, 1919, there were only on naval and military service 70 vessels of 230,000 tons, as compared with 256 vessels of just under 1,000,000 tons at the end of November. Down to the early summer 638 transports, of 2,250,000 tons, had been returned. Cargo ships were released freely, but a system of ship-licensing was maintained. This meant that vessels were sent to load grain in North and South America and Australia, and lumber and other essential supplies in North America, at fixed rates of freight. These rates of freight were always much lower than those which neutrals could earn

During the war the Government had contracted for a considerable quantity of new tonnage. Down to the early summer of 1919

AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH OF A CONVOY.

240 standard cargo ships, of just over 1,000,000 tons, had been completed in the United Kingdom. The Admiralty and the Ministry of Shipping had been responsible for ordering ships abroad in Japan, the United States and Canada. Almost all the ships ordered in the United States had been taken over by the United States Government. At the time of the Armistice the Ministry of Shipping had in service 283 Government ships, of which 147, of 1,800,000 tons deadweight, were standard ships. There were then building or under contract to be built 595 ships of about 3,800,000 tons deadweight. After the Armistice the Government decided that its ships should be sold, and orders cancelled where work had not been started. In accordance with this decision 159 ships, of over 1,000,000 tons deadweight, were taken over by the builders or cancelled. Speaking in the House of Commons on May 19 on the Shipping Vote, Colonel Leslie Wilson, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Shipping, said that under an agreement entered into with Lord Inchcape, on behalf of the British shipping industry, 249 contracts, of 1,700,000 tons, were taken over for distribution, without any profit to Lord Inchcape, to those British owners who desired them in proportion to their losses. There had been no loss or gain to the Government by this arrangement. Sixty-eight ships had been sold to British owners and 57 to foreign owners. Colonel Wilson pointed out that the usual practice of the Ministry had been to sell second-hand ships by auction, but that the standard ships were sold by private treaty, which was considered to be really the only way in which to secure a fair price. For the 125 vessels, of which 68 were sold to British owners and 57 to foreign owners, the sale price was £19,600,000, whereas the cost price to the Ministry had been £16,500,000, showing a substantial profit to the Ministry. Fourteen second-hand ships were sold for £895,000.

On July 18 Lord Inchcape dispatched a letter to the Chamber of Shipping, which was reproduced in *The Times* of the following day, stating that the ships which he had already taken over from the Government had been allocated to various British owners. Allowing for the fact that the builders had themselves had the right to take over the contracts placed with them, 156 steamers of 1,056,000 tons had been distributed through the instrumentality of Lord Inchcape. The amount involved

represented 23,887,400. Lord Inchcape stated that he had then taken over from the Government a further 40 steamers, all of which were in commission, with a deadweight capacity of 343,700 tons. These were offered by him to shipowners at prices which he hoped "would bring him out without loss." Anything realized in excess of the amount paid in to the Government for the whole fleet was to be divided amongst buyers in proportions to be fixed by himself, as soon as the transaction was closed. He added that, as in the previous case, no profit or commission of any description was to be taken by himself or his firm, and no advantage was to be given to the companies with which he was associated.

These transactions were on so vast a scale that it should be recorded that Lord Inchcape during the war and during the early period of reconstruction occupied a unique position in shipping. During the war he negotiated a number of important agreements between the Government and the shipping industry. It was even suggested at times in shipping circles that his attitude towards the Government was almost too kindly, but no sooner did the war tension relax than he appeared strongly as a champion of individual enterprise, and urged in letters to *The Times* and in public speeches the necessity of a return to normal trading at the earliest possible time. The ships ordered by the Government had been offered to the shipping industry in the autumn of 1918, but owners were very chary in bidding for them. When in January, 1919, Lord Inchcape gave the shipping industry a strong lead by taking over the Government contracts, owners generally were very quick to follow him.

THE KING INSPECTING THE CREW OF THE HOSPITAL SHIP PLASSY.
With Captain E. W. Bruce in command. The ship belonged to the P. & O. Company.

The statistical position of shipping as it was before and after the war was very clearly set out by Lloyd's Register in its tables issued early in August, 1919. Never were the statistics of the Society more valuable. The Society took into account vessels of 100 tons and upwards. On this basis it showed that the United Kingdom in June, 1914, owned 18,892,000 tons gross of shipping, and in June,



FLAGS OF THE MERCANTILE MARINE IN THE PEACE PROCESSION, JULY 19, 1919.

1919, 16,345,000 tons, a reduction of 2,547,000 tons or 13·5 per cent. There were in addition 1,632,000 tons owned in the British Dominions overseas in June, 1914, and 1,863,000 tons in June, 1919, an increase of 31,000 tons or 14·1 per cent. Another country besides the United Kingdom which showed a very substantial reduction was Germany, which in June, 1919, owned 3,247,000 tons, a reduction of 1,888,000 tons, or 36·8 per cent., as compared with June, 1914. Enemy vessels, however, which at the date of the Armistice had not been captured or requisitioned by other countries were included in the 1919 figures, and the tonnage of enemy vessels taken over by the Allies since the Armistice amounted to 1,750,000 tons. The actual loss of Germany was therefore very considerably more than 1,880,000 tons.

Greece showed a loss in June, 1919, as compared with five years previously, of 530,000 tons in her merchant marine, Norway of 360,000 tons, Italy of 192,000 tons, Spain of 175,000 tons, Denmark of 139,000 tons, and Sweden of 98,000 tons. Austria-Hungary lost 339,000 tons, or 32·2 per cent.

As against these decreases the United States, which in June, 1914, owned 2,027,000 tons of sea-going shipping, raised its ownership to 9,773,000 tons in June, 1919, an increase of 7,746,000 tons, or 382·1 per cent. Japan increased her mercantile marine by 617,000 tons, or 36·1 per cent. Holland showed an increase of 102,000 tons at 1,574,000 tons, or 6·9 per cent., and France increased her mercantile marine by 40,000 tons to 1,962,000 tons, or 2·1 per cent.

One of the outstanding results of a comparison of the 1914 and 1919 figures was the relative position of the United Kingdom and the United States. In 1914 the percentage of the world's tonnage owned in the United Kingdom was 41·6 per cent., while the United States owned 4·46 per cent. In 1919 the United Kingdom percentage had decreased to 34·1 per cent., while the United States had increased its share to 24·9 per cent., including 20·4 per cent. of sea-going tonnage. It had to be borne in mind, though, that a substantial proportion of the American tonnage was built of wood, which for practical purposes in ocean trade could be largely excluded, although during 1918 and 1919 American wooden ships were frequently appearing in European waters. If wooden tonnage were excluded the American sea-going tonnage was reduced to 8,426,000 tons, as compared with 16,267,000 tons owned in the United Kingdom.

The Register then proceeded to estimate what, taking into account the decline from the normal amount of shipbuilding in some countries which might have been expected, and the increase in others, the real effect of the war was on merchant shipping.

Summarizing the totals in the tables, the net result of the war on the world's merchant steam tonnage appeared as follows :—

	Tons.
Loss of British tonnage	5,202,000
Loss of foreign tonnage (except U.S.A.)	9,000,000
	14,202,000
Net gain to the U.S.A. tonnage ..	6,729,000
Net world's loss	7,473,000

There were many signs that the United States meant to have a large mercantile marine. The American representatives appeared to be successful in securing at the discussions in Paris held before the Peace Conference the retention for the United States of 89 ships, of 654,000 tons gross, including some of the largest transatlantic liners, which were seized in United States ports when war broke out between the United States and Germany. Shortly after the entry of the United States into the war, Congress at Washington passed a resolution which, in effect, declared the German ships in American ports forfeit to the American Government It was understood to

THE AQUITANIA'S LOUNGE AS A HOSPITAL WARD.

By far the largest loss was incurred by the United Kingdom, the tonnage of which was in 1919 probably more than 5,000,000 tons less than it would have been but for the war. The only country which increased her merchant fleet during the war was the United States, which appeared to have more than 7,000,000 tons of sea-going tonnage more than she would have had if the war had not taken place. The wonderful revival of shipbuilding in the United States was described and illustrated in a chapter entitled "The American Shipbuilding Crusade" (Vol. XVIII., Chapter CCLXIX.).

be by virtue of that resolution that the American delegates in Paris put forward, with skilful advocacy, a claim to the tonnage which was seized. Although frequently questioned on the subject, the British Government did not commit itself to any definite statement. The vessels seized included the Vaterland of 54,000 tons, the George Washington of 25,000 tons, the Kaiser Wilhelm II. of 19,300 tons, and the President Grant of 18,000 tons. The possession of these vessels was extremely valuable to the United States because they formed the nucleus of liner services. That the United States



S.S. CARMANIA SINKING THE GERMAN MERCHANT CRUISER CAP TRAFALGAR.

meant to adopt an enterprising policy was made clear by a statement published in July, 1919, that the Shipping Board had completed plans for the construction of two gigantic liners of 55,000 tons gross, a length of 1,000 feet, and a speed of 30 knots. The vessels were to have accommodation for 3,000 passengers and 1,000 crew, were to be equipped with oil-burning engines, and were to have a cruising radius of 7,000 miles. They were to be so equipped that they could be used as commerce destroyers in case of war. The effect of a large addition to the American tonnage in the North Atlantic trade made itself felt in the spring of 1919. In April of that year more than 31 per cent. of the United States exports, as measured by value, were carried in American bottoms, as compared with 20 per cent. in April, 1918. Only 33·6 per cent. were carried in British ships, as against 50·9 in April, 1918.

The services of British shipping did at last receive adequate recognition. For a long time the nation appeared blind to the full extent of these great feats. They were recognized in tributes paid after the conclusion of the Armistice by the King and also by the Admiralty and statesmen. In a letter to the national headquarters of the "League of America's Tribute to British Seamen," which was organizing the collection of a large fund in America in aid of British civilian sailors maimed and disabled in the war, President Wilson declared that, along with the United States' own gallant seamen, the British merchant seamen had rendered a service to humanity in the great war which enrolled them among the true servants of freedom and civilization. When replying to an address of congratulation from the Corporation of the City of London at the Guildhall on July 29, 1919, the King paid a fine tribute to the services of the mercantile marine. He declared that, especially in the centre of the Empire's commerce, the debt which the country owed to the officers and men of the British mercantile marine should be appreciated. Their splendid services during the war had been vital to its successful issue. Few, if any, merchant seamen, he continued, could have anticipated the conditions of stress and danger under which they had to work. From day to day they were facing death no less than the soldiers in the fighting line, and even when the submarine menace was at its height no single British crew ever refused to sail. He proceeded to urge that the re-creation of the merchant navy and the development of the ports must be pursued with the utmost energy if the country was to regain its old supremacy.

Representatives of the mercantile marine marched in the great representative procession of the Allied and Associated Forces through

the streets of London on July 19, 1919. A special commemoration of the sea services, unique in the history of the nation, was held on August 4, which was August Bank Holiday, and the fifth anniversary of the declaration of war This commemoration took the form of a pageant on the River Thames. The germ of the idea originated with Mr. W. H. Leslie, a leading member of Lloyd's, and everywhere it was received with enthusiasm. It was that a procession of lifeboats, bearing the House flags of all shipping companies, should proceed up the Thames, from the lower reaches to Chelsea. The exhibition of lifeboats was deemed particularly appropriate, since it was in these that merchant seamen, whose vessels had been torpedoed, were frequently cast adrift far from land. The idea developed, the Admiralty, approved it, and it was submitted to the King who immediately recognized its suitability, postponed a visit to Scotland in order to participate, and ordered the Royal barge to be made ready. The procession, which left the Custom House in the Pool of London early



[Aero photograph.

WHITE STAR LINER OLYMPIC (46,359 tons gross) CARRYING TROOPS.
She is flying the White Ensign.

in the afternoon, was headed by three boats of the Metropolitan Police. Then came a launch flying the flag of the Port of London Authority, then a steam vessel of Trinity House with the Duke of Connaught on board as Master of Trinity House, then the naval officer in charge in a picket boat, and then the Royal barge. Following the King and Queen, Queen Alexandra, the Prince of Wales, Prince Albert, and other members of the Royal Family in the royal barge, came the Lords of the Admiralty in a specially prepared barge, and the Lord Mayor, as Admiral of the Port of London, in the barge of the Commander-in-Chief at the Nore. Launches of the Ministry of Shipping, Customs and Excise, Lloyd's and the Thames Conservancy followed. Then came a dozen twelve-oared naval cutters, four picket boats and an armed motor launch of the Navy, then models of naval guns, motor and steam lifeboats, a motor launch of the Trinity House pilots, five steamboats of the mercantile marine associations, and, among other craft, boats from the training ships, fishermen's motor drifters, motor vessels of the Missions to Seamen, and finally, 70 lifeboats towed by tugs with the House flags of the shipping ownerships. Never before had there been such an assembly. All these boats were manned by seamen with war service. The Royal Marine Artillery Band played on a pontoon off the Custom House, while the 2nd Life Guards Band played at Cadogan Pier, Chelsea, where His Majesty disembarked. Other bands were at points along the route, and famous old sea songs were sung. The weather favoured the celebration, which was a unique commemoration of the splendid achievements of the sea services.

It should always be remembered that every cargo steamer which delivered a full cargo of foodstuffs or other essential commodities in this country rendered a service quite as vital as the services performed by merchant cruisers and transports. The few examples which are now included of the war services of individual ownerships are given because they are simple to set out, and may be regarded as representative.

The war services of the Cunard Steamship Company appealed, for instance, strongly to the imagination. An outstanding event in the company's war history was the dastardly torpedoing of the Lusitania on May 7, 1915,

THE NEW OFFICES OF THE BRITISH-INDIA LINE AT KARACHI.
Placed by Lord Inchcape at the service of the Government of India as a hospital during the war.



ALLAN LINER CALGARIAN SINKING AFTER BEING TORPEDOED.
Her career had been a distinguished one.

near the Old Head of Kinsale, when 1,195 persons lost their lives, including 291 women and 94 children. Her sister ship, the Mauretania, had a happier experience. The Mauretania was at first engaged in the trans-Atlantic service. In June, 1915, she made her first voyage in Admiralty service, conveying troops to Mudros for the Gallipoli campaign. After about four months she was converted into a hospital ship, with all the facilities of a modern hospital. In September, 1916, she was again being used as a troopship and carried Canadian soldiers from Halifax to Liverpool. Early in 1918 she became an armed cruiser, but was soon employed in bringing American troops to Europe. In seven voyages she carried more than 33,000 men.

Specially notable services were also rendered by the Aquitania, a larger ship of over 45,647 tons. At the outbreak of war she had made three round voyages between Liverpool and New York. Then she was immediately taken over by the Admiralty and converted into a merchant cruiser. Four days after the outbreak of war she left Liverpool flying the White Ensign. Later she became a transport, and carried 30,000 troops to the Dardanelles. For two years she was commissioned as a hospital ship, and carried a total of 25,000 men. In the spring of 1918 she was refitted as a transport, and in nine trips, when American troops were being rushed across the North Atlantic, she carried 60,000 American troops.

The sinking of the German merchant cruiser Cap Trafalgar in a duel by the Carmania is another outstanding event in the Cunard Company's service So was the participation of the Laconia in the operations which culminated in the sinking of the German cruiser Königsberg in the Rufigi River, East Africa. To sum up the operations of the Cunard Company during the war, the vessels of the line transported 1,000,000 sailors and soldiers, carried 10,000,000 tons of cargo and steamed 3,500,000 miles. The line suffered heavily in the loss of the following ships, besides the Lusitania: the Caria, Veria (1915); Franconia, Alaunia (1916); Ivernia, Lycia, Folia, Thracia, Feltria, Ultonia, Volodia, Vinovia (1917); Andania, Valeria, Aurania, Ansonia, Vandalia Carpathia, Flavia and Ascania (1918).

Shortly after the outbreak of war the White Star liners Oceanic, Teutonic, Cedric, Celtic and Laurentic were commissioned as armed cruisers. The Oceanic was lost towards the end of 1914; the Laurentic was sunk by submarine off the coast of Ireland in January, 1917, while carrying a large quantity of gold, in connexion with which salvage operations carried out during the summer of 1919 were very successful; the Teutonic survived and was acquired by the Government; the Cedric and

Celtic also survived and were available, with the Adriatic and Baltic, for the trans-Atlantic service.

Truly magnificent services were rendered by the Olympic, of 46,359 tons. She distinguished herself early by the rescue of the complement of the battleship Audacious, sunk by mine off the West Coast of Ireland. Later she was engaged in carrying troops to Gallipoli, on one occasion transporting as many as 8,000 men. Next she brought Canadian soldiers and Chinese labour battalions to Europe, and finally carried enormous numbers of American troops. She transported more than 200,000 persons while on war service, including hundreds of women and children—the wives and families of Canadian soldiers returning to Canada. Early in May, 1918, she had the satisfaction of ramming a large German submarine in the English Channel, 31 survivors of the crew of 60 being rescued by a destroyer.

The chief individual loss suffered by the White Star line was that of the Britannic, of 48,158 tons, which was sunk in the Ægean Sea on November 21, 1916, either by submarine or mine, while commissioned as a hospital ship. On her first voyage she brought back from Mudros 3,300 sick and wounded to Southampton. Altogether, before her career was cut short, she was the means of restoring nearly 15,000 disabled men to the country. The vessels employed in the Australian route carried a total of 112,000 men. The aggregate tonnage lost by the line during the war amounted to 148,145 and was represented by the liners Britannic, Oceanic, Arabic, Laurentic, Cymric, Afric, Georgic, Ceric and Delphic.

Of the Atlantic Transport Company's fleet the liners Minneapolis and Minnesota were immediately on the outbreak of war requisitioned for the transport of troops. In February, 1915, the Minnewaska, Minnetonka, Marquette, Manitou and Menominee were so requisitioned, and in December, 1915, the Missouri and Maryland. From the outbreak of war until the date of the Signing of Peace nearly 25,000 troops were transported in the vessels of the company, and, in addition, 72,418 horses or mules for the Army, one steamer in 21 voyages carrying 24,644 horses with a loss of only 0·56 per cent Cargo brought from the United States to the United Kingdom



ORIENT LINER ORAMA.
She was in action more than once.

amounted to the enormous total of 2,639,055 tons. In addition large quantities of guns were carried for the forces engaged in the Dardanelles, etc. Several hundreds of thousands of troops, a large number of Army remounts, and an enormous tonnage of Government stores were carried between the Mediterranean ports. Of the 71,641 tons gross employed in transport service, no less than 48,445 tons were lost by enemy action, equivalent to 67½ per cent. of the fleet engaged in this description of service. Of the steamers employed carrying livestock and cargo across the North Atlantic on behalf of the Government, the company suffered, through submarine action, a further loss of 24,163 tons gross, equivalent to 43 per cent. of the fleet employed.

From the outbreak of war until October 31, 1918, 1,040,000 troops and other passengers were carried by the vessels of the Canadian Pacific Ocean Services to and from various parts of the world, including China and Japan, Singapore, Bombay, Mesopotamia, Suez, Gallipoli, the Mediterranean, Colombo, Dar-es-Salaam, Delagoa Bay, Durban, Mauritius and Archangel, in addition to the West Coast of North and South America, and the United States and Canada. The total loss of troops carried, caused by enemy action, was eight in number. Besides many thousands of horses and mules, over 4,000,000 tons of cargo were carried. Probably as romantic a career as that of any merchant ship was the experience of the Empress of Russia, which sailed from Vancouver in August, 1914, in command of Commander C. C. Walcott, R.N., with Lieut.-Commander Davison, R.N.R., as navigating officer. At Hong Kong, four 4·7 guns were mounted fore and aft. The Chinese crew was paid off and British naval reservists and French gun crews were shipped. The Empress of Russia met the British cruiser Sydney, after the German cruiser Emden had been destroyed, and took off the German prisoners, including Captain von Müller, of the Emden, and disembarked them at Colombo. The Empress of Russia captured the Turkish post and fort of Kamaran, in the Red Sea, with the aid of Indian Territorial troops. For 23 days she and her sister ship, the Empress of Asia, guarded Aden, until they were relieved by British warships. Then her guns made some excellent practice on the Arabian ports at Salif, also on the Red Sea, where the Turks had refused to surrender, and in effect told the captain and crew that they might do their worst. They did, and when they left the town and fort were in ruins. Later the Empress of Russia steamed into the port of Hodeidah, where the Turks were told that if the British and French consuls, who had been kidnapped, were not brought back Hodeidah would be destroyed. After some days the captured officials were given up and were taken on board the Empress

WRECKAGE OF THE S.S. OTRANTO.

of Russia, which steamed away in search of more adventures. After about a year spent in Eastern waters, the Empress of Asia and the Empress of Russia returned to their regular service on the Pacific. Finally, in 1918, they received an S O S call to sail to the Atlantic and help in the transportation of American troops.

The liners Alsatian, Victorian and Virginian were taken by the Government on the outbreak of war, and were fitted out as armed cruisers and placed in the 10th Cruiser Squadron, which was responsible for a share of the blockade of Germany, patrolling between Scotland, the Shetland Islands, and the north of Norway and Iceland. They carried on this work until they were released for the escort of convoys, when the merchant tonnage of Great Britain had become much reduced. As many as 40 ships were escorted at one time. The Calgarian had a very distinguished career, which was ended by sinking on March 1, 1918, when proceeding home with a convoy of 30 ships, after four German torpedoes had been fired at her. During her career she took out to Canada £50,000,000 of English gold and securities to the value of millions sterling. Patriotism inspired all ranks of the Canadian Pacific Ocean Services from beginning to end. When war was declared it was thought that all the R.N.R. officers would immediately be required for Admiralty



ELLERMAN LINER CITY OF EXETER.
The vessel was mined in the Indian Ocean.

service, and a message was sent out enquiring if all were ready. The answer came back, "All officers ready and glad to serve." At that time it was impossible to have foreseen how this answer was to be tested or that the men who remained in the company's service were to go through as much as those in the direct service of the Admiralty.

Although the fleet was comparatively small n numbers, the Orient Line vessels were of immense value as armed mercantile cruisers and transports. The fine liners Otranto, Orama and Otway were commissioned as armed cruisers on August 4, 1914, and September 3 and 10 respectively of the same year. The Orvieto was commissioned on January 6, 1915, and the Ophir, which was subsequently purchased outright by the Government, on February 5, 1915. The Orvieto and Omrah, in Australian waters at the outbreak of war, formed part of the convoy which brought the first part of the Australian contingent home, sailing from Australia in November, 1914. The Orsova was requisitioned as a transport in May, 1915, the Orontes in October, 1916. The Ormonde, which was under construction in 1915, was completed in November, 1917, and was afterwards engaged in transport service.

The Otranto, which before the war was sometimes employed in cruises to the Norwegian fjords, was with Admiral Craddock's squadron when the latter encountered the German squadron off the Chilean coast in November, 1915. She came under fire, but was ordered away by the Admiral and escaped. Eventually she was lost by collision with the steamer Kashmir on October 6, 1918, when in convoy. The Orama, one of the largest and fastest of the Orient Line steamers, was at Port Stanley with the Fleet when the German squadron appeared off the Falkland Islands, and she subsequently operated with the cruisers Kent and Glasgow in the sinking of the German cruiser. The Orama had previously pursued and sunk the German auxiliary cruiser Navarra off the mouth of the Plate Altogether the Orient Line had a fine record of war service to its credit.

Naturally the P. and O. Company and the associated lines took their full share in the support of the Navy and the maintenance of essential commerce. The group included, besides the P. and O. Company itself, the British India, New Zealand Shipping, Federal, Union of New Zealand, Hain, Mercantile and Nourse lines. The total number of vessels lost down to November 11, 1918, through enemy action was 81, representing 491,629 tons, while 14 vessels of 76,622 tons were lost through marine causes. The vessels of the associated fleets served the nation well in all seas. Many examples of individual gallantry might be quoted did space permit. None was finer than that of the duel between the New Zealand Shipping Company's steamer Otaki, whose commander, Lieutenant Archibald Bisset Smith, R.N.R., received a posthumous award of the Victoria Cross, and the disguised German cruiser Möwe, armed with four 5·9 inch, one 4·1 inch and two 22-pounder guns and two torpedo tubes. The sole armament of the Otaki was one 4·7 inch gun for

defensive purposes. During the action the Otaki scored several hits on the Möwe, causing considerable damage and starting a fire which lasted for three days. After the Otaki had received several casualties and much damage to the hull and was heavily on fire, Lieutenant Smith gave orders for the boats to be launched to allow the crew to be rescued. He remained on the ship himself and went down with her when she sank with the British colours still flying after what was described in an enemy account as a "duel as gallant as naval history can relate."

No greater losses of tonnage were suffered by any ownership than by that of Sir John Ellerman, who through the Ellerman Lines (Ltd.), Ellerman's Wilson Line (Ltd.), and associated companies lost 103 ocean-going steamers, with a total cargo capacity of from 600,000 to 750,000 tons. Many of the ships were exceptionally fine vessels. They included the City of Paris, torpedoed in the Mediterranean in April, 1917, the City of Athens, mined off Cape Town in August, 1917, and the City of Glasgow, torpedoed off the Tuskar in September, 1918. All of these vessels were passenger ships. The City of Winchester was the first merchant vessel to be lost during the war. She was homeward bound from India with an extremely valuable cargo of produce when she was captured by the German cruiser Königsberg. After spending some days in the undesirable company of that cruiser she was sunk. The City of Lucknow, torpedoed in the Mediterranean in April, 1918, was another exceptionally severe loss.

Ellerman's Hall line, which consisted mainly of cargo vessels, suffered heavily, no fewer than 14 steamers of this line being sunk. The list included the City of Birmingham, a fine passenger vessel. A large number of vessels owned by the Ellerman Lines acted as transports and, in this capacity, carried many thousands of British and Dominion troops. They were also instrumental in bringing large numbers of United States troops to Europe when the presence of these troops was urgently needed. The City of Exeter, a fine passenger ship, struck



THE R.M.S.P. ALCANTARA SINKING THE RAIDER GREIF.

a mine in the Indian Ocean, about 400 miles from Bombay. No. 1 hold filled at once, and the master gave orders for the passengers and crew to take to the boats This order was promptly carried out, after which the master and chief engineer returned on board and at great risk to themselves carried out a thorough examination of the ship. They decided that the ship could, by the exercise of the greatest care, reach Bombay under her own steam. Passengers re-embarked, and the vessel duly arrived at her destination. The value of the services of these officers was afterwards fully recognized by the Admiralty. Not only did the officers and the white crews show the finest qualities of courage and determination during the war, but the lascar crews rose splendidly to the occasion when called upon.

Of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company's liners eight vessels were commissioned as hospital ships, namely, the Asturias, Araguaya, Drina, Essequibo, Tagus, Agadir, Berbice and Balantia (St. Margaret of Scotland), of which the Asturias was torpedoed while bearing all the distinctions of a hospital ship. The Andes, Arlanza, Almanzora, Avon (Avoca), Ebro and Alcantara, all acted as armed cruisers. It was the Alcantara, comparatively lightly armed, which fought the disguised German raider Greif for 20 minutes in the North Sea before she sank with colours flying, just before her enemy took the final plunge. The Potaro was captured and sunk by the German mercantile cruiser Kronprinz Wilhelm on January 10, 1915, and on March 24 of that year the Tamar was sunk by the same vessel. While on her maiden voyage, the Brecknockshire, a fine new cargo ship of 7,600 tons, was captured and sunk on February 15, 1917. The Radnorshire was sunk later. So were the Caroni, Tyne, Drina, Amazon, and Merionethshire.

The four Union-Castle liners, Armadale Castle, Edinburgh Castle, Kinfauns Castle, and Kildonan Castle, acted as armed merchant cruisers. Six of the company's vessels were torpedoed or mined when in service as hospital ships. These were the Dover Castle, Galeka, Glenart Castle (twice), Llandovery Castle, Braemar Castle and Gloucester Castle. The hospital ships of the company, while based on Southampton, brought a total of 331,404 British wounded officers and men to port and, in addition, landed 8,279 enemy wounded. During the first year of the war, and on certain later occasions, the Union-Castle vessels landed and embarked at Southampton and Western ports a total of 108,866 officers and troops. This total included the 5,072 officers and men brought (together with guns, vehicles, baggage and equipment) in the convoy which left South Africa on September 19, 1914, and 6,680 officers and men who embarked at Southampton as a portion of the Territorial Expeditionary Force for Egypt and India. The Company's vessels carried 12,471 horses and mules and 78,883 tons of stores and munitions. A summary of this character can only touch on the services of the regular lines, and merely indicate the inestimable value of the essential work done by the cargo steamship fleets. Every merchant ship, whether engaged in carrying troops or foodstuffs or in helping to protect the trade routes, contributed very gallantly and usefully her share to the final victory.



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CHAPTER CCCVIII.

INLAND TRANSPORT.

ITS GROWTH—WORK IN FRANCE AND FLANDERS—BRITISH BARGE WORK—THE MYSTERY PORT—STRAIGHTENING A RIVER—BEATING THE U-BOAT—OUR FIRST SEA TRAIN-FERRY—BATTLEFIELD SALVAGE—THE KING'S INTEREST—I.W.T. IN MESOPOTAMIA.

INLAND water transport was the outcome of the very earliest stages of the Great War. Like many of the other vast organizations which formed part of the effort of the British Army in our many fields of warfare, the Inland Water Transport section of the Royal Engineers had a small beginning. A search of the records shows that it was to Field-Marshal Lord French that the germ of the Inland Water Transport, R.E., which afterwards became the Inland Waterways and Docks Department of the War Office, was due. When our forces were fighting in the early months of the war in Flanders, it became apparent to the Commander-in-Chief that the waterways of Belgium and France behind the British lines offered good media for transport, and, properly organized, would afford relief to the already congested railways and roads from the sea-coast to the bases. The order which gave birth to the Inland Water Transport was scarcely 20 words in length, and from this order was evolved a great force. In its embryonic stages the Inland Water Transport consisted of an old tug and a few barges. Its birthplace was a little room with two officers and a clerk—an offshoot of the Quartermaster-General's Department of the War Office.

From so humble a beginning this amphibious force grew until there was scarcely a campaign in which it did not take part. France saw its birth; in Serbia it played its part; in Mesopotamia it proved itself when the re-organization of the transport service was brought about in order to assist Sir Stanley Maude; in Egypt it was part of the forces of General Sir Archibald Murray and his successor, Lord Allenby; in Salonika, East Africa, Taranto, Corfu, and even in Russia, it figured, and to judge only by the dispatches of the British commanders figured well, in spite of the many vicissitudes and the improvization which of necessity was unavoidable. The ready adaptability of the Inland Water Transport was perhaps the chief secret of its success, although that adaptability had behind it the brains of men many of whom had, either at sea, in great constructional undertakings abroad, or in pioneer work in various parts of the Empire, received just the training necessary for such a force.

It was in December, 1914, that the Inland Water Transport, under the Directorate of Movements Department (Director, General Stuart Wortley) of the Quartermaster-General, took up its duties, and early in the next year Lieut.-Colonel—afterwards Brigadier-General—G. E. Holland, C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., was appointed to take charge of the operations in France. Lieut.-Colonel Holland—who held the appointment of Marine Superintendent of the L.N.W. Railway Company—was one of the many officers connected with the British

A PADDLER AND A BARGE ON THE TIGRIS.

railways who, by dint of their gift for organization, did much to bring the war to a successful issue; like others, he did not live to see the real fruits of his work. The Inland Water Transport developed rapidly, and within nine months it became necessary to constitute it a separate directorate in France, General Holland remaining at its head there until his death in June, 1917, when Brigadier-General C. M. Luck, D.S.O., was appointed to succeed him.

Side by side with the development of the Inland Water Transport in France the home organization grew. When, in September, 1916, the department of the Director-General of Military Railways (afterwards the Director-General of Movements and Railways) was formed at the War Office, the Inland Water Transport became part of this, with its own Director (Lieut.-Colonel A. S. Collard, R.E.—afterwards Major-General). The functions of the directorate expanded until its work took in other branches of transport besides canal traffic, and included the reconstruction of Belgian ports, the supply of equipment for docks and harbours, constructional work, etc., at various ports which formed bases for transport of munitions and material for the British Army. The name of the directorate was changed to that of Inland Waterways and Docks in April, 1917.

In addition to utilizing the French and Belgian waterways for keeping our troops supplied, the Inland Water Transport maintained the waterways and bridges, using for this purpose salvage units, with piling plant, salvage pumps, pneumatic machinery, floating cranes, etc., sent out from home. Floating repair workshops were frequently at work under enemy fire keeping this important means of communication through the waterways open. When the administration of the docks in the British area was taken over, a great deal of material was supplied for port construction and dock operation, and many of the stevedores and other personnel engaged were trained at the Inland Waterways and Docks Depot at Richborough. At one stage of the campaign the Inland Water Transport traffic on the French and Belgian canals exceeded 250,000 tons a month, borne and maintained by a fleet of over 900 craft of miscellaneous types. At the end of 1916 about 20,000 tons per week were being conveyed in British barges; but this rose to 75,000 tons per week before the date of the armistice. The average distance increased from 25·8 kms. in October, 1917, to 37·8 kms. in October, 1918. The ton-kilometres for one year reached nearly 100,000,000. Not a small part of the work was that done by ambulance barges, which dealt with an average of 3,000 cases a month and afforded relief to the hospital train system.

The first base for the Inland Water Transport was at Dover, where a small store was formed to meet the urgent requirements for France At Dover barges were equipped, loaded and sent to France. Dover soon became unsuitable, for its importance as a

naval base—due to the necessity of maintaining an effective patrol of the coast of Flanders and the subsequent evolution of the Dover barrage—made it necessary to concentrate purely naval forces there. This, added to the fact that it was exceedingly difficult to carry on barge traffic by reason of the tides at the entrance to the harbour, forced the authorities to find another base for the Inland Water Transport, suitable for the expansion of the work. Store accommodation being totally inadequate at Dover, heavy material was kept for some time at Ashford, Kent; this, however, involved "double handling" and consequent delay in the movement of sorely needed munitions.

Various sites were inspected. It was necessary, in view of the probable demands which would be made by the ever-growing British Army in France, primarily to consider the formation of a base as near as possible to the ports of Northern France and the outlets to the canals in that part of the country, and to find a port which was not already heavily taxed with transport work and within easy access of a main railway system in order that there should be quick transit from munition factories to the canal and rail-heads of the Flemish-French ports. Consideration was given to the claims of Deal and Ramsgate, but it was finally decided to acquire land at the mouth of the Stour at Pegwell Bay, near Sandwich, which, besides being within easy reach of the Continental canal system, gave ample scope for camps.

While the port at Richborough was in the process of formation a depot for personnel was formed at the Stonar camp, and a service of barges, acquired for the Inland Water Transport in France, was equipped, manned, and dispatched. A stores depot was also inaugurated for the supply of urgent and necessary material, stores and plant.

By December, 1916, the work was so far advanced for the port to be fully at work. A cut in the Stour had been completed in less than five months—a record for work of this kind—the quay wall being of interlocked steel sheet piling, backed with concrete above low water level, and tied back with tie-bolts to a continuous wall which formed part of the loading platform. In the excavation for this New Cut nearly 300,000 cubic yards of material were removed by floating and land dredgers, and

A BARGE-LOAD OF REINFORCEMENTS AT DUNKIRK.

eventually the channel was formed, giving a width of 250 feet and a depth of 16 feet at high water. The wharf was equipped with a number of 2-ton transporter cranes and with travelling gantry cranes having a maximum capacity of 10 tons. Behind the wharf four lines of railways and some 80 miles of sidings were eventually laid.

The development of the U-boat campaign and the fast increasing demands of the British Army in France led to the need for more barges on the cross-Channel service from Richborough. The value of this service lay in the quick "turn-round," and its immunity from attack. Building yards in all parts of the country were at that time overwhelmed with work on larger craft, and the establishments devoted to building barges were taxed to the utmost not only to keep pace with the requirements in the near fields of warfare, but in Mesopotamia, where the munitioning of the British Forces up the Tigris called for shallow-draught craft. These considerations led to the establishment of a barge-building and repair establishment at Richborough. For this a site above the old stores wharf was selected, and this grew in dimensions until building-slipways on both banks of the Stour numbered 23, with two repairing slips, upon which fabricated material was assembled and a special type of barge, of measurements exactly calculated for the French and Belgian canals, was turned out.

As time went on the permanent buildings and camps, constructed entirely of concrete blocks manufactured on the Winget block method, were completed. Hitherto the men had been housed in wooden huts or on barrack barges, mainly consisting of vessels—French, Belgian and Dutch—of considerable value for transport. These vessels were released as rapidly as concrete huts could be erected and at a time when every ton of shallow-draught craft was exceedingly valuable. Eventually the permanent buildings and camps, with temporary camps, consisting of the standard type of wooden sectional huts, gave a total accommodation for 14,500 men and 523 women. In all, including officers, a strength of about 16,000 was housed in 512 buildings in the camps, the total floor area of which, including dining halls, administrative buildings, regimental institutes, etc., extended to 1,184,958 square feet, or over 57 acres. Approximately 172 acres were occupied by camps, with exercise grounds, 271 acres by store yards and salvage depots, and 111 acres by workshops

RICHBOROUGH: GENERAL VIEW OF THE PORT.

RICHBOROUGH: LAUNCHING A CROSS-CHANNEL BARGE.

and shipyards. The main group of camps was provided with a sewerage system and disposal works designed to deal with a daily flow of 250,000 gallons from a population of 25,000 persons. The supply of water was drawn from Ramsgate and Sandwich sources, tank accommodation for 157,250 gallons being provided in the camps. For the supply for the works, locomotives and fire services, water was pumped from the upper reaches of the river to a 60,000 gallon tank, 50 feet high, situated near the workshops, from which distribution was made throughout the works and camps. The pumping installation consisted of two electrically driven pumps, each capable of delivering 9,000 gallons per hour against a head of 120 feet. The total length of water pipes laid was about 38 miles. Throughout the camps were lighted with electricity generated at a central power station equipped with up-to-date steam-driven plant of the capacity of 750 k.w. It is interesting to note that the fuel used exclusively was East Kent (Tilmanston) slack coal, which gave good results in the boiler house, and not only was the whole of the electricity for both power and lighting of the various camps, cook houses, and workshops provided, but there was sufficient supply for the wharves and train ferry berth (a description of which will be given later). In addition, the works were equipped with an up-to-date Post Office Exchange telephone and telegraph service, having upwards of 140 extensions and possessing adequate trunk facilities for communication with the War Office, Admiralty, and the surrounding district. During a busy day the internal telephone exchange dealt with no fewer than 1,700 calls, while the daily average number of telegrams, inward and outward, was 450.

From the time of its institution until the Armistice, 1,220 officers and 51,000 other ranks passed through the depot at Richborough, instructed in the various duties they were subsequently called upon to fulfil. Special instruction classes were arranged for unskilled men, who were taught to become motor-launch drivers, divers, surveyors' assistants, crane-drivers, riveters, etc.

It was not until after the Richborough depot had been in being some six months that it was proposed to establish a cross-Channel Train Ferry service for the transport of military stores between French ports and this country. From this proposal matured the Richborough-Calais and Southampton-Dieppe Ferries, which

included three train-ferry steamers with terminal berths at Richborough and Calais—distance 36 miles—and at Southampton and Dieppe—distance 132 miles—with access railways, sidings, oil storage tanks, etc. When this project was begun at the Kentish terminal it necessitated the provision of a turning basin for the ferry steamers. The terminal was formed on the left bank of the Stour at the point where it debouches to its estuary in Pegwell Bay, the site being protected from waves by the projection of Shellness Point. By excavating the old narrow channel of the river to a width of 500 feet, and by dredging the approach channels to the train-ferry jetty to give a depth of 20 feet at high water of spring tides, the turning basin was made. A huge quantity of debris from the river had to be disposed of, and for this purpose a mud pump and pipe line were installed, the spoil being utilized to reclaim a large acreage of low-lying land between the ferry jetty and the Ramsgate-Sandwich road, which runs through the depot. This reclaimed land—consisting of some 300 acres, now of considerable value—was used afterwards for the purpose of salvage of material from the battlefields. The construction of the train-ferry berth fell into five distinct divisions: (*a*) the wharves forming the berth; (*b*) the communication bridge or ramp connecting the railway track on the steamer to the dock railway system; (*c*) the machinery and its supports for lifting and lowering the bridges; (*d*) excavation of the berth; (*e*) railways and sidings; (*f*) oil fuel tanks and delivery.

The train-ferry pier was made of timber pile structure, piles of 12-in. and 14-in. section being used. Later an extension of the main wharf was also undertaken, which provided berths for dredgers as well as giving additional traffic berths, which, like the ferry jetty, were constructed in timber piling. One result of the construction of the turning basin and the widening of the new wharf cut was that in addition to the 180-ton barges which were loaded at Richborough and made the passage to the French and Belgian waterways, the port became capable of receiving 1,000-ton sea-going barges, which were not only a feature of cross-Channel traffic during the concluding phases of the war but were useful for provisioning the Army of Occupation in Germany.



RICHBOROUGH: THE ELECTRIC POWER STATION.

RICHBOROUGH: THE TRAIN-FERRY JETTY—AWAITING A VESSEL.

Heavily laden trucks of the latest crocodile pattern, often containing heavy guns, were run direct from our arsenals and gun factories to France by means of the train ferry, thus saving considerable time and labour. Locomotives, each weighing 91 tons; 14-inch guns on railway mountings, each weighing 302 tons; tanks, aeroplanes, were of the type of cargo carried by the train ferry, in addition to heavily loaded goods trains, guns, limbers, and carriages. Access to the railway platform on the train ferry was gained over a bridge or ramp, the span of which was 100 feet between centres of bearings. The vessel was held in position by stern and breast moorings, but the bridge was also secured to the vessel during loading and unloading by a heavy forged steel centreing pin on the deck of the vessel, which engaged in an annular ring located in the centre, and projected beyond the floor of the bridge between what are known as two "elephant's feet" resting on seats on the vessel. For the accommodation of the railway wagons received for transmission by the train ferry, four sidings, each of sufficient length to hold 54 wagons with engine and brake, were provided. From these sidings an access line led to a grid of sidings close up to the ferry berth. In the sidings the wagons awaiting transmission were marshalled. On the arrival of the ferry the wagons were drawn off the railway deck simultaneously on both lines, the marshalled stock being then pushed on board also simultaneously, which avoided giving the vessel any unnecessary list. For unloading and loading the vessel, from the time the communication bridge was lowered to the ship until it was lifted on completion of loading, an average period of only 20 minutes elapsed, during which time the vessel was also supplied with oil-fuel and water. As Richborough was the first place on the British coast where a sea-going train ferry was instituted, it may be of interest to place on record the cost of the project under sub-heads of expenditure:—

Sub-head.	Description of Work.	Cost of Materials, Plant and Stores.	Military Labour.
No.		£	£
1	Steel sheet piling, timber wharves and landing jetty for ferry berth ..	26,600	13,410
2	Dredging berth ..	3,800	1,750
3	Bridge tower and machinery and signalling equipment ..	14,555	3,000
4	Bridge tower foundations	7,900	3,000
5	Electric power cable ..	483	200
6	Electric lighting for bridge and berth ..	76	50
7	Water supply ..	550	300
8	Railway tracks and sidings and culvert	5,050	1,680
9	Oil fuel depot, pipe and pumps, pump-house, etc.	5,100	1,100
10	Light approach channels	1,224	560
11	Mooring dolphins ..	2,125	1,100
12	Access road	600	2,000
13	Miscellaneous ..	1,437	350
	Total ..	£69,500	£28,500

Sir George Beharrell, D.S.O., Director-General of Finance and Statistics, Ministry of Transport, in a paper read before the British Association at Bournemouth on September 10, said: "In one quarter in 1918 the Channel ferry dealt with 80,000 tons. The outstanding feature of the ferries was the rapidity with which they were loaded and unloaded. During



RICHBOROUGH: CRAFT AT THE MAIN WHARF.

one month the time of loading and unloading in France averaged only 18 minutes per trip for each operation, which was one half the time occupied some months earlier. The ferry dealt with traffics such as tanks, locomotives and heavy guns, which would have occupied very considerable time in unloading if conveyed in ordinary cargo steamers, and in addition loss of time would have been experienced and additional labour required in taking down and re-erecting."

In May, 1917, the cross-Channel fleet consisted of eight tugs, five launches, 87 A.C. barges, eight A.C.W. barges, and two self-propelled barges, of a total tons capacity of 16,651. At the end of February, 1919, the fleet had grown to 232 A.C. barges, 20 P.D. 1,000 ton barges, and five A.C.W. 450-ton barges, the total tons capacity of all vessels being 51,006. The output of the shipbuilding yard from November, 1916, to February, 1919, was: 130 A.C. barges, 12 A. barges, 14 motor barges, four composite barges, one tug, 32 seaplane lighters, five pontoons. An analysis of the traffic carried from Richborough shows that when the cross Channel barge service was inaugurated in December, 1916, the amount of tonnage transported to France during that month was 2,09 tons. In July, 1918, it amounted to 100,331 tons (deadweight tons—multiply by 2½ to get shipping tons). Even so, the figures did not actually represent the increase, as originally only dead-weight cargo such as rails and heavy stores were handled; but the time came when all classes of war material were carried—which gave a very poor dead-weight result—including guns, gun-carriages and equipment, ammunition, permanent way material, R.A.F., R.E. and other stores, hay and oats, timber, etc.

The time came, too, when the barge service was increased by 1,000-ton barges, as the limit of the canal capacity had been reached by the smaller barges. These 1,000-ton barges were discharged on the French docks, and although they did not possess the advantages obtained through the light-draught A.C. barges, which could go direct up the waterways, yet they afforded direct relief to shipping.

In August, 1917, the dead-weight tonnage carried was 58,559; for April, 1918, it exceeded 68,000 tons, in May it reached 90,627, in August the figures jumped to over 101,000 tons, and in October, 1918, 102,134 tons were dispatched. The total amount transhipped from December, 1916, to the end of October, 1918, from Richborough was approximately 1,200,000 dead-weight tons, or about 3,250,000 shipping tons of material. Of this total nearly 700,000 dead-weight tons comprised ammunition.

In October, 1918, the amount of ammunition dispatched exceeded 77,000 tons dead weight, while the tonnage of guns and equipment shipped was 11,636. As showing the utility of the Richborough method, out of the total of 102,134 tons shipped in October, 1918, no less than 76,676 tons was sent direct to the interior, only 25,458 being dock discharged.

Naturally the wear and tear of the craft kept the various branches of the shipyard busy, but this did not prevent the yard undertaking the construction of special types of small craft required by the Admiralty in connexion with the towage of seaplanes, and which could not then be conveniently built either in civilian or Admiralty yards. The engineering shops, too, were able to accept urgent work in the shape of repairs to tractor locomotives, which owing to military operations could not be carried out in the war area; Richborough, in fact, became a base workshop for the British Expeditionary Force.

About 60 of the I.W.D. standard cranes, specially designed by the Technical Branch of the I.W. & D. at the War Office, were also erected at Richborough. These cranes were designed to perform the functions of a travelling crane on the standard British railway gauge, and at the same time capable of easy conversion into fixed or gantry cranes for dock or general purposes, or as floating cranes. At the end of 1916 some 120 cranes were in use at the French ports in the hands of the British, but by the end of 1918 nearly 400 were in operation, many of which were of the standard I.W.D. type. According to a writer in the *Railway Gazette*, "It is indisputable that the 'I.W.D.' standard crane has effected a great improvement in the traffic facilities so closely connected with the success of the transportation effort."

Another of the "side shows" was the manufacture and supply of pill-box gun emplacements for France; while amongst constructional work undertaken from time to time by officers and men from Richborough was the erection of aerodromes for the Royal Air Force, bomb depôts, coastal defence works, harbours, and other works at Cherbourg, Taranto, Corfu, Valona, Mesopotamia, East Africa, Salonika, Murmansk, and the Caspian.

Another aspect of the work at Richborough was that connected with salvage returned from the battlefields. It was not until June, 1917, that the port began to deal with this,



TRAIN FERRY: THE ADJUSTABLE BRIDGE IN POSITION.

but the average daily tonnage grew from 184 dead-weight tons to 572 dead-weight tons in June of the following year. At a Salvage Dump operated for the Ministry of Munitions by the I.W. and D. women workers and discharged soldiers found places. There, spread over many acres, were dumped millions of shell cases, fuse caps, shell containers, and all kinds of battlefield garbage, which could be repaired or re-utilized as required. Nothing was too trivial for the salvage expert; even charred rope which had done service in "the line" was sorted and sent away to be torn to pieces and used for stuffing ships' fenders. To take only four classes of salvable material, over £3,000,000 worth was dealt with from December 1st, 1917, to the end of September, 1918. Up to the end of July, 1919, some 410,000 dead-weight tons of salved war material had been received at Richborough. In that month alone returned stores and salved material received amounted to 198,065 tons, of which 34,943 tons had been carried by train ferry and 44,283 tons by barges.

The work at Richborough was frequently visited by distinguished people, and the secret of the operations of the port was well kept. On June 5, 1917, the King, accompanied by Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. Clive Wigram and Lord Camden, Lord Lieut. of the County of Kent, inspected the depôt, the barge-building slipways (witnessing the launch of three A.C. barges), the wharves and the preparations which were then being made for the Channel Ferry jetty. The occasion was also marked by his Majesty thoroughly investigating one of the latest hospital craft designed for work on the Tigris from plans which emanated from the headquarters of the I.W. and D., at the Embankment Annexe of the War Office. The King was shown over the vessel by Major R. Markham Carter (later Lt.-Col.), I.M.S., who was in charge of this sphere of work for the I.W. and D. This officer, it will be recalled, gave remarkable evidence before the Mesopotamia Commission, in the course of which he described the terrible conditions in which he found many of our sick during his work on the Tigris. The vessel was the latest of its type, and besides being fitted as an up-to-date floating hospital, ventilated with electric fans, and containing lifts from one deck to another to reduce to a minimum the discomfort of the sick and wounded, contained complete soda-water making and ice-making apparatus. The King, who was received by the then Director of the I.W and D. at the War Office, Col. (afterwards Brig.-Gen.) A. S. Cooper, and the Commandant of the Depot, as s own over the Depot by Major-Gen. A. S. Collard, who had just been transferred to the newly formed Controller's Department of the Admiralty, then in charge of Sir Eric Geddes. He expressed the greatest pleasure at what he saw, and the efforts which were being made to keep the armies in the various fields of operations supplied.

For some time before the conclusion of the Armistice, Richborough had become the first port of Army supplies, the next four being Newhaven, Southampton, Littlehampton, and Dagenham; and in addition to the services at Richborough the I.W. and D. were operating on a number of home waters, including the Forth and Clyde, the Caledonian Canal, from Basingstoke and Aldershot, Brighton, Ridham and Deptford, and from Southampton and Poole to Havre, Cherbourg, Rouen and Sonquance.

Very soon after the cessation of hostilities, plans were evolved for the continuation of Richborough. It was eventually decided to run the port through the South-Eastern and Chatham Railway Company, who were appointed to act as agents for the Government. Brig.-General A. J. Allen-Williams, C.M.G., the commandant since the inception of the depot, and who was responsible for the execution of the engineering work and the control of the port, remained in charge as commandant, and as superintendant on behalf of the railway company. General Allen-Williams was a civil engineer of wide experience, and a member of the Institution of Civil Engineers. The Headquarters staff at Richborough included Lieut.-Colonel C. L. Kempton, C.B.E., R.E., who became assistant director in March, 1918, and carried on the duties of senior staff officer on the military side; Major W. Daniel, O.B.E., R.E., who became chief technical officer in February, 1917, and was employed in supervising all constructional works carried out at the port; and Major M. Beasley, O.B.E., R.E. (Marine Superintendent of the Midland Railway), staff officer supervising work in connection with the train ferry and cross-channel barge services. The Construction Department was in the hands of three experienced civil engineers: Lieut.-Col. W. L. Lowe-Browne, R.E., Lieut.-Col. J. F. Wilson, R.E., and Lieut.-Col. J. K. Robertson, R.E. These three officers

were in charge of all constructional work, succeeding each other in the order named. With these three officers was Major G. M. Vaughan, O.B.E., R.E., who was in charge of all dredging operations from January, 1917, to the date of his demobilisation, and assumed command of the Marine Department was held from October, 1916, to September, 1917, by Lieut.-Col. C. Hudson, O.B.E., R.E., when he was succeeded by Lieut.-Col. R. Carruthers, O.B.E., R.E., who remained in command until March, 1919. Major (acting Lieut.-Col.) W. Blome-



RICHBOROUGH: TRAINS IN TRANSIT TO THE CONTINENT.

a similar appointment under the S.E. and C.R. at Richborough.

The chief mechanical engineer from October, 1916, till March, 1919, was Col. R. B. W. Holmes, O.B.E., R.E., with Major White, R.E., as his chief assistant, and Major Hambling, R.E., in charge of the Shipyard. The field, O.B.E., R.E., and Capt. (Acting Major) E. Hight, R.E., carried out the duties of traffic superintendent and assistant traffic superintendent, the former being posted to the War Office as Assistant Director of Movements in March, 1919, Lieut.-Col. J. A. Hawkes, O.B.E., R.E., held the appointment of chief store-

keeper from June, 1916, until his demobilization in July, 1919, when he was succeeded by his assistant, Capt. P. E. Croucher, R.E., who, like Col. Hawkes, was employed in the stores departments on railways before the war. Major G. Condon was in charge of the policing arrangements and recreation. Lieut.-Col. J. Usborne, Lieut.-Col. J. Maule, and Major F. H. Padfield, O.B.E., were three officers who commanded the depot for receiving and training on the military side, each relieving one another in the order named. While the command was held by these officers, 51,000 recruits passed through the depot for training and were posted to various units of the R.E. at home and overseas. During one period the movement through the depot reached 1,500 a week. As late as September 15, 1919, this depot was being used for the training of recruits for Mesopotamia.

Of the work of the Inland Water Transport abroad—with the exception of France—that in Mesopotamia, which commenced in the autumn of 1916, was the most important. This vast tract of country knew no railways at the time our troops entered on their operations, with the exception of the small length of railway which formed the first section of the Berlin to Bagdad railway from Bagdad in the direction of Samarra, part of the colossal German scheme which was to link up Europe with Asia *via* Constantinople. From time immemorial, when Babylon was at its zenith, the waterways of Mesopotamia were the only great channels of communication, of which evidences still remain in the shape of the dried-up beds of canals and rivers connected either with the Tigris or the Euphrates. It was on river transport that our troops which reached Ctesiphon had to rely, and when it was decided to retrieve the ill-fortunes which had beset our military operations there the War Office at home turned their attention to a drastic improvement of our communications on the Tigris. Lack of transport had largely been the cause of the check received at Ctesiphon, and certainly to this cause was due a great deal of the sufferings of our troops. Defective river transport was, according to the finding of the Mesopotamia Commission, "the foundation of all the troubles." To reorganize these communications was no easy matter, for at that time our shipyards were busy to the very utmost; the resources of every Ally were taxed to the utmost.



RICHBOROUGH: THE FERRY-BOAT CARRYING HEAVY GUNS.

In the summer of 1916 the War Office decided to send out a special mission to investigate the conditions, although, at that time, the operations were under the control of the Indian Government. Lt.-Col. (afterwards Major-General) W. H. Grey, R.E., who had just returned from Serbia, was dispatched on behalf of the Army Council, with instructions to report by cable. This officer—who was one of the New Army—had had considerable experience in the West African delta-lands, and of river transport; and for his conduct of affairs in Mesopotamia he was promoted to the rank of Brig.-Gen. and received the C.B. A comparatively young man of the early forties, with the valuable knowledge gained from pioneer work in Nigeria, Col. Grey entered on his duties with considerable vigour. Arriving at Basra July 31, he cabled his first report—buildings, wharves and equipment were insufficient; tools, machinery and labour were inadequate to keep a thoroughly efficient river transport service in decent trim; the bulk of the craft available was unsuitable for the demands made, while a root trouble was the confusion which arose through division of responsibility. Craft varied from the steamers which had been taken from the service successfully run on the Tigris for years by Messrs. Lynch, a British firm, to the primitive bellums which savoured of the times of the early Caliphs rather than the 20th century. There were in all 130 vessels in commission, consisting of steamers, hospital craft, tugs and barges, with a number of launches also. The Royal Indian Marine, which was dealing with the matter, had since the beginning of the year been increased in numbers by something like 700 per cent., and had done much good work; while the appointment by the Indian Government of an experienced officer, Sir George Buchanan, as Director-General of port administration and river conservancy, had been of undoubted value in developing the base port of Basra, and in the aiding what General Lake called "our all-important river communications." Col. Grey also found that another pressing need was an efficient pilot service, an extremely difficult proposition in view of the comparatively little use which had been made of the Tigris, within the memory of living man; although the valuable work done by the Indian Government from time to time must not be lost sight of. It was apparent that the officers

BRIGADIER-GENERAL A. J. ALLEN-WILLIAMS, C.M.G., R.E.
Appointed Commandant at Richborough, 1916.

of the Royal Indian Marine had had many difficulties to contend with, and had worked hard to combat these, aided with very little data. In fact, some twelve months elapsed after the War Office sent out its mission before the necessary intelligence was available for distribution in book form.

Just when Col. Grey arrived the War Office decided to take over the Mesopotamia campaign. A proposal by Col. Grey that the river transport system should be reorganized and the existing force absorbed in the Royal Engineers, and placed under one control, was quickly approved, and five weeks after the arrival he was placed in charge of the service.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR ERIC GEDDES.
Director-General of Military Railways and Inspector-General of Transportation 1916-17. Afterwards First Lord of the Admiralty.

Meanwhile the authorities at home through the Inland Water Transport were concentrating their efforts on giving effect to the recommendations of Lieut.-Col. Grey. The Director of the Inland Water Transport and his staff set about collecting special craft from all parts of the Empire; machine tools were ordered, electric power supply units, cranes, pile driving appliances, rolling stock and permanent way, pumps and timber, engineering shops mobilized, and stores, etc., accumulated for dispatch by steamer to Basra. One of the conclusions formed by Lieut.-Col. Grey was that the type of craft likely to be most useful for the coming operations was that of the vessels used by Messrs. Lynch. In Great Britain over 100 firms were approached with a view to ascertaining what craft could be adapted and sent out, and orders were at once placed for 200 vessels, and for ice barges, water barges, commissariat barges, tugs—including stern-wheeled type—hospital ships, etc. Officers from the Inland Water Transport were sent to India to cooperate with the Government officials, and the resources of India were tapped to the utmost. A conference was also called in London of representatives of the largest shipbuilding and navigating firms in India, with the result that a scheme was worked out for the creation under the Indian Government of a River Craft Board to act in consort with the Indian Railway Board and the Indian Engineering Association to develop the resources of the Indian Empire on behalf of Mesopotamian transport. By this and other means much useful coordination of effort was brought about.

To provide personnel for the increased transport service was no small task. At Richborough officers and men were trained for constructional, engineering, shipbuilding and other duties; while the depot was also used for some time to concentrate the captains of the river craft, to whom soon attached the cognomen of "Golden Pheasants," because of the blue and gold gorgets of their khaki uniforms. From Nigeria natives used to river work were recruited, and skilled and unskilled labour for the wharves and shipyards was obtained from India, Egypt and China, the whole being superintended by a highly-trained staff of British officers and N.C.O.'s. By the end of January 1,700 officers and other ranks were sent out from this country to Basra (where, as has already been said, valuable work had been done by Sir George Buchanan and the Royal Indian Marine), which was fast being changed into an up-to-date port. A site at Maghil, a short distance away, was decided upon for docks, wharves, shipways, repairing shops, shipyards, and warehouses. The river was dredged, charted, buoyed, lighted, and improved by revetting where necessary, while at Amara, Kurna, and other places, depots with adequate water supplies

were established, piers, jetties, and store-houses erected in readiness for the coming advance of the British forces under Sir Stanley Maude.

For the purpose of equipping and manning the craft specially obtained for Mesopotamian waters, the I.W. & D. opened a depot at Glasgow, whence many of the vessels started for the East. It can easily be understood that many of these voyages were of a hazardous character. Some of the earliest units of the fleet were the erstwhile penny steamers which formed part of the service run on the Thames by the London County Council. To navigate such types of vessels across the Bay of Biscay, through the mine infested waters of the Mediterranean, required not only consummate skill but iron nerve. At home those who knew how eagerly all craft was being awaited at Basra, and how much depended upon their safe arrival, watched their progress with as much interest as if they were mammoth ocean liners or the latest type of battle cruiser. Sometimes news came that these cockle-shells—for in some cases they

SIR SAM FAY.
Director-General of Movements and Railways, 1918-19.

were little more—had been unable to survive the storms or had been mined. It is worth while to give the following narrative by one of the sailing masters engaged in I.W.T. work:

"On the afternoon of the 12th inst., at 4 p.m., I was in charge of the H.P.6, in tow of the H.S.47, proceeding from Malta, when a report was brought to me that a submarine had been sighted in the glare of the sun on our starboard quarter. I put on my shaded glasses and found the report to be correct, and

SIR GUY GRANET.
Appointed Director-General of Movements and Railways, 1917.

opened fire. In order to give myself and the tug freer action for manœuvring, I slipped the tow-rope. I then ordered the chief officer to signal to the tug to turn stem on to the submarine. I cannot say whether the signal was understood or not. The tug sheered off on our starboard bow, and brought her gun into action; after firing a few rounds she proceeded on our port bow at about three miles away. The action between the submarine and ourselves was continuous all this time. Shortly after 5 p.m. the firing from the submarine ceased. She was then broadside on, and stationary, clear of the sun, and had evidently been stationary some time. One attempt only was made by her to overtake us, which only lasted a few minutes, the remainder of the time she was broadside on to us. The course of the H.P.6 was slightly zigzag from N.E. to E.S.E., and the speed, owing to our using the smoke-clouds, was down to three knots. The distance of the submarine during the whole of the action ap eared to me to be about 4,500 yards. The action ended about 5.20 p.m., when the tug slowed down and cruised around us."

When, in the winter months, Sir Stanley Maude was able to start on what proved to be his victorious march to Baghdad and beyond, all was ready for the Commander-in-Chief. At every stage in his advance stores and supplies came to hand with a regularity which earned the appreciation of all ranks. Full field rations were practically maintained at all stages, and earned the encomiums of Mr. Edmund Candler, the special correspondent of *The Times*, who said that the transport was perfect, that all the wants of the Army were met with commendable celerity. In addition to maintaining a punctual delivery of stores, munitions, etc., fresh drafts of fighting men, camp followers and horses, were constantly sent forward, and wounded and prisoners were evacuated. A marked effect of the reorganized service was the better health of the British forces. Much was due to the stationary and floating water filtration stations sent out from England. From these stations the advancing troops were kept supplied with good pure water taken upstream to their posts by twelve tank barges These floating "Gunga Dins," as they were sometimes called, were of the greatest service, although only an incidental part of the organization. During the quarter ended June, 1918, the work performed by the river transport system on the Tigris and Euphrates amounted to 7,750,000 ton miles.

When the British forces entered Baghdad on March 11, 1917, they were followed within a few hours by the Inland Water Transport vessels, and three days later a river-head was established there. In one of his dispatches Sir Stanley Maude said:

"The Directorate of the Inland Water Transport was created, and men and material arrived from overseas, while the influx of adequate and experienced personnel for port administration and conservancy work, railways, supplies and transport, etc., enabled these services to cope more adequately with their responsibilities in maintaining the field armies."

The War Cabinet also expressed their appreciation of the services rendered by the Inland Water Transport, and members of the Government also paid tribute in Parliament. The work of individual officers and men was freely recognized in dispatches, both by Sir Stanley Maude and his successor, Lieut.-General Sir W. R. Marshall.

The work of the Inland Water Transport on the Tigris had a valuable adjunct in the railways which were constructed in Mesopotamia under the superintendence of the Railways, Light Railways and Roads Department, which, like the I.W. & D., was under the control of the Director-General of Movements and Railways. Following the British advance new railways were laid around Baghdad, which in the opinion of experts will form important communication through North-West Persia. Baghdad and Basra became railway centres whose outward traffic increased from 23,000 tons a week in January, 1918, to 33,000 tons in October of that year. On the return of Brig.-Gen. W. H. Grey to London in May, 1918, he was succeeded by his second in command, Brig.-Gen. R. H. W. Hughes, C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O. Brig.-Gen. (afterwards Maj.-Gen.) Grey later undertook the control of the Mediterranean Lines of Communication from Cherbourg to Taranto, and ultimately became Director-General of Transportation in Italy under General Sir W. Plumer.

The first Director of Movements and Railways at the War Office, of whose department the I.W. & D., R.E., and the Inland Water Transport formed part, was Sir Eric Geddes, who held that post until his appointment as Controller at the Admiralty in 1917, when he was succeeded by Sir Guy Granet. When Sir Guy resigned, Sir Sam Fay became Director-General. The original Director of the I.W. & D. was Brig.-Gen. (afterwards Major-Gen.) A. S. Collard, C.B., C.V.O., who, in June, 1917, was succeeded by Colonel (afterwards Brig.-Gen.) A. S. Cooper, C.M.G., formerly general manager of the Nigerian Railway.

CHAPTER CCCIX.

THE BRITISH SHARE IN THE PEACE CONFERENCE.

ASSEMBLING OF THE CONFERENCE IN PARIS—THE BRITISH DELEGATION—REPRESENTATION OF THE DOMINIONS—THE DISPOSAL OF THE GERMAN COLONIES—THE SYSTEM OF MANDATE—ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS—MILITARY, NAVAL, AND AIR TERMS—INDEMNITIES AND REPARATION—M.P.'S TELEGRAM TO PARIS—PRIME MINISTER'S RETURN AND DEFENCE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS—THE INDEMNITIES SETTLEMENT—THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTION—QUESTION OF THE TRIAL OF THE KAISER—SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY—PEACE CELEBRATIONS—REWARDS FOR VICTORIOUS COMMANDERS

THE armistice with Germany was signed on November 11, 1918, but over two months were to elapse before the Peace Conference assembled in Paris. There was an enormous amount of work to be done in each of the Allied countries before their Plenipotentiaries could begin the task of creating a new world order. The rapidity and completeness of the German collapse took most of the Allied Foreign Offices by surprise. Great Britain alone seemed to have her "case" for the Peace Conference well advanced.

The British Government, however, felt it necessary to hold a General Election before entering the Conference. In a manifesto to the electors issued 10 days after the signing of the armistice, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Bonar Law declared that, as a preliminary to the solution of the many anxious problems which the war had bequeathed to the Government, it was essential that a fresh Parliament should be summoned, possessed of the authority which a General Election alone could give it, to make the peace of Europe and to deal with the difficult transitional period which would follow the cessation of hostilities. The mandate which the Coalition leaders sought was of a very general character. They argued that the first task must be to conclude a just and lasting peace and so to establish the foundations of a new Europe that occasion for further wars might be for ever averted. They promised that, to avert a repetition of the horrors of war, which were aggravated by the onward march of science, it would be the earnest endeavour of the Coalition Government to promote the formation of a League of Nations, which might serve not only to ensure society against the calamitous results of militarism but to further a fruitful mutual understanding between the associated peoples.

As a matter of fact, there was no need for the Government to formulate detailed terms of peace for ratification by the electorate. The minimum British terms had been repeatedly declared, and nobody in the whole world, friend or enemy, had the slightest excuse for being in doubt about them. It was less than 12 months since Mr. Lloyd George, after consultation with the Labour leaders, with Mr. Asquith and Viscount Grey, and with representatives of the Dominions, had made a final restatement of war aims to a great meeting of trade union delegates at the Central Hall, Westminster. The statement of January 5, 1918, still held good as the charter of British peace policy, and no part of it was the subject of controversy at the General Election. There were three points, however, on which the

electors insisted on laying special stress All three were adopted and expounded by the Prime Minister in his election speeches. They were officially summarized on the eve of the polling as follows:—

(1) Trial of the Kaiser.

(2) Punishment of those responsible for atrocities.

(3) Fullest indemnities from Germany.

The result of the General Election was unmistakable. Its chief verdict was that there must be no weakness in the making of peace. Whatever trouble the Government had stored up for themselves in domestic affairs, there could be no doubt that the result of the polling in December, 1918, greatly strengthened the hands of the British delegation when they entered the Peace Conference.

While the General Election was in progress, M. Clemenceau and Signor Orlando, the French and Italian Prime Ministers, came to London to discuss with the British Government a number of pressing questions relating to the preliminaries of peace. No binding decision could be taken, as the Allied Governments had agreed not to adopt any definite policy until they had had an opportunity of consulting President Wilson. The American President arrived in Europe on December 13, and Paris at once became the centre of an inter-Allied diplomatic activity which was destined not to flag for many months to come. A month had then passed since the signing of the Armistice, and the date of the assembling of the Peace Conference seemed still far distant. On Boxing Day, President Wilson visited England and was the guest of the King at Buckingham Palace. He spent several hours in conference with Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour, and made some fine speeches on the principles which ought to animate the Allied Governments in the task before them at the

MR. LLOYD GEORGE WITH M. CLEMENCEAU AND SIGNOR ORLANDO.

Peace Conference. He particularly dwelt on the inspiring theme that it was essential to the future peace of the world that there should be the frankest possible cooperation

THE HOTEL MAJESTIC, PARIS.
Headquarters of the British Commissions.

and the most generous understanding between the two English-speaking democracies. Speaking at the Guildhall on December 28, he declared that it had been delightful, in his conferences with the leaders of the British Government, to find how their minds moved along exactly the same lines, how their thought was always that the key to the peace was the guarantee of the peace, not the items of it. "That," he insisted, "is the most reassuring thing that has ever happened in the world."

At the beginning of 1919, the world was becoming impatient of the delay in getting to business. It was with genuine relief that the peoples heard that the Allied statesmen had held their first formal conference on January 12, and that the opening of the Peace Conference had been fixed for January 18. The British Empire was represented by five Plenipotentiary delegates, entitled to take part in all sittings and Commissions. This general right was shared only with the United States, France, Italy and Japan. In addition, two delegates each were allotted for Australia, Canada, South Africa, and India, and one for New Zealand. The personnel of the delegation from the British Empire was as follows:—

Great Britain: Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Balfour, Mr. Bonar Law, Lord Milner, and Mr. Barnes.

Canada: Sir Robert Borden, Sir George Foster, Mr. Doherty, and Mr. Sifton.

Australia: Mr. Hughes and Sir Joseph Cook.

South Africa: General Botha and General Smuts.

India: Mr. Montagu, Lord Sinha, and the Maharajah of Bikanir.

New Zealand: Mr. Massey and Sir Joseph Ward.

Each delegation had the right to avail itself of the panel system. The representation of the Dominions (including Newfoundland, represented by Sir William Lloyd), and of India might besides be included in the representation of the British Empire by the panel system. The fifth delegate-in-chief was frequently chosen in this way. It was at once recognized that the decision on the representation of the British Empire was a constitutional landmark of tremendous significance. That decision took full account of the importance of the Dominions, and constituted by far the most

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR GENGA SINGH BAHADUR, Maharajah of Bikanir, and SIR SATYENDRA SINHA (afterwards Lord Sinha, Under-Secretary of State for India).

striking recognition that had yet been given internationally to the self-governing parts of the Empire. The Dominion delegates were frankly delighted with a decision which placed them upon the same footing as the smaller Allied nations. They saw in the arrangement, which had been warmly advocated by the

British Prime Minister, the creation of a new precedent in Imperial affairs which was bound to lead to further developments. They realized that they had now received "recognition," and there seemed to be no doubt that the Peace Conference would have to be followed by an extremely important Imperial Conference at which the internal relations of the Empire would be overhauled.

The permanent officials of the Foreign Office in attendance included Lord Hardinge, Sir William Tyrrell, Sir Louis Mallet, Sir Esmé Howard, Sir Ralph Paget, and Sir Eyre Crowe. In addition, there were delegations representing the War Office, the Admiralty, the Air Board, and other Departments. Lord Robert Cecil, although no longer a member of the British Government, was appointed to supervize all matters arising in connexion with the League of Nations. Lord Reading acted as chief British representative in organizing the work of the Inter-Allied

SIR ESMÉ HOWARD, K.C.M.G.
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Sweden: afterwards Ambassador at Madrid.

Food Council. Other distinguished public men gave the benefit of their experience of different branches of policy, as the following list of the British representatives on the Commissions appointed by the Conference shows:—

League of Nations: Lord Robert Cecil and Gen. Smuts.
Responsibility for the War: Sir Gordon Hewart and Sir Ernest Pollock.
Reparation: Mr. Hughes and Lord Cunliffe.
Labour Legislation: Mr. Barnes and Sir Malcolm Delevigne.
Ports and Waterways: Mr. Sifton.

As the Conference proceeded, it became necessary for several British Ministers, who were not members of the Delegation, to join Mr. Lloyd George and his colleagues in Paris for conferences on specific portions of the Treaty which affected the interests of their respective Departments. Sir Maurice Hankey, secretary of the War Cabinet, was appointed official

LORD HARDINGE
At his desk in Paris.

British secretary. The British Delegation made their headquarters at the Villa Majestic, and there on January 13 the Imperial War Cabinet held its first meeting outside England. There was some criticism at home of the size of the British Mission. At the beginning

SIR GORDON HEWART.
Solicitor-General; British representative on the Commission on Responsibility for the War.

of the sittings, the Foreign Office detachment numbered 18, including six officials who were entrusted with the general secretarial work of the British Delegation; The War Office

was represented by 28 officials, the Admiralty by 22, the Air Department by 13, and economic, trade and shipping interests by 26. There were eight legal officials. The League of Nations branch had a staff of five. The Indian and Dominion detachments numbered 75, and there were five persons in the Press section. These figures gave a total of 207, and took no account of a host of staff servants and smaller officials.

On the eve of the first general meeting of the Conference, considerable misgiving was caused by a decision that, beyond *communiqués* to be issued by the Inter-Allied Drafting Committee, the newspapers should not be authorized to publish any information regarding the work of the delegates It appeared that the Plenipotentiaries had undertaken not to reveal anything of the discussions. It was recognized that the whole question of publicity was one which bristled with difficulty, but it was equally clear that any arrangements which did not give the peoples of the world a reasonable idea of how matters were going would arouse their anger. The Allied Governments were at once brought to realize, by the protests they received from the assembled American and British journalists, that their policy of dealing with the Press was in serious need of reform. As the result of a conference between the officials and the Press representatives, it was decided that the whole problem should be thrown upon the shoulders of a committee on which the Press were fully represented. In practice, the general ban on news was not enforced, but the relations of the Conference and the Press were never satisfactorily adjusted. President Wilson's championship of open diplomacy could not be wholly ignored, and the newspapers never failed to tell the peoples in all parts of the world day by day what the delegates were doing in their name in Paris. No news of substance was missed, and the Peace Conference in the end was the gainer from publicity notwithstanding the thousand and one obstacles which the officials of every country put in the way. One result of these early discussions was the throwing open of the plenary sessions of the Conference to the Press. Between 200 and 250 journalists, including half a dozen women, were admitted to the opening session. Although a limited gain, it was a notable event in the history of diplomacy.

THE OPENING OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.

M. Poincaré stands a little to the right of the clock, Mr. Balfour and Mr. Bonar Law can be seen farther to the right.

This first general session of the Conference was held on January 18 at the Quai d'Orsay, exactly 48 years to the day since the proclama-

tion of the German Empire in the Galérie des Glaces at Versailles. A particularly happy speech was made by Mr. Lloyd George, in seconding President Wilson's proposition that M. Clemenceau should preside over the Conference His description of the French Prime Minister as the "Grand Young Man of France" is a phrase that will live. Mr Lloyd George uttered a warning that was to be only too fully justified. He believed that in the debates of the Conference there would at first inevitably be delays, but he guaranteed from his knowledge of M. Clemenceau that there would be no time wasted That was indispensable, with the world thirsting for peace. He pointed to the millions of men who were waiting to return to their normal life; they would not forgive the Conference too long delays. There was general satisfaction when M. Clemenceau announced that the problem of the League of Nations would be placed at the head of the agenda for the next sitting. He also insisted that the responsibility of the Kaiser was one of the first questions which must be discussed.

THE "BIG FOUR" OF THE CONFERENCE.
Mr. Lloyd George, Signor Orlando, M. Clemenceau, President Wilson.

With the formal opening of the Conference, the vast machine behind the delegates began to revolve in more orderly fashion. The full Conference, which resembled an Inter-Allied

GENERAL BOTHA (Premier of South Africa), SIR ROBERT BORDEN (Premier of Canada), and GENERAL SMUTS (South African Minister of Defence) embarking for the Paris Conference.

Parliament, in number and in functions, was only rarely called together. The decisive work was done by a sort of Inter-Allied Cabinet, which took all the essential decisions. This Cabinet was at first a Council of Ten, consisting of the American President and the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the great Allied Powers. Later on, it became a Council of Five or Four, consisting of the American President and the Prime Ministers of the great Allied Powers. Amid the mass of questions which had to be decided, the following half-dozen stood out as more particularly affecting British interests :—

1. The disposal of the German Colonies.
2. The military, naval, and air terms.
3. Indemnities and shipping reparation.
4. The League of Nations.
5. The International Labour Convention.
6. The trial of the Kaiser and the punishment of war criminals

One of the first tasks which the Council of Ten took up was the settlement of the Colonial question. Sir Robert Borden, Mr. Hughes, Gen. Smuts, and Mr. Massey were summoned to the Council Board to explain the particular interests of the respective Dominions in this field. It was known at this early stage that Mr. Wilson had taken the standpoint that the German Colonies should be handed over to the main Allies and colonizing Powers under the mandate of the League of Nations. The right of South Africa to remain in possession of German South-West Africa was generally admitted. It was evident, too, that German East Africa would probably be handed over to Great Britain as mandatory of the League of Nations, although here the claims of Belgium, which had fought side by side with Great Britain, had to be taken into account. Kamerun and Togoland formed an almost entirely Anglo-French point for discussion. The French were not completely satisfied with the somewhat artificial boundaries made in those regions during the war, and the British were animated by the widest spirit of conciliation in considering the problem.

There remained the difficulty of the Pacific islands, about which there were three points of view. Australians did not view with any satisfaction the approach of Japan to their shores. While they had been pleased by the successful effort of the Imperial Government

THE PHILIPPINES UNDER AMERICAN RULE: A NATIVE VILLAGE.

to obtain adequate representation of the Dominions at the Conference, they felt that in this matter European opinion did not properly appreciate their point of view. In accordance with an arrangement made between Great Britain and Japan, the Equator would form the limit of Japanese extension to the south. That would confirm the Japanese in their possession and administration of the Marshall and Caroline Islands. These islands, several hundred in number, consist for the main part of little coral atolls and are a sort of dust of the Pacific Ocean. What advantage, asked Australia, could Japan be seeking in the possession of territories where there was practically no Japanese population, where indeed there was practically no population at all to make them desirable as a market, and which produced very little for export purposes? On the other hand the strategic importance of these two groups of islands had, with the growth and possible development of the submarine, become very considerable indeed. The American point of view—and America was concerned because of her interest both in the Panama Canal and the Philippines—was that the Imperial Government should take over the whole of the German Colonies in the Pacific and administer them under the League of Nations. The attitude of Great Britain at this stage seemed to be that she was more or less bound by agreements to hand over the Caroline and the Marshall Islands to Japan, and that the rest of the German Colonies should become the direct possessions of the Dominions.

While these considerations were being severally urged in Paris, Australians did their best to make the Mother-country realize how vital to the Commonwealth were the issues for which Mr. Hughes was strenuously fighting at the Quai d'Orsay. They claimed that the disposition of the Pacific islands formerly held by Germany was the question of greatest concern to Australia which the war had raised, and contended that on its decision rested her future security. New Guinea and the adjacent islands of the Bismarck Archipelago, it was argued, were to the Continent of Australia very much what the British Isles were to the Continent of Europe. Whoever was in possession of those islands and was able to use them as naval bases would be able to establish a blockade of the Australian Continent, and to cut it off from communication with the rest of the world. If supplied with aircraft and military forces, their occupants could invade Australia and harass it in such a number of ways as ultimately to reduce the inhabitants to helplessness. At the outset of the war, these strategic outposts of Australia were occupied by Australian troops, but not without stiff fighting and considerable losses. Since then, in addition to her great effort in the

fighting in France and the Near East, Australia had shouldered the burden of these territories. Under the control of the Federal Government, their condition had improved, the administration had been smooth, and the rights and interests of the natives had been carefully consulted. All traces of slavery had been swept away, and there was no doubt of the choice of the protectorate which the indigenous races would make if they were consulted. It was even held of the other islands to the north of this great group that some of them were large enough to form a menace to the future safety of Australia.

The régime to be instituted in the Pacific was the crux of the Colonial difficulties. It was not overlooked that Americans saw in the Pacific islands the first field in which their principles could find application. As the discussions went forward, Mr. Wilson urged with great tenacity the view that the whole of the Pacific islands, both north and south of the Equator, should be entrusted to Australasia as mandatory of the League of Nations. It was realized that, if Mr. Wilson gained his point, he would establish a precedent for the settlement of other and more difficult matters involving territorial interests, and incidentally America would gain materially by rendering impossible any menace there might be in the Philippines and Panama by reason of a Japanese occupation of the Marshall and Caroline Islands. The decision to be taken was obviously one of very great importance to the British Empire, as it might well have a great bearing upon the larger questions of principle which would be raised later and upon the attitude of the other Allies to territorial claims. It was easy to understand the desire on everybody's part that the first territorial settlements, even though they were in countries far from Europe and with very different conditions, should as far as possible set a broad model for the treatment of problems nearer home.

Upon one thing all were agreed—that no part of Germany's Colonial Empire should be returned to her, for humanitarian and strategic reasons would oppose any other decision. General Smuts, who was willing to apply the mandatory system to the Ottoman Empire, Russia, and Austria-Hungary, rejected it for the Colonies. The Americans, however, urged the mandatory system for the Colonial settlement. General Botha made out a strong case against the system, at any rate as applied to German South-West Africa, and many of the points he made against it applied to similar problems in other parts of the world. Mr. Hughes was able, in response to Mr. Wilson's question whether he was sure of having Australian public opinion behind him in asking for the Pacific islands, to point to a large number of resolutions passed by many different bodies at meetings in Australia. What the Powers

[*Vandyk.*

GENERAL BOTHA.
Premier of the South African Commonwealth.

now sought was a formula sufficiently elastic to be capable of adaptation in accordance with local conditions, while generally governing the settlement of the whole world-question. This debate, although it might appear relatively insignificant when compared with the great territorial problems awaiting solution in Europe, was really of the very first importance. It raised for the first time the real work of the Conference—the creation of a new world, based on the main principles of the League of Nations.

A different aspect of the question was raised in some sections of the French Press. The view was urged that under the American scheme, applied to those regions of Africa, Kamerun and Togoland, in which France was particularly interested, all that would result would be that France, as the mandatory of the League of Nations, would be paying for the administration of countries which in a very short time would be exploited by German trade

to the detriment of her own. There was also the fact that the proper development of a tropical Colony involved a large expenditure for which no immediate return could be expected, and it had to be recognized that those who would undertake the mandate were entitled to some return on their capital. The question also was raised as to what would happen in the event of a mandatory country incurring heavy losses in the endeavour to develop the territory entrusted to it. If agreement had been less easy than it was, the Allied Powers would have been drawn together by German claims, which had been hardly modified by defeat. Leaving out of the question such a large scheme as the formation of a German Empire, stretching from sea to sea across Africa and providing a vast supply of potential black soldiers, it could not be forgotten that Germany had laid little stress on the possession of Colonies as homes for surplus population, and preferred that Germans should infiltrate the possessions of other nations rather than concentrate in their own Colonies. The importance of a Colonial Empire to Germany was held to be that it provided a chain of military, naval, and wireless stations throughout the world, commercial jumping-off places for the re-establishment of world trade, and lastly a source of supply of raw materials of which, although 50 per cent. of Germany's requirements came from the Tropics, only a very small part was actually supplied from German possessions.

Before the close of these debates, it seemed certain that the experience of the past had borne its weight and that there would be no real scheme of internationalization. The French had had bitter experience of the troubles due to the international clauses of the Algeciras Convention in Morocco. The whole world knew with what difficulty the system had worked on the Congo. Any League of Nations mandate had obviously to be framed with that experience in mind. The French Government had special claims on Kamerun, arising out of exploration work and the fact that she could consider the 1914 agreement with Germany as null and void. The history of this part of the world during the war had been that, after heavy fighting, Kamerun was occupied by Franco-British forces, and in an exchange of letters in 1916 the British and French agreed upon administrative boundaries. By this agreement, France governed five-sixths of Kamerun, including the important port of Duala, and the British ruled over a narrow strip on the Nigerian frontier and the district of Chad. In further

A PEACE OFFERING IN CENTRAL AFRICA.
Sacred Cattle presented to the Belgian Royal Commissioner, General Malfeyt, by Musinga, King of the Ruanda Tribe.

letters, the two Governments agreed that, in the event of this Colony being given to the Allies, the provisional boundaries should become definite. A similar arrangement was made for Togoland. M. Simon, Minister of the Colonies, had declared that, if France was confirmed in her possession of these regions, she would be quite prepared to accept definite obligations as to free ports and trade, and would continue her humane policy towards the natives.

UNDER THE FRENCH PROTECTORATE.
The Sultan of the Kamerun arrives in state for a meeting with the French Mission.

Great Britain, in the discussion on the Colonies in which the Dominions were interested, supported their point of view, both in regard to Africa and to Australasia. For German East Africa, however, Great Britain was at no point opposed to some form of mandate. By the end of January, the Council of Ten were able to announce that satisfactory provisional arrangements had been reached. The scheme involved the placing of the different territories and islands in the hands of the appropriate Allied countries acting as mandatories of the League of Nations. German South-West Africa would go to South Africa; the southern Pacific islands to Australia, and so on. When the terms were finally drafted, it was found that Germany was called upon to renounce in favour of the five Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions. This clause covered every contingency, even the forgetfulness o the Conference that Germany had, by exploration, established certain claims in the Antarctic over Kaiser Wilhelm II. Land. All movable and immovable property in such territories belonging to Germany was to pass to the Government exercising authority over them, and the decision of the local courts in any dispute would be final. The Government which acquired control over any former German Colony would be free to take such action as it thought fit with regard to the repatriation of German citizens and to the conditions upon which German citizens of European origin might be allowed to remain.

The principles governing the system of mandate were laid down in the Covenant of the League of Nations. It will be well to quote here the following paragraphs from Article 22, to show how the British and Dominion case was eventually met:—

Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the mandatory must be responsible

for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic, and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of the territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the League.



SIR ERIC DRUMMOND.
Secretary to the Council of the League of Nations.

There are territories such as South-West Africa and certain of the South Pacific islands which, owing to the sparseness of their population or their small size or their remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the mandatory and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above-mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

The second paragraph covered the question of immigration, which was raised by Australia in particular. The solution did not please everybody. Still it was felt that two great things had been achieved, besides the settlement of a difficult specific question. The League of Nations had been convincingly, almost dramatically established, as the first necessity for *post bellum* international intercourse. Secondly, those responsible for British policy had, by putting their own interests second to those of world democracy, given the Conference a fine example of what adhesion to Mr. Wilson's principles and M. Clemenceau's doctrine of the necessity of sacrifice really meant.

The League of Nations was established by a resolution of the Conference at its second full meeting on January 25. Mr. Lloyd George, in seconding the resolution, which had been proposed by President Wilson, explained that the project was emphatically supported by the British Empire. His feeling, after a recent visit to the devastated regions of France, was that it was time that a saner plan for settling disputes between peoples should be established than organized savagery. "I do not know," he declared, "whether this will succeed, but, if we attempt it the attempt will be a success." Lord Robert Cecil and the other members of the League of Nations Commission at once got to work, and framed a draft Covenant which they presented to the full Conference on February 14. Many of the basic ideas of the draft Covenant, which was later incorporated in the Treaty with certain modifications, were supplied by British brains. The meaning of the Covenant could not be better understood than by reference to a speech which Lord Robert Cecil made after the text had been read to the Conference. He pointed to the Covenant as an attempt to safeguard the peace of the world by the establishment of certain principles. The first was that no nation should go to war with any other nation until every other possible means of settling the dispute had been fully and fairly tried. Secondly, it was laid down that in no circumstances should any nation seek forcibly to disturb the territorial settlement to be arrived at as the consequence of this peace or to interfere with the political independence of any of the States of the world. It had further been recognized that, if these two great principles for the government of international relations were really to be acted upon, it must be laid down that no nation must retain armament on a scale fitted only for aggressive purposes. He asked the Conference to try and substitute the principle of international cooperation for that of international competition.

The scheme was warmly welcomed in Great Britain and in other Allied lands. The result of the fullest publicity and the freest discussion was the adoption of a series of amendments, and the Covenant was finally approved by the Conference on April 28. It was provided that the action of the League should be effected through an Assembly and a Council, having a permanent secretariat under Sir Eric Drummond, a distinguished British Civil Servant,

with its seat at Geneva. Although the document contemplated the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice, it was made clear that it was not the constitution of a super-State, but a solemn agreement between sovereign States which consented to limit their complete freedom of action for the greater good of themselves and the world at large. Recognizing that one generation could not hope to bind its successors by written words, the authors of the Covenant had worked throughout on the assumption that the League must continue to depend on the free consent in the last resort of its component States. This assumption was evident in nearly every article of the Covenant, of which the ultimate and most effective sanction must be the public opinion of the civilized world.

A few days before the publication of the first draft of the Covenant, Mr. Lloyd George had returned to London for the opening of the new Parliament. Reference was made in the King's speech to the first month's labours of the Conference, and it was noted with special satisfaction that the principle of the League of Nations had been accepted. "For it is by progress along that road," the King said, "that I see the only hope of saving mankind from a recurrence of the scourge of war." The new House of Commons was very anxious to hear an authoritative statement about the proceedings of the Peace Conference. Sir Donald Maclean, one of the Opposition leaders, expressed a very general view when he called for a large measure of publicity, so that the peoples could be carried forward in generous agreement with what was done. The Prime Minister made a guarded reply. He thought it would be a misfortune if, before the discussions in the Conference were concluded, they were referred to the Parliaments of the various countries. He insisted on the difference between this Conference and any that the world had ever seen. The Plenipotentiaries in Paris represented over 30 nations and were settling questions which involved every Continent in the world. Mr. Lloyd George had been asked whether the Treaty would be placed upon the Table of the House before ratification. He replied that that would be done, and told the House that it could repudiate the Treaty if it chose.

During the debate on the Address, the House drew from the Prime Minister some emphatic declarations on the subject of election pledges. A member had alluded to a rumour that both Mr. Bonar Law and Lord Milner were in favour of reparation but not of payment for war damage. "I have never said anything of the kind," Mr. Bonar Law declared. The Prime Minister followed with the deliberate statement that the Government stood by all their election pledges. He was promptly asked if he would say that the Government

LORD ROBERT CECIL.

were going to press for payment by Germany to the full extent of her financial resources. "That is the election pledge I gave, after very careful consideration with the Cabinet," the Prime Minister replied, "and I stand by every word of it." Later he took the House in some degree into his confidence about the work of the Conference. He stated that it had been decided that the German Colonies should not be restored to Germany. That, he insisted, was an essential part of peace with Germany. On the subject of indemnities, he declared that the British Government, far from showing any slackness, were in advance of any other Government. He regretted the slighting tone of some of the remarks about the League of Nations. He assured the House that the little nations at the Conference were depending for their lives upon the League.



AUTOGRAPHS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIED CONFERENCE PRESENT AT 10, DOWNING STREET ON DECEMBER 3, 1918.

A few days later, the Prime Minister returned to Paris and resumed his seat at the Council table. He had spent much of his time while in London in dealing with a wave of industrial unrest which was passing over the country, and more particularly with a threatened general strike of miners. This obstacle was cleared for the time by the passing of a Bill setting up a Commission to inquire into the position of and conditions prevailing in the coal industry. A strike was eventually averted by the acceptance of the majority Report of the Commission, recommending a considerable increase in miners' wages and a definite reduction in their hours of labour. Meanwhile Parliament turned its attention from the vast problems which had been submitted to the Peace Conference to consider a great programme of legislation which the Government brought before it. Reconstruction was the imperative need of the time. In the King's speech, both Houses had been reminded that the aspirations for a better social order, which had been quickened in the hearts of the people by the experience of the war, must be encouraged by prompt and comprehensive action. A large number of measures affecting the social and economic well-being of the nation were promised, and most of them were carried into law in the months which followed. Bills were passed for the creation of new Ministries of Transport and Health, for a large increase in housing accommodation, for encouraging settlement on the land, particularly by ex-soldiers, and for other purposes.

Mr. Lloyd George found a host of new problems awaiting solution in Paris. One in which he took a prominent part was the nature of the clauses to be inserted in the Treaty for a definite limitation of the German Army. His last words before the General Election had been that he stood for the abolition of conscript armies in all lands. This pledge conflicted with the military terms first proposed by the Versailles Council. Marshal Foch suggested that the German Army should be limited to 200,000 men of one continuous year's service, and that the annual contingent of conscripts should not exceed 180,000. Mr. Lloyd George insisted that the terms were not stringent enough. Recalling the lessons of Napoleonic experiments of the same nature, the Prime Minister expressed the view that, since Germany, at any rate for a number of years, would be a nation trained in arms, it would be dangerous to allow her to have a standing army of such size. He also argued that it

was necessary to abolish conscription in Germany and to make her army purely voluntary. He urged, too, that Germany should not be permitted to have a permanent peace army bigger than the British Army. The Council of Ten were so impressed by Mr. Lloyd George's arguments that they accepted all his proposals. It was decided to abolish conscription in Germany. The new German Army was fixed at 100,000 men, recruited by the voluntary system for 12 years' service, with 4,000 officers. The General Staff was to disappear, and armament was to be strictly limited. Special measures would be taken to prevent any disguised military training of civilians. In fact, the object of the military terms was to restrict the German Army to the bare necessities of an internal police force.

About the middle of March there seemed to be some chance of the early publication of the preliminary terms of peace. Reports were beginning to come in from the Commissions, and, with President Wilson's return from a flying visit to the United States, the Conference was well under way again. On March 19 a remarkable letter was addressed to Mr. Lloyd George by President Wilson, M. Clemenceau, and Signor Orlando. At that moment the labour crisis in England was becoming acute, and there was some talk of the Prime Minister's returning to London to deal with it. In these circumstances, Mr. Wilson and the two Prime Ministers strongly urged Mr. Lloyd George to remain in Paris until the chief questions connected with peace were settled. They informed him that it was their belief that, if he could arrange to stay over two weeks, the all-important result could be obtained. Mr. Lloyd George remained in Paris, the work of the Peace Conference was continued without a break, and the Ministers who were left in London managed to compose the difficulties with the miners.

It was generally recognized that Mr. Lloyd George had been well advised to stay in Paris. Serious as our labour troubles were, early peace was an over-riding need. The seat of the malady from which Europe was suffering was that it was in a state which was neither peace nor war, but had all the political disadvantages of both. There was neither the artificial and deceptive plenty of wartime nor yet the real settlement and steady industry of peace. Peace was, therefore, the master-key to all domestic troubles, and to let it wait upon their settlement would have been to treat the symptoms and to leave the malady untouched.

STRIKES ON THE LONDON TUBE RAILWAYS IN FEBRUARY, 1919.
Motor lorries were utilized to convey workers to and from the City.

THE GERMAN BATTLESHIP DEUTSCHLAND.
This ship was launched in 1904. By the Peace Treaty ships of this type were the largest Germany was permitted to maintain.

The Council of Ten quickly made an end of the discussion of the military, naval, and air terms. Having fixed the limits of the German Army and devised methods whereby it would be rendered difficult, if not impossible, for Germany again to spring a surprise, as she did after Jena, by surreptitious military training, the Council turned to the naval clauses. The object aimed at was the same, the reduction of the German naval strength to the requirements of police and frontier control. There could be no greater irony than the stipulation that the German fleet of the future was to have no submarines. The terms further limited the German Navy to six battleships of the Deutschland type, six light cruisers, twelve destroyers and twelve torpedo boats in commission. All other warships, whose fate had not otherwise been settled, were to be placed out of commission or used for trade. It was decided that the personnel of the German Navy should not exceed 15,000, including not more than 1,500 officers and warrant officers. All other German warships which were not in German ports would cease to be German, and vessels interned were regarded as being finally given up. As for warships under construction, they were to be broken up under the supervision of the Allies.

The question of the "freedom of the seas," of which a great deal had been heard before the United States entered the war, did not arise in an acute form at the Conference. One or two important addenda to the naval terms must be noticed. It was provided that all military and naval works on Heligoland were to be destroyed. A proposal had been made that all the fortifications and harbours of Heligoland and the Düne should be destroyed by German labour and at the expense of Germany. Heligoland was in the curious position at the Peace Conference of being a piece of territory which nobody wanted. The only thing of importance was that Germany should not be allowed to make a naval base of it. This Germany had done at very considerable expense, as she had been forced by the action of the sea to carry out extensive works to prevent the crumbling away of the island. One suggestion was that the sea should be allowed to complete its work and the island be left to disappear in the natural course of time. It was pointed out that fishing vessels were in the habit of using its harbours as refuges

from heavy weather, and that their total destruction would be a real deprivation, and this view prevailed. It was decided to apply to the Kiel Canal a *régime* very similar to that in force in the Panama Canal. Provision was made for ensuring free passages to the Baltic by all routes. This meant that the Kiel Canal and its approaches were to be kept free and open to the merchant shipping of all nations at peace with Germany on terms of complete equality. No impediment was to be placed upon the movements of persons or of vessels other than reasonable regulations for internal police or sanitary purposes.

Naval experts were in favour of depriving Germany of her cable system. The British assimilated the seizure of enemy cables to the capture of enemy shipping at sea, but their point of view was contested by the American delegates. Complications arose from the fact that during the war the British Government had not only cut German cables, but diverted them. It was finally decided that 15 German cables should be placed at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Governments.

The air terms gave little trouble. It was laid down that the armed forces of Germany should not include any military or naval air forces save until October 1, 1919, up to which date she might maintain a maximum number of 100 seaplanes, to be exclusively employed in searching for submarine mines. No dirigible was to be kept, and, apart from the men required for the destruction of mines from the air, the air forces of Germany were to be demobilized within two months of the signature of peace.

Towards the end of March, it became apparent that the Conference was nearing a crisis. It became clearer every day that the optimistic forecasts of the early presentation of the terms to Germany were not likely to be realized. Up to this point the only portions of the Treaty which had been practically settled were the establishment of the League of Nations, the disposal of the German Colonies, and the disarmament of Germany. The whole problem of reparation and indemnities was still unsolved. There was complete agreement at this time upon only two main principles, first that Germany must pay all she could, and secondly that she could not pay any sum faintly approaching what she ought to pay. Estimates as to Germany's paying capacity were widely different, and the question admittedly was an extraordinarily difficult one. How much was Germany to be called upon to pay? What time-limit was to be fixed for payment? The periods suggested ranged from 30 to 50 years. It was not easy to find agreement on the method by which Germany could meet her indebtedness without injuring her creditors. It was absolutely clear that the Allies had to allow Germany to regain at any rate some of her former prosperity, if she was to work off her debts. That prosperity on the other hand, could not be encouraged at the expense of any Allied industry. Could the payment be exacted in kind? The same problems arose. The delays in Paris had a strong reaction in London. For some time the House of Commons had been becoming suspicious of the intentions of the British Delegation on the subject of indemnities. Public

FORTIFICATIONS ON A CORNER OF HELIGOLAND, TO BE DISMANTLED.
Photographed from a Zeppelin.

opinion had expressed itself very strongly on this question during the General Election, and the electors had succeeded in extracting some very binding pledges from the Prime Minister.

The first muttering of the storm was heard on March 24, when Mr. Bonar Law, who was acting not only as Leader of the House but as a sort of Deputy Prime Minister in Mr. Lloyd

M. CLEMENCEAU AND MR. LLOYD GEORGE.

George's absence, was handed a memorial signed by over 100 members. The memorial urged the allocation of a day for the discussion of the enemies' liability and their capacity to pay, in view of repeated statements of the intentions of the Peace delegates to impose an indemnity wholly incommensurate with the Allied war bill. Mr. Bonar Law was also placed in possession of a memorandum by Lt.-Col. Claude Lowther on Germany's ability to pay. It was prepared, in consultation with other members of Parliament, in answer to a challenge thrown out by Mr. Bonar Law in debate a few nights before. Basing his calculation on a gross war indemnity of £25,000,000,000, Col. Lowther outlined a concrete scheme by which, in his view, Germany could over a number of years be compelled to discharge the whole cost of the Allies' war debt. The controversy quickly became acute. Mr. Bonar Law announced that he had sent Colonel Lowther's memorandum to the British representatives on the Financial Commission, which was drawing up the indemnity clauses in Paris. He acceded promptly to the request for facilities for a discussion in the House of Commons, and the debate took place on April 2.

Col. Lowther, in opening the discussion, recalled that a large majority of members were solemnly pledged to their constituents to do everything in their power to exact from Germany the utmost farthing she was able to pay, subject to reason. He insisted that Germany and her Allies would be able to pay the whole of the Allies' war bill on three conditions: that time was given to them to recuperate and to pay, that an international commission was set up in Germany to collect the money, and that, while it was acting, Germany or her strategic points were occupied by an inter-Allied army of occupation. He further expressed the hope that in this matter the British Delegation was not "truckling to America." Another speaker who adopted a critical attitude towards the Government was Mr. Kennedy Jones. He asked the Government this pointed question:—"Do they still adhere to the pledge given by the Prime Minister that Germany should be made to pay the cost of the war to the limit of her capacity, or is Paris to-day dealing with a new idea of being kind and moderate in the demands to be made upon the enemy countries?" His contention was that the first thing to be done was to determine the amount of our full bill and present it to the enemy. Sir Samuel Hoare introduced a new subject, which had given the House of Commons a great deal of anxiety ever since an abortive attempt to summon a conference of the various warring Russian parties at Prinkipo, which had been one of the first acts of the Peace Conference. He told the House that he had received information from several sources that two distinguished Americans had visited Bolshevist Russia and had recently returned to Paris with an offer of terms from Lenin's Government.

Mr. Bonar Law replied for the Government on both subjects. He explained that he had heard nothing about the report of overtures for peace having been received from Lenin's Government. He had telephoned to the Prime Minister in Paris, and he also knew nothing about it. On the subject of indemnities Mr. Bonar Law emphatically declared that there had been no change in the attitude of the Government. The intention, he announced, still was to obtain as part of the debt which Germany owed whatever could be got from Germany, but there were differences as to what that amount might be. He assured the House that it would be an entire mistake to assume that the views of the British Government on this matter had been influenced by any action of the President of the United States. As for his election pledges, he pointed out that he at

any rate had not held out the hope that Germany would be able to pay anything like the whole cost of the war.

The House was not altogether satisfied with the Ministerial reply, and the position was not made easier by a statement which Mr. Lloyd George made to a Paris newspaper. Among other things, he said :—

All the Allies accept the fundamental principle that Germany should pay to the last halfpenny all that she can pay, but it is not enough to draw up a bill and present it to the enemy. Guarantees and methods and times of payment must be investigated. There is no difference between the negotiators, but only between the experts. Cannot people wait until we have finished and judge our work instead of wishing always to judge our ntentions ?

On this the Political Correspondent of *The Times* in Paris was constrained to write :—" Mr. Lloyd George's colleagues and the whole British Delegation, which he has left far too long to work like a mill without grist, would be grateful to him were he to leave his political position at home to take care of itself until a just peace has been made, instead of trying to mould the peace in accordance with his fears for his own domestic position." The Parliamentary critics of the Government now took a dramatic step, which did more than anything else to rivet attention on the question and finally to clear the air. As many as 370 members signed the following telegram, which was dispatched on April 8 to the Prime Minister in Paris :—

The greatest anxiety exists throughout the country at the persistent reports from Paris that the British delegates, instead of formulating the complete financial claim of the Empire, are merely considering what amount can be exacted from the enemy. This anxiety has been deepened by the statement of the Leader of the House on Wednesday last. Our constituents have always expected, and still expect, that the first action of the peace Delegates would be, as you repeatedly stated in your election speeches, to present the bill in full, to make Germany acknowledge the debt, and then to discuss ways and means of obtaining payment. Although we have the utmost confidence in your intention to fulfil your pledges to the country, may we, as we have to meet innumerable inquiries from our constituents, have your renewed assurance that you have in no way departed from your original intentions ?

It was stated that the decision to send this remarkable message was taken " in view of the serious news from a reliable source concerning indemnities." The Prime Minister at once telephoned the following reply :—

My colleagues and I mean to stand faithfully by all the pledges which we gave to the constituencies. We

A MEETING OF BRITISH EMPIRE DELEGATES AT THE PREMIER'S HOUSE IN THE RUE NITOT, PARIS.

Left to right Sir Joseph Ward, General Smuts, Lord Milner, Sir Joseph Cook, Mr. Barnes, Mr. Balfour, Mr. Montagu, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Mr Hughes, Sir F. E. Smith, Mr. Winston Churchill, General Sir Henry Wilson, General Botha, Mr. Massey, Mr. Kerr.



SURRENDER OF U BOATS: A GERMAN OFFICER READING THE DOCUMENT VOUCHING FOR THE GOOD CONDITION OF HIS SHIP, WHICH HE WAS REQUIRED TO SIGN.

are prepared at any moment to submit to the judgment of Parliament, and, if necessary, of the country, our efforts loyally to redeem our promises.

No sooner had this reply been received than another telegram was sent from the House of Commons to the Prime Minister, this time on the subject of Russia. Signed by over 200 members it was in the following terms :—

We, the undersigned, learn with great concern that there is a proposal before the Peace Conference to recognize the Bolshevist Government of Moscow, involving also the recognition of Russians as subjects of that Government, and urge the British Plenipotentiaries to decline to agree to any such recognition.

No reply was sent to this telegram, but the Prime Minister decided to return home without delay to face his critics. His instinct told him that nothing less than a profound sense of uneasiness would have induced hundreds of members of the House of Commons to take direct action of an unprecedented kind. It was not too much to say that the whole country was becoming profoundly depressed by the delay of the Peace Conference in coming to vital decisions, and by the futility of some of its proceedings. The spur of public opinion was never more needed than at this critical stage in the negotiations for the resettlement of the world. The Prime Minister's statement was awaited with mixed feelings. The general optimism with which the Conference had opened no longer prevailed. The lapse of week after week and month after month, with only a small instalment of the good things on which popular hopes were chiefly fixed, had created disappointment and disillusion. Time had been wasted, business had been badly organized, and blunders had been made. There had been dilatory debates on secondary subjects, and there had been widespread indecision. The shortcomings of the Conference had been observed with cumulative dissatisfaction, which had been intensified and exasperated by the systematic efforts of the Governments to keep their peoples in the dark.

The debate in the House of Commons on April 16, in which the Prime Minister made his apologia, was an event of the first importance, and in the end it marked a decisive stage in the career of the Peace Conference. Mr. Lloyd George began on a very grave note. He reminded the House solemnly of the difficulties with which the Peace Conference had had to grapple, "with stones clattering on the roof and crashing through the windows, and sometimes wild men screaming through the keyhole." He warned members, too, of the dangers

which the Conference might still have to face. In a long and earnest passage on Russia, he contended that there had never been any question of recognition of the Bolshevist Government. He shared the horror of all the Bolshevist teachings, but he declared that he would rather leave Russia Bolshevist until she saw her way out of it than see Britain bankrupt, because that was the surest road to Bolshevism in Britain. On the general question of the terms of peace, the Prime Minister denied that the Peace Conference had wasted a single hour. He stated categorically that the representatives of the great Powers had arrived at a complete understanding on the fundamental questions affecting peace with Germany. They had formulated their demands, and he hoped that by the end of the following week they would be presented. He gave an emphatic denial to any idea that America and Europe had been at hopeless variance. No one, he said, could have treated more sympathetically the peculiar problems of Europe than President Wilson. There had been complaints of secrecy as well as of delay. "There has been rather silly talk about secrecy," he remarked with some asperity. Had not the conclusion been unanimously come to in Paris that to publish the terms before they were disclosed to the enemy would be a first-class blunder? He defended that decision on the ground that no peace terms could satisfy everybody, and nobody but the enemy would benefit by premature publication.

As for his election pledges, Mr. Lloyd George was prepared to say that every pledge he had ever given would be incorporated in the demands to be put forward by the Allies. The peace, he insisted, must be just but not vindictive, stern because the crime demanded it. Above all, the future must be protected against a repetition of the horrors of this war by the punishment of any individual who was responsible. "What about the Kaiser?" a member asked. "I stand by all my pledges," the Prime Minister replied. He expressed the hope that he would go back to meet the emissaries of the enemy with the fullest support of Parliament behind him; for he warned the House that, although Parliament could repudiate the Treaty when it was signed, it would be difficult to do it once British signatures had been attached to it. The Prime Minister betrayed annoyance over the indemnities telegram. He did not object so much to the telegram as to the information on which it was based. He affected to discover the "reliable source" of the information, on which the telegram had been based, in a newspaper proprietor whose name he did not mention but of whose identity none could be in doubt. An angry attack on *The Times* followed, and the Prime Minister made play with the characteristic phrase, "I would rather have a good peace than a good Press."

A little later the House had the opportunity of hearing an interesting speech from Lord Robert Cecil, the mandatory of the Government in connexion with the League of Nations. The Prime Minister had endeavoured to build up an elaborate case for secrecy. Lord Robert Cecil, on the other hand, explained how much



SOME OF THE SURRENDERED U BOATS AT HARWICH.



GERMAN WARSHIPS ON THE WAY TO SCAPA FLOW.

the League of Nations Commission had gained by publicity. It had published to the world the draft of the Covenant with the object of securing consideration and criticism of the proposals in detail. Lord Robert Cecil was now in a position to say that the result had been on the whole fully to justify the course taken. The criticisms had been quite numerous and on the whole very encouraging. Those, he added, who had been friendly had become more friendly, and the unfriendly had become less unfriendly. He brought reassurance on one point: the League of Nations was to be not merely a League of Allies. In the debate, the Labour leaders joined issue with the Prime Minister on the cardinal issue of publicity. Mr. Clynes insisted that the House and the country were entitled to know more of the main lines which the Paris negotiations were taking. He asked pointedly what had become of all the promises of open diplomacy. Mr. Adamson frankly told the Prime Minister that the absence of detailed information of the proceedings of the Peace Conference had strained the patience of all sections of the people. He urged the great need of speed in order to save the world from a worse fate than had yet befallen it.

This was the first and last occasion on which the British Parliament took an active part in the discussion of the peace terms. About the same time there were public manifestations of irritation and impatience in other Allied countries, and particularly in France and the United States. The effect of this combined expression of public opinion on the Peace Conference was instantaneous and decisive. No sooner had Mr. Lloyd George once more arrived in Paris than there was a general speeding-up of the machinery of the Conference. Publicity had done its work, and the Conference had had its lesson. It had now come to a provisional agreement on reparation and restitution. Germany was called upon to accept for herself and her Allies responsibility for all loss and damage to States and citizens due to the war imposed on them by the enemy's aggression. While the Allies recognized that Germany could not pay the total bill, they declared that she must compensate civilians for personal injuries, air-raids, submarine crimes at sea and the like, forced labour, levies, fines, maltreatment of prisoners, damage to

civilian property, and the capitalized value of pensions and allowances. The total bill would be notified by an inter-Allied Commission by May 1, 1921. The payment of the instalments would be spread over 30 years. Germany would have to pay £1,000,000,000 by May 1, 1921, a further £2,000,000,000 by 1926, and £2,000,000,000 more thereafter.

The nature of the shipping terms may be indicated here. Germany was called upon to recognize the right of the Allies to the replacement, ton for ton and class for class, of all merchant ships and fishing craft lost or damaged. Within two months she was to give up all her ships of 6,000 tons and over, half of all between 1,000 and 1,600 tons, and a quarter of her trawlers and fishing boats. Further, she had to undertake the obligation of building for the Allies up to 200,000 tons of ships annually for five years.

Another positive achievement which stood largely to the credit of the British delegation, and more particularly of Mr. Barnes, was the adoption of the International Labour Convention by the Conference at the sitting on April 28, at which it had finally approved the Covenant of the League of Nations. It was provided that an International Labour Conference was to be held annually to propose labour reforms for adoption by the States composing the League of Nations. There were to be a governing body to act as executive and an International Labour Office. The annual conference was to consist of four representatives from each State, two for the State and one each for employers and employed. The conference would have power to adopt by a two-thirds majority recommendations or draft conventions on labour matters. The first meeting was fixed for Washington in October, 1919, and the agenda included the principle of an eight-hour day, unemployment, and the employment of women and children, especially in dangerous trades. It was a great labour charter, on which high hopes were based. As Mr. Barnes said, it was the hope of the Peace Conference to lay the foundation of a better order, under which more humane conditions of labour would be established and maintained.



BRITISH LABOUR LEADERS IN PARIS.

Mr. G. N. Barnes presides; amongst those at the table are Sir R. Borden, Mr. J. H. Thomas and Mr. Arthur Henderson.

The Conference left the question of the trial of the Kaiser and punishment for war crimes almost to the last. It was finally decided that the Allied and Associated Powers should publicly arraign William II. of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the

THE GERMAN DELEGATES SUMMONED TO RECEIVE THE DRAFT OF THE TREATY.

They are seen on the extreme left. M. Clemenceau (on the right) rose to address them; the German delegates remained seated.

sanctity of treaties. Provision was made for the constitution of a special tribunal to try him. It would be composed of five judges, one each to be appointed by Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States, and Japan. The Allies agreed to address a request to the Dutch Government for the surrender of the ex-Emperor in order that he might be put on trial. The German Government had further to recognize the right of the Allies to try persons accused of acts in violation of the laws and customs of war before military tribunals. Any such persons for whom the Allies asked were to be handed over by the German Government, which had also to furnish all documents and information which the Allies required.

Progress towards the end was rapid. The German Plenipotentiaries were summoned to Versailles, and the draft terms were handed to them on May 7. But some weeks were to elapse before peace was actually signed. Simultaneously with the presentation of the draft Treaty to the Germans, a full official summary of the terms was published in this country. Public opinion at first seemed a little bewildered by the range of subjects covered in the document, but after a time opinion hardened into a general feeling of satisfaction with the main outlines of the terms, qualified by questioning rather than criticism of points of detail. A striking feature of the reception of the terms in the Lobby of the House of Commons was the recognition by most of the Labour members of their essential justice. The question of indemnities still gave rise to some anxiety. Clearly the settlement was not what many members who had taken a strong line on that matter had expected. A last attempt was made to secure a reconsideration of this part of the terms, before they were signed. An attempt was made to move the adjournment of the House in order to secure a debate, but it failed through lack of sufficient support.

The Germans made a last desperate effort to get their propaganda machine at work in order to divide the Allies and more particularly to influence the working class movements in the Allied countries. The attempt was a complete failure. The British Labour movement gave them no encouragement. It is true that late in the day the Labour Party issued a manifesto declaring that the terms were defective, not so much because of this or that detail of wrong done, but fundamentally in that the Treaty was based upon the very political principles which were the ultimate cause of the war. Still, Germany could extract little comfort from a document in which the opinion was expressed that the payment of £5,000,000,000 as reparation for wanton destruction in all the Allied countries was not excessive in view of the damage done. The stern mood of the whole nation was expressed by Mr. Lloyd George, in a speech which he delivered to the 38th (Welsh) Division near Amiens. This is what he said:—

> These terms are written in the blood of fallen heroes. The Germans had been reckoning on this job for years, even working out the number of spikes per yard of barbed wire. We never dreamt of being in a position like this. In order to make it impossible to occur again, we have had to make these terms severe. We must carry out the edict of Providence and see that the people who inflicted this shall never be in a position to do so again. The Germans say they will not sign. Their newspapers say they will not sign. The politicians say the same. We say, "Gentlemen, you must sign. If you don't do so in Versailles, you shall do so in Berlin."

And sign the Germans did—notwithstanding all their protests and counter proposals. But before they signed, they gave the world a significant indication of their intention to evade the penalties imposed by the Peace Treaty in any way possible. On June 21, the German crews left with the interned German fleet interned at Scapa Flow scuttled their ships. Ten battleships were sunk, only one remaining afloat. Five battle-cruisers were sunk. Five light cruisers were sunk, and three were beached. Thirty destroyers were sunk, 10 remained afloat, and 18 were beached. This final breach of faith caused a wave of anger to pass over the Allied peoples and hardened their determination, if that were possible, to insist on the acceptance of the Peace Treaty without any modification of substance. All the Allies could do for the moment was to address a stern letter to Germany, characterizing the scuttling of the ships as an act of bad faith and declaring that the necessary reparation would be exacted.

The curtain fell on the great drama in the Galérie des Glaces at the Palace of Versailles on Saturday afternoon, June 28, 1919. There the peace was signed by two German delegates and by the Allied Plenipotentiaries. The signatories for the British Empire were Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. Balfour, Lord Milner, and Mr. Barnes (Great Britain); Mr. Doherty and Sir George Foster (Canada); Mr. Hughes and Sir Joseph Cook (Australia); Mr. Massey (New Zealand); Gen. Botha and Gen. Smuts (South Africa); and Mr. Montagu

and the Maharajah of Bikanir (India). The Prime Minister communicated the news to the King in a dispatch written in the historic hall in which the Treaty was signed. The letter, which was sent to London by aeroplane, was in the following terms :—

La Galérie des Glaces du Château de Versailles.

Mr. Lloyd George, with his humble duty to your Majesty, has the honour to announce that the long and terrible war in which the British Empire has been engaged with the German Empire for more than four years, and which has caused such suffering to mankind, has been brought to an end this afternoon by the Treaty of Peace just signed in this Hall. He desires, on behalf of all the Plenipotentiaries of your Majesty's Empire, to tender their heartfelt congratulations to your Majesty on the signature of a Treaty that marks the victorious end of the terrible struggle which has lasted so long and in which your Majesty's subjects from all parts of the Empire have played so glorious a part.

D. LLOYD GEORGE.

June 28, 1919, 4 p.m.

There were great scenes of rejoicing in London that evening. Crowds thronged the approaches to Buckingham Palace. The King went out and addressed these simple but moving words to the people :—"Peace has been signed, and thus ends the greatest war in history. I join you in thanking God." The King's more formal message to his people on that memorable day was as follows :—

The signing of the Treaty of Peace will be received with deep thankfulness throughout the British Empire. This formal act brings to its concluding stages the terrible war which has devastated Europe and distracted the world. It manifests the victory of the ideals of freedom and liberty, for which we have made untold sacrifices. I share my people's joy and thanksgiving, and earnestly pray that the coming years of peace may bring to them ever-increasing happiness and prosperity.

GEORGE R.I.

The next day the Prime Minister returned to London with most of his colleagues, except Mr. Balfour, who was to stay in Paris some months longer. Although it was a Sunday evening, Mr. Lloyd George received a popular welcome on his arrival at Victoria Station, where he was met by the King. A great crowd awaited his coming in Downing Street. Soon after entering his official residence, Mr. Lloyd George appeared at an upper window and made a short speech. He called upon the people to thank God for the fact that the hideous slaughter of brave men had come to an end in a righteous peace. "Let us rejoice," he said, "in this great victory, not in the spirit of boastfulness which was the downfall of Germany, but in the spirit of reverence which is worthy of the noble sacrifices which have been made." The next day Mr. Lloyd George went down to the House of Commons to announce that later in the week he would bring in a Bill to enable the Government to give effect to the Treaty, and would make a statement on the terms. His return was made the occasion of an impressive demonstration. As he walked to his place on the Treasury Bench, Ministers and members without distinction of party rose and cheered again and again. The whole House finally joined in singing the National Anthem.

At length, on July 3, the Prime Minister made the full statement on the Peace Treaty to which the House of Commons had been looking forward during all the previous months of uncertainty. The statement was made on the introduction of two Bills, one for carrying into effect the Treaty of Peace between his Majesty and certain other Powers, and the other for approving a Treaty between his Majesty and the President of the French Republic, by which Great Britain and the United States undertook to go immediately to the assistance of France in the event of any unprovoked movement of aggression against her being made by Germany. The statement took the form of a reasoned defence of the terms as "a just but stern Treaty," an examination of the guarantees for its execution, an appeal for fair play for the League of Nations, and a call for a united national effort to repair the ravages of war and garner the fruits of victory. As the whole British case was summed up in his argument, the speech formed one of the most important State documents of the war. The argument, in which the Prime Minister vindicated the principles of the Treaty, can be summarized in the following way :

All the territorial adjustments are restorations.

There was but one limit to the justice and wisdom of the reparation claim, and that was the limit of Germany's ability to pay.

Is there anything unjust, having regard to the use which Germany made of her great army, in scattering that army and making it incapable of repeating the injury which it has inflicted on the world ?

It would have been folly to have widened the area of injustice in the world by giving renewed opportunities to Germany for possible further mischief by restoring her colonies.

It is essential that those who are responsible for planning the war and those who have been guilty of offences against the laws of war should be tried.

It may be urged that we should say to Germany, "You tried and failed. Go, sin no more." But Germany suffered less than her victims, and that would be putting a premium on militarism.

There is another extreme : treat Germany as Rome treated Carthage. It would be folly. I am glad that we have not soiled our hands with Prussian methods in dealing with Prussia.

READING THE ROYAL PROCLAMATION ANNOUNCING THE SIGNATURE OF THE PEACE TREATY.
The scene at the Royal Exchange.

There is a third course: to compel Germany to restore, repair and redress, to take every precaution against a recurrence of the catastrophe, and to make such an example as will discourage ambitious rulers and peoples from attempting to repeat the infamy. That is not vengeance: it is discouragement. The crime must be marked; the world cannot take these risks again.

The Prime Minister's examination of the guarantees for the execution of the Treaty was prefaced by the firm declaration that the Government were determined that it should not be a "scrap of paper." He explained to a House which clearly wanted enlightenment on this as much as on any other branch of his subject, why Great Britain and the United States had given guarantees to go to the assistance of France in the event of a wanton and unprovoked attack by Germany upon her. The arrangement which was embodied in the Anglo-French Treaty Bill was to be entered into with the approval of the League of Nations. But, the Prime Minister reminded the House, the League of Nations was an experiment. France had within living memory been twice invaded by Germany, and she saw herself with only the Rhine between her and the foe which had trampled upon her. So France said, "We would like to know that you Britons and you Americans, who helped to emancipate our soil, are still behind us, if there is any war of aggression." Mr. Lloyd George declined to agree that this showed a lack of faith in the League of Nations. He insisted that the League would be of no value unless it had the sanction behind it of strong nations prepared at a moment's notice to stop aggression.

As for the League of Nations, it was the last and greatest guarantee of all. That great and hopeful experiment, the Prime Minister declared, was only rendered possible by the other conditions of the Treaty. "Let us try it," he urged. "I beg this country to try it seriously and in earnest. It is due to mankind that we should try it. If you avert one war, the League of Nations will have justified itself. If you let one generation pass without the blood of millions being spilt, the League will have been justified. I beg that no one will sneer at the League of Nations. I look to it with hope, with confidence, for great things for humanity." On the subject of the admission of Germany



SCUTTLED GERMAN DESTROYERS AT SCAPA FLOW.

to the League, Mr. Lloyd George said that the time of her entry depended on herself. She could accelerate it by showing that she had broken really with her past.

There was an extremely interesting passage in the Prime Minister's speech on the future of the German Colonies. He vindicated the decision of the Peace Conference that the German Colonies should not be distributed amongst the conquerors, but should be entrusted to Great Powers to be administered in the name and on behalf of humanity. He pointed out how the conditions under which these mandates were entrusted to the various countries differed according to the particular territory disposed of. For instance, South-West Africa, running side by side with Cape Colony, was felt to be so much a part geographically of that area that it would be quite impossible to treat it in the same way as a colony two or three thousand miles removed from the centre of administration. There was no doubt at all in Mr. Lloyd George's mind that South-West Africa would become an integral part of the Federation of South Africa. The same considerations applied to New Guinea, part of which was already under the administration of the Australian Commonwealth. The Prime Minister showed clearly enough that it was impossible to have that part under one system of administration and the next part under another. New Guinea was so near the Australian Commonwealth that the Peace Conference felt that it ought to be treated as if it were part of it. The circumstances were different in Togoland, in Kamerun, and German East Africa. Accordingly, a different system of mandate had been set up in those territories. The Prime Minister invited the House to look carefully at the conditions of this mandate. He assured members that they would find that they were the conditions which applied to British Colonies throughout the world. He recalled with pride that Great Britain had never raised an army for aggressive purposes in any of her Colonies, and had allowed equal opportunities for trade and commerce in all. Finally, Mr. Lloyd George reminded the House that under the mandate the responsibilities of the British Empire had been enormously increased. Something like 800,000 sq. miles had been added to the already gigantic charge upon the shoulders of the Empire. Members heard with satisfaction that the confidence which British administration had established by its efficiency, its fairness, and its gentleness to the natives had

been a matter of common observation throughout the Paris Conference.

The Prime Minister commended the Labour Convention as of vital importance for the future industrial conditions of the world. It was hoped that by means of the machinery which this great charter set up it would be possible to establish some permanent means by which the level of labour could be raised throughout the world. The speech ended with an eloquent tribute to the great share which the men and women of the British Empire had taken in the achievement of victory.

was no disposition to discuss either subject at length, and a quarter of an hour after the Prime Minister had spoken the two Treaty Bills had passed their first reading. Mr. Lloyd George at once went away for a fortnight's rest to North Wales, and the further stages of the Bills were not taken until after his return to London. The second reading was put down for July 21, and after a long sitting, which did not come to an end till half-past three o'clock on the following morning, the House of Commons passed the Bills through all their remaining stages. The second reading debate had many points of

OFFICERS OF THE SCUTTLED GERMAN SHIPS ON BOARD H.M.S. RAMILLIES.

Photographed immediately after the sinking of the Fleet.

Mr. Lloyd George's speech, the first authoritative exposition of the results of the Peace Conference, was received by Parliament and the nation with every mark of satisfaction. It was inevitable, of course, that there should be some criticism of the great document which had been signed at Versailles. Such discussion as there was related mainly to the indemnity provisions and to the Prime Minister's announcement in his speech that the Allied Powers had unanimously decided that the tribunal before which the Kaiser would be tried should sit in London. For the moment, however, there

interest. What chiefly emerged, however, was a general agreement among members of all parties with the justice of the peace. The almost universal feeling was summed up by the Prime Minister in a fine phrase. "I claim," he declared, "that this Treaty will be like a lighthouse in the deep, warning nations and the rulers of nations against the perils against which the German Empire shattered itself."

In the debate Sir Donald Maclean gave expression, though in no hostile spirit, to some current fears. He was afraid that the terms imposed on Germany would by their very severity

render her incapable of paying some of the indemnity at an early date, and that the enforcement of them would lay a military burden upon ourselves which he doubted our capacity to bear. While supporting the proposal to bring the ex-Kaiser to justice, he was against the trial taking place in London. Looking at the Treaty as a whole, he thought the one bright, shining hope in it was the League of Nations. The views of the Labour Party were stated by Mr. Clynes, in a speech of great moderation. He asked that the suspicions of Labour should be allayed on two points—conscription and armaments. He wanted a clear declaration that conscription was not to become a permanent part of our military system, and insisted that munitions should be made not by private individuals but under the control and ownership of the Government. Mr. Barnes announced that it had been decided that Germany should be admitted to the Labour Commission even before she was invited to become a member of the League of Nations.

An impressive speech was made by Lord Robert Cecil, who was warmly praised both by Mr. Barnes and Mr. Lloyd George for his work in Paris for the League of Nations. Lord Robert Cecil's hope of the peace of the world and the advancement of mankind was centred in the League. But a new conception of international relations was necessary to the success of the League; if the jungle view were accepted, he saw no hope for the world. He explained what the League of Nations had done towards making possible a new spirit in international relations. He attached most importance to the explicit recognition of the necessity of international cooperation. There was in the Covenant, for example, the explicit recognition that it was part of the duty of all the nations of the world to promote the welfare, safety, and freedom of the native races of the world. He regarded the mandate system as fraught with the greatest possibilities. Then there was the absolute condemnation of the principle of aggression and annexation, which was enshrined in two articles of the Covenant. While there was no attempt to intervene in a quarrel in which two high-spirited nations thought each was right, he attached great importance to the provision that, before they fought, they should submit their dispute to the arbitrament of the international body. It was the belief of those who framed the Covenant that the operation of public opinion would be so strong that only in cases of a very rare character and very restricted nature would war take place, if this provision was in force. Lord Robert Cecil made it absolutely clear that there was no attempt to rely upon a super-State, upon force to carry out the decisions of the Council. He held that that was almost impracticable as things stood. What was relied upon was public opinion, the effect of which was overwhelming. Among other arresting points which Lord Robert Cecil submitted to the House was the desirability of the periodical review of treaties and their modification to meet the changing requirements of mankind. He attached enormous importance to the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice to carry out these several principles. He believed the scheme was workable, but he did not deny that there were enormous difficulties ahead.

Another turn was given to the debate by Mr. Bottomley, who moved an amendment regretting that the Treaty did not impose upon Germany definite and binding obligations to make good to Britain her total financial cost of the war. The Prime Minister dealt with this line of criticism, when he rose to reply. On this occasion he had no set oration to make. Mr. Bottomley had described the sum to be paid by Germany to this country as no more than compensation for broken windows. The Prime Minister retorted that on the contrary, if the hopes of the Government were realized, this country would receive very considerable amounts in compensation for ships sunk, for lives lost, for injuries sustained through submarines and aeroplanes, and in respect of the pensions and allowances to which the nation had become liable. But it was said that the Treaty did not provide for the payment by Germany of what Great Britain had spent on the war. In answer to this, Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that Germany admitted by signing the Treaty her obligation for all the costs of the war. These amounted to a sum of £30,000,000,000, which meant that Germany would have to find £1,800,000,000 a year for its payment. What chance was there, he asked, of Germany's paying that gigantic sum? In the end, Mr. Bottomley's amendment was withdrawn, and the Peace Treaty Bill was read a second time without a division.

The Committee and other stages were somewhat prolonged by Mr. Devlin, who made an

appeal to England, which had risen so high for the freedom of the world during the last five years, to rise to that height again for a little sister island almost at its door. He suggested that the Prime Minister would find the right foundation on which to build an Irish settlement in the declared principles of President Wilson. Mr. Lloyd George replied that, when he attempted to apply those principles to Ireland by summoning a Convention, nothing came of it. Mr. Devlin moved the rejection of the Bill on its third reading as a protest against the failure of the Government to attempt to solve the Irish problem. Only eight members voted for the amendment, and the 13 hours' sitting ended with the sending of the Bill with the Anglo-French Treaty Bill, on which there was no discussion, to the House of Lords. There the two Bills had a quiet and rapid passage, and they received the Royal Assent on July 31.

There had been much public rejoicing on June 28, the fateful day on which the Plenipotentiaries of the Allies and Germany signed the Peace Treaty at Versailles. These unorganized manifestations were spontaneous and came from the heart. They were kept within bounds by an announcement by the Government that it had been decided that national peace celebrations should take place on Saturday, July 19. The day was declared a Bank Holiday, and every city, town, and village from Land's End to John o' Groats held high festival to celebrate the triumph of British arms and the return of peace.

THANKSGIVING FOR PEACE: THE ROYAL PARTY LEAVING ST. PAUL'S CATHEDRAL, JULY 6, 1919.

The celebrations in London were worthy of the occasion. The authorities had organized the greatest military display ever seen in the capital. Contingents of all the Allied Armies, with their victorious commanders at their head, marched through the streets of London and saluted the King in front of his Palace. The man of the moment was undoubtedly Marshal Foch, who had a wonderful reception as he rode with his baton in his hand at the head of a magnificent body of French infantry. He was to revisit London a few days later to receive the baton of a British Field-Marshal from the King and to become a Freeman of the City of London.

At the head of the procession rode General Pershing, leading a smart American contingent in full fighting kit. A detachment of Belgian fighting men was greeted with special fervour, and there followed Italians, Portuguese, Rumanians, Serbians and representative contingents of the other Allies, great and small, who made, each in their own way, their contribution to the common cause. After the Allies came the forces of the British Empire. There marched in the procession contingents representative of every branch of the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force, with massed colours crowned with laurel wreaths. The men of the Navy made a brave show, and a contingent of the gallant mercantile marine was received with especially grateful cheering. There were women of the auxiliary services in the pageant. There were also Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders, Newfoundlanders, and South Africans, volunteers from the Crown Colonies, and, indeed, fighting men from every corner of the far-flung Dominions of the King. The machinery of the war was not neglected. There were tanks, greeted as though they were human beings, artillery, and aircraft. At the head of the different detachments marched the commanders who had made victory possible. Sir David Beatty led the men of the Fleet, Sir Douglas Haig was at the head of his troops. With him were many of his victorious generals, Sir Henry Rawlinson, Sir William Birdwood, Lord Cavan, and a score of others.

The most moving part of the triumphal ceremony was a salute to the dead given at a cenotaph in Whitehall. Raised to the memory of the glorious dead, the cenotaph was only a temporary structure made to look like stone. It was designed by Sir Edwin Lutyens, and was so grave, severe, and beautiful that, with the almost hallowed memories of this day crowding about it, London could not help wishing that it were indeed of stone and permanent. So strong became this feeling that in a few days the Government had announced that it would be erected in permanent form on the same site. Every man and woman in the long procession saluted the glorious dead. No salute of all, poignantly touching as was every single one of them, could have surpassed that given by

THE PEACE PROCESSION, JULY 19, 1919.
Marshal Foch conducted to the King by General Feilding. General Weygand walks behind his Chief.

THE PEACE PROCESSION, JULY 19, 1919.

The Guards passing the Cenotaph in Whitehall.

Marshal Foch and his French soldiers. The core and crown of the day was the homage paid by living soldiers of every nation to their dead comrades.

The celebrations were continued far into the night. At 11 o'clock, on the actual anniversary of the sighting of the Spanish Armada more than three centuries before, a chain of beacons leapt into flame from one end of Great Britain to the other. An Indian contingent unfortunately arrived too late to take part in the procession. A few days later it had a triumphal march of its own through London. Then on Bank Holiday, August 4—a solemn date, for it was the fifth anniversary of the declaration of war by Great Britain on Germany—the King went in the

Royal barge at the head of a picturesque water procession up the Thames from London Bridge to Chelsea.

The last phase was at hand. The battle had been won. The nation for which it had been fought had had its celebration. What of the men who had made victory possible? On August 6, the Prime Minister went down to the House of Commons and moved a Vote of Thanks to the Navy, the Army, the Air Force, the over-sea contingents, the mercantile marine, and the women of the auxiliary Services. In a final paragraph, the Prime Minister asked the House to "acknowledge with deep submission and reverence the heroism of those who had fallen in the service of their country, and tender its sympathy to their relatives in the hour of their sorrow and their pride." In a second resolution, the House was asked to accord its profound sense of admiration and gratitude for the supreme services rendered to the British nation by Marshal Foch as Generalissimo of the Allied Armies, "in which great position he displayed a military genius worthy of the foremost captains in history." In commending these motions to the House, the Prime Minister dealt first with the special vote to Marshal Foch. "The war," he affirmed with conviction, "would have been won by the valour, the endurance, and the resources of the Allies without Marshal Foch's leadership, but I am profoundly convinced it would not have been won in 1918 without it." He confessed himself unable to depict what would have happened had there been another year of casualties, loss, anxiety, and unrest. "From all those dark possibilities," Mr. Lloyd George declared, "we were saved by the genius of Marshal Foch. And the gratitude of our people as well as that of all the civilized nations of the world ought to go out to him." Coming to the heroes of our own race, the Prime Minister spoke of the great and constant strain which the war had imposed upon the nerves and courage of soldiers and sailors. War had never witnessed such a trial of manhood, and British soldiers and British seamen stood it to the last. The loudest cheer of all went up when the Prime Minister claimed that it was a matter of just boast to us as a people that in such a trial Britain fought better in the last year of the

THE PEACE PROCESSION, JULY 19, 1919.
The Naval Contingent at Hyde Park Corner.

war than she had ever fought before. The Votes of Thanks were endorsed by the acclamation of all parties and were passed *nemine contradicente*.

After words, deeds! The Prime Minister next proposed that the services of the victorious commanders on sea and land and in the air

	£
Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson	10,000
General Sir Henry Rawlinson ..	30,000
General Sir Julian Byng	30,000
General Sir Henry Horne	30,000
General Sir William Robertson	10,000
General Sir William Birdwood	10,000
Lieut.-Col. Sir Maurice Hankey .. .	25,000
THE AIR FORCE.	
Air Vice-Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard ..	10,000

THE WATER PAGEANT: The King landing from his State barge at Chelsea Pier

should be recognized by the following money grants:—

THE NAVY.	£
Admiral of the Fleet Sir David Beatty ..	100,000
Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe ..	50,000
Admiral Sir Charles Madden	10,000
Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee	10,000
Rear-Admiral Sir Roger Keyes	10,000
Vice-Admiral Sir John de Robeck.. ..	10,000
Commodore Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt ..	10,000
THE ARMY.	
Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig	100,000
Field-Marshal Viscount French	50,000
Field-Marshal Sir Edmund Allenby ..	50,000
Field-Marshal Sir Herbert Plumer ..	30,000

Only that morning it had been announced that the King had conferred earldoms on Sir David Beatty and Sir Douglas Haig; a viscounty on Sir Edmund Allenby; baronies on Sir Herbert Plumer, Sir Henry Rawlinson, Sir Julian Byng, and Sir Henry Horne; and baronetcies on Sir Charles Madden, Sir Roger Keyes, Sir John de Robeck, Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt, Sir Henry Wilson, Sir William Robertson, Sir William Birdwood, and Sir Hugh Trenchard. In moving the financial resolution,

the Prime Minister, himself about to receive the Order of Merit, reminded the House of the honoured tradition of this country that it rewarded liberally those who had rendered it conspicuous and distinguished services in time of war. He paid fine tributes in turn to Sir Douglas Haig, Sir Edmund Allenby, Sir David Beatty and the other successful commanders on his list. The grants in the aggregate amounted to £585,000—a far smaller sum relatively than that awarded at the end of other campaigns. Mr. Lloyd George recalled that the Duke of Wellington alone had £500,000 awarded to him after the Battle of Waterloo. The House did not show the same unanimity in voting the money grants as in expressing its formal appreciation of the services which they were intended to reward. Mr. Adamson moved a reduction of the vote by £385,000, leaving £200,000 to be divided. While declaring that the Labour Party fully realized the value of the services rendered by the Admirals and Generals, he argued that they should not be measured by money payments, which moreover were out of all proportion, when compared with the monetary rewards given to the rank and file. A mean little debate was redeemed by a generous speech from Major-General Sir John Davidson, formerly Sir Douglas Haig's Director of Military Operations, who reminded the niggards that his old chief had hitherto refused to accept any honour until he saw that his officers and men had been adequately treated. The Prime Minister intervened again to deprecate strongly statements which conveyed in an indefinite way that all the money was being voted for the Generals and Admirals and nothing at all for the soldiers and sailors. The fact was that the soldiers and sailors got £100,000,000 a year in pensions, and the Generals and Admirals a sum of £585,000. The debate was not long sustained, and although the Labour amendment was pressed to a division, the grants on the scale proposed by the Government were endorsed by 272 votes against 64.

There was no evidence at all to show that the Labour protest had any substantial backing among the mass of the nation. Rather were the British people at this supreme moment, when the war had ended in victory and peace had been definitely re-established, in the mood to return thanks in the noble language of a great poet of our own day:—

From the depth of the springs of my spirit a fountain is poured of thanksgiving,
My country, my mother, for thee,
That thy dead for their death shall have life in thy sight and a name everliving
At heart of thy people to be.
In the darkness of change on the waters of time they shall turn from afar
To the beam of this dawn for a beacon, the light of these powers for a star.
They shall see thee who love and take comfort, who hate thee shall see and take warning,
Our mother that makest us free;
And the sons of thine earth shall have help of the waves that made war on their morning,
And friendship and fame of the sea.

ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY

CHAPTER CCCX.

THE UNITED STATES AT WAR: END.

AMERICAN WAR EFFORT—REACTION TO GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF 1918—INCREASED TRANSPORT OF TROOPS—ASSISTANCE TO ALLIES IN MONEY AND FOOD—MUNITIONS, EQUIPMENT, AEROPLANES, SHIPS; GOVERNMENT CRITICISED—LABOUR PROBLEMS—PUBLICITY CAMPAIGNS—REPUBLICAN CRITICISM OF THE PRESIDENT—THE GENERAL ELECTION; REPUBLICAN VICTORY—MR. WILSON GOES TO PARIS—ATTACKS ON THE PEACE TREATY AND THE COVENANT—INTERNAL AND WORLD PROBLEMS—ALIEN POPULATIONS—GERMAN AND IRISH INTRIGUES—TENDENCY TOWARDS A RETURN TO ISOLATION.

THE last six months of the war was for the United States a period of triumphant effort abroad and of a great, though sometimes rather painful, gathering of strength at home, the single-mindedness of which contrasted rather curiously with the era of controversy afterwards produced by the Treaty of Versailles and by President Wilson's personal participation in the negotiations leading up to the Treaty.

Betwee May and November, 1918, Americans saw in Europe the steady arrival of their mighty hosts. They saw their troops helping dramatically to stem the final plunge of the foe towards Paris. They knew that without American reserves Marshal Foch could not have then launched his kaleidoscopically successful offensive. During the last stages of that offensive they learnt with pride that American Armies under American commanders were already able to force unaided to a victorious issue operations of the first magnitude. At home they saw their vast industrial war machinery settling into its rhythm, albeit not without complaint and delay; they saw their countrymen by the million cheerfully entering or preparing to enter the Army, cheerfully stinting their food supplies for the sake of less lucky Allies, subscribing to war loans and charities by the tens of millions, and submitting without a murmur to the prospect of taxes which before the war would have been deemed fantastic. They saw Labour and Capital settling down to their common war-work in a way that a few months before would have been unthinkable; and if the appearance of hordes of glitteringly selfish profiteers and parvenus in the great cities and in the industrial centres were of somewhat ominous augury for the future, few stopped to wonder whether, when war prosperity and enthusiasm had gone and high prices alone were left, there might not be an uncomfortable period of readjustment. All that was apparent was that everyone was joined in a tumultuous drive for victory Grumbling there might be about the slow production of ships, the failure of the great aeroplane programme and so on; dissatisfaction there might be that in France American boys were fighting under British helmets in British boots before French artillery and below French aeroplanes; but what did it matter with victory made certain by American effort next year and defeat staved off this year by American man-power, just as American money and then American food had tided other crises?

The slowness of the materialization of American ships was also offset to no small extent by pride in the achievements of the American



THE ATLANTIC FLEET IN HARBOUR.
A few days after the Declaration of War by the United States.

Navy There anyhow there had been clear-cut promptitude. American war vessels had been on their way to join the British Fleets within a few weeks of the declaration of war. Since then the American forces in European waters had expanded manyfold and the entire naval establishment at home and abroad had grown smoothly and quietly out of all recognition, until at the time of the armistice there were half a million souls working for it and in it, nearly ten times as many as when Admiral Sims took his first flotilla of destroyers across In the same period ships increased from 197 to 2,000. Altogether, the Navy had at the end of the war 373 vessels based on Europe, including eight battleships, 70 destroyers, many of a new and large pattern, built in the past 18 months, 120 submarine chasers, 12 submarines, and over 50 patrol boats of various types. There were also on the Atlantic many vessels in convoy work. Of mines, 56,000 were laid by Americans, mainly in the North Sea, and that despite the fact that their mine production had hardly started

Finally, when the German collapse became imminent and statesmanship began to count again, there was the pride, spiced, it is true, by some trepidation, of watching an American statesman mould the diplomacy of the Allies.

As was shown in the chapter of this history entitled "America's First Year at War," the last phase of the American war-effort really started in March, 1918, with Hindenburg's great rush for Amiens and the Channel ports. The spectacular suddenness and depth of his advance, followed by the Lys attack and Marsha Haig's famous order of the day about British backs being to the wall, entirely changed the atmosphere both at Washington and in the country. Before that time preparations had been proceeding in almost leisurely fashion, partly, as will be shown later, because of the judgment of the Allies that the main American effort would have to be for 1919. Troops had been going over comparatively slowly. All the tonnage possible had been allocated for the relief of the food shortage, which so gravely threatened the endurance of Great Britain and her Allies during the spring of 1918. Production of munitions and material seemed, to a public unfamiliar with the immense amount of spade-work needed in the shape of plants and equipment for the manufacture of the appliances of modern warfare, to be falling disappointingly short of the over-sanguine promises made in the exuberance of the first few months of belligerency. The war, moreover, remained to many as remote as it had been during the days of neutrality. No possibility could be espied that the enemy would ever be a real menace.

The German lunges changed all that with great speed. They brought the war to the fireside of all Americans. There were no longer

dreams of victory without much else than economic effort, or in moments of pessimism of a drawn war before America could intervene in force. Officials in Washington no longer looked forward to preparation for a maximum of effort a year hence. Germany, it was proclaimed, might win in Europe that summer, and by her victory become an actual and imminent menace to American civilization. The lectures which for a year past the President had, in his public utterances, been giving upon the real meaning of the Pan-German peril were recalled and digested. It was realized that the United States must make offhand a supreme effort, not so much to expedite victory as to stave off something tantamount to defeat.

How the United States responded to the alarm has also been told. There was an immediate and remarkable acceleration in the dispatch of troops across the Atlantic; plans were laid for a huge army in France by the ensuing spring; the Government's financial projects were broadened to meet heavier expenditure in the immediate future and to support the drain of war for years if need were. Industrial plans were recast on a larger scale. The organization of basic industries was strengthened; plans were laid for the curtailment of unessential production; the telegraph and telephone systems, in the United States the property of private companies, were, like the railways, taken over for the term of the war, to be run, like the railways, at a loss and, unlike the railways, at a distinctly lower pitch of efficiency. Private organizations like the Y.M.C.A. and the Knights of Columbus and, of course, the Red Cross were expanded. The country throbbed with new-found energy. No sacrifice, it was proclaimed, must be spared that might increase American weight in the war and the volume and value of food and other supplies that she was counted on to produce. Voluntary food-saving, though not so necessary as it had been during the winter, was continued. Severe rationing of such things as sugar was accepted without a murmur; and what was more remarkable in a country where cheap production on a large scale has made motors almost as much of a necessity to the middle class as the bicycle in England, great economies were made in petrol by voluntary saving. At a hint from Washington the whole country forswore for several Sundays of a hot summer all pleasure riding whatsoever; and on the rivers and harbours motor-boats no longer ran.

The first important sign of this awakening was in the work of the War Department. During

LOADING MUNITIONS ON AN AMERICAN TRANSPORT.

the winter troops had been moving to France too slowly to please ardent patriots who, in their desire that the United States should make speedy amends for her long neutrality, were rather over-prone to disregard the call made on her dwindling tonnage resources by other war services. On March 21 when the German storm broke there were but 343,000 Americans in France, of whom certainly not more than half were combatant troops. But, whereas in January and February combined the total number of troops dispatched was under 100,000, the figure rose in March to 81,000, in April to 117,000, in May to 244,000, in June to 276,000, in July to 306,185. By the first of that month one million men had thus been ferried across. Before the end of October the second million had sailed, and when the armistice was signed the total embarkation was 2,075,834.

Altogether there were under arms at home and abroad at that date 3,441,000 men. Of these, 2,801,635 had been drafted under the selective service law of May, 1917, and its subsequent amendments. That law provided only for the taking of men between the ages of 21 and 30; and during the summer of 1918 it became evident that something under 3,000,000 men was all that it could supply without unduly dislocating industry. As the President had during the stress of the spring promised to have 4,000,000 men in France for the campaigning season of 1919, it hence became necessary to have a second draft law.

The second draft law was passed by Congress before the end of August. It provided for the registration of all males between 18 and 45 inclusive. As by then the Anglo-American Recruiting Convention had come into force and allowed each country to recruit the other's nationals, the registration took in a number of British subjects, despite the fact that the British and Canadian recruiting mission had, during the preceding year, picked up some 30,000 volunteers.

The registration was held a few weeks later, and when the armistice came the United States had nearly 24,000,000 names upon the rolls of the War Department. Had the war continued it had been meant to have well over 6,000,000 men in uniform—one million in the Navy, where enlistment was still voluntary, and the rest in the Army to give General March, the Chief of Staff, the force he had planned of a fighting strength of 80 divisions in France and a reserve of 18 divisions at home. It was a good proof of the hardening of the American spirit that, though there had been a certain amount of shirking among the young men under the first draft, the second registration of the middle-

REGISTERING IN NEW YORK FOR AMERICA'S DRAFT ARMY.

AMERICA'S FIRST DRAFT ARMY.
10,000 conscripts marching through Chicago in August, 1917.

aged and very young mounted considerably higher than had been expected.

The stiffer taxes of 1918 were met in the same spirit, though as a matter of fact, the Revenue Bill introduced during the summer was not finally enacted till the ensuing February, and was considerably modified. The first War Revenue Measure of 1917 had been calculated to raise between £600,000 and £800,000 by taxation. To those already under the pressure of war finance in Europe the sum was not very startling considering that the population of the United States is over 100,000,000. But Americans, with their dual system of Government, by which the States have considerable taxing powers, were not accustomed to heavy direct imposts by the Federal Treasury. A Federal income-tax had, indeed, been authorized by the Supreme Court but a few years before. There was consequently some nervousness when in May, 1918, the President asked Congress to authorize the raising of double the 1917 sum by taxation. It was feared that even if the prospect did not sour war enthusiasm it would interfere with the loans that would be necessary to make up an expenditure of nearly £5,000,000,000 during the pending fiscal year—a budget just about double of that of the preceding year. The income-tax in particular drew attention. Though slightly modified, the rates proposed worked out as follows when compared to the rates of the equivalent tax in Great Britain and in France:

Income in dollars.	Percentage of Tax. U.S.	England.	France.
2,500	1·20	8·44	1·25
4,000	3·0	14·53	2·44
6,000	4·33	18·75	3·71
8,000	6·81	22·50	4·34
10,000	8·45	22·55	4·98
15,000	11·97	32·08	6·97
20,000	14·48	34·06	6·99
30,000	18·65	37·29	8·41
50,000	24·99	41·88	10·905
100,000	39·10	47·19	11·27
200,000	50·55	49·84	11·89
500,000	59·42	51·44	12·25
1,000,000	64·71	51·97	12·38
2,000,000	70·54	52·39	12·48

The American income-tax, it will be noticed, falls much more lightly upon moderate incomes than the British. That may have been one of the reasons why it was accepted in such a philosophical way. Another reason was the promise contained in the Bill of a lower rate

for the ensuing year, for the American Government, with characteristic sense, used the delay that there had been in the passage of the Revenue Bill until after the armistice to take into consideration the changes that peace would make. Various sections of the Bill were modified so that its revenue producing capacities were reduced from eight billions to under five billions of dollars. Besides the income-tax the most important tax was a tax upon the profits of companies calculated to produce about £250,000,000 as compared with about £360,000,000 from the income-tax. Roughly speaking, the excess profits tax was reduced in the final draft of the Bill by about the same proportion as the same tax was reduced in England a few months later.

The magnitude of her war preparations was not the sole reason for the magnitude of the war finance of the United States. After the armistice there was what seemed to Americans who knew the facts rather an ultra-exuberant outbreak of self-congratulation over the leading part that American fighting men were supposed to have played in chasing the Germans out of France. There was no inclination to begrudge the credit due to General Pershing and his armies. It was realized that American reserves had played a vital part in Marshal Foch's plans, and that the American Armies actually on the front had fought with the greatest gallantry; but it was felt at the same time that more credit should have been given to the American effort in other fields. There was probably a good deal in that view.

The invidious task of apportioning among its various champions the share of the credit due for saving civilization from the Prussian peril falls fortunately to the historian of the future. It is possible that the verdict may be that without American armed aid the Allies might have been forced eventually to conclude a less clear-cut peace; but that without American economic assistance they might easily have been actually beaten. When in 1917 the United States entered the war Allied finance was in worse shape than was generally known. Great Britain in particular had been drawing vast volumes of supplies from the United States. She had financed these trans-

DECLARING THEIR INCOMES FOR INCOME TAX.
American citizens were required to attend personally at specified centres for the purpose of making their declarations.

actions partly by selling American securities, partly by raising credit loans in the United States. For these American securities were to some extent used as collateral. There were also great shipments of gold across the Atlantic, and the rate of sterling exchange was pegged.

During the period of American neutrality the United States lent to the belligerents the following main sums—in 1915 a loan of £100,000,000 to France and England jointly, and a supplementary bankers' credit of £10,000,000. In 1916 the United States gave £110,000,000 in secured loans to Great Britain, £20,000,000 to France, and £22,000,000 to French cities. By the end of 1918 the total of Great Britain's war issues in the United States was £261,680,000, the total of the issues of France £169 ,000,000, of those of Russia £32 000,000, and those of Italy £5, 800,000. They were nearly as big when the United States entered the war, for by that time the Allies had almost exhausted the credit which they could expect from the United States. The situation was consequently very serious. Without a continued and ever-growing stream of supplies of food and munitions from over the Atlantic the Allies could hardly hope to fight effectively. Yet unless they could raise the money to pay for them those supplies would presumably cease.

The entry of the United States saved the day. The Government came to the rescue of private finance. One of the first things that the President did after the declaration of war was to get from Congress leave to raise great loans, a considerable proportion of which could be re-lent to the Allies at three per cent., or about half what the rate had been for loans from private American sources. Between then and 1919 the American Government was hence able to lend the following sums to the Allies :—

Great Britain	£863,200,000
France	561,695,200
Italy	315,300,000
Belgium	68 300,000
Russia	37,545,950
Greece	8,682,593
Serbia	5,453,721
Rumania	5,000,000
Cuba	2,000,000
Liberia	1,000,000
Czecho-Slovakia	10,065,000
	£1,876,053,805

To meet the drain upon her resources implied by these loans, in addition to her own great war expenditures—the War Department alone was authorized in the two years following April, 1917, to spend £3,564,600,000, and spent £2,837,200,000 — the Government was, of course, compelled to borrow to supplement revenue as well. It floated in that period five great popular war loans, producing in al £5,300,000,000. All were well over-subscribed, and whereas there were three



HON. DAVID F. HOUSTON,
Secretary of Agriculture.

million applicants for the first loan in 1917, there were 25,000,000 for the last two years later, which reached the unprecedented sum of £1,200,000,000.

America's aid to the Allies by food production was hardly less remarkable. The earlier stages of her work in this regard have already been dealt with in this history. There can be little doubt that here again American self-sacrifice and American "push-and-go," as organized by Mr. Hoover and Mr. Houston, the Secretary of Agriculture, saved Europe from a very real danger of at least a compromise peace. There is no need to recapitulate how in the late winter and spring of 1918 Mr. Hoover, aided by Mr. McAdoo, who at that time added to his duties as Secretary of the Treasury those of Director of the Railways when their administration was assumed by the Government, and, aided by the response that their demands for saving got from the people, carried the Allies over the crisis. It may, however, be not out of

HARVESTING IN CALIFORNIA.

place in this, the last chapter dealing with America's war effort, to sum up in the following table precisely how much food the United States was able to send us and our Allies.

The crops of 1916 had been small. The Department of Agriculture, realizing the calls that were likely to be made by the Allies for food, summoned before war was actually a fact

EXPORTS OF DOMESTIC FOODSTUFFS FROM THE UNITED STATES.
REPORTS OF BUREAU OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COMMERCE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE.

Article exported.	Year ending June 30.					Annual Average 1910–1914.
	1918.		1917.	1916.	1915.	
	Amount.	Per cent. of 1910–1914.				
Wheat .. .. bu.	34,118,853	59·9	149,831,427	173,274,015	259,642,533	56,913,328
Wheat flour .. bu.	21,880,151	204·9	11,942,778	15,520,669	16,182,765	10,678,635
Oats .. .. bu.	105,881,233	1,275·0	88,944,401	95,918,884	96,809,551	8,304,203
Rye .. .. bu.	12,065,922	1,411·6	13,260,015	14,532,437	12,544,888	855,765
Barley .. .. bu.	26,408,978	334·5	16,381,077	27,473,160	26,754,522	7,895,521
Maize .. .. bu.	40,997,827	103·0	64,720,842	38,217,012	48,786,291	39,809,690
Total ..	317,933,492	—	386,880,263	419,258,518	517,360,227	161,831,264
Sugar .. .. lb.	576,415,850	812·1	1,248,908,286	1,630,150,863	549,007,411	70,976,908
Dairy products—						
Butter .. lb.	17,735,966	414·6	26,835,092	13,487,481	9,850,704	4,277,955
Cheese .. lb.	44,330,978	901·9	66,050,013	44,394,301	55,362,917	4,915,502
Milk, condensed lb.	529,750,032	3,358·4	259,141,231	159,577,620	37,235,627	15,773,900
Total ..	591,816,976	—	352,026,336	217,459,402	102,449,248	24,967,357
Meat and meat products						
Canned beef .. lb.	97,366,983	1,036·7	67,536,125	50,803,765	75,243,261	9,392,122
Fresh beef .. lb.	370,057,514	1,256·5	197,177,101	231,214,000	170,440,934	29,452,302
Pickled beef .. lb.	54,867,310	166·8	58,053,667	38,114,682	31,874,743	32,893,172
Oleo oil .. lb.	56,648,102	20·2	67,110,111	102,645,914	80,481,946	280,224,505
Bacon .. .. lb.	815,319,424	446·8	667,151,972	479,808,786	346,718,227	182,474,092
Hams and shoulders .. lb.	419,571,869	251·5	266,656,581	282,208,611	203,701,114	166,813,134
Pickled pork .. lb.	33,221,502	68·8	46,992,721	63,460,713	45,655,574	48,274,929
Lard .. .. lb.	392,498,435	82·7	444,769,540	427,011,338	475,531,908	474,354,914
Lard compound lb.	31,278,382	46·5	56,359,493	52,843,311	69,980,614	67,318,857
Total ..	2,270,829,521	—	1,871,807,311	1,828,111,120	1,499,628,321	1,291,198,027

These tremendous figures were not the result solely of the economy of the American consumer. They represent a great increase in production. When the United States declared war the situation in regard to production was not good. a conference at St. Louis to consider what could be done. Another conference was, at the same time, held in California for the Far West. Organizations were formed to stimulate food production in each State. Something like

500,000 people were enrolled in these organizations. Over 44,000,000 pamphlets were, in a few months, sent out to them by the Department in Washington. Congress gave large sums of money to the work. The amounts of different crops were worked out and the farmers were told what to sow. The quota for each State was scientifically fixed. Agents visited each farm to expound the nature of the emergency. In 1917 acreage planted in the leading crops grew from 261,000,000 in the preceding year to 280,000,000. In 1918 the acreage was 283,000,000. The year of 1917 was bad for wheat and 1918 for maize. Nevertheless, there was for the two years a great average increase over preceding years. It was the same with live-stock, as is seen from the following table:

Production of	1914 lb.	1918 lb.
Beef	6,079,000,000	8,500,000,000
Pork	8,769,000,000	10,500,000,000
Mutton	495,000,000	739,000,000

The situation in regard to munitions was, as said above, less happy when the armistice was signed. The artillery, ammunition, aeroplanes, tanks, and machine-guns used by the American Armies in France were at the time of the armistice still to a very large extent of British and French manufacture.

The aircraft situation can be roughly tabulated as follows:

Machines produced by November 11:	
Service	4,100
Training	3,700
In France	1,185
With the First and Second American Armies	740
Actually fighting	250

The artillery situation was as follows:

	Ordered.	Finished.	Floated.
37 mm.	9,108	884	300
75 mm.	8,437	1,399	143
4·7 in.	—	149	16
155 mm. howitzer ..	3,000	1,712	—
155 mm.	2,190	71	16
8 in. howitzer ..	295	165	96
9·2 howitzer	100	—	—
240 mm. howitzer ..	1,214	1	—
Anti-aircraft	713	95	—

The situation in regard to tanks, gas appliances, etc., was much the same. The number of American motors at the front was better.

Our entry into the war [said General Pershing in his final report on operations in December, 1918] found us with few of the auxiliaries necessary for its conduct in the modern sense. Among our most important deficiencies in material were artillery, aviation, and tanks. In order to meet our requirements as rapidly as possible, we accepted the offer of the French Government to provide us with the necessary artillery equipment of 75's, 155 mm. howitzers, and 150 G.P.F. guns from their own factories for 30 divisions. The wisdom of this course was fully demonstrated by the fact that, though we soon began the manufacture of these classes of guns at home, there were no guns of the calibres mentioned manufactured in America mounted on our front at the date of the armistice. The only guns of these types

A BIG SITKA SPRUCE ON ITS WAY TO THE MILLS FOR CONVERSION INTO AEROPLANE FRAMES.

THE CURTISS AEROPLANE FACTORY: THE MOTOR ASSEMBLING SHOP.

produced at home thus far received in France are 109 75 mm. guns.

In aviation we were in the same situation, and here again the French Government came to our aid until our own aviation programme should be under way. We obtained from the French the necessary planes for the training of our *personnel*, and they have provided us with a total of 2,676 pursuit, observation, and bombing planes. The first airplanes received from home arrived in May, and altogether we have received 1,379. The first American squadron completely equipped by American production crossed the German front on August 7, 1918. As to tanks, we were less fortunate, for the reason that the French production could barely meet the requirements of their own armies.

It should be fully realized that the French Government has always taken a most liberal attitude, and has been most anxious to give us every possible assistance. . . . .

As a matter of fact Great Britain also made her contribution. She was particularly generous in the matter of boots and clothes, which she sold to the United States to the value of £5,674,000, and to the number of more than a million pairs of boots, over six million pairs of socks, and two millions each of caps, drawers, gloves and puttees. Great Britain provided 179 equipments of 9·2 and 8 in. howitzers, with a considerable amount of ammunition and the requisite spare parts, nearly 2,000 equipments of trench mortars with a huge amount of ammunition, nearly 1,500,000 steel helmets, about 3,000,000 grenades, a generous outfit of gas supplies, over 1,000 machine-guns, some rifles and pistols, and many million rounds of small arms ammunition. She produced for General Pershing about 4,000 lorries, over 1,000 each of motor-bicycles and side-cars, 64 tractors, 277 water tanks, and lastly 18 tanks, 255 aeroplanes with engines, 247 without engines, 87 engines with a large number of hangars, and over 100,000 bombs.

The shortage of American supplies in France produced much criticism both before and after the war It was noted that, save in spending money, none of the agencies responsible for production had lived up to their glowing promises of the spring and summer of 1917. Those responsible for aircraft production had promised thousands of machines by the beginning of 1918. By the end of the year they had spent $9 8,000,000, and had produced virtually nothing in France. For ordnance $4,323,000.000 had been set aside, and the fruits of this expenditure were also conspicuous for their absence in France. The most important official effort to meet criticism came from the War Department, which got out in the first half of 1919 a fascinating history of America's production of munitions during the war. The chief argument of the report, and it was a very strong one, was that critics forget the time and money necessary for the preparation for the manufacture of modern arms. It was also shown that the Allies had encouraged the United States to sacrifice comparati ely small immediate production to very large output later.

One sees that in the important and graphic account given by Mr. Benedict Crowell, the Assistant Secretary of War, in his preface to the report of the negotiations on this subject.

All through the summer of 1917 the emphasis upon American man-power in France gradually grew, but no definite schedule upon which the United States could work was reached until autumn or early winter until the mission headed by Colonel E. M. House visited Europe to give America a place on the Supreme War Council and in the Interallied Conference. In the conferences in London and Paris the American representatives looked into the minds of the Allied leaders and saw the situation as it was. Two dramatic factors coloured all the discussions—the growing need for men and the gravity of the shipping situation. The German submarines were operating so effectively as to make exceedingly dark the outlook for the transport on a sufficient scale either of American troops or of American munitions.

As to man-power the Supreme War Council gave it



THE CURTISS AEROPLANE FACTORY: AN AEROPLANE APPROACHING COMPLETION, AND "BOATS" AWAITING THEIR WINGS

as the judgment of the Allies that if the day were to be saved America must send 1,000,000 troops by the following July. There were in France then parts of four divisions of American soldiers, 129,000 in all. The programme of American cooperation as it crystallized in these conferences may be summarized as follows:

1. To keep the Allies from starvation by shipping food.

2. To assist the Allied Armies by keeping up the flow of material already in production for them in the United States.

3. To send as many men as could be transported with the shipping facilities then at America's command.

4. To bend energies toward a big American Army in 1919 equipped with American supplies.

Mr. Crowell then gives the international ordnance agreement reached at these conferences, the result of which was to make the American authorities inclined to sacrifice immediate requirements to large scale production for 1919. The agreement follows:

The representatives of Great Britain and France state that their production of artillery (field, medium, and heavy) is now established on so large a scale that they are able to equip completely all American divisions as they arrive in France during the year 1918 with the best make of British and French guns and howitzers.

The British and French ammunition supply and reserves are sufficient to provide the requirements of the American Army thus equipped at least up to June, 1918, provided that the existing 6 in. shell plants in the United States and the Dominion of Canada are maintained in full activity and provided that the manufacture of 6 in. howitzer carriages in the United States is to some extent sufficiently developed.

On the other hand, the French, and to a less extent, the British, require as soon as possible large supplies of propellants and high explosives, and the British require the largest possible production of 6 in. howitzers from now onwards, and of 8 in. and 9·2 shell from June onwards.

In both these matters they ask the assistance of the Americans.

With a view, therefore, first to expedite and facilitate the equipment of the American Armies in France, and, second, to secure the maximum ultimate development of the ammunition supply with the minimum strain upon available tonnage, the representatives of Great Britain and France propose that the American field, medium, and heavy artillery be supplied during 1918 and so long after as may be found convenient from French and British gun factories; and they ask (*a*) that the American efforts shall be immediately directed to the production of propellants and high explosives on the largest possible scale; and (*b*) Great Britain also asks that 6 in., 8 in., and 9·2 shell plants already created in the British service in the United States shall be maintained in the highest activity, and that large additional plants for the manufacture of these shells shall at once be laid down.

In this way alone can the tonnage difficulty be minimized, and potential artillery development, both in guns and shells, of the combined British, French, and American Armies be maintained in 1918 and still more in 1919.

There was also the renewed insistence placed upon man-power after the disasters of March and April, 1918, when in effect the cry of the Supreme War Council was, "Give us the reserves to meet this crisis and we will somehow or other find their equipment." Nor did those who were angry at the appearance of what looked to people with their eyes glued on the fighting lines at the front like a mouse out of a mountain of effort make proper allowance for the vast amount of time and trouble and money expended upon permanent plant, from aerodromes in Texas to railways in France. In France the army built just under 1,000 miles of standard railway lines and more than half as much again of narrow gauge, most of which, like harbour improvements, was so much permanent gain to France, and constituted to the United States a marketable asset. There were also great expenditures on things like cantonments in the United States and nitrate plants and other plants of a permanent value. But neither such considerations nor the patent fact that had the war gone on into 1919 the United States would have more than justified her slowness by the immensity of her supplies of aeroplanes, artillery and so on served to

silence the dissatisfied or disarm investigations by Congress.

The production of aircraft and artillery drew the sharpest fire. At the beginning of August, 1918, a Senate Committee had already excoriated the Aircraft Board (details about which and about the other war agencies will be found in Chapter CCXLIV., Volume XVI.) for delay and waste. It was noted that more than a year before public announcement had been made that a fleet of 25,000 aeroplanes was to be built for the winning of the war, that a



MR. JOHN D. RYAN.
Head of the Aircraft Production Board.

good percentage of the fleet was to be ready by the end of the year, and that over $600,000,000 had been set aside for the venture, and already it had been necessary to find more. Much good work had doubtless been accomplished, but, nevertheless, the Committee felt that there must have been great waste and a good deal of incompetency. It was pointed out that no aeroplanes had yet been sent to France. It was noted that there had been expensive false starts on the manufacture of sundry types of machines, and that, on the other hand, approved types of European machines had been rejected as patterns. The famous Liberty motor, afterwards developed into a fine standardized engine which if the war had lasted would have been invaluable, came in for criticism, as did the failure of designers to find a good machine for it.

During the testimony before the Committee one of the associates of Mr. Ryan, who was then head of the Aircraft Production Board, had said that General Pershing had called for 25,000 machines for the summer of 1919, but would be lucky if he got 10,000.

Owing to statements of that kind, the work of the Committee caused a great commotion, accompanied as it was by rumours of corruption among the business men at or near the top of the producing side of the air service. There were other inquiries into the slowness with which the ordnance and shipbuilding programmes seemed to be coming on. The ordnance situation has already been outlined. The American shipbuilding effort has been dealt with in another chapter. Undoubtedly, in manufactured material for the war the United States fell as far short of expectations as she exceeded the wildest dreams of the Allies over food and man-power.

The thing was, however, understandable, and if the Allies were disappointed they may thank, in part, the lack of judgment of the missions which they sent out to the United States early in 1917. Intoxicated by the spectacle of the potential resources of their new Ally, the members of those missions were at scant pains to separate the power to give from the will to give. They forgot to impress upon Americans the lessons of their own difficulties at the beginning of the war. By so doing they encouraged them to underestimate in the first months of warlike enthusiasm the tremendous magnitude of the problems involved in turning so gigantic an industrial plant as that of the United States from a peace to a war basis. Because the United States had, while neutral, turned out huge quantities of munitions for the Allies, it seemed to be taken for granted that she could suddenly multiply her production tenfold. It seemed to be forgotten that contracts for the Allies would have to be continued if the equipment of armies already in being was to be kept up. This was remembered later so far as munitions went, and, if America's output for her own armies was poor, it should be noted that during her participation in the war she sold to the Allies over 1,000 guns of all calibres, 14,000 gun forgings, and over 5,000,000 shells and shell forgings. Of small arms, moreover, with the means for the production of which the Allies were pretty well supplied by the beginning of 1917, she turned out for her own army 2,500,000 rifles, and produced as

many machines-guns as either Great Britain or France.

A great deal was made at the outset of all that the Allies could do for the United States by turning over to her their designs. The difficulty of adapting alien plans to the use of American workmen, the difficulty of finding the necessary number of skilled hands were not sufficiently considered. It was also necessary to contend with the natural reluctance of ordnance experts and skilled engineers to scrap their own plans and ideas. One of the facts established by the various Congressional investigations was that both artillery and aircraft production was retarded by the desire of American experts to go one better than their European colleagues. There were cases of guns already in the rough for the Allies being re-bored to suit American plans; and in aircraft manufacture there was loss of time over engines and machines alike through the efforts of Ame can motor engineers and designers to follow their desire for perfection rather than recognize the need for speed. The period of preparation for quantity production on the enormous scale required was underestimated.

The miscalculation was most serious, perhaps, over ships. Though in 1917 ships were the one thin above all others that the Allies wanted the United States to produce without delay, it may be noted that Mr. Balfour failed to bring a shipping expert with him on his mission, and that the original American shipbuilding programme was hence formulated and accepted without the advantage of the experience that we had gained. Later, when the Ministry of Shipping became adequately represented at Washington, the mischief had been done. It was not until 1919 that American yards began to produce the monthly quota which Mr. Balfour and the American public had been told to expect almost within a few months. It was only the extraordinary way in which British tonnage was made to stretch to meet each successive emergency, the seizure by the United States of the 600,000 tons of German tonnage that the British Navy had kept in her ports while she was neutral, and her acquisition of a large amount of neutral tonnage that prevented the collapse of plans conceived on an untenable hypothesis and strained by unexpected emergencies.

Had the war continued until 1919 the weight of American production would have been decisive in many other things besides ships. It can thus be said that she did what the Supreme War Council at the end of 1917 asked her to do; the memory of contemporary disappointment should not be allowed to obscure the essential magnitude of that achievement.

As readers of this history will remember, the United States was in 1917 utterly unprepared for war. Her military establishment in all its branches was still on a peace footing, except for the calling out of some of the militia for service in Mexico. She had less than a thousand guns



AN AMERICAN SHIP PRODUCED IN LESS THAN A MONTH.
This photograph of the Crawl Keys was taken on the 29th day after the laying of her keel.

of all calibres. She had little ammunition and no immediate facilities, save those developed by the demands of the Allies, for its manufacture in more than moderate quantities. Her air force hardly existed. In the summer of 1916 General Pershing had for his Mexican expedition only a few machines of a pre-war type. Her mechanical transport resources were scarcely larger. Her mercantile marine was notoriously small. Shipbuilding, since the Civil War and the substitution of steel and iron for wood, had languished progressively. Reserves of supplies in the quartermasters' stores were inadequate. Everything had to be improvized and improvized by emergency organizations. It was worse than it would have been if, in 1914, the British War Office had been told to mobilize at once armies of the size it ultimately controlled, for the War Department in Washington was in 1917 smaller and less experienced than the War Office in London three years earlier. To have been ready, after these beginnings, to put two years later what

HON. WILLIAM TAFT.
Ex-President of the United States; Chairman of the Mediation Board.

might well have been the largest and best equipped army produced even by the recent war was a feat beside which the shortcomings and disappointments of the spadework period bulk rather small. It is illuminating, for instance, to compare the small number of American aeroplanes actually at the front in the autumn of 1918 with the total production of engines in the same year:

	Liberty 12 Army	Liberty 12 Navy	Hispano-Suiza, 180 h.p.
Jan. 1–March 31 ..	122	142	—
April 1–June 30 ..	1,493	633	—
July 1–Sept. 30 ..	4,116	1,710	185
Oct. 1–Nov. 8 ..	4,093	1,087	284

HON. SAMUEL GOMPERS.
President of the American Federation of Labour.

There was also the problem of mobilizing Labour. The industrial situation was not good when the United States entered the war. Unrest and discontent existed in many places. Agitators, prodded on by agents of Germany and weak-minded American pacificists, battened upon it and encouraged it. Here again it was ot till the armistice was almost in sight that things were straightened out. The problem was not an easy one for the Government to solve, energetically aided though it was by the heads of organized Labour. Organized Labour was, in the United States, represented by the American Federation of Labour. At the head of the Federation was Mr. Samuel Gompers, a Londoner by birth, a cigar maker by trade, and by virtue of his character the soundest guide that American Labour could have had for the war. Inclined towards pacificism at the outset, Mr. Gompers was among the first leaders of American thought to become thoroughly alive to the significance of the German onslaught against civilization. He fought at every turn German efforts to induce American labour to quit work rather than violate the Prussian idea of neutrality, which was that by refusing to

make or export munitions America should help the Central Powers to offset British sea-power. He resisted suasion that did not stop short at almost direct efforts at bribery. He countered efforts to make American working men agitate for a premature peace. When the United States entered the war he did all he could to hasten the day of her effectiveness, both as labour leader and as a member of the Council of National Defence. Under his auspices the American Federation outlined terms for peace of an unimpeachable orthodoxy. He went abroad himself and sent representatives to encourage the working men of the Allies to stick to it. He was an uncompromising, an effective foe of the efforts of internationalist pacificists in England and among the Allies to make dangerously premature touch with their German colleagues. He fought the Bolshevist idea with a keen-sighted energy, which some of those associated with him might at times have done well to imitate

Unfortunately, Mr. Gompers was not supreme over American Labour. His Federation was neither ubiquitous nor omnipotent. It had scant influence with the vast floating alien proletariat which unrestricted immigration had poured into the large cities. Many of the more radical unions were not affiliated to it. Its power was further lessened by the fact that industrial organization was far behind what it had been in England at the outbreak of war. The traditions of the old individualistic pioneering age dragged on. Employers were still to be found who would not recognize unions, and refused to meet their hands for the purpose of collective bargaining. There was still a tendency to disregard the welfare of working people. The gulf between Labour and Capital was, in fact, considerable, and responsibility for it lay not always with Labour.

As a result, patriotic labour leaders not only lacked the influence that close organization would have given them; they were handicapped in their efforts for industrial peace by local troubles, which sometimes they could hardly blame the men for causing, and which invariably gave the pacificist and internationalist his chance. This was particularly the case in the West, where radicalism was at the time strongest. For many months war industry was kept back by strikes and troubles in the lumber camps of the North-West, in the copper mines of the South-West, and in the shipyards of the Pacific Coast. So bad was the situation in the early part of 1918 that the Government sent out a commission to investigate. The commission reported in the sense of what has just been said. The agitators, they found, had been exploiting among people who knew little of the war grievances at conditions that were not as they ought to be. The Government acted without delay. To the lumber districts, whence ought to have been coming huge supplies of spruce for aeroplanes, the War Department dispatched an officer who, by adjusting

MR. FELIX FRANKFURTER.
Chairman of the War Labour Policies Board.

wage questions and improving conditions of employment, was in a short time able to get things going. Elsewhere the Government by striving to remove grievances restricted the field of the Industrial Workers of the World, as the agitators were called. To assist the Department of Labour and the other Government Departments—one of the difficulties in coordinating the labour situation was that each producing Department dealt separately with its men, the Navy Department with those in the Navy Yards, the War Department with those in Arsenals, and so on—President Wilson created, or got Congress to create, various special war agencies. One such agency was a Mediation Board of which ex-President Taft was chairman; another was the War Labour Policies Board, under the chairmanship of a

young Harvard professor, Mr. Felix Frankfurter. While each had its special sphere, these agencies worked together for the formulation of an enlightened labour policy which it was hoped would outlast the war.

Progress was slow. The incubus of a long, careless neutrality had to be removed. The masses had to be shown that a menace, scouted in 1916 as distant to the point of being negligible, had suddenly become very imminent—too imminent to admit of slacking or striking for any causes. All through the summer of 1918 industry, and especially the shipbuilding industry, upon which so much depended, was harried to a greater or less degree by unrest, aggravated by some slacking and considerable labour shortage. The shortage of labour was brought on by sundry things. There was the drain of the draft, even under the careful selective system that the United States adopted. There was the difficulty of distributing labour in a country so huge as the United States. There was the stoppage during the war of immigration, which in the preceding decade had brought in nearly 1,000,000 hands annually. Lastly, there was the continued competition of non-war industries. So serious was this competition that in September the Government, which had already established labour exchange mechanism, announced that there was urgent need of a million additional workers for war industries, and accompanied the announcement by the inauguration of a campaign against "business as usual." The announcement read in part:

> The Federal Employment Service has sent various States the quotas of men needed, some for work at home, others to be sent away. These demands must be met, no matter what happens to private business, but the men cannot be taken from other war industries—farms, railroads, or mines. The shortage must be met, or our new army will be faced by additional cases of lack of equipment such as were apparent last winter. The shortage became apparent when the Federal Employment Service stopped the practice of stealing labour from one plant to another. Previously, if a plant was short it went out and stole men from some other plant, and the shortage throughout the country was not apparent.

One of the officials of the Federal Employment Service added the following note for the Press:

> If we are to end the war quickly the production of luxuries and non-essentials must stop. Manufacturers must give up the creation of needless goods, workers must be willing to change from non-essential to war production. Even at a hardship to themselves, the public must stop buying luxuries. . . .

The armistice came too soon for the new policy to be put properly in force, but the following list of non-essential industries put out by the Community Labour Board of Washington would probably have been more or less closely followed:

> Automobile industry, accessories, drivers of pleasure cars, cleaning, repairing, delivery of pleasure cars, sight-seeing cars, automobile trucks, other than those hauling fuel or doing Government work, bath and barber-shop attendants, bowling, billiard, and pool rooms, bottlers and bottle supplies, sweet manufacturers, cigars and tobacco, cleaners and dyers, clothing, confectioners, and delicatessen establishments, builders and contractors not engaged in erection of structures for war-work, dancing academies, mercantile stores, florists, fruit-stands, junk-dealers, livery and sales stables, pawnbrokers, peanut-vendors, shoe-shining shops, window-cleaners, soft-drink establishments, soda-water fountain supplies.

The need for the appeal may be appraised by the fact that it was estimated at about that time that there were in the great Hog Island shipyards but 29,000 workers instead of 38,000, of whom little over half were native-born Americans, and many inexperienced. The appeal had an immediate effect. So did the move which the President made at the same time against strikes and lock-outs. The trouble in the East had been worst among the important machine shops in New York State and New Jersey, and in some of the munition and other plants in New England. There was also sporadic unrest in shipyards and among some classes of railwaymen. Nor were the iron and steel workers of Pennsylvania working as they might have done, and in the collieries there was a tendency to take days off for the spending of big wages.

In some cases it was a question of the recognition of unions; in others wages were the issue, for war-time prices were beginning to pinch, and men who were working for a concern making handsome profits were not always inclined to put patriotism above their natural wish to share some of the profits. President Wilson acted in characteristic fashion. The most spectacular strike was among machinists at Bridgeport, in Connecticut. Earlier in the summer the men at a munition factory at the neighbouring town of Springfield, Massachusetts, had struck for higher wages and better working conditions. Later they returned to work pending a decision by Mr. Taft and his Board. The decision went against the company, which was asked to set aside its prejudice against unions for the term of the war. The company refused to do anything so "fantastic." With the consent of the President the War Department took over the plant.

The Bridgeport strike gave the President the

chance of asserting himself against the men also. In a letter to the strikers he called attention to the foregoing case, and said :

> It is of the highest importance to secure compliance with reasonable rules and procedure for the settlement of industrial disputes. Having exercised a drastic remedy with recalcitrant employers, it is my duty to use means equally well adapted to the end with lawless and faithless employees.

The President reminded the men that their case also had been passed upon by an arbitrator appointed by the War Labour Board, and that 5,000 men out of 60,000 had refused to accept the award. Since the International Union of Machinists, to which the men belonged, was a party to the agreement to submit labour disputes to the Government, the strike was "a breach of faith calculated to reflect on the sincerity of organized Labour. . . . If disregard of a finding of a tribunal to which both parties submitted their claims be temporized with, agreements become mere scraps of paper." Therefore :

> I desire you to return to work and abide by the award. If you refuse each one of you will be barred from employment in any war industry in the community in which the strike occurs for a period of one year. During the time the United States Employment Service will decline to obtain employment for you elsewhere in the United States, as well as under the War and Navy Departments, the Shipping Board, the Railway Administration, and all Government agencies ; and the draft boards will be instructed to reject any claim for exemption based on your alleged usefulness in war production.

After some protests the men gave in, and Mr. Wilson's letter was interpreted as inaugurating a policy to the effect, first, that Washington would take over and run plants of employers who failed to abide by decisions of the War Labour Board ; secondly, that in transigeant strikers would lose all privileges as essential war-workers. Its enunciation had a salutary effect. It acted upon Labour directly, and indirectly also by arousing public opinion. A regular campaign was started against striking and slacking. There were riveting contests in the shipyards. Speakers were poured into the industrial centres to explain the war. Walls were placarded with appeals to the working man to do his bit. In the shipyards more remained to be done. Riveting contests and so on were all very well for the time, but their effect did



FORGING A 14-INCH SHELL BY STEAM HAMMER.

not last. It was noted that at Hog Island whereas 195,000 rivets were driven on a competition day, a week later the tale was down to 89,000. The trouble, said a newspaper, came from slackers of different types

Some are inefficient men who have wormed their way into the yards in order to pick up high wages and escape the draft. Baseball players, actors and pugilists —men from every non-essential walk—have found the shipyards a place for soft living. Their employment has incensed some of the men who really know how to work. In Cramps' shipyard some of the workers have quit because these impossible fellows were put over them as bosses. . . . The other evil in the yards comes from a common human weakness, the desire to loaf. In a great many men the desire finds accomplishment when wages are abnormally high. When a man can make three or four times as much money as he could make before the war, he often succumbs to the temptation to work only half as long. . . . .

The picture may have been overdrawn, but it was decided by the Government, a few days before the armistice, that no Class A men were to be employed in the yards unless of exceptional ability, and that anything like slacking would mean the withdrawal of exemptions.

Efforts to improve labour conditions, both in the East and West, were accompanied by a continuous campaign to stir up the general public. Each Liberty Loan issue was the occasion for a "drive." For weeks ahead city vied with city, State with State, to stir enthusiasm. Lecturers went everywhere, some native, some officers and soldiers of the Allies sent from Canada, from Great Britain, France and from other countries at the desire of the Government. There were processions and bands; there were speeches in all the theatres and moving picture palaces. There were war plays and war moving pictures. For the production of some of the latter, expeditions were organized to the firing lines in France, where photographs were taken actually in the trenches. Exhibitions of war relics toured the country, and each community had its fixed ones. There were placards and posters everywhere. Restaurants would be invaded by sellers of Liberty Bonds. Citizens formed vigilance committees to see that each man's neighbour took his bond, and woe betide the argumentative person of Teutonic tendencies who refused to buy. In some instances such people were hailed before the Courts.

BUYING BONDS OF THE FOURTH ISSUE AT THE SUB-TREASURY.

The Red Cross, the Y.M.C.A., and other war charities had their weeks and days with the same sort of educative enthusiasm, and

behind it all was the Government ceaselessly working to wipe from the public mind the blight of what had been—from the psychological if not from the political point of view—a too prolonged neutrality. At its forefront stood the President with a series of speeches elucidating the baleful significance of the Pan-German bid for world supremacy, explaining why it was that even remote America could not afford to ignore the danger of a successful *Drang nach Osten*, explaining the danger of a Middle European Teutonic hegemony, and

VICE-PRESIDENT MARSHALL ADDRESSING A GREAT CROWD AT THE ALTAR OF LIBERTY IN MADISON SQUARE.

substituting for the callous materialism of neutrality the glowing picture of a world reconstructed from the ruins of autocracy, and rendered democratically warless by the League of Nations. But first, he cried, there must be "force, force to the utmost," a phrase which, with others like it, brought from Berlin plaintive wails about Mr. Wilson's "colonial coarseness."

With the President worked the Committee of Public Information, under the direction of Mr. George Creel, a radical writer and close personal friend of Mr. Wilson. Mr. Creel's organization was a gigantic one. It had its moving picture division. It dealt in war exhibits, in posters, in photographs for publication, etc. It controlled thousands of lecturers. One of its branches had tens of thousands of men speaking every night for a few minutes in moving picture palaces from Boston to Los Angeles. It took charge of distinguished foreigners, from Sir F. E. Smith downwards, who came to the United States to give her public the benefit of their war experiences. It put out pamphlets by the thousand and started an official *Gazette* so that Congressmen and others might have accurate reports of every sort of official document and deed bearing on the war. It cooperated with the American branches of the British Ministry of Information and of the French and Italian publicity organizations, which were set up here to a great extent at its request. It had its agents at foreign capitals; and the whole of its vast machinery was used for the sole purpose of stimulating war enthusiasm and popularizing the President's war policies.

Mr. Creel was, indeed, accused by the Republicans of too great loyalty to the personal fortunes of the President. He was accused of

THE FOURTH OF JULY, 1917, IN PARIS.
Admiral Lacaze, General Pershing, MM. Poincaré and Painlevé reviewing a contingent of American troops.

using his organization at home to press the fortunes of the Democratic Party, and his agents abroad to give Mr. Wilson a sort of extra diplomatic service. Agents were dispatched to Russia to explain American democracy to the revolution, and at one time to foster Bolshevism beyond the German and Austrian frontiers; to Switzerland to get into touch with discontented Teutons; to Spain to counteract German intrigue. Especially over the Russian venture there were accusations that the White House was using Mr. Creel's agents to supplement the activities of its accredited representative somewhat after the fashion of Bismarck. The accusation would not be worth a place in this History but for one thing. It indicated that by bringing the country into the war the President had not been able to obliterate the distrust engendered by his neutrality policy among Republicans and Conservatives. His political opponents were with him so long as he kept close to the business of winning the war, but upon his diplomacy they continued to look askance. There were suspicions until the German offensive of the spring of 1918 that the President still had a leaning towards the drawn-war school. They felt that his conviction that the war could not be won outright but would have to be compromised was one of the reasons why so few troops went to Europe in the winter of 1917 and 1918. The vigour with which Mr. Wilson met the threat of the spring and early summer they attributed to his tardy realization that the United States was fighting for her own independence as well as to make the world safe for democracy. During the crisis they supported all that the President did to increase American efficiency. After the crisis, when it began to become apparent that Marshal Foch's repeated hammer-blows had more than turned the tables upon Hindenburg, there was a recrudescence of suspicion that the White House might revert to the policy enunciated during the period of American neutrality and try to mitigate Germany's punishment by pressing for a cessation of fighting before she had tasted real military defeat, and for the subsequent peace arrangements upon too lenient terms.

The part that Mr. Wilson's diplomacy played in the collapse of Germany's Allies in the autumn of 1918 has already been told. Nor is there any need to recapitulate the story

of that interchange of notes with Germany which eventually led Germany and the Allies alike to consent to an armistice provided that the subsequent settlement was based upon the principles enunciated in the famous Fourteen Points which Mr. Wilson had laid down during the previous winter.

The President's critics were extremely nervous during the negotiations, if negotiations they can be called. The Republican Press freely intimated that Mr. Wilson was interfering with the military conduct of the war, and that the supreme command should be allowed to go on driving the Germans back until they sued for peace at any price, or anyhow until the soldiers were certain that the German people had realized that they were beaten. Republican leaders like Mr. Roosevelt, who was destined to live just long enough to see the defeat of the enemy, but not long enough to participate in the controversies produced by the work of the Peace Conference, expressed very freely in private and did not hide in public their fear that Mr. Wilson was doing a disservice to the Allies by giving Germany a chance of saving some remnant of her military strength, and by sparing her the ultimate punishment and disillusionment of complete collapse. The President was accused of being in sympathy with the European pacificists who wished to compromise with Germany lest the war should continue until civilization was torn to tatters. The flight of the Kaiser and the publication of the terms of the armistice, which everybody knew were the work of the Supreme Command of the Allies and not of President Wilson, stilled that criticism. It did not, however, disarm the distrust which underlay it.

Just before the armistice the President made the worst and most expensive of the few mistakes in tactics and strategy that until then had marred a most successful career as party leader. A General Election was due at the beginning of November, at which the whole of the House of Representatives, and one-third of the Senate went before the country, as they are bound by the Constitution to do every other year. The Democrats controlled both Chambers, and the general view was that the elections might reduce their majorities, but would not wipe them out

Mr. Wilson had already made up his mind that if, as seemed probable, he could get the belligerents to accept his Fourteen Points as the basis of the peace settlement he would go to

THE FOURTH OF JULY, 1917, IN PARIS.
The scene in the Invalides.

Paris and be the chief representative of the United States at the Peace Conference. He knew that it would not be easy to make the political principles which he had evolved in the seclusion of the White House fit in with the necessities of the European situation. He foresaw a struggle between the nationalist traditions of Europe and super-national system implied by his idea of the League of Nations. His idea was probably to appeal if necessary to the liberalism of the masses in Europe against the Governments, but even so the outcome was doubtful enough to make it most advisable that he should sail to Paris with some outward and visible sign that he had his countrymen solidly behind him. In the past, over Mexico and while he remained neutral in the war, the Republicans had been bitter critics of his foreign policy. They had been distrustful of the diplomacy in which he was then engaged. So he appealed to the nation to return Democrats to Congress in order that, in the words of one of his lieutenants, "unity in command in the field might be backed up by unity of action in America." A Republican victory would, he said, be taken in Europe as showing that America was divided over foreign policy. A Democratic victory was, in fact, essential to a satisfactory peace. The Republicans had got out something the same sort of appeal during the Spanish War. But neither that nor anything else lessened their fury at the way in which they proclaimed that the President had libelled them. He did, indeed, in his statement virtually accuse them of not having given loyal support to his war policies. Was it not the fact, they asked with some show of justice, that time and again important war measures had been put through Congress by Republican votes while Democratic support was lukewarm?

The Republican leaders appealed to their followers to accept the President's challenge. The chairman of the Republican National Committee excoriated his statement as ungracious, unjust, and wanton.

Why, he asked, does the President demand the defeat of the Republicans? Is it because they are for peace through, and not without, victory, because they do not believe that a lasting peace can be obtained through negotiation, because they consider that the United States stands for unconditional surrender as well as for the

AMERICANS ARRIVE IN PARIS.

Mounted men passing through the streets were presented with bouquets.

AMERICAN TROOPS PASSING THROUGH LONDON, AUGUST 15, 1917.
Headed by the Guards' Bands.

United States and Uncle Sam? A Democratic Congress does not. Mr. Wilson does not. Mr. Wilson wants only "rubber stamps" in Congress. He is no longer satisfied to be one branch of the Government as provided by the Constitution. Republican Congressmen must be defeated and Democratic Congressmen must be elected as they would yield in everything. That is evidently his idea—the idea of an autocrat calling himself a servant, but bidding for the mastery of this great people.

The Republicans, continued Mr. Hays, had sent their sons to the war. They had given more than half the money for the winning of the war.

But Mr. Wilson's real purpose has nothing to do with the conduct of the war. He has had that from the beginning and has it now, and nobody dreams of interfering with his control. He wants just two things. One is the sole power to settle the war precisely as he and his sole, unelected, unappointed, unconfirmed personal adviser may determine (Colonel House, who was in Europe as the President's personal representative with expenses paid out of a private fund that Congress had given the President for the war, and without any reference to the Senate, by whom the appointment of diplomatic agents is, under the Constitution, confirmed). The other is full power as the "unembarrassed spokesman in affairs at home," as he actually demands in his statement, to reconstruct in peace times the great industrial affairs of the nation in the same way—in unimpeded conformity with whatever socialistic doctrines, whatever unlimited Government ownership notions, whatever hazy whims may happen to possess him at the time, but first and above all with absolute commitment to free trade with all the world thus giving Germany out of hand fruits of victory greater than she could win by fighting for 100 years. The Germans look to Mr. Wilson to get this for them. They have turned to him in the belief that he is the one great political leader who can be trusted to make a political peace which shall permit equal political development. . . .

This is a call to all loyal Republicans, proud in their patriotism to stand by their country and their candidates, and to let the world know that America spurns autocracy no less at home than abroad and will uphold her allies in whatever reparation they may exact for the frightful outrages inflicted upon them by the accursed Huns.

A few days later the country returned a Congress with a large Republican majority in the House and a bare one in the Senate. It had, the Republicans proclaimed, rejected the President's appeal as "unsportsmanlike," with the result not only that all erring Republicans had come back into the fold, but that a good many Democrats had deserted the President in disgust.

Mr. Hays's appeal has been given at some length because it is an excellent and by no means exaggerated picture of the state of mind of the average Republican, and, indeed, of



PRESIDENT WILSON ARRIVES IN BREST.

some conservative Democrats. Subsequent events have shown that many of their fears were quite unjustified. Less than a year later those who had held them were applauding Mr. Wilson for the firm stand that he took with Labour in its restless demands for more money and for the sudden overturning of the economic fabric. Nor was the Peace of Versailles contaminated by any of that tenderness towards Germany or tendency towards radicalism which Mr. Hays feared that Mr. Wilson would insist upon.

Mr. Wilson, on the other hand, appeared determined to justify Republican strictures upon the autocracy of his methods and his intention of giving the Opposition as little as possible to do with the peace settlement. A short time after the election the announcement came that the Peace Conference, or rather a conference between the Allies for the formulation of a Peace Treaty which Germany would subsequently be asked to sign, was to be held at Paris with as little delay as possible. It was announced that the President would go to it as the chief American delegate.

The announcement produced another sensation and more criticism. It had been an unwritten rule of American public life that Presidents should not leave American soil while in office. The rule had been broken only once, and that was merely to allow Mr. Taft to go to the middle of an international bridge over the Rio Grande to greet President Diaz of Mexico. And here was Mr. Wilson proposing to sail away to Europe for an absence of indeterminate length at a time when America, with all her reconstruction work before her, with great problems, such as the return of the railways to private ownership, the reduction of the cost of living, the arrangement after their dislocation by the war of the relations of Labour and Capital, needed above all things firm leadership on the part of the Executive. The Republicans inveighed against this crowning example of what they meant by the President's autocratic tendencies; the Democrats were nervous at being left leaderless with the Opposition in power at the Capitol; the country was inclined to think that, especially in view of the enormous executive power that he had gathered into his hands, the President might have been better advised to have sent to Paris properly accredited agents and to have directed them from Washington.

Another autocratic lapse from precedent increased the agitation. The President is not the sole treaty-making power of the United States. He negotiates and signs treaties, or rather, as a rule, the Secretary of State does so for him. But he cannot exchange ratification

without the consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Nor when a treaty has been duly ratified have the duties of Congress necessarily ceased. The United States cannot bind herself to go automatically to war in given circumstances. All she can do is to bind the President, in the case, for instance, of an agreement to go to the aid of a country with force against a third country, to point out to Congress that a *casus belli* has occurred and ask it to declare war if it takes the same view. Congress shares under the Constitution the duty of declaring war, and no duty entrusted by the Constitution to any part of the Government can be legislated away from it. When peace was made with Spain after the war of 1898 Mr. McKinley, who was then President, recognized the Senate's interest and gave it representation on the commission which was sent to Paris.

There were especial reasons why people expected that Mr. Wilson would follow the example set by his predecessor. It would have seemed obvious policy to placate the Opposition and stop the criticism in which it had been indulging by inviting at least one Republican Senator to accompany him to Paris. There was also the League of Nations to be considered. To render effective American participation in the League the President would need the cooperation of Congress in a double sense. The Treaty embodying it would have to be ratified by the Senate; undertakings in it to cooperate with other countries in common ventures short of warfare might well turn out to require enabling legislation. For if Congress cannot delegate its share in declaring war, there is no reason why it should not delegate its authority over economic matters so as to enable Presidents to join with the Governments of other countries in boycotting outlaw States. The President ignored all such considerations. He ignored the Senate entirely in choosing his colleagues for Paris. He named a Republican, it is true; but a Republican who had never been in political life and whose chief claim to party affiliation lay in the fact that during his long and successful career as a diplomatist Mr. Henry White had been more often appointed to posts by Republican Presidents than by Democratic Presidents and had been a very close friend of Mr. Roosevelt. Colonel House, his unofficial representative in Europe for some time past, and his closest friend and adviser on all public affairs, and Mr. Lansing, his most loyal Secretary for State, were Mr. Wilson's other civilian colleagues.

Mr. Wilson sailed at the beginning of December with the loyal acclamations of the multitude But no amount of cheering could obliterate the fact the politicians and the public alike had refused to acquiesce in the very natural explanation of his mission which he made in his Annual Message to Congress the day before his depar-



HON. HENRY WHITE.
Formerly U.S. Ambassador to France.

ture—namely, that the representatives of the Allies having accepted his Fourteen Points as a basis of negotiation, naturally wished to have him at hand to elucidate the meaning of those rather indefinite articles.

The first weeks of the President's stay in Europe lessened criticism in a way which, for a time, made it look as though he had made a less rash move than many even of his friends had feared. There was prideful pleasure at his magnificent receptions in France, England, and Italy. There could be no doubt, it was proclaimed, that the Allies wished to do all they could to show their gratitude to their associates. The United States on her side must reciprocate by doing all that she could for war-torn Europe. Friends of Great Britain were relieved to see that the President had no intention of trying to write into the Peace settlement anything about the freedom of the

seas. For a time his policy in that regard had caused genuine anxiety. Shortly after his departure Mr. Daniels, his Secretary of the Navy, suggested to Congress the need for a three-year building programme of a size which could have been interpreted only as a challenge to the British Navy. The suggestion caused astonishment, mystification, and alarm. The President, it was recalled, had been strong for disarmament; but it was also recalled that as a neutral he had said officially sharp things about the British use of sea-power; and the assumption sprang up that perhaps, after all, he might be going to declare for a strong American naval policy if only so could British maritime supremacy be curbed. The assumption was strengthened by various things that he and still more his subordinate spokesman had said about that rather vague dream of pacificists, the Freedom of the Seas

It is possible that at one stage of his thinking on international reconstruction the President had some ideas of the feasibility of the formulation of rules for the use of the seas that would render impossible such a dislocation of neutral and perhaps of belligerent non-contraband trade as had happened during the war He may, too, have had some ideas of establishing a freedom of the seas in times of peace by some such measure as the establishment of international equality in the use of ports and bunkering facilities and so on. But that Mr. Wilson had ever meant to try to inaugurate any such policy without the cooperation of the British Empire is unthinkable Nor can so keen a mind as his have failed for long to see that with the establishment of a League of Nations the freedom of the seas would come automatically in the sense that it could only be with the trade of outlaw nations that the navies of the world could or would interfere. The Freedom of the Seas, at any rate, hardly figured in the conversations at Paris, and it soon became patent that Mr. Daniel's bid for heavy naval construction had no chance of authorization by Congress, and was probably little more than the product of the energy of sailors anxious to do their best for their favourite arm before war enthusiasm waned.

Simultaneously newspaper dispatches from

PRESIDENT WILSON LANDS IN ENGLAND.

The Recorder of Dover (Sir Archibald Bodkin) reading an Address of Welcome. The Mayor of Dover wears his chain of office.

PRESIDENT WILSON IN ENGLAND.
Arrival at the Guildhall to receive the Freedom of the City of London.

Paris began to show that far from being overshadowed by the statesmen of the Old World Mr. Wilson was taking a leading part in their deliberations. The League of Nations was seen to capture the first place in the programme of the Conference under his steady impulsion. In whatever important question came up, whether it concerned Russia or the treatment of Germany or anything else, Mr. Wilson was described as in the forefront. Writers and commentators, who had in the beginning opposed his mission, veered round and proclaimed that by being in Paris Mr. Wilson was adding to the lustre of his country and serving well the cause of civilization. He was, it was proclaimed, the "honest broker" of a conference in which jarring aspirations of Old World nationality were already beginning to lift their ugly heads.

It was then that Mr. Wilson began to realize the depth and bitterness of the feelings raised in the United States and above all in the Senate by his flouting of the Republican Party. In the latter part of February he returned to the United States with the draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations which he had assured the leaders of the Peace Conference he would have no difficulty in persuading public opinion and the Senate to accept. Never was a statesman in foreign parts more mistaken as to sentiment at home. The draft of the Covenant had no chance. It was attacked as giving away important American policies and privileges. It was deemed to barter for the shadow of an eirenic internationalism the dearest traditions of the American nation. The Senate took especial exception to its failure to safeguard from foreign interference the cherished doctrine laid down a hundred years since by President Monroe, which under subsequent developments had come to be read as an instrument not only to prevent extra-American Powers from gaining new footholds in the Western Hemisphere but also to ensure for the United States that nobody should interfere with any of her dealings with her Latin neighbours. Mexican affairs gave at the time a good example of the practical workings of the latter part of the Monroe Doctrine. There had been for years past chaos in Mexico following upon the *dégringolade* of the Diaz *régime*. The President's policy had done nothing to cure—many Americans thought that it had done much to aggravate—the chaos. British and other European interests were suffering from its continuance at least as much as American interests. Yet even had the war

not come, no European Power could have intervened on its own account. Only through American assistance could safety for British life and property be assured, and so long as the American Government remained indifferent to the plight of the interests of its nationals nothing could be done. Had the League ruled Latin-American affairs it would, on the other hand, have been possible for it to ask the United States to act in Mexico in the interests of humanity.

signatory might invoke to quit the League at some future date.

After a controversy marked on neither side by any particular desire to conciliate, the President returned to Paris and secured amendments in the Covenant which it was hoped would satisfy the Senate.

How impossible it was to satisfy the Senate was still to be learnt. On his return in the early summer of 1919 from his second stay in Paris, the President found opposition to the League

FRENCH SOLDIERS AND SAILORS MARCHING IN THE LIBERTY DAY PARADE ON FIFTH AVENUE.

Other things in the Covenant to which the Senate took most exception were Article X., which many thought would commit the United States too deeply and expensively to interfere in non-American affairs, its alleged failure properly to safeguard national control of domestic policies, such as immigration, in which Americans were particularly interested on account of their running controversy with Japan over their refusal, in common with the British Dominions, to give the Japanese equality of treatment and opportunity with other immigrants, and the lack of machinery which a

running higher than ever. The alterations he had secured were condemned as inadequate, and the more the Treaty was studied the more anxious a powerful band of Senators became to avoid many of the responsibilities implied by participation in the League for the keeping of a peace which they felt had been anything but firmly buttressed by the Treaty of Versailles.

It is indeed a hard and cruel peace that this Treaty stipulates, and I have no objections to its being so, but see no reason why we, who do not partake in its spoils, should become parties to its harshness and cruelty.

I see no reason why we should be parties to imposing

upon Germany a Treaty whose terms our negotiators say she will not be able to meet; a Treaty that robs our ancient friend China in a way disapproved by our negotiators; a Treaty that lays the foundation for centuries of blood letting into which we should not be drawn; a Treaty that, contrary to our own judgment, fails to fix the amount of indemnity to be paid, leaving



SENATOR PHILANDER CHASE KNOX.
A Republican ex-Secretary of State.

that vast question to the whim of a majority of a commission on reparations; a Treaty predicated upon the assertion that a stricken and helpless world requires our counsel and support, but leaves to the beneficiaries the decision as to the measure and character of the benefactions they are to receive; a Treaty that with ominous words presages our involvement in the eruptions of suppressed volcanic world conditions; a Treaty that would require us to underwrite all the regional understandings between nations recognized by the League, most of which are based upon oppression of weaker nations, many of which are as yet secret and undisclosed, and when disclosed might drive us to acts of injustice similar to that in which the President felt himself compelled] to acquiesce in the case of Shantung.

The mind stands appalled and refuses to grasp the infinite possibilities which arise from the ramifications of the obligations we are asked to assume. Looking at the Treaty as a whole, is it to be wondered at that we are asked to guarantee by our arms and our resources the territorial status which it creates?

Sir, I have all but finished. I have not sought to propound or establish any thesis beyond this: the Treaty as it stands cannot be enforced. This is admitted by its proponents. The Treaty as it stands is but a harbinger of other and greater wars.

The above extract is from a speech by Senator Knox, who, as a Republican ex-Secretary of State, took a leading part against the Treaty in the debate of the summer of 1919. The opposition of the Republicans representing a section of conservative opinion was, moreover, reinforced by the dislike of Liberals for much in the Treaty of Versailles, such as the way in which it put Teutons under alien rule, the ban upon subsequent Austro-German amalgamation, and other things like the Shantung settlement, which were deemed to controvert the President's Fourteen Points. The Treaty, proclaimed the Liberals, showed how utterly Mr. Wilson had failed to hold his own against European diplomacy, with its bias towards selfish nationalism and its inability to realize how utterly the war had cut through the traditions of the old international relationship, with its balances of power and its system of grasping alliances. The world, they argued, had not been remade at Paris in such a way as to tempt the United States to take an intimate part in its future administration.

It has been necessary to glance ahead of the



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HON. CHAMP CLARK.
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

period with which this chapter deals because without some conception of the controversy which attended the arrival in the United States of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles it is impossible to appraise the influence of their participation in the war upon the American people. The situation in the summer of 1919 could hardly have been more paradoxical or more deadening to the enthusiasms and aspirations which the war had aroused. It

A PORTION OF THE AMERICAN FLEET IN EUROPEAN WATERS IN 1918.

was paradoxical because it revealed the Republican Party driven from the fixed foreign policy of a generation partly by the patent shortcomings of the Treaty, partly by antagonisms created by Mr. Wilson's methods.

Roughly speaking, the United States came into world affairs after the Spanish war. That war was largely the product of altruistic indignation at the colonial maladministration of a European Power. It ended in a victory the easiness of which was mitigated by resultant responsibilities. Those responsibilities were on a small scale of the same type as those with which the United States and the other Powers of civilization were saddled by the Great War. In Cuba and the Philippines and in Puerto Rico undeveloped peoples required to be educated in the ways of democracy. Her Spanish war responsibilities the United States accepted under the leadership of the Republicans and in face of steady opposition from the Democrats. In subsequent years the Republicans continued a stalwart foreign policy in which there was a common-sense blend of enlightened self-interest and altruistic idealism. A Republican Secretary of State formulated the Open Door doctrine for China and got the Powers to recognize it. Another Republican Secretary of State tried to refurbish the Monroe doctrine so as to help the Republics of the Americas in a material as well as a cultural way. When the recent war came and the Democrats hung back from the acceptance of responsibilities which a large portion of thoughtful American opinion early thought duty and interest demanded to be shouldered, it was the Republicans who urged preparations for war and chafed under Mr. Wilson's patient neutrality. In the Presidential election of the autumn of 1916 Mr. Wilson was re-elected on a platform which argued that the United States ought to remain prosperously neutral as it was her destiny to remain aloof from the troubles of the world, and the Republicans, rather feebly, it is true, talked about responsibility to civilization and the sacrifices it might require. Yet in 1919 it was Mr Wilson who asked for sacrifices in the interests of world peace and decency and the Republicans who counselled a return to the isolation which a short time before they had said was gone for ever.

It was small wonder that the resultant controversy tended to stay the progress of that process of national solidification which participation in the war had started. The chief reason why, against the instincts of the majority of educated Americans, Mr. Wilson remained neutral so long in the face of German submarine atrocities and other violations of American neutrality was his conviction that only by slow degrees could the country be made ready for war. The conviction may have been right or it may have been wrong—one of the great subjects for debate by future historians will doubtless be whether the country would not,



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HON. THOMAS R. MARSHALL.
Vice-President of the United States.

so far as public opinion went, have come better into the war after the shock of the Lusitania than it did when Prussian persistence in maritime murder finally made it impossible for the President to remain longer neutral. All that need be said here is that it was a tenable one. Even had public opinion been ready in 1915, there were other considerations which rendered caution necessary. There was the question of finance. At the time of the Lusitania the country was in transition between the old banking system that had prevailed since the days after the Civil War and the new and far more compact system authorized by Congress in 1913. War then would have thrown everything into chaos. In 1917 it was different. The Federal Reserve Board had had time to get its complicated machinery going and, like the Agricultural Department over food, had

had the courage to start perfecting its plans for war before the President gave the word.

From the racial point of view their caution also had its justification. Every nation in Europe that was at war in 1914, or that later came into the war, was represented in the United States by powerful groups. The Germans and Austrians formed together, as was shown in the first chapter of this history devoted to the United States, quite a considerable portion of the population, and one upon which Berlin had relied for years to secure

COUNT BERNSTORFF.

a beneficent American neutrality. It was estimated that apart from the millions of Teutonic blood there were listed at the Consulates of the Central Powers over a million men who had been enrolled in gymnastic societies and were supposed to be still loyal to the Wilhelmstrasse or to the Ballplatz rather than to Washington. Next to the Germans came the Irish and after them every sort of European. During some inquiries held by a committee of the Senate into the relations of alien nationalities in the United States to the war, an official of the Government organizations charged with ferreting out disloyalty answered a question regarding the influence of those nationalities upon the collective thought of the country by the following table of foreign-language newspapers in the United States :—

Albanian	6
Arabian	10
Armenian	8
Dutch	16
Flemish	3
Bohemian	60
Bulgarian	1
Chinese	7
Croatian	10
Esperanto	2
Finnish	21
French	42
German	330
Greek	19
Hebrew	4
Hungarian	27
Italian	104
Japanese	17
Lett	1
Lithuanian	17
Norwegian and Danish	56
Persian	1
Polish	81
Portuguese	18
Rumanian	5
Russian	14
Serbian	7
Slovack	28
Slovene	14
Spanish	104
Swedish	67
Ruthenian	9
Welsh	2
Yiddish	44

Many of these so-called papers were, of course, no more than sheets appearing at weekly or even longer intervals. Few had any real influence except some of the big German organs, which during the war reached circulations of large figures and enjoyed more prosperity than ever before. Nevertheless the list shows pretty clearly the sort of reasons that made the President at the beginning of the war call for not only neutrality of act but also neutrality of opinion. He and many of his advisers feared that any taking of sides might mean riots in the great industrial cities where half the nationalities of Europe live cheek by jowl in the same street or even in the same tenement house. After events would tend to prove that those fears were exaggerated; but in feeling that time was needed to educate a vast mass of aliens, of whom the most important unit belonged to the race against which the United States would have to fight, and the second most important unit was never tired of detesting the country that would become her chief ally, the President was undoubtedly right. Nor was it merely a question of education. It was known that there were people within the gates only too ready to make trouble if the United States went to war.

The first thing that Germany did in 1914 was to start an organization to influence American opinion and to marshal those elements in the United States which might agitate to render American neutrality favourable to Germany, or if that was impossible to prevent her becoming an active enemy. The organization was on a great scale. Dr. Dernburg, who came out as an agent of the German Red Cross to

manage it with the assistance of Dr. Heinrich Albert, commercial secretary of the German Embassy, had on his arrival £30,000,000 of German Treasury notes to sell, the proceeds of which would no doubt have gone to advance his work. As a matter of fact the sale failed, and only £1,000,000 worth of the notes was eventually used as collateral for loans. But almost unlimited money was found from other sources, and Dr. Dernburg's organization outlived its organizer's departure after his tactless efforts to justify the sinking of the Lusitania and to point the warning which it was meant to convey. The least shady work of the organization was that which justified its ostensible object of action as an Information Bureau about the affairs of the Central Powers. In that capacity, aided by Americans, of whom their compatriots were not particularly proud, it sent free "information" to newspapers and so on. Secretly, as has been told earlier in this history, it went in for every kind of intrigue that the fertile brain of Bernstorff could devise to influence American opinion to lessen the efficacy of the aid that American industries were giving to the Allies, and to encourage other enemies of the Allies, and especially the enemies of Great Britain, to work and speak in the German cause. There was constant bargaining with Irish extremists; there were efforts, partly through the Irish, to influence the Catholic Church in America; there were interchanges of encouraging confidences with Indian Nationalists and revolutionists. With the Irish extremists it was pretty plain sailing for the German agents; with the Church something was done with the lower ranks of the clergy, who were mostly Irish, but things were prevented from being brought to dangerous extremes by the hierarchy, which, led by men like Cardinal Gibbons and Archbishop Ireland, never wavered in its sympathy with the Allies. In their relations with Hindus and others the Germans had a good deal of success, but, thanks to the vigilance of the British and American authorities, did not get much out of it.

Both their success and their failure in this regard was brought out in a dramatic trial at San Francisco in the winter of 1917 and 1918

PRESIDENT WILSON IN ENGLAND.
Presentation of the Freedom of the City of Manchester.

MEMORIAL STONE OF THE WILSON BRIDGE, PARIS.
Opened on the 14th of July, 1918.

of 36 people charged with conspiracy to use the United States for military operations against India. A number of the defendants were Indians, and with them were convicted the German Consul-General at San Francisco and several of his staff. It was proved that the conspirators had in 1915 bought and tried to send to India a ship-load of arms. The arms were stowed in one vessel which sailed from San Francisco. Another vessel was sent out to meet the first in the South Seas, and the cargo was to be transferred. The transfer never came off. It was prevented by sundry romantic circumstances. The trial, which would have delighted Stevenson with the variety of picturesque intrigue that it revealed, ended by the dramatic assassination in Court of one Indian by another, and by the pistolling of the murderer offhand by a Court official. The conviction of the German Consul-General of a share in this conspiracy, and of general underhand propaganda work, was, with the revelation of Herr Zimmerman's efforts to mobilize Mexico against the United States, the worst blow that German official methods had in the United States; It confirmed a thing many Americans had long ago known, but which could not be officially resented while the United States remained neutral—namely, the use of the United States by Berlin and by Bernstorff and his subordinates here as a base for operations against the Allies. It enabled Americans in the spring of 1918 to review, with adequately intimate knowledge, the action of all German agents to the United States, from Prince Henry of Prussia at the beginning of the century to the von Papens and Boy Eds, the von Igels and Rintelns, who, when the war came, were ready to help Germans in America and put into effect the political and material sabotage against the country of their adoption which was demanded of them by Berlin The review increased the general determination that disloyalty should once for all be stamped out

The War Department, the Treasury Department, the Department of Justice, all of which had before the entry of the United States into the war rather rudimentary Intelligence and Secret Service Branches, increased tenfold their machinery for the running down of German agents and disloyalties. In this they were well helped by the British officials whom they asked to cooperate and by private American organizations. Before the armistice there was one such League, the American Protective

Society, that had several hundred thousands of members whose business it was to look out for signs of disloyalty in clubs and counting houses, in drawing-rooms and restaurants, and wherever men met in the ordinary processes of life. The result was the inter. ment of many Germans in camps in various parts of the country and a notable slump in the popularity of Pan-Germanism as a hobby for *soi-disant* Americans of Teutonic blood. The notorious German-American Alliance had its charter cancelled by Congress. It became a dangerous business for disloyal Hindus to pose before the intellectual Liberalism of America as members of a misunderstood race; various of the most vocal of Irish-American extremists had unpleasant experiences with American law; and a number of American pacificists and others who had been useful tools for the Germans in their successive efforts to manufacture sentiment for a drawn war found that by dabbling with international politics they had been tempted into unpleasantly deep and chilly water, the only means of rescue from which was in some cases through a place of detention. Another sign of the awakening of Americans to the danger of the foreign intriguer in their midst was the growth of a strong sentiment for the overturning of what before the war had been one of their favourite traditions—namely, that it was the duty of the United States towards civilization to keep her doors agape for the oppressed of all nations, and to try to make herself into a melting pot in which immigrants of all nationalities should be welded into a new race. Immigration has, as said above, stopped during the war, and hardly had the armistice come than Bills were introduced into Congress to render the stoppage more or less permanent. Supported by organized Labour, which was quick to grasp the advantage of a short labour market in the conflict with Capital that lay before it, the movement soon achieved a considerable impetus

The process of Americanization sketched above, despite the help that it had been given from the loyalty with which the vast majority of Irish-Americans and, indeed, the average German-American threw themselves into the war, was, on the other hand, rudely set back by the controversy between the President and the Senate over participation in the League of Nations. The Republican Senators, as said above, reverted to the philosophy that had been preached by Mr. Wilson in the days of his neutrality. The United States, they argued, was rich enough and strong enough to be able to mind prosperously her own affairs, however turbulent the less favoured corners of the world might become. The League of Nations, they

SINN FEIN IN AMERICA.

Presentation of a Gold Card, inscribed with sentiments of support for an Irish Republic, to De Valera by the Mayor of San Francisco.

argued, was a document of British and European manufacture It was meant to bolster up and keep intact the Empires of Great Britain and of the French Republic. Americans ought not to put their names to what might be a contract for them to send their sons overseas to fight for the integrity of those Empires. They ought to think twice before signing what might be a contract to send American regiments to the Balkans or to Asia Minor. Let them be satisfied with the Monroe Doctrine and the Western Hemisphere. The Treaty, moreover, that the League was to guard and strengthen was a bad one. It imposed terms of impossible severity upon Germany. It carved up German territory against the very rules of the game laid down by the President. It did nothing for Ireland. It perpetuated the British Protectorate over Egypt. It left China to the mercy of Japan, and Persia to that of the British Empire. It gave in in many directions to the bad old spirit of selfish nationalism.

To lend point to their argument the Republicans gave public hearings to Irishmen, Egyptians, and other suppressed nationalities. All of them were against the League. So were the Germans. Encouraged by the outbreak, they swiftly began to organize themselves again. Another league was formed to take the place of the German-American Alliance. It petitioned Congress against the Treaty and the League. It talked openly of Kultur. The German language, it actually said in its prospectus, must be kept going, German civilization must be encouraged, if America was to remain America and not become an appanage of the British Empire. German publications began to lift their hyphenated heads again and talk in no hidden terms of the coming of another "day."

There was also, thanks to the Republican agitation against the external commitments of the League, a recrudescence of distrust among real Americans against foreign entanglements and, what was worse, against the policies of her late associates. That was especially the case with Great Britain. Partly owing to the slowness of the British Government in trying seriously to settle the Irish question, an agitation was allowed to arise against British war aims which impaired the excellent results of the close and friendly cooperation in France between the American and British Armies and the effect of the very real admiration kindled in American breasts at the way in which the British nations—their soldiers and civilians alike—had spared no sacrifice to do their share in the winning of the war. There was the same drifting away from the French and Italians—from the French because Americans found it difficult to see that the hard French policy towards Germany was prompted not by selfish vindictiveness but by a very natural desire to ensure against any fear that the history of her relations with Germany might repeat itself, from the Italians on account of Fiume.

The chief sign of this tendency during the months after the signature of Peace while the fate of the League of Nations was still under debate, was, besides the things said in that debate, the reluctance of American public opinion to envisage the acceptance of mandates in Asia Minor and its indifference about the Treaty with France and Great Britain for the insurance of French frontiers against aggression pending the time when the League of Nations should be really functioning. For those who believed that the future of the world was largely bound up in the League, and especially in close Anglo-American cooperation under it, the summer of 1919 was indeed one of anxiety. Hopes were still strong that in the end the American Senate would allow American participation in the League, but in the meanwhile the fear could not be stilled that for the reasons sketched above the United States was likely to return to a greater degree than seemed possible in the first flush of a common victory to her old ways of contented and indifferent isolation, and that even if the Senate ratified American participation in the League, the American share in enforcing its constitution would lack some of the fervour which it had been hoped had been foreshadowed by Mr. Wilson's vigorous championship of its principles and by the enthusiasm with which his countrymen followed him into the war.

LIBRARY OF THE BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY

CHAPTER CCCXI.

ARMIES OF OCCUPATION.

THE ADVANCE TO THE RHINE—THE FRENCH IN ALSACE-LORRAINE—MARSHAL PÉTAIN'S ENTRY INTO METZ—KING OF THE BELGIANS IN ANTWERP—FEELING IN LUXEMBOURG—REJOICING IN BRUSSELS—FRENCH ENTER STRASBOURG—GERMAN ARMY'S RECEPTION IN GERMANY—BELGIANS IN AIX-LA-CHAPELLE—ALLIED ZONES OF OCCUPATION—AMERICANS IN TRÈVES—GERMAN ATTITUDE—BRITISH REACH COLOGNE—BRIDGEHEADS ON THE RHINE—FRENCH ENTER MAYENCE—GENERAL FAYOLLE'S SPEECH—ADMINISTERING THE OCCUPIED DISTRICTS.

THE actual end of hostilities, the orders to cease firing and the quelling of the storm of war on the morning of November 11, 1918, came with all the surprise of a shock to the men in the front lines of the Western front. While the streets of the capitals of the Allies were thronged with an excited and exuberant crowd of merry-makers, while Regent Street, Broadway, and the Avenue de l'Opéra resounded with the laughter and cheers of thousands of men, women and children all thankful for the end of the war, it was difficult for those who had fought so long that war had become a daily mechanical task of seizing ground and killing foes, and to whom death or wounds were matters only of time, and escape matter of mere chance, to realize that at eleven o'clock on that grey and misty November morning the value of human life was to suddenly leap from the infinitesimal of war to the inestimable of peace. The infantry in their pathetic shelters dug in the sides of roads or hills who, cut off from the news of the rear for many days, had not absorbed the latest rumours of the coming of an armistice, stood, long after the hour of war had passed, disciplined alertness at their machine-guns and rifles. Cold and miserable though the men were they did not lose their sense of prudence, and it was not until the following day, after a night in which star shells, rockets and various lights had competed with one another in great profusion to illuminate the sky and proclaim to all the heavenly worlds that peace had once more returned to earth, that a complete realization of what had happened dawned upon the minds of the infantry. The artillery, however, enjoying some fragile contact with events at the rear, only vied with one another in seeking the privilege of firing the last shot of the war, and cooks, orderlies, and ammunition carriers were all pressed into service that morning to pull at the lanyards for the final message to the enemy. The news of the end quickly travelled throughout the highways and byways of the war zone. While ignited powder made the nights weird with its colours, the French poilu drank his ration of pinard with increased zest. Through all the little estaminets and huts, the cafés and clubs of the Western front, laughter and song, no longer mocked by the grim prospect of sudden death, feebly succeeded to all the noisy hilarity of an irresponsible Mars. The bloody toil of over four years had achieved its purposed end. The Germans were defeated. The soldier could look back upon his handiwork with the satisfaction of success. The faithlessness of the enemy to his word still demanded that every precaution should be taken against

treachery, and the lines were manned as if war still existed but had momentarily lost its teeth. Meanwhile, those who could were polishing their buttons and cleaning their uniforms for the march forward, while the Germans sent over officers in derelict automobiles flying white flags to indicate the existence of mines and tank traps.

It was early on the morning of November 17, that the Allied troops, Belgian, British, American and French, moved out of their shelters, crossed No Man's Land, and, reaching the main roads, marched forward. The British Second and Fourth Armies, under Generals Sir Herbert Plumer and Sir Henry Rawlinson, a newly created American Army, the Third, composed of the best of America's divisions, with only one exception, under the command of General Joseph T. Dickman, and the Tenth, Eighth, Fourth, and Second French Armies of Generals Mangin, Gerard, Gouraud, and Hirschauer, were accorded the honour, together with a Belgian force under General Michel, of following on the heels of the withdrawing Germans. Cavalry patrols preceded the infantry, scouring the countryside as if a retreating enemy were being leisurely pursued. Soon that mystery of the beyond, that wonderment of what was happening behind the enemy lines which every soldier felt at some time, was a mystery no more. The revelation of villages bright with joyous and cheering populations, who greeted the soldiers of the Allies with grateful enthusiasm, unfolded itself as every few miles were passed. Tales of privations, of enforced labour, of wholesale requisitions, and too often of brutality, were poured into the sympathetic ears of the advancing soldiers. At Château Salins the Moroccan division of the French Army, with its Foreign Legion and its Zouaves and Spahis, re-entered territory that Germany had held for forty-eight years in bondage, and received what was the most moving and enthusiastic welcome of the day. Mulhouse, too, in Alsace, was entered that morning by the French under General Hirschauer, commanding the Second Army. Ever since the French captured and lost the city in 1914 they had been able to view all of its activities from the security of a mountain observation post. Many French officers who spoke the Alsatian dialect could see, throughout those long and bitter years, the homes where their mothers and fathers were living. They were at last to enter, and the local population, which, ever since the disastrous year of 1871, had lived behind a German frontier post, gave them a frantic welcome. Anything which might suggest France and the French—statuettes of Napoleon,

REPATRIATED ALSATIAN PRISONERS GREET FRENCH SOLDIERS AT STRASBOURG, NOVEMBER 25, 1918.

[American official photograph.

AMERICAN "DOUGH-BOYS" RECEIVE NEWS OF THE SIGNING OF THE ARMISTICE.

old cockades—were brought out and exhibited, to show their French sympathies. The old town, with its grey buildings and its dull exterior, was transformed into a bouquet of flags, dominated by tricolours that had been preserved in nervous secrecy during many years by the patriotic townspeople. But it was not the army that moved forward, but a ghost of an army that returned that made women's hearts beat with overflowing emotion and men's faces rigid with anger of the enemy on that cold November day. When the war had commenced, a stream of refugees, hurrying away from the advancing enemy, had greeted the Allies moving into battle. Those refugees, pitiable though their plight, had been well fed a few days before and, except for physical exhaustion, bore no signs of long endured suffering. But far more pitiable were those blue- and khaki-clad refugees who, after the armistice, staggered along the roads in passing to the rear. At every town on the front, from the far north of Belgium southward to where the mountains of Alsace overlook the Rhine, these thinly clad, shivering warriors, whose arms had not the strength of a child's, and who, if they could swallow a morsel of bread, thought themselves fortunate, crowded together in search of warmth and food. They had been let loose by their captors the Germans, who having underfed and maltreated them for months, cared nothing whether they ever reached the Allied lines or died on the way.

A more melancholy and wistful procession, men seldom saw. French, British, Belgians, Italians, Americans and Russians, all shared the horrors of that march. With sunken cheeks, with shoulders bent with fatigue and ill-treatment, with shrunken frames that made their uniforms look ridiculously ill-fitting in their abundant largeness, dressed in an amazing collection of coats and caps, no distinction of nationality or speech was recognized, for the helpless helped the helpless whether Russian or Italian. Napoleon in his retreat from Moscow never saw such a suffering army as that of those pitiable prisoners. They all told a similar story of hardships, of cruelty, and of underfeeding. The British had been mocked with the retort that if they were hungry the blockade was the cause, and towards them, the other prisoners said, the Germans evinced a spite and malice which caused intense suffering. Many had come hundreds of miles from distant camps by boarding the trains, and many had walked over 40 miles to reach the Allied lines. Yet, amid all their rags and all the filth that covered them, the men had preserved some relic of their days in the lines. From out of the linings of uniforms the British in particular produced old regimental badges and tattered photographs of loved ones, or a ring and an identification disc. Happily all the Allied peoples and armies, together with the people of Luxembourg, worked with feverish energy to relieve the sufferings of the

prisoners, and in many a quiet village notices were hung saying where these unfortunate soldiers could find food and rest. Many passed over the frontier into Holland, and some into Switzerland, but wherever they went assistance was given with a will and a graciousness that contrasted vividly and pointedly with the treatment of the Germans. Towns behind the old front line, like Nancy and Verdun, became the concentration centres for these hapless prisoners. British officers, in dirty multi-coloured uniforms, poured into the capital of Lorraine, where such institutions as the American Y.M.C.A. were ready, with baths and food, to help their Allies, and the old grim fortress of Verdun, with its derelict houses, its high walls marked by shell fire, and its exterior of desolation, resounded to the tramp of thousands of weary feet, all seeking, within its capacious citadel, a haven of rest. But weeks passed before the stream of refugees began to slacken and then finally ceased, and it was only after Sir Douglas Haig had addressed a vigorous wireless demand to the Germans that the inhumanity of turning these men adrift came to an end. In some of the towns and villages hospitals laden with both Allied and German wounded were found, and in a few cases German doctors had stayed behind to take care of the patients until the Allies arrived, but generally a note was merely left asking for kindness and attention to the German wounded in the name of humanity. As the men moved forward they viewed, with some surprise, the complete organization which existed behind the German front. There were newly built railways, and well-constructed roads. There were comfortable barracks and inviting cinematograph theatres. In almost every town the Germans had abandoned some of the varied material of war, and guns, aeroplanes, machine-guns, mortars, rifles, ammunition dumps, and even threshing machines and steam rollers were to be found piled up in the little public squares awaiting the gathering hand of the Allies. Nor was the sphere of interest confined to the sombre line of prisoners, and the warm welcome of the delivered. Towns famous as the scene of the fighting of 1914, villages that could tell a dreadful tale of drunken Germans firing promiscuously into the houses, and of streets burned down as the price of a stray shot, still bearing all their scars of war and atrocity, related their trials to the unmoving soldiery.

[*French official photograph.*

THE ENTRY OF THE FRENCH TROOPS INTO METZ.

The Germans, assessing their unpopularity, moved through France and Belgium with every fear of attack by the civilians whom they had so long terrorised, and who at any moment might seize a fortuitous revenge. Notices were placarded in all the towns warning the people of the consequences of attack, and jeering was all the open hostility that they were compelled to endure. The retreat was very different from the advance.

November 19, 1918, will always be remembered as one of the greatest days in French history. On that day Marshal Pétain, then newly promoted to his exalted rank, rode at the head of the famous 20th French Corps, to whom was given the honour of leading

ALSATIAN CHILDREN LOADED WITH PRESENTS OF DOLLS AND TOYS AT A FRENCH ARMY CENTRE SCHOOL.

the entry into Metz. From early morning the gay tricolour flew from almost every building in the city. Happy-faced young girls, many dressed in Lorraine costumes, promenaded through the streets. The statues of the first Emperor Wilhelm and of Prince Frederick Charles, who led the German troops into Metz in 1870, statues which to the eyes of the irreconcilably French element of the city represented nothing throughout the 48 years of bondage but German brutality, were wrenched from their pedestals and thrown into the street. But the most fantastic touch of all, and one that had the merit of much wit, was the handcuffing of the statue on the Cathedral façade representing Wilhelm II. as a saint. A cardboard placard, too, adorned this monument to his hypocrisy and insatiable vanity. It bore the very appropriate inscription "Sic transit gloria mundi." In spite of the grey and dull morning thousands assembled in the streets to see the French troops swing by. Still the atmosphere had a tragedy very much its own. At Metz the ebb and flow of two civilizations have met. For 48 years the Germans, with every device that their ingenuity could suggest, had been striving to make the town German. The more insistent their desire the more French the French people of the city became. This daily struggle only came to a close when the Germans left the city after the war, but the evidences of its length and bitterness were there to be observed by all. Thousands spoke no French. Their language was either that of the Lorraine patois or German, and it was a little difficult for them to share with their French fellow-citizens the glamour of that day. Having seen throughout all their lives the methods the Germans had pursued in suppression of the French, they feared the introduction of such methods by their new protectors at their expense. Then, too, the oldest of the French people were too

[French official photograph.

SAINT WILHELM II.

full of emotion to express their feelings in the waving of flags, the singing of the Marseillaise, or the fluttering of handkerchiefs. Tears of gratitude were their visible symbols of joy. It was in the Place d'Armes, opposite the statue of Marshal Ney, that Marshal Pétain reviewed his passing troops. After the march past, M. Mirman, who had been Prefect of Nancy, was introduced to his new post as



MARSHAL PÉTAIN REVIEWING FRENCH TROOPS IN THE PLACE D'ARMES AT METZ.

Commissaire of the Republic for Metz, while a torch-light tattoo and a solemn Te Deum in the Cathedral completed the day's programme. That night the people went to bed happy that Metz was once more French, but it was some time, in fact many months later, before they fully realized the true significance of that fact. Eventually the streets were re-named, and the crowd of German shopkeepers who had invaded the city after 1870 found it wise to retreat where the Germans could still rule; it was only then that Metz became really French.

While France was rejoicing for Metz, Antwerp was expending herself in a great popular welcome for the King and Queen of the Belgians on that day. Perhaps nowhere in Belgium had the Germans been hated with such a fierce hate as in Antwerp. Their very name brought sternness to the faces of men, and no one appeared to see any humour but only a natural expression in the signs that were fixed on many cafés: "Dogs admitted, not Prussians." Any man whose name might have suggested a German origin, or anyone who was known to have been partial towards the German occupation, was hunted through the streets, fortunate, indeed, to escape into some refuge without sustaining some injury or even death. The measure of the hate for the Germans was the measure of the enthusiasm for the King and Queen when they re-entered. Those who remembered the terrible nights of October, 1914, when the fortresses were destroyed by the heaviest artillery the Germans possessed, when solid concrete bastions were flung into the air as if they had been made only of wood, and when shells and bombs had rained into the city, driving the people in terror over to Holland, those who could recall that night, when the Cathedral remained silhouetted against the dreadful glare of flames, were the most thankful and the most enthusiastic for the return of their own countrymen. The last days of the German occupation of Antwerp, like Brussels, had been somewhat similar to the first. The German troops, flying red flags, had raided the town, stripping provision shops of their contents and stealing whatever came to hand. Their officers were powerless to resist, for they themselves lost their epaulettes in the struggle and thought themselves fortunate in remaining alive. The Germans, during their occupation, had exacted a monthly contribution of sixty million francs (£2,400,000). But apart from the irritating requisitions and punishments which the Germans chose to inflict upon the people of Antwerp during the occupation, nothing aroused more hostility than the activist movement for the separation of the Flemish element of Belgium from the rest, which, started by the Germans, received the support of some Belgians. By the time the German Army had left the activists had disappeared. In Holland and in Germany they found a refuge, fearing to stay in a city which deservedly bore them so much hostility.

Two days later, on November 21, Americans who had been steadily marching forward from their line on the Meuse river entered the city of Luxembourg. Passing up through Longwy and Arlon they had been greeted with curiosity and enthusiasm by the French and Belgian people. The gay and reckless inconsequence of the youngest army of the day won great favour everywhere. The children found particular joy in sitting on the knees of America's sons, and by the time the American Army had reached the borders of Luxembourg, its reputation had well preceded it. The city of Luxembourg certainly strove its best to do honour to the men from overseas. The children in the schools had been taught to cry "Hip-hip-hooray" in English, and the streets of the city resounded with the cries of these youngsters as with full abandon they celebrated a great occasion. The 18th Infantry Regiment of the 1st Division was selected by General Pershing to enter the city as a guard of honour. The Luxembourg Army, numbering roughly 100 men, did justice to the occasion. With the band of the army playing "Yankee-Doodle" and to the loud cries of "Vive l'Amérique!" General Pershing, standing at the side of the Grand Duchess Marie Adelaide on the balcony of the palace, received the cheers and congratulations of the people. But this act, unfortunately, brought political complications in its train. General Pershing, all unknowingly, had supported the Grand Duchess, who, thoroughly unpopular because of her German associations, was the object of revolutionary feeling which was passing through the city when the Americans entered. She had entertained the Kaiser on many occasions during the war, and all parties, those who wished for union with France, those who desired to become Belgian, and, finally, the great majority who desired to remain pure Luxembourgeoise with political sympathies for the Allies, all agreed that the end of her reign was necessary for the

future benefit of the country. There was, therefore, a little consternation and disappointment when the figure of General Pershing appeared at the side of the Grand Duchess, but this apparently made no difference to the people's attitude towards those whom they termed "our deliverers." The Americans had attempted to keep their troops out of the city, except such as were absolutely necessary, but, hearing of the elegance and modernity of Luxembourg, hundreds of the soldiers trickled in during the evening, to be amazed by the warm welcome they received. All the hospitality that could possibly be offered was given to them. Many a soldier slept that night in a luxurious feather bed in one of the principa houses of the town. Delirious with enthusiasm, the Luxembourg people expended every energy to make their guests as happy and as comfortable as could be. The cafés were filled with excited civilians and happy soliders. The National Anthems of the Allies were sung right through the night.

The intolerable rudeness of the Germans had been endured by the people of Luxembourg during the war with unmistakable dislike, and the Germans were forced to realize that the people's sympathies were French.

A new chapter in Belgian history was now to open. Four years before, the Belgian troops,

AMERICAN INFANTRY MARCHING THROUGH LUXEMBOURG TO THE RHINE.
General Pershing, with the Grand Duchess Marie Adelaide on his right, can be seen on the balcony.

[French official photograph.

THE KING AND QUEEN OF THE BELGIANS WATCHING THE ENTRY OF THE ALLIED TROOPS INTO BRUSSELS.

Generals Plumer and Birdwood in the background.

steadily retreating before the triumphant onrush of the elated Germans, then sweeping through the country at a remarkable pace, had been compelled to abandon Brussels to the enemy. Never did men leave a city more reluctantly or with more misgivings. Those who had fought along that long cobbled road that connects Liége with the capital, those who from their lines had seen the flames leaping into the sky at night from Louvain as the torch was thrust into house after house by the Germans, those who in many a local counter-attack had seen what German "frightfulness" had wrought, could not but imagine the worst of fates for Brussels. The struggle seemed hopeless. The outlook the blackest. But on the banks of the Yser the Belgians had fought the despoilers of their country with steady energy, and at last the day of days had dawned when they were to return to the capital, not as the defeated, but as one of the victors in a mighty conflict. Bright was the sunshine on the morning of November 22 when King Albert, with his Queen and two Princes, accompanied by the British Prince Albert, rode into Brussels after a long and melancholy exile. Happy was the day for the thousands of grateful Belgians who lined the streets in animated density to welcome the first gentleman of the land and the Allied troops who followed him. Arriving at the Porte de Flandre in his motor-car, the King mounted and rode to the Place de la Nation, where the soldiers of victory marched past. Those who were present have written that it was an unforgettable sight. It certainly was a great personal triumph for King Albert. As the battalions of Americans, French, English, Scottish and Newfoundlanders swept past, the myriads of flags fluttering in the breeze, gave to the square a gaiety and colour most appropriate for the occasion. The military music stirred the people into cheer after cheer. No man not utterly destitute of feeling could stand there and see the King, who had symbolized in his own amazing fortitude the courage of his people, and his Queen, who had so bravely supported him, once more among their subjects, without feeling an emotion that no words could justly express. Accompanied by General Pershing, General Plumer and General Birdwood among many others, the King watched the march past. The Americans,

sturdy and stalwart, led the way, and then came the French, who had a wonderful reception. Quickly following were the Highlanders, with two platoons of Seaforths, one of the Camerons and one of the Black Watch, and as the kilts swung by, the people who had so long waited to show their appreciation of the sons of Scotland drowned the sounds of the pipes in a roar of approval. But it was naturally reserved to the Belgians, who came last, behind composite companies of British troops, to move the onlookers to tears and laughter, to shrieks of joy and the thunder of cheering. Women broke through the ranks to fling themselves into the arms of loved ones, and men wept for happiness as they watched the men march past. In the afternoon the King went to the Chamber of Deputies, where the Germans had installed a cinematograph theatre in addition to an officers' club and casino, and delivered an address that won the approval of all. In his speech the King asked for the establishment of universal suffrage for all men and announced the Government's intention to create a Flemish University at Ghent. This latter project was not received with any great enthusiasm, but when the King appealed for unity the whirlwind of enthusiasm was let loose, and the cheers continued after the King had departed from the Chamber. But it was at the Hôtel de Ville, where the King, late in the afternoon, proceeded to receive the homage of the city and to see Cardinal Mercier, that the people seized the opportunity to honour their monarch. When he appeared on the balcony in the evening dusk and a searchlight added to the illuminations of the city revealed his tall, simple and dignified figure standing bare-headed while the band played the "Brabançonne," all restraint was swept away in a final burst of enthusiasm that seemed to engulf everything that they had yet attempted. Then a fanfare of trumpets announced his approaching departure, and the crowd swarmed around him in his car as a fitting close to a most memorable day. Meanwhile the British troops were crossing the battlefield of Waterloo *en route* for the Rhine.

The Allied troops were both pleased and astonished to find such gaiety and luxury in a city which they had presumed was wealthy only in starvation and dullness. The soldiers peered into provision shops full of everything tempting to eat and gazed at articles of luxury with bewildered wonderment. Delicacies which they had never seen for years appeared on tea-tables, and the well-dressed people who

THE GERMAN RETREAT: A CAR FULL OF ARMS ON ITS WAY TO THE FRONTIER

[French official photograph.

THE GERMAN RETREAT: KITS OF GERMAN SOLDIERS CARRIED THROUGH BRUSSELS BENEATH THE FLAGS OF THE ALLIES.

paraded the Boulevard Anspach gave to life something of a fantasy and a dream. Then at night the cafés with their dancing and music, the music-halls and theatres with their presentations, made Brussels the magic city that allured all war-stained warriors, who promptly voted it the brightest city in Europe. But the prices of everything were appalling, and it was soon seen that the poor people must be having the most desperate of struggles to live. Yet the Germans enjoyed themselves in full zest in Brussels, the soldiers argued, and there was something akin to envy in their voices as they recalled the little villages and towns behind their fronts, which they had thought represented all that a soldier could possibly hope to have. The German soldiers, who had revolted in the capital before they left, placing machine-guns on the roofs of buildings and firing promiscuously down the streets at the expense of the lives of many Belgians, left the city with pockets bulging with cigars, wines and food. Brussels was happy to lose them, and she evinced her gratitude in intensifying her gaiety, in smiling the happiest of smiles, and making herself the Mecca of all pleasure seekers within reach. Her day of deliverance had come. She celebrated it well.

Brussels was not alone in her rejoicing. General de Castelnau entered Colmar amidst the enthusiasm of the people, while advanced detachments of the British moved into the famous fortified town of Namur and crossed the Meuse. They were welcomed with a simple joy that was touching. Banners were inscribed with such greetings in English as, "Welcome," "We congratulate the heroes of Bapaume and Péronne," and "Honour and thanks to our brave liberators, the British." Many of these banners, like the home-made Union Jacks that flew from many a humble window, had been made by hands that had borne with every fortitude the presence of the enemy for over four years. The British soldiers observing the irregular blending of the colours, the work of simple amateurs, appraised their welcome with a true appreciation, and many a man was heard to exclaim that such tributes were worth more than all the grand celebrations in haughty capitals. Meanwhile the rapid collection of the abandoned guns, aeroplanes and ammunition proceeded, and German officers were conducted through the Allied lines by escorts to hand over war material in accordance with the terms of the armistice. But the soldiers' event of the day in the French Army was at Villers sur Semoy, near where in 1914, during the hasty retreat, the 2nd Colonial Regiment had buried their colours rather than let them fall into the hands of the enemy. The Germans never suspected their hiding place, and on November 22 the 264th Infantry Regiment returning to the town recovered the battle-worn emblems and with full military honours handed them over to the Colonial Army.

Events moved with dramatic swiftness during

[French official photograph.

FRENCH TROOPS ENTERING COLMAR IN ALSACE.

those days. While one regiment at one place lived in a world of glamour as the guests of a restored city, another was to be found somewhere else receiving the fullest honours of a victorious army. As the men marched day after day through the countryside, as kilometre after kilometre was counted off in their progress, they always had in front of them as an inspiration the gratitude of their own people, and the eventual march into Germany itself. Alsace-Lorraine naturally possessed a romance of its very own. After Metz came Strasbourg, and the great city of Alsace on the Rhine, farther from France for 48 years than her sister city in bondage, responded to her deliverance with an unrestrained enthusiasm that distance seemed to have generated.

Of all the cities of Alsace-Lorraine, Strasbourg is by far the most eminent and most attractive. Metz during its domination by the Germans lost many of its French characteristics. Metz, the city of tragedy, as it has been fitly ermed, was a continual battlefield for the French and the Germans struggling, on one hand, to retain all the evidences of a lost paternity that was French, and on the other to impose a new paternity that was German. The Germans, of course, fiercely eliminated everything that might suggest France or a return to her fold. French architecture disappeared beneath the weight of German buildings. Ugliness and heaviness, the abiding and enduring characteristics of the German, swept away all the artistic delicacy of the French. Metz became one of the dullest cities in Europe, a monument in herself to German oppressiveness and German brutality. But at Strasbourg there was a difference. The Germans, although conscious of the love of France of the people, never feared her desertion to the French. They knew that if the French ever came to the city they would be welcomed as the Germans had never been welcomed, but the distance from the frontier—in the case of Metz only a few miles—the close proximity to Germany itself, and the absence of any fierce activist movement, lulled them into an easy security in which they accepted the situation as it happened to be, and hoped that in the course of the years propaganda and infiltration would make Strasbourg thoroughly German. The result was to be plainly seen in the city. The old houses, French in their style and atmosphere, elegant with a gracious elegance, abounded throughout the city. But they presented the most remarkable and instructive of contrasts, for among them appeared modern German buildings, very secure and substantial, but destitute of every artistic grace, of every touch of lightness and of every semblance of easy dignity. In the Kleber Place, where the statue of the famous general was to be the rallying ground for French enthusiasm in Strasbourg, the contrast was particularly vivid.

It was on November 25 that the French troops made their grand formal entry into Strasbourg. All along the roads to the city the Alsatian people had planted decorated

Christmas trees, so plentiful in that part of the country, and suitably adorned them with inscriptions expressing their affection for France. As the French soldiers marched behind their bands they were joined by numbers of young girls dressed in the Alsatian national costume with its black butterfly headgear, who very attractively demonstrated their joy in beholding the poilus once more. By the time the men had reached the Imperial Palace in the Kaiser Platz, where Marshal Pétain and General Gouraud, the commander of the famous French Fourth Army, who was to become the military governor of Alsace, together with Generals de Castelnau, Fayolle and Maistre, the three army group commanders, stood to review them as they marched by, they had been almost submerged beneath the weight of heartfelt enthusiasm with which they were received everywhere. Street after street presented one thick mass of people honouring a great day. With little tricolours pinned in their coats, with flags of all the Allies but particularly those of France and Alsace flying from thousands upon thousands of windows, the Alsatians, numbers of whom of the fair sex wore the national costume that gave a most picturesque atmosphere to the whole scene, lined up to offer the soldiers of France a welcome that even the purest French blood could not have surpassed.

But there was one figure among them all which the soldiers regarded with an affection and a reverence that few men ever inspire in others. It was that of General Gouraud. The classically stern features of Marshal Pétain, who beneath his long cavalry cloak hid all his many decorations, caught many an admiring eye, but it was Gouraud, with his right sleeve hanging empty (for he had lost an arm in the war) and his left hand bearing his sword, who, with that pensive, philosophical and calm look which so well revealed his character, gazed upon the men of his beloved Fourth Army, the defenders of Reims and the Marne, for whom the soldiers wished to show their love and respect. He had just returned from his mother's death-bed to see his men swing by. Three of the divisions of his army were selected to march through the city, and as they passed the assembled generals, who had shared with the poilus throughout the war its inevitable fatigues and sufferings, there was a pathos in the midst of triumph, a sentiment in the midst of victory, that almost brought a hush to the excited throngs. Infantry

[French official photograph.

YOUNG ALSATIAN WOMEN IN NATIONAL COSTUME AWAITING THE ARRIVAL OF GENERAL PÉTAIN IN STRASBOURG.

[French official photograph.

GENERAL GOURAUD AND HIS DIVISION ENTERING STRASBOURG.

of the Line, Zouaves, Tirailleurs, Territorials, Hussars, Dragoons, Artillery and Engineers, with colours flying, sabres and bayonets flashing in the sun, bands playing—and for one African Regiment a band consisting solely of wild wood instruments that chanted like bagpipes—all shared in the thrill of that march. When it had passed, the generals shook hands with one another and everyone felt that at last a great wrong had been righted and that the crime of 48 years, although not removed from history's pages, had at least been definitely consigned to an unhappy past. There was indeed a solemnity in the entry that was not associated with triumph but with justice. Bands might fill the air with martial music, the people might listen to the echo and re-echo of their own cheers, but the occasion was too grand and too impressive for the intoxication of enthusiasm. It was some weeks later before the real significance of all that had occurred entered the minds of the people. The night of the entry, however, found Strasbourg gay with myriads of lights and happy with thousands of smiles. The soldiers made the night merry with their laughter and songs. Quickly at home in the old city, they settled down to the full enjoyment of life, a soldiers' reward for faithfulness to duty and victory in action.

Strasbourg had not much complaint against the Germans. There had been harshness, but not of a kind to excite any deep feeling or prolonged antagonism. But the decided preference for the French of the people of Strasbourg became more and more marked as the days passed by, and of all the cities of Alsace-Lorraine a month later Strasbourg stood first in enthusiasm for the French and gratitude for their deliverance from the Germans. There was no happier triumph for France and no greater tribute to the statesmanship of General Gouraud. The proclamation that was posted at the time of the entry proved to be a charter which won the approval of all. It read:

"To the inhabitants of Strasbourg.

"To the soldiers of the Fourth Army.

"The day of glory has arrived. After forty-eight years of the direst separation, after fifty-one months of war, the sons of Great France, our brothers, are united once more. This miracle has been worked by you people of Strasbourg and Alsatians, because you kept in your faithful heart the sacred love of the Mother Country through all the vexations and ill-treatment of the odious yoke . . . history will hardly furnish another instance of this admirable fidelity. This miracle has been worked by you, soldiers, who have fought heroically the hardest battles ever seen, and issued from them covered with immortal glory. The redoubtable barrier has fallen, the eagles of the frontier posts have been laid low for ever.

"France comes to you people of Strasbourg as a mother to her darling child, lost and found again. Not only will she respect your customs, local traditions, religious beliefs, economic interests, but she will dress your wounds, and in these difficult days will ensure your food supplies. At this solemn and magnificent

hour, which proclaims the triumph of right, justice and liberty over brutal force, let us unite, liberated Alsatians and liberating soldiers, in this same love. *Vive la France! Vive l'Armée! Vive la République!*"

Meanwhile Paris, too, was celebrating the entry into the Alsatian capital by removing the crape and faded wreaths from the famous Strasbourg statue in the Place de la Concorde, which had awaited for so long the coming of this day; and Saverne (Zabern), the town which for five years stood as a symbol of Prussian militarism at its worst, proclaimed its emancipation from the Germans with a banner that read: "L'Affaire Saverne, 1913, La Libération, 1918."

On November 27 Marshal Foch himself, accompanied by General de Castelnau, visited Strasbourg to review the troops and to receive the acclamations of the people.

The problem of transferring the administration of Alsace-Lorraine from the hands of those appointed by the Germans to French officials demanded all the attention of the French Government. In the telegraph office at Metz, for instance, the operators spoke only German, and great difficulty was experienced by the French operators in Nancy in getting their messages understood. But an occasional, "Vive la France," which followed at the end of a message sent by one of the Metz telegraphists was taken as proof of loyalty, and promptly drew a sympathetic response from the French. Then the provision of foodstuffs became the most urgent of problems. It was not that the people of Alsace-Lorraine were starving, or that they fared any worse than the rest of France or of Germany. Indeed, the shops of Metz and Strasbourg attractively displayed such fruit as lemons, which were unobtainable in Germany, and scarce in the northern districts of France. But France, anxious to propitiate the good wishes of the Alsatians and the Lorrainers, dispatched tons of food to the lost provinces, and so congested did the railways become on the Paris-Nancy-Metz line that the journey from Metz to Nancy, ordinarily occupying half an hour, took six hours; while from Metz to Paris the traveller was fortunate who could reach the capital within 24 hours.

Throughout the two provinces two distinct trends of opinion soon became very evident. To return to the protection and domination of Germany few, and those only Germans, desired. But there were more who wished to see the erection of a separate state of Alsace-Lorraine, enjoying all the freedom of complete independence, and at absolute liberty to give the fullest expression to the national life. The wise men argued, however, that Alsace-Lorraine at the time, at least, was unable to stand alone. She needed both the protection and help of France, and economically she would be dependent for many years on the assistance of the country which had made it a condition of peace that Alsace-Lorraine should be returned to France. They ridiculed the idea that France threatened their independence or their freedom: and in many a village the shrewd Alsatian or Lorrainer, sitting in his favourite café,

THE STRASBOURG STATUE IN PARIS UNVEILED AND ILLUMINATED.

was heard to murmur that "Independence may be fine, but the food of France, at present, is much finer." The independence movement never made any really great strides among the people; and when the populace of Metz took it into their own hands to thrust the German traders out of the city, the French military authorities, in the desire to maintain public order, were forced to forbid their men to purchase at shops which were at all tainted with German connexions. A number of notices then appeared in the shops announcing whether the proprietor were French, Belgian, or Luxembourgeoise,

while the Germans sorrowfully and sadly withdrew to beyond the Rhine. Within a very short time the people became accustomed to the French, and finding that their fears were groundless, they gave their unswerving loyalty to the new power. Metz took on a radiance that shone with sombre contrast amid the forbidding architecture of the city, and there was a happiness depicted in the faces of the people which plainly showed what a difference their emancipation had effected.

Liége, too, was entered on November 30 by the King and Queen of the Belgians, riding at the head of their troops, and the people of the fortress city, who bore the most vivid of recollections of the earliest days of the war, when they had sought their cellars for safety from the German siege cannon, accorded a special welcome to General Leman, whose heroic defence of the city will always remain a glorious chapter in Belgian history, as, at the time, it served an invaluable purpose to the Allies in temporarily delaying and impeding the German advance. Visé, where, the villagers said, the first combatants were killed in the war as the Germans attempted to cross the Meuse river, welcomed, too, the men who had fought so gallantly in 1914 through the town that the Germans, in desperate revenge, seized and killed the Burgomaster.

All Allied territory was now clear of the enemy. The Belgians, indeed, had sent a cavalry brigade into Aix-la-Chapelle at the request of the Germans to preserve order on the last day of November, but December 1 was set as the day when the frontier was to be crossed by the full forces of the Allies.

For the men there was a temporary rest in the marching along roads in the trail of the enemy and the entering of enraptured cities. And they seized the opportunity to prepare themselves for the advance into the territory of the enemy itself.

The Germans meanwhile had been retreating nervously and apprehensively until they reached the frontier. Many cases of indiscipline, and in some instances of outrage, had occurred among the German soldiers, and behind the main army there had trailed a band of hooligans in uniform who, provided with arms, terrorized the local populations and their own officers. But as the Germans reached the Rhine a new spirit came over the men. They were returning to their homes

[French official photograph.

SAVERNE DECORATED IN CELEBRATION OF HER DELIVERANCE.

GERMANS ASSEMBLING IN THE PLACE ST. LAMBERT, LIÉGE, PREPARATORY TO THEIR RETREAT.

acknowledging no defeat, and only conscious that the unsullied honour of the army must be preserved at all cost. Discipline improved, but the men did not forget to keep a large number of cattle and food stuffs that they had taken from the people of France and Belgium in spite of all the provisions of the armistice. A surprise awaited them as they re-entered their own country. They had passed through Belgium and France in a silence that was only broken by the tramp of their own weary feet and the turning of the wheels of their artillery and supplies, and had looked into faces that plainly bore the fierceness of a long, brooding resentment that had steadily accumulated during the years of war and at last had found full freedom for expression. The soldiers could not fail to observe the hatred borne them, and many muttered that it would not be long before they returned, but all were thankful to leave scenes which had brought them no glory but great loss. The flags of the Allies flaunted in their faces as they marched on, and it was with great relief that they once more reached the German frontier. Then their depression was rapidly swept away. A new enthusiasm imbued all. The old red, white and black colours of Germany floated from many a house-top and the streets were decorated with a profusion of banners and ribbons welcoming them home. The men viewed with some amazement the enthusiasm with which they were received, but they quickly became accustomed to be regarded as heroes returning from a victorious campaign, and accepted the showers of flowers that the German maidens thrust upon them with a willingness that showed how heartily they endorsed the people's idea of their valour and success. Officers and men alike were entertained extravagantly amid a riotous assembling of flags and music and good cheer. Never did a beaten army receive such a strange and royal welcome. Never were men retreating before an army of occupation accorded such cordiality. They were "Our heroes" and the "Brave." And no warrior returning victorious from a mighty encounter commanded as much reverence as the German soldiers when they finally reached their homes. The reception was not isolated. It flourished beneath the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin as well as on the banks of the Moselle river opposite Luxembourg. It was a national demonstration of affection for the German soldiers that acknowledged no defeat, no disgrace—nothing but an armistice, a peaceful compromise. The effect on discipline and moral was immediate. The German Army became no rabble but a proud military force anxious to prove that the solidarity which they

[French official photograph.

HOW THE GERMANS LEFT BELGIUM.
A scene in Brussels during the retreat.

had attained in war could be retained in the era of peace. How far these manifestations of joy in their return assisted in saving Germany from the worst horrors of a Spartacist *régime* it is difficult to estimate exactly, but there is no doubt that the German discipline during those fateful days was mainly due to the reception the men received when they crossed once more into their own country.

The turn of the Allies had now come to enter Germany. Orders were issued to the troops reminding them that they would find themselves among an enemy people and that their conduct must not tarnish the lustre of their arms so bravely and victoriously borne in the field of battle. In the British and American armies there was to be no "fraternization." The German, whether an indulgent and kind-hearted man or a receptive and coquettish woman, was to be left severely alone. Germany was still an enemy, and a treacherous enemy, and prudence demanded that discipline and vigilance should not be relaxed.

The Allied troops contemplated the march into Germany on that cold morning of December 1, 1919, with mixed feelings; All wondered how the German people would behave when they went into their billets, and many visualized the necessity of sleeping with a rifle or revolver not far away in case murder were attempted by the enemy people. Others thought that they would be segregated from the German populace, but all agreed that it was a great adventure that might hold many mysteries and many surprises, but come what might was well worth any risk or any discomfort.

It was at 5.30 in the morning of December 1, 1919, that the Allied troops crossed the frontier and peacefully invaded German soil. In the north the Belgian Field Army under General Michel completed the occupation of Aix-la-Chapelle which the cavalry, at the invitation of the Germans, had begun the day before. Then came the Second British Army, including the Canadian Corps, under General Sir H. Plumer, which moved into Malmedy, while the American Third Army, commanded by General Joseph T. Dickman, entered Trèves, and the French Tenth and Eighth Armies, led respectively by Generals Mangin and Gerard, crossed the Saar and occupied Saarlouis and Saarbrücken in its rich industrial valley. Accompanying the Belgians, and separating the Canadian right flank from the left of the Americans, were French troops apparently acting as liaison links between the armies but, in reality, seizing a great opportunity to impress upon the minds of the German people the solidarity and harmony of the Entente.

The move forward was as picturesque on that cold morning as it was impressive. Cavalry

patrols, gay with a thousand pennons flying from their lances—except for the American cavalry, which discarded all emblems of display—led the way into the western marches of Prussia. The infantry followed close behind and the artillery rumbled in the rear. Bands struck up the liveliest of tunes and the sound of the pipes echoed and re-echoed throughout the hills of the frontier territory. The men's faces betrayed all the excitement they felt in entering into a strange and hostile country. They knew that they were actors in a great event, and they seemed to realize the full significance of an historic day. The German people in the clean and neat villages of the frontier flocked to their doors to see the troops, while the throngs of German children, all of about the same height and same age, many of whom wore forage caps of the style of the German Army, made merry with the soldiers and crowded around the field kitchens with envious eyes. Accustomed though the German people had become to military smartness, they were moved to surprise by beholding the cleanliness of guns and horses and the steady even tread and martial bearing of the soldiers. The British especially won this approval, but it was the arrival of the Scotch troops, with their kilts swinging and their pipes playing, that transformed curiosity into excitement and imagination into amazement. On the French front, on the other hand, a tremor of fear swept through the villages. It was rumoured that Senegalese warriors were on their way, a rumour that happened to be true, and the German people, accustomed by the propaganda of their government during the war to regard the black troops who fought with the Allies as the worst of barbarians and the most atrocious of savages, were filled with consternation when they visualized the possibility of these men being billeted upon them. But the discipline of the French Army and the childish wonderment with which the French blacks regarded everything they saw quickly removed all fears. Nevertheless the prospect of occupation by the Senegalese or Algerians was sufficient to alarm whole areas of occupied Germany months afterwards. As the men marched forward, observing, with great attention, everything in the country from whence the hordes of invaders who had fought with such tenacity and endurance for over four years had come, there dawned upon them the realization of a tremendous contrast All the way up through Belgium and France smiling faces, bouquets of flags, hand shakes of gratitude and tears of joy had greeted them. They had passed through a fairy procession in a world made happy once again, where grief had lost its poignancy and rejoicing held firm sway. But once in Germany, and the smiles which the returned Germans had received were turned to scowls as the Allies advanced. The Allied troops were to suffer what the Germans suffered while leaving France and Belgium. The silence was

HOW THE GERMANS ENTERED BERLIN.
The 155th Regiment received as conquering heroes.

only broken by their music, and the tread of thousands of feet.

All four of the Allies regarded the event in a slightly differing light. To the Belgians, it was a day of revenge; to the British, a day of congratulation for the accomplishment of a wonderful task; to the Americans a just necessity; and to the French an occasion for exultation in entering as victors the territory of an implacable enemy who had pursued them so long with an insatiable hatred that knew no bounds.

The occupation of each city and the subsequent rule imposed revealed very vividly and strikingly the differing standpoints of the Allies.

The Belgians entering Aix-la-Chapelle, a city

both rich with industry and famous as a resort, piled their arms in the square in front of the Rathaus. Of outward display there was little and of noise less, but the people of Aix awoke the next morning to discover that Germany's crimes in Belgium had not been allowed to be forgotten. The streets, in fact, were placarded with notices over the signature of the Belgian Commandant, phrased as nearly as possible on the lines of similar German proclamations that had been imposed during the war on the occupied areas of Belgium. It was as dramatic as it was sardonic. The people were warned against offering any violence or disrespect to Allied troops and all men were to take off their hats to Allied officers in the streets. All cafés, restaurants and theatres were temporarily closed together with all hotels, except those kept open for the convenience of Allied troops. It was forbidden to be out of doors between nine at night and seven in the morning, and shops were to be kept lighted all night. The use of vehicles in the streets was forbidden, and the wearing of German uniform or the carrying of arms carried the penalty of being summarily shot. Where Germans forgot to raise their hats to Belgian officers they were promptly knocked off, but in a few days the realization that such a proclamation was not only most unpractical even for the Allies, apart from its imitative harshness, a realization that the Allied Governments shared, brought modifications until, in time, something like normal life in Aix was restored without discomfort to the Belgians or harm to the Allies.

The event of the day, however, was the American entry into Trèves. The famous old Roman city, scene of many a thrilling chariot race, where, in the Moselle, amid a world of voluptuous beauty, the Romans held their aquatic sports, and where Constantine the Great lived among the vine-clad hills and the red sandstone buildings that moved the poet Ausonius to call Trèves, "Rome beyond the Alps," had been one of the strongholds of Pan-Germanism both before and during the war. That fierce antagonism which only hostile frontier peoples know had been strongly maintained in the city. There was, then, something appropriate in that the soldiers of America, the hosts of freedom, should march past the Roman gate, Porta Nigra, Trèves's greatest possession, to add another historic day to the city's eventful life. The last invasion of Trèves had been by air, when British aviators had flung their bombs into the railway station and the market place, without, however, inflicting any considerable damage. The American invasion was entirely different.

Trèves is not many miles from the Luxembourg border, and it was just after midday

GERMANS RETIRING FROM VISÉ, THE SCENE OF THEIR FIRST WAR CRIMES.

[Belgian official photograph.

BELGIAN TROOPS CROSSING THE FRONTIER INTO GERMAN TERRITORY.

that the Sixth Infantry Regiment, renowned in many a battle since America's war of independence, marched in to the accompaniment of its band. The day before, a triumphal arch had dignified the main street in honour of the returning German troops under General von der Marwitz, but never a flag fluttered from the houses overlooking the narrow streets, and in frigid silence the Americans made an entry free from every particle of ostentation and of every sign of triumph. It impressed those present, in truth, as a mere marching of troops into barracks, and those troops mud-stained, weary, and only casually interested, some wearing steel helmets and some the ordinary forage caps. The dull preciseness of this march foreshadowed the character of the American occupation.

The people stopped on their way about the city to look at the soldiers of America, and apart from the curiosity of the young, an attitude professedly of contemptuous indifference was observed. But behind many a curtained window enquiring eyes peered down into the streets to watch the Americans pass. Such Germans as came into contact with the Americans were genial from nervousness and precise from hostility. The city officials, under a Burgomaster who had been at the mercy of a soldiers' council until the Americans came, showed every willingness to assist in the peaceful administration of Trèves, but in the restaurants meals were served hurriedly but unwillingly to American officers as if the Germans were willing to placate because of power, and oblige because of profit, but to refuse because of pride. Profit and power won, however, and it was not long until the Germans had converted the American occupation into a valuable commercial proposition, in which they became lost to all sense of pride and shame.

The Germans were quickly assured by the Americans that the occupation would be as lenient as safety could allow. In Trèves a long time elapsed before any regulations were issued for the public, who went about their avocations as if nothing particularly strange had happened to dislocate their commerce or destroy their pleasures. This part of Germany is fertile, and the food supply of the city was not seriously menaced. Although prices were high and certain commodities, such as leather and linen, were almost unobtainable, there was little to form a case for the sympathy of the Allies. The soldiers, in fact, were heard to exclaim their surprise that the Germans looked so sleek and well fed, and as they gazed into shop windows attractively displaying a variety of articles they began to murmur that the Germans "did not know what war was." Their illusion of closed shops and a ragged, starving people, victims of a terrible calamity, rapidly disappeared as the days went by. Then they began to contrast the prosperous state of Germany, untouched by the marring hand of war, with the derelict remains of a once beautiful

FRENCH TROOPS IN BELGIUM CHEERED IN BRUSSELS ON THEIR WAY TO THE FRENCH ZONE OF OCCUPATION.

part of France, that less than a month before had given them a feeble shelter from the rain and wind. And many were tempted to feel that justice was unknown and that right had no friends.

The proclamation of Marshal Foch to the Rhenish peoples was posted throughout the occupied zone, to be read with anxious interest. The Germans were told that the Allied military authorities were taking over command of the country, that the strictest obedience was demanded from all, that the laws and regulations in force at the moment of occupation would be guaranteed by the Allies so long as they did not interfere with the security or rights of the armies, that the public services would be called to continue under the direction and control of the military authorities, that the officials had a duty and would be required to carry out their work honestly and conscientiously, and that the Courts would continue to administer justice. The inhabitants were warned to abstain from any act of hostility to the troops or to the Allied authorities, and were told to obey the requisitions of the army made upon them in conformity with law. Court-martial was to be the fate of those who disobeyed or perpetrated crimes against the Allies, but the people were told that the Allies wished them to return to normal life in each district in quiet and disciplined tasks. Neither this proclamation nor those that followed were easily drafted. Differences of opinion among the Allies were constantly occurring as to what the right attitude towards the German people must be. That the security of the armies must be maintained at all costs all agreed, but the British, Americans and French, particularly the Americans and the French, had differences about tolerance and intolerance. In fact, the delay in publishing any specific regulations for the people of the area occupied by the Americans was due to their refusal to concur in the first draft of these regulations, which they considered were not only futile in their harshness but might multiply the difficulties of the Allies. It was not that the Americans were at all favourable to the Germans. They merely could not see what advantages were to be gained by any harshness in face of the difficulties of putting such a policy into effect. A natural disinclination to abuse the power given to them and a desire to maintain the traditions of American freedom which they all held dear were other factors in the situation that were of great importance.

Meanwhile the Allied troops were marching onward to the Rhine. The British, strangely enough, as in the war, found a valuable industrial district, teeming with factories and a sky ever clouded with smoke, in front of them. The men could not but help comparing the country with the North of England, and many who were from the great industrial cities examined with close interest all that they saw. Through Juliers, Duren, and Euskirchen the British passed, making the main highway from Aix-la-Chapelle to Cologne their chief line of road communication. Soon the people became accustomed to see the Allied troops in their villages and towns, but while the townspeople sullenly awaited events the villagers did not find it at all humiliating to go out of their way to help the soldiers and even take care of them. The Americans followed the most picturesque route of all. The Moselle valley, with its miles upon miles of vineyards, with its clear stream, and its pretty villages that cling to the banks beneath the majestic hills that rise almost from the waterside, is one of the most beautiful in the world. In times of peace there is a quietude in the valley which has an attraction all its own. It was through this valley, winding in and out of the hills, that the Americans marched on the way to Coblenz. The men could not restrain their admiration of the whole scene and the cleanliness of the villages, nor could they, sons of a New World, contemplate the ruins of a castle securely perched upon a hill top, the home of many a robber baron and the theme of many an inspiring legend, without feelings of awe and even wonderment. The French, on the other hand, passed down from the hills of Alsace into the fertile and well-cultivated plains of the Palatinate, where Marshal Turenne had fought one of his finest campaigns and where signs of a former occupation by the French were still to be observed after centuries had passed. Kaiserslautern and the wonderful forests that surround it were occupied, while on the right flank of the Americans the French traversed the plateau between the Rhine and the Moselle that finally looks down into Bacharach and Bingen. In front of all of the armies parties of officers went ahead to prepare for the billeting of the troops. They were surrounded wherever they moved by a crowd of Germans, who had it well within their power to inflict injury. But, except for the annoyance of being regarded as prize animals might have been, they found the German officials willing to conform to all their desires. The occupation, indeed, was marked by a peacefulness and a tranquillity that few who started on the march ever thought possible. This was undoubtedly due more to the sound

[Official photograph.

A BRITISH ARMOURED CAR ENTERING COLOGNE AHEAD OF THE OCCUPYING FORCE.

CANADIANS CROSSING THE RHINE AT BONN SALUTE THE CORPS COMMANDER.

common sense of the Allies than to anything else.

But the No-Man's-Land which separated the advancing Allied Armies and the withdrawing Germans was soon chosen by the Spartacists as a favourite ground for their activities. No sooner had the last troops of the German Army departed than the municipal authorities would be called upon to deal with a town or village revolution. It was impossible to recall the German troops, although communication was always established with the withdrawing army. There was but one course, remarkable, and after the four years of war very dramatic. It was to call in the Allied troops ahead of the schedule of occupation and entrust to their care the burden of maintaining order and protecting property. Thus the occupation of Cologne, Coblenz, and Mayence by detachments of Allied troops took place much sooner than the Germans had anticipated.

On Friday night, December 7, the first British detachments, at the request of the German authorities, reached Cologne. They were a small troop of cavalry and had some machine-guns, which were promptly placed in position in the streets and on the quays in preparation for any disturbance. The promise of fighting Spartacists, however, proved to be merely a promise. The riots which led to the call of the Germans to the British were not at all serious, but the Germans, very susceptible to panic, seized a favourable opportunity to ensure the preservation of order in the Rhine city. Three weeks before, representatives of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Council at Hamburg had come into the city and under the red flag had torn off the officers' epaulettes, commandeered motor-cars and assumed forcible control of Cologne. Then a town guard of disbanded soldiers in civilian dress sprang up when the Spartacists were removed from power, and it was the attempted pillaging by a crowd of hooligans, which was, apparently, prevented by the resourcefulness of the civilian guard, that, nevertheless, determined the civil authorities to request military support. The small detachment provoked more curiosity than hostility among the people of Cologne, who went about their daily business with no apparent concern for the act of occupation. On the Rhine itself, the boats for Coblenz and Dusseldorf, laden with passengers, left as usual. The following day at noon a detachment of cavalry entered the university town of Bonn, on the Rhine, which, like Cologne, enjoys a noteworthy history dating from the greatest days of Rome, and the bridges across the Rhine in the British zone were occupied and patrolled up to where the German sentries stood on the right bank of the river. The cavalry were able to look down on the famous river which, throughout the long and anxious years of war, had seemed to the troops like a mythical stream over which

thousands upon thousands of field greys passed to add to the density of German attacks or to the accumulation of prisoners. Now it was under British control, and it was pardonable that a curious exaltation should assail the emotions of the men. Meanwhile the Germans had sent out a call to the Americans at Trèves. Evacuating Coblenz they feared to leave the city unprotected, and requested the Americans to hurry a detachment as an advance guard of the occupation. The Americans willingly complied, and on the morning of December 8 a battalion of the 39th Infantry Regiment entrained at Trèves and travelled along the railway that follows the course of the Moselle to Coblenz. Here they arrived at two in the afternoon, and immediately went into barracks, to be seen only as occasional sentries sauntering through the streets of the city, rivals, as policemen, with a bedraggled company of armed German civil guards. The Germans found it difficult to conceal their hostility towards the new comers. Coblenz was a garrison town, the headquarters before the war of the VIIIth German Army Corps, and at one time the home of von Moltke. Privileged, too, to possess a Royal Palace, its civic pride and military prestige made it far from amenable to occupation, but a bridgehead commission that had preceded the troops had arranged all necessary details by the time the forces arrived. The women of Coblenz, wives or widows of German officers for the most part, were particularly open in their hostility, and one was heard to exclaim to an American officer who was watching the Rhine at the foot of the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse statue at the confluence of that river and the Moselle, "Look well at our German Rhine, for it will never be yours." The number of uniformed German officers, too, who strolled about the streets, as if to demonstrate their presence to the occupiers, aroused misgivings in the Americans' minds, for their troops by a curious circumstance were really the guests of the German Army, as it was explained at the time, and not a legitimate occupying force. Then the Germans, convinced that they were not defeated in the war, but had signed an armistice by which both sides satisfied their craving for peace, began to sneer at the small American force that paraded through the streets in



GENERAL VIEW OF COLOGNE.

THE BRIDGEHEADS.

For the zones leading up to the Bridgeheads see the map in Vol. XX, p. 287.

companies of two or three with a rifle carelessly slung over their shoulders. As in all the Rhine towns, Cologne included, food, if not at all plentiful, was at least obtainable in sufficient supplies to satisfy ordinary appetites, but at a price almost prohibitive except to the most fortunate of the people. The restaurants seemed to have a monopoly of the choicest eatables, and the Americans enjoyed many good meals to which they supplied their own white bread before the main body of the army arrived. The same day the French, too, sent a small advanced detachment into Mayence, to arouse the very lively curiosity of the people of a town whose grandfathers had lived under French rule and had not entirely forgotten its many benefits. Here, too, food conditions were similar to those in the other Rhine towns.

But the great event that stirred men's hearts and minds was the crossing of the Rhine and the final occupation of the bridgeheads. On the morning of December 12 the German people in Cologne were awakened in the half dawn by the calls of buglers and a little later by the sound of cavalry passing through the city. They left their beds to see the event, and lined the streets as the British Dragoon Guards, Lancers and Hussars, with lance and pennon, followed by the Royal Horse Artillery, moved towards the Hohenzollern Bridge, that massive structure with its rugged stone battlemented arch, flanked by bronze statues of the emperors, which bridges the Rhine. It was a dull, misty morning, with the river partly obscured by drizzle, when General Sir H. Plumer, commanding the Second Army, the army of occupation, and General Jacobs of the Second Army Corps, took up their positions in front of the Union Jack that flew from the left end of the structure, and beneath the tall statue of Wilhelm II, who, "sitting stiffly on his horse, seemed as he gazed from his lofty pedestal towards the town to be keeping his face averted from the spectacle that passed below." The cavalry led, and, to the favourite tunes of the British soldier, "Tipperary" and the "Long, Long Trail," armoured cars that dipped their machine-guns in saluting General Plumer, cyclists, signallers, and transport followed to the right bank of the river, there to serve as heralds of the coming of the forces that would occupy the 30-kilometer bridgehead as a guarantee for Germany's signature and future fulfilment of the peace. The next day the infantry, having arrived on their long march forward, followed the cavalry. General Plumer was again present at the Hohenzollern Bridge to take the salute when a battalion of Royal Fusiliers of the 29th Division, leading, the Lancashire Fusiliers, Dublin Fusiliers, with bands playing, swung over the Rhine. Then came battalions from all parts of the British Isles. There were Scottish Borderers with pipes, Leinsters and other Irish, Monmouthshires and South Wales Borderers who marched to the "Men of Harlech," Hampshires and Worcestershires, and the Border Regiment waking the echoes of the Rhine to ask them if

[Official photograph.

EXAMINING A PASS AT THE BRITISH BARRIER ON THE DUSSELDORF ROAD.

they kenned John Peel. The crowds of Germans were almost as dense as the soldiers, in spite of rain and discomfort. At the Nord, or Mulheim, Bridge Scottish troops of the 9th Division, both Highland and Lowland, were pouring over the river—Royal Scots and Royal Scottish Fusiliers, Seaforths and Camerons, amid a feast of pipes and under the eye of General Sir Charles Ferguson, Military Governor of Cologne, who had been the first to fly the Union Jack from the roof of the Hotel Monopol in the city. At the Iron suspension bridge General Plumer motored to watch the 1st Canadian Division, strong, sturdy and bronzed men, cross the Rhine, while at Bonn, General Currie, commander of the Canadian Corps, received the salute from the men of the 2nd Canadian Division to the "Maple Leaf for Ever." Few more impressive armies ever

crossed a river than the British Army that day Every man had taken care that his appearance and the appearance of his equipment or artillery should be worthy of the occasion, and those military-minded Germans who braved the rain to see the crossing certainly saw a sight that they did not readily forget.

The Americans crossed the Rhine at Coblenz the same day. The infantry had arrived in the city the night before, and at seven in the morning with "Old Glory" aloft and bands playing, the long lines of khaki all topped with steel helmets and followed by the artillery moved over the German pontoon and Pfaffendorfer bridges. They occupied the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein that overlooks the city and the confluence of the Rhine and the Moselle, and was captured by the troops of the first French Republic, and went forward to take over the bridgehead. The morning march through the streets of Coblenz brought a sudden change in the attitude of the German people. The array of might, the mass of artillery, and the sight of such well set, youthful infantry won a reluctant respect from those who had believed that only a small detachment of troops from America would constitute the occupying force. The sneers of yesterday were changed into the amiabilities of to-day. And the Germans settled down to endeavour to win the favour of the Americans who, they thought, would be valuable friends at the peace table, and would act as a restraining force on the attitudes of their allies in the occupation of Germany.

The Americans, meanwhile had lost half their bridgehead. All the zone of the Coblenz bridgehead south of and including the Lahn river was taken over by the French, who thus occupied Ems, where Bismarck sent the famous forged telegram that directly led to the war of 1870–1, Nassau, and Boppard. There was more than a suspicion of friction between the Americans and the French, who were at times inclined to think the Americans too lenient with the Germans. Then the French gave General Dickman a division, with the intention that it should be placed between the Americans and the Canadians, where their lines joined to the right of Godesberg. But the American commander, exercising the rightful power of an army chief, left the French division in the rear and established what he was determined to establish—liaison with the Canadians. It was withdrawn by the French and assigned to the French Armies of the Rhine.

[French official photograph.

THE FRENCH GENERALS MANGIN AND FERRAND AND THE AMERICAN GENERAL DICKMAN PASSING THROUGH COBLENZ.

GENERALS FAYOLLE AND MANGIN WITNESSING THE MARCH-PAST OF TROOPS AT MAYENCE.

The French on December 14 staged the most inspiring and most impressive of Allied demonstrations on the Rhine. It was the formal entry into Mayence. Those who had seen the French troops welcomed amid a shower of bunting in Metz and Strasbourg agreed that remarkable though those days had been they faded before the dignified magnificence of the occupation of the German city that held the graves of many of Napoleon's Old Guard, and which, within the memories of those still living, had once been French. General Mangin's Tenth Army, famous as "shock" troops, were selected for the great occasion. It might have been a military procession in Paris, so perfect were the arrangements for the entry. The streets were sanded, troops with bayonets fixed, dressed in a blue faded by many campaigns, lined the streets, and at the square near the opera house the bands of the army assembled, the tassels of the buglers flying in the air with the change of music, making a disciplined whirl of red that had its own attraction. General Mangin, clothed in the black tunic and red breeches of the XXth Corps, mounted with his staff on one side of the square, while General Fayolle, the commander of the group of armies of occupation, in light blue, mounted on the other. As the infantry passed to give the salute as the bands played those inspiring tunes like the "Madelon" and the marches that had been the enemies of exhaustion of many a front-line march, the minds of all were taken back to the glorious days of the Marne and Verdun of a thousand battles, and a thousand scenes where the valour and endurance of the poilu had saved and ennobled France. Onlookers of all nationalities but German could not suppress a deep emotion when they saw these war-stained heroes in the hour of triumph. For it was the poilus' day. Behind them came all the varied paraphernalia of war. There were anti-aircraft guns, and the heaviest artillery. There were tanks that rumbled awkwardly over the cobbled paving, and there were trains of transport that still carried the fantastic and artistic devices as division emblems that had aroused the curiosity and the smiles of all the Allied troops in the fighting days in France. The Germans viewed the historic scene from the safe seclusion of windows, but a large crowd of poor people gathered on the streets to watch what was a stirring procession.

But the most momentous event of the day was seen by few. Generals Fayolle and Mangin had given notice that they would receive a deputation of the leading civilian inhabitants. When the procession had passed the generals proceeded to the palace of the Duke of Hesse escorted by their troops. The German deputation, 20 in number and including two ecclesiastics in robes, were ushered into the great hall of the palace. Then the doors were flung open, and Generals Fayolle and Mangin entered together with

their staffs. A dramatic thrill passed through all. In this gilded chamber, beneath a ceiling resplendent with a magnificent painting of cherubs bestowing iron crosses on every activity of German life from out of the heavens, stood on one side a brilliant assembly of French uniforms enlivened with many a hard-won decoration. There was Fayolle, wearing, like the others, his képi, his sword almost touching the floor as it hung from his side, tall, white-haired and dignified. His florid features were set. The soldier victor of many a battle had come to claim the last victory of all. By his side, stooping slightly, and his closely cropped head on one side, stood Mangin. The dark and firm jaw and the severe lines of the mouth of one of the finest fighting generals France has ever seen, whose "shock" tactics demanded as much courage of mind from the commander as courage of heart from the men, were relieved only by the high intelligent forehead. Then came Gouraud, his right arm left in Gallipoli, and his heavily bearded face contrasting strangely with the sympathetic expression of his eyes. Between these craftsmen of victory stood erect and at attention a major in full fighting regalia. He was the interpreter for the Germans. They were ranged in a semi-circle from wall to wall. With the exception of the ecclesiastics, all were dressed in deep black. Their heads bared, their faces resigned and morose, they awaited in anxious silence the word of Fayolle. Humility never saw a greater triumph, and the Burghers of Calais bore themselves with more spirit than those heavy-featured, thick-set, square-headed Germans. The interpreter announced that the Germans had a communication to make to the French generals. Each of them was severally presented by his name and title to General Fayolle, who advanced and saluted them in response to their elaborate bows as he walked down the line. Then, in succession, the President of the Province, the Burgomaster of Mayence, and the President of the Chamber of Commerce addressed the General in German, asking for the protection and lenient treatment of the inhabitants, and announcing that they were prepared to work loyally under the French administration. When these speeches had been translated into French, General Fayolle coldly and incisively said, "I am going to say to you frankly what is in my mind." And then came the truth in a deluge. As each stroke, telling of what crimes Germany had committed in the war, fell like a lash on the Germans, the General moved a few steps up and down the floor, his ringing voice holding all in silence, profound and impressive. More and more impassioned the speech grew as General Fayolle mercilessly exposed the falsehood and shame of Germany as he tramped the ducal floor. The war which they had forced on France they were told was the most unjust and cruel that humanity had ever known, and had been marked by refinements of barbarity which the whole world had condemned. They had not only ravaged Belgium and France, but they had stolen everything they could possibly lay their hands on. "That is not war It is robbery by armed force. To-day in our country and in Belgium thousands of families are homeless and without resources. Their soil has been turned into a desert. That is the situation which the iniquity of your war has created and for which you will remain responsible." The General then enumerated the defeats of the German Armies since July 15, 1918, the huge captures in men and guns of the Allies, and the fina asking for grace when their armies were on the brink of final disaster. "Now we are on the Rhine," he added in a ring of triumph. He told them that they need fear nothing so long as they obeyed the regulations of General Mangin, who was to be commander in Mayence, and he went over and personally assured the Church dignitaries that freedom of religious beliefs would be guaranteed. One of the Germans, all of whom had remained silent throughout the address, accepting it as a criminal accepts that sure and terrible summing up of a judge, burst into tears, but the others, with gloom depicted on every line of their faces, awaited General Mangin's assurance, given in a soft, purring voice that contrasted remarkably with the features of the general, that he would do all to ensure the prosperity of the city, reminding them that their grandfathers had been happy under the republicanism of the French. Then they slowly filed out of the hall into the gardens and to the streets, while the French generals appearing on the steps, received the colours from their troops to the stirring accompaniment of the "Marseillaise." The day was over, the triumph recorded. But it still remained for a great painter to immortalize the scene in the palace hall. For there have been few greater or more significant. General

Gouraud was seen half an hour after the ceremony buying souvenir picture postcards in a humble shop of the city.

Occupying Wiesbaden, the well-known resort, and advancing to the outskirts of Frankfort, which was assigned to the neutral zone, the French completed their occupation of the bridgehead and of the Palatinate, where General Gerard's Eighth Army took charge of such towns as Worms and Speyer. A corps also joined up with the Belgians in front of Aix-la-Chapelle, while the Belgians themselves advanced to the outskirts of Dusseldorf. The whole occupation was completed within a few days, smoothly, satisfactorily, and happily, and the soldiers settled down to make the best of the time that was to pass before peace was signed and demobilization took full effect.

GENERAL LECOMTE ADDRESSING THE NOTABLES OF WIESBADEN
Who stand bareheaded. The French General can be seen a few steps in advance of the group of his officers.

Naturally the finding of satisfactory and comfortable billets was the first concern of all, but the power conferred upon Allied officers of disregarding the objections of individual Germans to one of the chief burdens of occupation facilitated the process. At Bonn General Sir Arthur Currie, the Canadian Commander-in-Chief, found himself living in a luxurious mansion that belonged to a relative of one of the most distinguished officers of his staff who, while quite willing to place a suite of rooms at her relative's disposal, was quite averse from accommodating the whole staff. The German people, however, for the most part, complied very willingly with the demands of the Allies. The fortunes of billeting were often amusing. A Canadian mess was established in a house where the wife of a German colonel, who had been made prisoner only a few days before the armistice by the very division which utilized his plate and linen, lived. An American general, William G. Haan, commanding the VIIth Corps, occupying Trèves and the Moselle valley up to Cochem, found his grandmother living in a Rhine village surrounded by smiling American soldiers. In one of the many royal palaces of the occupied area American soldiers slept in rooms hung with armour and famous old paintings. Then various casinos and hotels were taken over for clubs, while sports grounds were requisitioned for the men, apart from the demands of headquarters staffs for buildings for their work. The Germans, however, after the first trials of occupation had passed, and they

had become accustomed to seeing Allied soldiers living in their rooms and occupying their favourite resorts, determined to profit by the country's misfortune. Souvenirs of all kinds made their appearance in the shops. There were iron crosses, betraying their name by being silver plated, displayed in windows for sale to the souvenir hunter, and in the

FRENCH 1 FRANC NOTE, FOR USE IN THE ARMY ONLY.

American zone all the tailors and drapery stores competed with one another in selling the insignia of an "A" and an "O," which the headquarters troops wore on their uniforms. Souvenir handkerchiefs, "in remembrance of my occupation of the Rhine," as they were inscribed, appeared everywhere, and the whole Rhineland seemed to have departed on a delirious chase for the Allied troops' money and favour. Ingenuity every week suggested some new offer to the purchaser, and the German shopkeepers in course of time began to find that occupation, far from being a disaster, was the best of commercial propositions and the most profitable of investments. Of course there were objections, and for some time the German food distributing bodies threatened to curtail the supplies of those who sold iron crosses to the Allied troops, while the newspapers condemned the traffic in many a vigorous leading article—but it survived. The restaurants and cafés, too, offered every attraction possible to the occupying troops. The orchestras played American, British, or French tunes as the case might be, and even the national anthems of their enemies. The Allied officers and men could only, at first, view with amused amazement these conversions of humiliation into hard cash, and accepted them with a contemptuous smile that expressed more than words their opinion of the Germans.

Soon the Rhineland became converted into a huge military camp, in which, behind the outposts of machine guns and artillery, always ready for any emergency, and the little bridgehead villages populated with an army prepared at any moment on a call to take up the offensive and defensive positions that had been selected for action, an extensive variety of amusements sprang into life for the benefit of the occupying troops, and often for the edification of the German people. Every kind of sport held its place. Golf vied with football and cricket, swimming with horse racing and horse shows. The Americans taught the German children how to play baseball, and the Canadians showed how they excelled at lacrosse. Then the Schiller, a Rhine vessel, flying the British flag, made her daily trip with a load of smiling soldiers to Coblenz, while all the armies explored the Rhine with bands playing from the decks of steamers, and every resort had its Allied visitor. Nor were indoor amusements neglected. In addition to the number of clubs, there were dances and concerts, cinema shows and lectures, while both the British and the American armies brought into existence colleges for their soldiers at which every possible subject was taught. The demand

METZ, FRENCH AGAIN AFTER 48 YEARS, ISSUED ITS OWN PAPER CURRENCY.

for learning among the armies of occupation, indeed, was remarkable, and nothing more valuable was ever accomplished in any army than the instruction which both officers and men received from these impromptu colleges.

Of course, the Germans, too, catered in amusements for their enforced guests. The programmes at the Opera were printed in two languages, English or French as the case might be, and German, while the German publishers, with the permission of the military authorities, issued in English elaborate illustrated guides to the Rhine and the Moselle valley, and in the American area "A Description of the American Bridgehead" actually appeared. Both the

British and Americans published daily newspapers on the Rhine, *The Cologne Post* at Cologne, and *The Amaroc* at Coblenz, which served the very excellent purpose of keeping the men informed up to the moment of the news of the outside world, when the Paris or London newspapers arrived at least a day or two after publication.

The greatest problem of all that the military authorities on the Rhine had to face, however, was that of civil administration of the area occupied. The orders to the populace, which were only drawn up after long disputes and many corrections, demanded that every person above the age of twelve must carry at all times an identity card bearing his signature, address, and photograph, and that the head of each household was to keep a list of every person in the building, with particulars as to occupation, age, sex, and nationality posted inside the outer door. All movement out-of-doors without written permission was restricted from seven at night to five in the morning, while the carrying of weapons and ammunition or their retention was strictly forbidden. Then there were restrictions on the sale of alcoholic liquors, which were altered from time to time, while assemblies or meetings without permission were forbidden. A complete censorship of the Press and the postal, telegraphic and telephonic services was instituted, and the newspapers appeared with a note at the head of the first page, stating that they had been issued under such censorship. The taking of photographs, the possession of Allied property, the concealment of pigeons, and the committing of any act of sabotage or injury to the American Army, subjected the offender to all the rigours of a court-martial. Many of these rules were amended or extended as time passed. Strikes were forbidden, and labour was requisitioned for building roads, both measures which experience proved to be necessary.

But the responsibilities of occupation of enemy territory were found to involve much more than the mere posting up of arbitrary regulations and ensuring their observance. The safety of the Allied Armies was the supreme demand of the hour. Armed vigilance ruthlessly enforced would doubtlessly have guaranteed that, but it was necessary in the interests of all that the people should live in tranquillity and that disturbances and irritation should be so rare as to become negligible. To ensure this it was necessary not only to see that the Germans were well fed but also that they were fully employed. A common policy recognizing responsibility for the welfare of the peoples committed to the Allies' care was found. The British, French and Americans all differed on detailed policy, but they all agreed that although Germany had to bear the financial burden of occupation they had themselves a moral burden. Thus, while the Germans were

[Official photograph.

EASTER HOLIDAY SCENE AT COLOGNE.

called upon to obey all regulations and orders, while punishment awaited all malefactors, the Allies were making a thorough survey of the resources of the Rhineland and a complete investigation of the state of the people's health, with the object of ameliorating any hardship which might exist. To maintain perfect relationship with the civilian population, to carry out these investigations with efficiency, to watch attentively over the attitude of the people, to provide the machinery of justice, it was necessary for each of the Allied Armies to detail a number of officers to supervize all civilian affairs. The call for administrative ability, the demand for knowledge of finance, agriculture, industry, politics, public health, sanitation, education

[Official photograph.

GENERAL ROBERTSON RECEIVES MARSHAL FOCH AT COLOGNE.

Marshal Foch arrived by river on board the Bismarck.

and law was exceedingly heavy. To the lasting credit of the Allied Armies the men were forthcoming.

The three chief armies of the Rhine all approached the problem of dealing with the German civilians from a different standpoint. They issued similar regulations and used similar machinery, but their interpretation of the orders and the administration of the territories were not the same. The French quickly settled down to the policy of refraining from inflicting that irritation which accompanies the penalizing of

GENERAL GERARD.

Commanded the French Eighth Army.

small sins. Nor did they interfere with the pleasures of the people, and, in fact, the deadly offence of "fraternization" was an offence of conscience only in the French zone. The French, indeed, could not forget, as General Mangin had once remarked, that the people of Mayence had once been French, and there was an inclination both pardonable and politic to show to the German people the superiorities of French policy in administration. That ingratitude, the abiding vice of the German, was their reward made no apparent difference.

The French occupied area was divided into about 30 administrative circles, each having at its head a controller assisted by a staff of experts chosen for their special knowledge of agriculture, industry and law. In Mayence a central board sat, whose duties were to observe the administration of the territory and to assist in the speedy rebuilding of the industrial and agricultural life of the zone. No phase of German existence in the occupied area missed the watchful eyes of this board, and the provision of coal and even that of a German Director of Education for the schools of Mayence were made. Throughout the French area peace and prosperity went hand in hand. The peasants toiled unremittingly in the fields, Wiesbaden, with an influx of visitors from the

other areas, came into a new happiness, while the large industrial areas gained a new activity and a new life.

The Americans, on the other hand, dealt out justice with a severity and fairness, a freedom from favour and a cold relentlessness, that frequently angered the Germans. They were particularly severe with those who were found with stolen army property in their possession, and the Germans bitterly complained of the sentences which were inflicted for this offence. Yet in the early days of the American occupation rumours were circulated throughout the capitals of Europe that the Americans were not dealing with the Germans as drastically as they should have done. It was said that a thinly veiled friendliness was being shown, and the American objection to certain regulations in other zones, which they thought too severe, was quoted as proof of the canard. It was true that when the American soldiers, all young men and very impressionable, and many of them reinforcements who had never seen a day of fighting, arrived in Germany they were surprised to find the streets so orderly and the buildings so substantial and comfortable. They had been living amid shattered villages in the worst part of France, and they could not but feel some exhilaration in being billeted in a large modern town like Trèves or Coblenz. Then, too, the German Army when withdrawing had left behind at the different Landrats instructions that the Americans were to be treated more with the spirit of friends than of conquerors, for they would, it was hoped, be Germany's best friends at the Peace Conference. So that when the Americans first arrived on the Rhine the Germans, both from fear and from policy, performed many small acts of kindness which the soldiers did appreciate. But the lure soon passed. The trick was overplayed. The German, thinking himself secure, began to presume too much. The soldier became disgusted with his plausible and sycophantic hosts. And the Germans saw with alarm that the American was beginning to dislike them more and more. Then they tried bluster, and promptly found themselves in trouble. At last, when the proceedings of the Peace Conference plainly showed that America endorsed all the judicious severity of France and Britain, they charged the Americans with perfidiously breaking their word of honour. The German Army, on this new theory, was not defeated at the close of the war, but with great simple-mindedness and in the name of humanity had kindly consented to sign an armistice that guaranteed a peace to be based on President Wilson's 14 points. The result was that every day the American dislike of the German increased, and it was not long before an epidemic of street fights took place. When peace was signed the occupiers and the occupied were on the worst of terms, the one persuading themselves they had been basely deceived, and the other convinced that the Germans needed another sound thrashing to improve their manners.

Stadttheater Mainz

Théâtre de la Ville de Mayence

Dimanche le 30 Mars 1919

Représentation Extraordinaire donnée par la Troupe du Théâtre de la Porte Saint-Martin de Paris.

L'Aiglon

Sonntag, 30. März 1919

Letztes Ensemble-Gastspiel der Mitglieder des Theaters Porte St. Martin in Paris.

L'Aiglon

Kassenöffnung 7 Uhr. Anfang 7½ Uhr. Ende gegen 11 Uhr.

PLAYBILL IN FRENCH AND GERMAN
of a performance at the theatre of Mayence.

To the administration of the territories the Americans brought many of the ideas of the New World. They drew up sanitary regulations for the villages which drove the Germans into consternation, and they instituted a series of public health inspections and laws for which few of the Germans showed any liking. Thus young America experimented with her laws on old Germany, and the Germans found that they had a good deal to learn. The Americans attached an officer in charge of civil affairs to each division. His duties were to watch over the district and report to headquarters. In this way the Americans were enabled to know precisely what was happening and to watch the

process of justice as it fell upon the transgressor. "Fraternizing" with the enemy was punished with a heavy hand.

The British, while very severe on actual violations of the law, adopted a policy of as little interference as possible. Under Lieut.-General Sir Charles Fergusson and Major-General C. S. Clive, an organization not very different from that of the Americans was created, with excellent results. The British area was particularly difficult to handle. For the most part it was industrial, with a turbulent population and in close proximity to the storm centre of Dusseldorf. The prevention of smuggling to the neutral zone and the suppression of industrial disputes occupied most attention, while the German efforts to create dissension and mutiny in the British Army when the peace terms were about to be presented demanded all the vigilance of the authorities to defeat.

The question of feeding the Germans was left to a special commission appointed by the Allied Governments to deal with the problem, and finally supplies began to arrive, although the Army had to anticipate arrangements by selling Army food at fixed prices. Then all the various commissions were amalgamated into what became known as the Allied Rhineland Commission, with M. Tirard, an ex-Governor of French Morocco, as chairman, and Sir Harold Stuart and Mr. P. B. Noyes, of the Community Silver Company of America, serving as British and American representatives. The Belgians, too, sent their representative, but the Italians, although requested to have a commissioner, refused. It was Mr. P. B. Noyes who submitted to President Wilson the points on which the civilian control of the Rhine in the Peace Treaty was substituted for the military control which Marshal Foch desired.

With the approach of peace the Rhinelands awoke to interest in the terms. That the peace would be impossible to sign, that ruination faced Germany if she did sign, that it would be traitorous to sign—all these and many more reckless sentiments were expressed by indignant Germans both in the occupied zone and in Frankfort. Bravado held complete sway for some time, but it gradually melted until the last few days before Germany was due to announce her intention to sign. All the Allied troops moved forward, all the old scenes were re-enacted. The soldiers hailed with joy the prospect of moving forward once more, and many hoped that Germany would refuse to assent to the peace. But this show of determination impressed the German people. They began to revise their opinions, not on the peace, but on the advisability of signing. They had hoped that an insidious propaganda, the propaganda of discontent, would have made such progress that the French and British Armies would have refused to march forward and the Americans would have departed for home. The signing of peace was purposely prolonged, they said, with this object, but they miscalculated once again, and their only condemnation of the treaty was in words. Marshal Foch arrived at Kreuznach, a pretty resort not far from Bingen, just before the peace was signed, and on Sunday, June 22, 1919, at seven in the evening, he learned by telephone that the Germans had agreed to sign.

CHAPTER CCCXII.

THE COLLAPSE OF GERMANY.

EFFECTS OF THE BLOCKADE—UKRAINIAN FOOD SUPPLIES—WAR LOANS AND NATIONAL CREDIT—SUBMARINE FAILURES—SOCIALISM IN THE ARMY—MORAL WEAKENING OF THE PEOPLE—LICHNOWSKY MEMOIR—HERR VON KÜHLMANN AND THE PEACE OFFENSIVE—FALL OF VON KÜHLMANN—ADMIRAL VON HINTZE FOREIGN MINISTER—A MINISTRY OF FAILURE—EFFECT OF THE BATTLE OF AMIENS—PRINCE MAX CHANCELLOR—SOCIALISTIC PARTICIPATION—EFFECT OF CAMBRAI—MAIN HEADQUARTERS DEMANDS PEACE—THE FOURTEEN POINTS—SOCIALIST IMPATIENCE—ABDICATION OF THE KAISER—THE ARMISTICE.

IN previous chapters it has been shown how Germany, during the period from the defeat on the Marne to the fall of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, had used the weapon of peace negotiations side by side with the military and naval arms to secure a victory that should give her the world hegemony of her desires at the ultimate cost of her enemies. It has also been shown that owing to the steadfast purpose of the Allies these schemes had resulted in failure. The Germans had now become the prey to two conflicting policies. They had found themselves in the position of a dishonest gambler, who had staked all on the success of a sharper's coup, and had not succeeded in getting away with the winnings. Could they have concluded peace on the basis of the war-map, their victory would have been overwhelming. They began to see the fruits of victory slipping away from them with the mere passage of time, as they reasoned in a vicious circle. All the circumstances called for an early peace, but they had staked far too much to cut their losses, and their peace aims, whenever these began to take a concrete form, always presumed punitive, financial, territorial and economic indemnities. These indemnities in themselves defeated the project of their authors; it would have taken two to make such a peace, and the Allies were unwilling. Thus the Germans were in the position of being compelled to continue the war and to incur further losses against ever receding hopes of reimbursement.

This dilemma was the governing factor of Germany's policy during the period from March to November, 1918. If the period previously reviewed* was one of tremendous events in the wide areas of the world campaign, that now under consideration was not less tremendous in its effect on Germany herself. In the skein of events that brought the war to a conclusion certain threads stand out clearly. It would be well to get these disentangled before passing on to the trend of actual events.

In March, 1918, the war had gone on already for three and a half years, to the amazement of the world and against all calculations of the Germans. In this period many of the war schemes of the Allies had been tested out, and had only just come to fruition. Chief among these was the blockade. With the interruption of the normal carrying trade of the world, the withdrawal of large masses of men from productive industry, and a consequent decline in the bartering of goods for food, the entire world was feeling the pinch of shortage. Whole grain-producing countries had been laid waste, whole industrial districts had been

*See Chapter CCXXX, Germany: August, 1916-February, 1918.

turned over to the manufacture of war material, and owing to the impressment of shipping for war purposes, distant agricultural countries had found themselves stacked with food that they could neither consume nor export. Germany had calculated on this being the case, and in time of peace had devoted great effort to making herself independent of foreign food by stimulating home production. But Germany's miscalculation of the duration of the war falsified her calculation of her own endurance. For a year she could hold out against a blockade that was never effective; for two years, against a more stringent blockade, with increasing discomfort; for a third year, against a really effective blockade, only with considerable suffering; and she found herself facing the future with something like terror.

The serious state of the food supply by April,

HERR VON WALDOW.
Food Minister.

1918, was reflected in a speech in the Reichstag Committee by the Vice-Chancellor, Herr von Payer, who announced that the Food Administration *hoped*, with existing stocks, "not to reduce the bread ration for the present," while the potato ration would remain at seven pounds a week. This speech was followed by a searching examination of the food question by the public and by the Press of all shades. The sum of information from individual localities revealed a still more alarming outlook in regard to meat and fats. It was found that cattle stocks and head of pigs had been heavily reduced by slaughtering, owing to lack of fodder. Milch cows had been drawn upon to maintain meat sales, thereby wrecking the prospect of the winter's milk supply. An announcement that early threshing would be

FIELD-MARSHAL VON EICHHORN.
German Commander-in-Chief in the Ukraine.
Murdered at Kieff.

compulsory was taken to mean that the grain stocks were even lower than in the previous year. When, therefore, the people were informed in May that the bread ration would be further reduced from seven ounces to five-and-a-half, the order was received with grim resignation. A promise of an increased potato ration, and an extra allowance of sugar was disbelieved, and in fact it was never kept. Disappointment was hardly tempered by the promises of Herr von Waldow, the Food Minister, in the Reichstag that great hopes were entertained of receiving grain supplies from the Ukraine.

These supplies, the existence of which was already beginning to be doubted in many quarters, had been dangled before the eyes of the people ever since the ratification of the Ukraine treaty, but they had never materialized. Independent reports from the Ukraine had given a depressing account of destruction and neglect on the part of the Ukrainian peasantry, who had hoarded their own supplies, and had abandoned the spring cultivation altogether. These reports blamed the severity of the German military administration, which had treated the Ukrainians as a conquered people

The drastic arrangements of Field-Marshal von Eichhorn, German commander-in-chief in the Ukraine, might result in a reasonable harvest in the following year, but for the present needs, and those of the immediate future, little could be counted upon from that quarter. It is significant of the temper of the German people at this period that these unofficial reports appeared to carry more weight than the most fervent protestations of the officials.

Continuous shortage was also beginning to have its effect on the health and energy of the German people. Mortality statistics of dysentry were on the upward grade, while deaths from phthisis, pneumonia and other lung complaints, had risen 40 per cent Infant mortality was always high in the rural districts of Germany, but its sharp rise in the cities was a new feature. The average for Berlin in September, 1915, had been 9·62 per thousand. By June, 1917, it had risen to 13·52, on a steadily upward curve. The births for the whole of Germany had fallen some 40 per cent. Heart ailments among young people had also increased, since many such young people were obliged to do a man's work on a ration below the normal needs of their years. Thus the food necessary for young people between the ages of fifteen and eighteen employed in normal circumstances was 1,800 to 2,400 calories; they were receiving 1,200 calories.* An increased lassitude had become noticeable in the German workman, with a consequent decrease in output. Higher wages had no effect on production, since increased spending power could not affect the amount of food obtainable. Decreased production compelled the importation of foreign industrial labour, chiefly from Holland and Switzerland, with correspondingly high expense. The depression was further augmented, in July, 1918, by the calling up of men up to the age of fifty-two.

Decline of character is also noticeable from the statistics of the period. Judicial statistics, which should have been reduced by the numbers in the Army, were swelled by prosecutions for illicit traffic in food, which the most drastic sentences failed to check. There was an increase in practically all kinds of crime, but it was most marked in crimes of violence and in juvenile offences. The Germans had never been famous in Europe for manners or courtliness, but it is noteworthy that a recurrent note in the observations of all travellers at that period is the still greater decline in social politeness. The Germans were suffering from nerves. As long as the news from the war front was good, or even not definitely bad, the workers had been prepared to put up with an appalling degree of discomfort, buoyed

HARVESTING IN THE UKRAINE.

by the belief (which was carefully fostered by Government propaganda) that final victory was not far distant. But with the increasing signs of collapse on the war front, a marked decline in the moral of the people at home set in. Reports of strikes and food riots—at first thought in Allied countries to be designed by the German government for the purpose of hoodwinking the world—became more and more insistent and circumstantial, compelling the conclusion that Germany had begun to lose her hold.

Similar tendencies were at work in the field

* *Soziale Praxis*, September 27, 1917. Article by Dr. Drenemann, M.O.H. of Dresden.

of finance. It has been shown that Germany down to the end of 1917 had raised in a series of seven loans the sum of £3,639,205,000.* On June 11 the results of the eighth loan were announced as £750,071,270, not including the

COUNT VON ROEDERN.
Finance Minister.

amounts from former war loan offered for conversion. The total therefore was now £4,389,276,270. The amount necessary for the service of such a debt was already beginning to be regarded with anxiety in German financial circles. Its effect on the people was to produce the belief that the Government intended to impound through the banks all private savings for investment and then repudiate the loan. That such fears were then possible is indicative of the state of public opinion at the time. These fears were not allayed by a statement of Count von Roedern in the Reichstag. Questioned on the subject of his budget programme and the prospects of Germany's future solvency, he replied: "We do not know yet the amount of indemnity we shall win." He was obliged to admit the superiority of the English system of financing the war, whereby a much greater part of war expenditure was covered by current taxation. Like Herr Helfferich he looked for reimbursement to a future when Germany should be surrounded by a ring of states paying tribute.

In Count von Roedern's budget statement new taxes were announced with a total estimated yield of £150,000,000, of which, however, the sum of £30,000,000 was non-recurring, being derived from the confiscation of war profits made in 1917. There was an acknowledged deficit of £140,000,000, but examination of the Budget figures showed that this did not represent the true position. While crediting the country with the old peace-time revenue the Finance Minister had neglected to enter on the debit side the £71,000,000 paid in peace time for the upkeep of the Army and Navy. The true position was that without indemnities Germany must raise an additional £300,000,000

POSTER ADVERTISING THE GERMAN WAR LOAN.

by taxation to meet liabilities already incurred. The Reichstag, of course, was not blind to this, though little was made of it in debate. But its effect on trade was to redouble the demand for indemnities among the big business corporations. Thus already in May, when the budget figures were announced, the Industrial Union of Saxony, one of the great industrial organizations in Germany, issued a manifesto stating that the war (prior to the eighth loan) had

* Volume XV., page 315.

FOOD RIOT IN BERLIN.
A looted shop for the sale of delicatessen in the Invalidenstrasse.

added £740,000,000 to the peace expenditure of £240,000,000. This, it was pointed out, would absorb 60 per cent. of the whole income of the nation. Capitalised at 5 per cent. the National Debt would then amount to £19,600,000,000, or more than the entire wealth of Germany before the war. "Such a burden," added the manifesto, "would completely paralyse production and all spirit of enterprise, and bring complete ruin to our economic life."

This circular reverberated through the German commercial world, and other great business corporations issued similar manifestoes. These had their echo in Chambers of Commerce and in the municipal councils of the great commercial cities. These still looked on Germany as the ultimate victor (they, like the State, had made no provision for the possibility of even an indecisive war, quite apart from any question of defeat), and their demands were proportionately heavy. The Hamburg Senate passed a resolution demanding that the Federal Council at the conclusion of peace should press for a sufficient war indemnity in money or raw materials, the formation of great colonial possessions, and the prohibition of an economic boycott after the war. Fears for Germany's economic position had in fact begun to give her commercial thinkers considerable anxiety. Germany had no trade that the Allies need purchase, no raw materials she could profitably threaten to withhold.

Great events had happened in Germany when the ninth and last loan was announced for subscription between September 23 and October 23, 1918; but these events may be conveniently anticipated here. The loan took the form of 5 per cent. bonds and 4½ per cent. redeemable Treasury Bills, both at 98. Germany had hitherto launched her loans on the crest of military successes; never did loan start its career under more ill-starred auspices than this. The campaign of advertisement opened on September 9. Bapaume had fallen a fortnight earlier; a week after that the Drocourt-Quéant line had been breached. While the loan campaign was in progress General Pershing flattened out the St. Mihiel salient, capturing 15,000 prisoners and 200 guns, and giving the sceptical Germans a new view of America as a fighting force. Before the subscription list was actually opened the outer defences of the Hindenburg line had been stormed, Nazareth and Samaria had fallen, and the Bulgarians were in full retreat on a front of a hundred miles between Monastir and Lake Doiran. The period of the loan



GERMAN SUBMARINES IN HARBOUR AT WILHELMSHAVEN.

coincided with one continuous series of defeats for the Germans, and before the list was due to close Damascus, St. Quentin, Cambrai, Ostend, Lille, Douai and Bruges had been retaken by the Allies, the Belgian coast had been cleared, and the Germans on the Western front were in full retreat. On October 14 it was announced that the period of subscription would be extended for an additional fourteen days. Long before that period had elapsed Bulgaria had become a republic, Austria had signed an armistice, and the German troops were back on the Scheldt and the Meuse, with the abdication of the Kaiser a foregone conclusion.

The close of the loan coincided with the fall of the old *régime*. The *Vorwärts*, at that time likely to have been well informed, stated that subscriptions to the nominal extent of ten milliards of marks, representing at pre-war rates about £500,000,000, had been received. The amount represented nothing like face value. The rapid depreciation of the mark had been going on through the war. Germany had practically abandoned world-trade for the time being owing to the blockade, but those whose business it was to know the position of her potential credit were well aware that the neutral markets of Holland, Scandinavia, and especially Switzerland, were flooded with German paper money, issued against prospective victory as the main security. As Germany's prospects declined so the exchange weakened, till the collapse in foreign markets came and the German mark in Switzerland and Holland defeated all attempts at support. The pre-war value of 100 Swiss francs was M.81.45; by April 1 it was M.112.75, and by July 31 it was M.151.00. The pre-war value of 100 Dutch florins had been M.168.80; by April 1 it was M.216.00, and had been as low as M.315.25; by July 31 it was M.311.00. A similar movement was also noticeable in Scandinavia. Little wonder that the German commercial community was showing signs of financial as well as social panic.

The progress of the submarine war was not without its effect on the German people. Here again two contending influences were at work—from the side of the Allies constant and continuous pressure, and from the German side a steady concealment of the truth. These two ultimately contributed to bring about the same result.

The German people, with all their gift for self-deception, could not forget that they had been promised victory through the medium of the submarine within six months from the opening of the campaign of unrestricted ruthlessness. In that period England was to be brought to her knees. The promise had been

due of fulfilment in August, 1917, but the Germans had allowed themselves to be put off again and again. Nevertheless, they kept heart in regard to the submarine with greater tenacity than they had shown in any other kind of warfare, perhaps because it was the subject they knew least about. For there is little doubt that the conception of the submarine campaign was evolved by political economists as a *pis aller* for the disappointed hopes of the military. German memoranda since published show that it was thrashed out as an economic proposition before it was even presented to the German Admiralty as a naval problem. In the list of eminent persons consulted in its early stages there does not figure one single naval officer, while in 1917 it was Ludendorff the soldier, Erzberger the politician, Delbrück, Dernburg and Solf, the economists, who were the enthusiasts for the submarine campaign—though by the beginning of 1918 Ludendorff had joined the growing band of sceptics. The navy, given the policy of "sink-at-sight," tried to carry it out to the best of its ability.

In the Reichstag debate on the Naval estimates in April, 1918, Admiral von Capelle, Imperial Secretary of State for the Navy, made a speech on the submarine campaign, the wild statements of which should have driven clearheaded statesmen, if any such still remained unbewitched, to examine his figures more closely. For example, in announcing the tonnage sunk he counted the ships of all the world, while in estimating the tonnage that would be available to replace them he included only British shipbuilding, conveniently overlooking the vast output of America and the greatly increased programme of the Allies. In calculating the steel required by Great Britain for replacing the ships sunk he referred to the requirements of America as a decrease in the available supply, neglecting the fact that the steel in question was going into American shipbuilding which would be available to the Allies. There were other discrepancies, but with the small exception of the Independent Socialists the Reichstag was in no mood for critical examination. On behalf of the Majority Socialists Herr Noske said, "We consider it necessary to employ all fighting means and do not think of any restriction in the U-boat war." Admiral von Capelle's speech was the occasion for an outburst of demands for even more ruthless methods, and the Admiral in reply declared he would do everything possible to promote and develop the weapon.

The speech had been preceded by equally wild statements in the Press, made at the instance of the German Admiralty Administration, and it was followed by the publication of still wider

SUBSCRIBING TO THE NINTH WAR LOAN AT THE REICHSBANK, BERLIN.

claims. The Conservatives in the Reichstag put "no restriction on the use of submarines" into their prospective peace terms. But by July, when the third reading of the Naval estimates was taken, deferred hopes had begun to produce a slightly more critical atmosphere. True, with one or two uninfluential exceptions, the criticism was not directed against the campaign, but rather against the method of its prosecution. Admiral von Capelle was thought

GEORG NOSKE.

not to have been vigorous enough, and side by side with his further wild statements he was found mildly defending himself. Two main lines of attack were directed against him. On the one hand rumours were prevalent that the Allies had discovered a means for defeating the submarine at sea; and Herr Pfleger, the Centre deputy, asked whether it was true that two-thirds had been sunk. On the other hand there was the question of the transport of American troops. On January 16, 1918, Herr Hegt, Prussian Minister of Finance, in his budget speech in the Landtag, had said "The great army over the water cannot swim and cannot fly. It will not come." But on May 10, Mr. Baker, Secretary for the Navy in the United States, had announced that the half-million Americans estimated to reach France by that date had been exceeded, without the casualty of a single soldier through submarine attack. By June 9 it was officially announced in Washington that the number in Europe exceeded 700,000. The men were there, the Germans knew they were there. In the memoirs of von Tirpitz we read: "That such an enormous number should have been raised and transhipped took us all, including the Army Administration, by surprise." Yet that did not prevent Admiral von Capelle, in his speech on the third reading, from going into elaborate calculations of tonnage to prove that the thing was impossible, and that if it had happened the demand for tonnage involved in its maintenance would prove merely the greater embarrassment for the Allies.

This might satisfy a heated Reichstag for the moment, but neither the Press nor the people were now in the mood to be put off with phrases and calculations. On August 8 Mr. Lloyd George roundly declared that at least 150 submarines had been destroyed, half of these during that year. At the same time rumours—of the kind to which the Germans were always an easy prey—had it that so great were the losses of submarines that seamen had been unwilling to put to sea in them, that they had grown tired of seeing comrades depart who never returned, that the authorities had found it advisable not to terminate cruises at the port of embarcation lest the non-return of the boats should be noticed. These rumours, exaggerated though they were, combined with the general discontent at the failures to defeat the Allies, had their effect. Admiral von Capelle in due course was superseded as Secretary of the Navy by Vice-Admiral von Behnke, and Grand Admiral von Holtzendorff, chief of the Admiralty Staff, gave way to Admiral von Scheer, the unsuccessful commander at the battle of Jutland.

Other factors were at work in the German fleet, of which the submarine arm was, of course, only a small part. It will be remembered that the presence of Socialist agitation had already occupied the notice of the German naval authorities in connexion with an outbreak of mutiny at Wilhelmshafen, which had culminated in the execution of the seaman Reichnitz.* The Germans had toyed with the Russian revolution in their efforts to turn it against the Allies; here were the seamen of their own fleet profiting so far by it as to turn it against their leaders. The truth about Jutland was long kept from the German public, but the humblest German seaman can hardly have been under any illusion. The fleet had been founded on the principle of its being liable to put to sea as a fighting machine, but it was not built, and not adapted, for sea-

* See Chapter CCXXX., page 304.

keeping. With so prolonged a period in harbour, and with no outlet for fighting energy, the discipline of any fleet would have been liable to decay. The Germans proved no exception. When the time came the German sailors were found with the defects of their virtues. Iron discipline and perfect organization, coupled with the prospect of death at any moment, had made them strong in revolt and indifferent to consequences. With the march of events they had become an added menace to their country.

There were signs, not less ominous, of a general moral collapse in the army. Socialist propaganda was no new thing in the German Army. As long ago as 1902 it had become so noticeable as to form the subject of a German

ADMIRAL SCHEER.

military novel,* of which a million copies had been sold in the year of publication. This propaganda had been dormant at the outbreak of the war, when the lust of battle ran high, and the promised victory always seemed not far distant. But with the first waning of German success it had reappeared. In 1916 there had been an outbreak of mutiny in the Sixth Army (drawn from the industrial districts of Rhineland and Westphalia) attributed to Socialist propaganda. It had been ruthlessly suppressed and was at the time one of the best kept secrets of the war. Of the state of affairs in which this mutiny was produced there is



VICE-ADMIRAL BEHNKE.

the best first-hand evidence in the memoirs of Ludendorff himself. "Looking back," he says, "I say our decline began clearly with the outbreak of the revolution in Russia. . . By sending Lenin to Russia our Government had moreover assumed a great responsibility. From a military point of view his journey was justified, for Russia had to be laid low, but our Government should also have seen to it that we were not involved in her fall."

His estimate of the German national spirit is also illuminating from the same point of view.

"At the beginning of 1918," he writes, "in Germany the national spirit appeared to be better than with our Allies; nevertheless, it had sunk very low, and feeling had become worse. I must admit I formed too favourable an estimate of our remaining energy. . .

"The troops had borne the continuous defensive with uncommon difficulty. Skulkers were already numerous. They reappeared as soon as the battle was over, and it had become quite common for divisions which came out of action with desperately low effectives, to be considerably stronger after only a few days."

This aspect of the German moral had not escaped the independent notice of British war correspondents, whose dispatches of the period are full of evidence from prisoners that German military police were regularly posted on the outskirts of the field to stop the ways of escape.

* *Jena oder Sedan*, by Franz Anton Beyerlein, English Edition, reprinted 1914.



COLOGNE: THE NEW BRIDGE.

Regimental discipline was also in a deplorable state. Of the German offensive in March and April, Ludendorff writes with great bitterness that the Allies' machine-guns were not grappled with more vigorously because the attackers were not storm troops and often wasted time looking for food.

> The way in which the troops stopped round captured supplies, while individuals stayed behind to search houses and farms for food, were serious matters. They impaired success and showed poor discipline. Frequent declarations of amnesty also had a bad effect on the men.

The rapidity of this deterioration is further revealed by Ludendorff in describing the abortive German offensive of August 9:

> Returing troops greeted one particular division that was going up fresh and gallant to the attack with shouts of "blacklegs" and "war-prolongers" . . . The officers in many instances had lost all influence, and allowed themselves to be carried away by the stream.

The decay was not less behind the line, and in some regiments it had become impossible to allow soldiers to go on leave, because of the collusion between the townsfolk and deserters. In May the General of the Rhine province sent for certain socialist editors to come to Münster for a consultation. There he explained that he desired the Socialist Press to combat certain "false views" among the people. Asked what those false views were, the General said they took the following shape:

> The war would come to an end if our soldiers at the front were to throw down their arms. The enemy would not advance, and if he did it would not be a bad thing. After all, it is a matter of indifference whether the German workers work for German, French or British capitalists, or whether the territory they live in belongs to Germany or any other State.

The matter was raised by the Socialists in the Reichstag, where it was revealed that the General in question had failed to secure the cooperation of the editors in question.

By this time the Allies had embarked on a system of air-raids on German towns, primarily as reprisals for the wanton destruction and loss of life wrought on towns in England, and secondarily as a means of prejudicing the production of German war material. They had the further effect of destroying, to a great extent, the civilian nerve throughout western Germany. Panic, and rumours of panic, had become common. Reports were current that troop-trains had been destroyed, that three-quarters of the city of Cologne had been wiped out, that Rhine bridges had been broken down, that ammunition dumps and factories had been blown up. These incidents occurred at a time when Germany, already hard pressed for men, was reduced to the expedient of combing out her munition factories and mines. A further 100,000 men were taken from the industrial districts of Westphalia alone in May, giving rise to reports that the German losses on the Western front had been unprecedented, and causing further depression among both troops and people. After scoffing at tanks, the

German Army Command had come to realize all too vividly their usefulness, and in the spring of 1918 there was a call for their manufacture. The dilemma in which the army commanders found themselves is described in Ludendorff's memoirs:

> I really do not know over which branch of Army supply we could have given the tanks precedence. More workmen could not be released; the home authorities failed to raise any. If any had been available, then we were bound to claim them for the Army.

The Reichstag debates of the period are full of gallant but futile attempts on the part of Herr von Payer and others to explain away the depression and faintheartedness that had overtaken the German people. When the last German offensive had definitely failed, and the Allies had begun to roll the German hordes back; when Germany's allies had begun to show restlessness for peace at any price; and when the home front definitely broke into strikes and riots, they gave up the attempt

Throughout the years the belief had been fostered in Germany with the most sedulous care on the part of the Government that Great Britain had "laid all the mines that had caused the war." On the structure of this supposition had been based the whole fabric of Germany's hatred of England. The people had been taught that the struggle was for Germany a war of defence, a matter of life and death, caused by the Machiavellian statesman Grey; that the English had prepared for it by the pursuit of an encircling policy towards Germany, and that arrangements had been made to use Belgium as a jumping-off ground for the attack. This view had been somewhat shaken by the publication of a document written by the Kaiser's own hand and published in the memoirs of the ex-American ambassador in Berlin, Mr. J. W. Gerard, though the mischief thus wrought on German faith had been to a large extent repaired by counter-propaganda. Faith was to sustain a far ruder shock by the publication of a memorandum from the pen of Prince Lichnowsky, the last German ambassador in England, entitled "My Mission to London, 1912-1914." According to Prince Lichnowsky's own account, this memoir had been written for preservation in the family archives, and not for publication; and this fact may be accepted as evidence in support of its truthfulness. In a moment of expansiveness, however, he decided to show it to a few friends, in whose judgment and trustworthiness he says he had full confidence. Among them was Captain Hans

[French official photograph.

A GERMAN TANK.
Captured by the French.

Georg von Beerfelde, a member of an old Junker family, and an officer of the Prussian Guard, serving on the General Staff in Berlin. Captain von Beerfelde was much impressed with the document. He came to the conclusion that Germany had been deceived as to

PRINCE LICHNOWSKY.
Formerly German Ambassador in London.

the origins of the war, and in the interests of truth he determined to give the memorandum wider publicity. Copies were made and passed round, the circle of readers ever widening, till at last one came into the hands of the Editor of the Stockholm *Politiken*, the organ of the Swedish Socialists, who printed the major part of it in his paper. It attracted enormous notice at once. Summaries were telegraphed to Germany and also to the Allied and neutral countries. The *Politiken* was immediately prohibited from circulation in Germany, but the mischief—from the German Government's point of view—was out, and in a very few days the memoir in pamphlet form was on sale throughout the country at the price of threepence. The full text also appeared almost simultaneously in Allied and Neutral journals. The British Government ordered three million copies to be distributed, and caused the text to be telegraphed to the British Dominions and the Far East. It was soon translated into almost every known tongue, and in a very short while the testimony of Prince Lichnowsky had rung through the entire world.*

That testimony from the pen of a German made perfectly clear that the whole basis of the German case was a tissue of falsehood. In his memorandum Prince Lichnowsky gave most lucid and convincing evidence in support of his statement that it was England, and especially Sir Edward Grey, who had striven hardest for the preservation of peace; that Sir Edward had done all that was possible to meet Germany in regard to her Eastern and Colonial policy, and that he (Prince Lichnowsky) had reported to this effect to Berlin. He also made clear that Berlin had not wanted his testimony and had rejected it, and that behind his back the German Government had all along been preparing its own tortuous and warlike schemes through other and sinister agents in London. He added an account of the preparations for war that had been made in Berlin before there was any thought of its immediate possibility in Europe, and he concluded with a series of vivid pen-portraits of British statesmen which utterly demolished the vitriolic and legendary caricatures that had disfigured the German Press and poisoned the German mind.

The memorandum received an additional advertisement from the fact that the German Government in its anger thought fit to take disciplinary proceedings against Prince Lichnowsky. On March 16 a debate took place on the subject in the Reichstag Main Committee, the report of which was not published until the 19th, the interval being spent in "trimming" it for publication. It is a striking fact that neither Count Hertling nor Herr von Kühlmann, the two statesmen best able to criticize the document, appeared in the debate, and it was left to Herr von Payer to perform the task of denying that the memoir represented the true facts. Herr von Payer's statement, however, merely took the form of declaring that Prince Lichnowsky had not the knowledge of the events he pretended to describe, and that his description of his own part in them was due to personal vanity. This cavalier treatment of the most damning document that the war

* The document is published in full in *The Times* Documentary History of the War, Vol. IX.

had produced could not satisfy the suspicions of the German people. The effect, indeed, was such that it was deemed necessary to put up Herr von Jagow (who had been Foreign Secretary at the time of Prince Lichnowsky's mission) to issue something in the nature of detailed criticism. But Herr von Jagow plainly had no case, and fared no better than Herr von Payer. He was compelled to bear out the assertion that in 1913 England had been prepared to enter into friendly agreement with Germany, and he, too, found himself, when it came to the point, unable to support the German policy was false and that the theory about Belgium also collapsed. This view remained uncombated. It had the support of other documents, notably a letter published by Herr Mühlon, an ex-director of the Krupp armament firm at Essen, which revealed that the Kaiser had approved the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, and had of his own initiative committed the German Government to war in the middle of July, 1914. It was now plain that the war was Germany's war, and that all that had happened between that fateful July and the outbreak of hostilities had been mere deception.

MAINZ.
One of the Rhine cities raided by Allied aeroplanes.

view that "England had laid all the mines that caused the war." He even referred to "Sir Edward Grey's known love of peace and his serious wish to reach an agreement with us." He did, however, say that "Grey could have prevented the war"; but that statement would not stand examination beside Prince Lichnowsky's assertion that Berlin had been frequently warned that Great Britain in case of war would protect France. Even the Socialist Majority Press refused to accept so thin an explanation, and the *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung* is found observing:

> The doctrine of England's responsibility for the world war has been regularly filtered and drummed into us for four years, and Germany's war policy was in the main guided by it. And now we learn that this doctrine was false, and that it was never believed by our Foreign Secretary in 1914, or by our London Ambassador.

It further argued that on this basis the whole

The publication of these documents left its mark on the German moral. It is a commentary on the mentality of the German people that except in the Socialist Press there was nowhere open condemnation of this perfidy.

A momentary sense of relief was felt by the German people when on May 7 the peace with Rumania was signed. This and the peace with Russia, together with an arrangement with the Ukraine had produced the illusion that things were again going well with the Central Powers. The German public was not disposed to examine too closely the terms of either treaty if it gave them an alleviation of the food situation and a promise of ultimate victory in the west. In the Reichstag, however, the matter was not regarded in quite the same light. The Independent Socialists, it is true, had wholly mis-

calculated the effect that the treaty of Brest-Litovsk would have on the German proletariate. Under the impression that the Russian revolution would find a sympathetic echo among the German masses they had split with the old Socialist organization, thinking to carry the majority of the Socialist electorate with them. Under the direction of Herr Haase, and with the support of Herr Bernstein, who had come over to them from the Majority Socialists (he subsequently returned to the fold), Herr Kautsky, Herr Wurm and Herr Ledebour, the Independents at first grew and gradually began to claim equality with the official Socialists. But at a by-election held in the constituency of Nieder-Barnim (Greater Berlin), a seat which had been previously held by the independent Herr Stathagen, they were handsomely beaten; a further by-election at Zwickau-Crimmitschau produced a still heavier defeat, and with it disillusion. Thereafter the Independents fell on evil days, and their organization went into a state of suspended animation.

Members of the Majority parties of the Reichstag had in fact begun to feel that the Peace Resolution was out of date. The war aims of the Pan-Germans were under revision in an upward direction; they now included a frank claim that "Belgium must remain firmly in German hands from a military, political and economic point of view"—complete annexation in fact: and they demanded "a war indemnity commensurate with the enormous sacrifices and losses of the German people." The Fatherland Party, under the leadership of Admiral von Tirpitz, published a similar manifesto, and proceeded to back it throughout the country by a vigorous propaganda. The Conservatives and National Liberals gave tacit adhesion to the same programme, while the Majority Socialists, though at the time they produced no direct statement on the subjects, could not be induced to disavow them. It was suspected that Herr von Kühlmann was not sound on either, and already in April there had been rumours of his resignation, both in this connexion and because his peace with Rumania, severe though it had been, was not thought to give Germany the full rewards of her victories in the south-east. Similarly in regard to Russia his policy had been attacked

LOADING GRAIN IN RUMANIA FOR GERMANY.

Scheidemann. Ernst. Ebert. Haase. Barth.

SOME LEADING SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS.

from two sides. The military party had demanded annexations in the East, and they had forced him into a policy with regard to the Ukraine and the Baltic States that had seemed to clash with the traditional German idea of a barrier against the Russian hordes.

A demand by Herr Ebert in the Reichstag Main Committee for explanations on this subject produced from Herr von Payer a lame reply that failed to satisfy the Majority parties, whose representatives declared that the restoration of a bourgeois government in the Ukraine, with a view to its ultimate incorporation in a restored bourgeois government in Great Russia, was inconsistent with the demand of Germany for a string of buffer States on the Eastern border. They demanded that the work of carrying out the Eastern treaties should be left to the civil authorities, and they drew up a formula to this effect. However, when Herr von Payer pointed out that this would in effect be a vote of censure on the Government they meekly withdrew it.

A meeting had been held at German Main Headquarters in April, at which Herr von Kühlmann had strongly opposed the militarist policy of the annexation of Courland and Esthonia, which the Army Commanders claimed as a fresh reservoir for the conscription of fighting men. He tendered his resignation to the Kaiser, who, however, refused it. Instead a special department was planned to co-ordinate policy in the East. At a subsequent meeting the questions of Germany's relations with Austria and the settlement of Poland were discussed. With regard to the Austrian Alliance, arrangements of a binding nature were made to hold her in permanent bondage to Germany, but on the subject of Poland no agreement was reached. Criticism of the Eastern peace was now widespread, and for Herr von Kühlmann, ground between the upper millstone of the military and the lower one of the Reichstag majorities, there was very little sympathy—the less indeed on account of the additional fact that his private character had been openly attacked in the Press in connexion with certain social irregularities he was supposed to have been guilty of during his stay in Bukarest.

Meanwhile a further German peace offensive had been set afloat. Its ostensible reason was that Germany's victory and prospects were such that the Allies had nothing to gain by continuing the war; that nemesis overtook all those who threw in their lot with England, as witness the fate of Belgium, Serbia, Russia and Rumania; and that if England's Allies would desert her they might obtain a mitigation of their just deserts, an offer that would not be repeated if neglected now. It was a transparent pretence, and not less transparent was the underlying motive that prompted it. It was plain that those who directed Germany's destinies already perceived that without an early peace their cause was hopeless. For them the tide had flowed to high-water mark in the East, and could only ebb; while in the West the ebb had begun. England's Allies, and especially France, at whom the appeal was the more directly aimed, had before them in the terms of Brest-Litovsk and Bukarest a living example of the German in his triumph; if for no higher reason, it would have been

worth while to hold on. So the peace offensive once more died down without result. The blandishments in the Press, led in chorus by the press-bureau of the Wilhelmstrasse through its principal mouthpiece Herr Georg Bernhard, fell upon deaf ears, and the debate on the Rumanian Treaty in the Reichstag on June 22 saw Herr von Kühlmann with his back to the wall.

The occasion of the debate was the Budget estimate for the Foreign Office, and the Foreign Secretary surveyed the whole field of Germany's endeavours. He gave an account of

HERR SCHEIDEMANN.
Socialist leader; Minister without portfolio in Prince Max's Government and later President of the Ministry.

what had been decided at the meeting at Main Headquarters with regard to Austria, Poland and the various matters of Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic States. In these matters, though the Reichstag was not entirely in agreement with him, only a minor interest was taken. But on the vital question of peace, and the terms on which Germany was prepared to grant it, he faced a distinctly hostile assembly. He was obliged to admit that "in spite of Germany's brilliant successes, and in spite of the initiative in the West remaining with Germany," no limit could be set on the duration of the war, and no clear desire for peace was recognizable among Germany's enemies. He quoted a speech that had been delivered by von Moltke in the Reichstag in 1890 that if war were to break out its duration and end could not be calculated, and that it might become "a seven-years' war, a thirty-years' war." He added:

> There is a common idea amongst the public that the length of the war is something absolutely new, as if authoritative quarters in our time had never reckoned on a very long war. This idea is incorrect. . . . Since the old master of German strategy made this statement the conditions have altered only in the sense that the Powers taking part in the war have enormously increased their armaments.

In defining Germany's war aims Herr von Kühlmann entirely omitted all mention of indemnities. He stipulated for "the boundaries drawn for us by history, meaning the retention of Polish lands, Alsace-Lorraine and Schleswig; a Colonial Empire; and freedom of the seas in time of war." With regard to Belgium, "Germany declines to make any statement about Belgium which will bind her without in the least binding her enemies." He concluded by saying that a purely military decision of the war could hardly be expected, and that the German government was prepared to listen to plain unambiguous peace proposals.

With these utterances it may be said that the fate of von Kühlmann as Foreign Secretary was settled. They were distasteful to the military party at Headquarters—Herr Scheidemann at a subsequent stage of the debate drew a satirical picture of the "telephonic drumfire" to which the General Staff must have subjected the Foreign Secretary as the sentences of his speech reached them. The views were equally unpalatable to the Conservatives in the Reichstag, whose spokesman, Count Westarp, made it plain that his party could no longer tolerate a Foreign Secretary who did not regard an increase in Germany's power and territory as essential conditions of a peace which, moreover, must be obtained by the sword to be worth having at all. Herr Stresemann for the National Liberals and Herr Naumann for the Progressives joined in the attack, forcing the Foreign Secretary into something like a recantation on the following day. Count Hertling, in a speech intended to support that of his lieutenant, frankly disavowed its main thesis. This brought the Socialists into the open. They perceived that the Foreign Secretary stood in a white sheet before the wrath of Main Headquarters, and Herr Scheidemann observed, in the course of a

threat to vote against the war credits, "The retreat of Herr von Kühlmann before Main Headquarters opened up unpleasant vistas." Herr Haase, in a speech the points of which were tipped with infinite scorn, declared "the military autocracy, for which Count Hertling and Herr von Kühlmann are but figleaves, rules over us solely and alone. The man who really governs—namely General von Ludendorff—should be placed in the Chancellor's chair."

This was in fact the bare truth. Three days later Count Hertling was summoned to Main Headquarters, and the dismissal of the Foreign Secretary followed a week later. Under the stigma of defeatism this sinister figure passed for the time being from the stage of German affairs, dismissed by his creators. As his successor the military party chose a man after their own heart, Admiral vo Hintze, then German Minister in Christiania.

The threat of the Socialists to vote against the war credit had been regarded as a piece of demonstration. When it was found they meant business, steps were taken to refer the application for credit back to the Main Committee. So Admiral von Hintze stepped into the vacated shoes with the evil day postponed. His policy was defined at the outset by the *Cologne Gazette* in the following note:

> The condition antecedent to national unity is that authoritative Government quarters, in unison with the German Army Command, should profess one single and united programme. Only then can they claim that the people also should be united.

What was really meant was that the command of the people as of the soldiers in the field was the province of Main Headquarters. Admiral von Hintze was to be its lieutenant.

The new Foreign Secretary had come originally from the middle classes and had joined the Navy in 1882. He served his first years afloat and was flag-lieutenant to Admiral Dietrichs on the occasion of the difference with Admiral Dewey at Manilla in the Spanish-American war. In 1903 he was attached to the embassy at Petrograd. Here he attracted the personal attention of the Kaiser, was promoted to the rank of wing-adjutant and raised to the nobility. In 1909 he was naval attaché for the Northern Kingdoms at Petrograd, and was subsequently made military plenipotentiary at the court of the Tsar.

HERR EBERT AND HIS WIFE.
At work in their garden in Schwarzburg.

During the early part of the war he had served as Minister in Christiania, his main occupation there being apparently the co-ordination of northern espionage and the maintenance of communication with Russian malcontents. Except for a brief interval as Minister in Mexico his diplomatic experience had been almost wholly connected with Russian affairs.

REAR-ADMIRAL VON HINTZE.
Foreign Secretary, July-September, 1918.

His initial ventures in his new capacity gave a keynote to his outlook, for in his first public speech he toasted the ex-Khedive and promised the "liberation" of Ireland. This provoked in Germany the question whether he was to set the policy in these matters, and drew from the Chancellor the statement that they were his own province. At the conference between von Hintze and the political leaders of the Reichstag, no secret was made of his view that Germany could not completely evacuate Belgium without a military, political and economic convention, or conclude peace before "German industry was definitely safeguarded by the incorporation of the Briey Longwy iron districts into Germany." These views satisfied the Majority Socialists and they decided to vote for the military credits. Count Hertling at the same time made a categorical statement on the subject of Belgium "as a pledge for future negotiation," which in effect meant the same thing. This was as much of the "vigorous policy" of Main Headquarters in the west as von Hintze was permitted to put before the Reichstag, though actually there were in contemplation far-reaching annexations in French Lorraine and the occupied regions. But as far as Hintze was concerned these matters were never begun. Things were going badly with Germany in the East, and throughout the whole period of his tenure of office his eyes turned in that direction. Count Mirbach had been murdered in Moscow; now Marshal von Eichhorn was shot by a Russian in the open street in Kieff; and Herr Helfferich, the special ambassador to Moscow for the arrangement of economic relations with Russia, went in fear of his life, and withdrew with his mission to Pskoff.

The Allied Powers had given the world to understand that it was their policy to annul Germany's Eastern treaties at the peace table, and Main Headquarters was well aware that the only way of maintaining them was by an overwhelming victory. This they still hoped for, and they therefore devoted their attention to straightening out the terms and arriving at an agreement with Austria. For this purpose a fresh conference was called at Main Headquarters. It may have been intended to confine deliberations to the outstanding questions of Poland, Esthonia, Lithuania, Finland, Courland, and the Ukraine—in themselves a large agenda—but at an early stage the larger question of peace and war was raised by the Austrian representatives. The discussions pursued a somewhat troubled course. On the question of Poland the Austrian representatives did not appear to find it easy to come to an agreement with Germany, while on the general Russian question the disagreements between Herr Helfferich and von Hintze were such that the former tendered his resignation. The meeting was followed by a peace move on the part of Germany, led by the Press and introduced by Herr Solf in a speech delivered on August 20 to the German Society, in which an insincere attempt was made to hoodwink the Allies on the subject of Belgium and thereby to provoke them into some form of peace negotiations. For the watchword of German policy had now become, "Hold what you have in the East, and get the best you can in the West." But the transparent pretence of Solf's assertion that Germany had never intended to "keep Belgium in any form" did not deceive anybody. It was replied to in trenchant manner by Lord Robert Cecil, and it served alone for

use as propaganda in Germany. The speech is of interest only in that Prince Max of Baden came forward with a similar statement to that of Herr Solf, and drew some attention to himself as an upholder of moderate war aims.

The month of August was full of disappointments for the Germans in the field. The French had retaken the Lassigny Massif, and had driven the Germans with heavy losses from Soissons. The British had advanced on the Ancre, while in the Eastern theatre of war Allenby in Palestine was continuing his victorious advance on beyond Jerusalem. The moral of the Allies had never been higher, while that of Germany's allies was waning rapidly. Austria and Bulgaria had both clearly had enough; Turkey fought in continuous retreat.

Now began for Germany a fateful period. The schemes for the solution of Eastern problems—what Herr Scheidemann called "the game of King-making in the East"—had to be laid aside, and it was destined never to be taken up again. At the beginning of September von Hintze paid a visit to Vienna, as usual under the pretence of discussing some aspect of the Polish question, in regard to which no agreement had yet been reached with Austria. But Austria had by now in view the urgent necessity for an early peace, and it was the form which this was to take that really formed the discussion between him and Baron Burián. A deadlock was reached in which Germany on the one hand was pressing Austria to conclude an unpalatable settlement regarding Poland before

A STRIKE DEMONSTRATION AT HALLE ON THE SAALE.

any peace move should be made; while the character of the Polish offer on the part of Germany was such that Baron Burián appears to have thought any peace preferable.

The Austro-Hungarian note was issued on September 15, and was directed to all the belligerents. It invited these governments "to send delegates to a confidential and non-binding discussion of basic principles," with a view to further explanations. That this note was not altogether approved of by Germany speedily became evident. Herr von Payer in a speech at Stuttgart delivered a few days previously to the issue of the Note, the contents of which were known to the German Government, outlined what he called Germany's irreducible peace terms. The speech was delivered in a distinctly truculent tone, and it contained the principle that Germany alone was to settle the fates of Poland, Finland and the border states, and would tolerate no intervention by the Allies in her treaties with Russia, Ukrainia and Rumania. He also demanded the return of all Germany's colonies, and the right to exchange them for others. Then only would Germany evacuate the occupied regions—if it pleased her to do so. The purpose of this was apparent; it was the intention of the Germans to wreck any such peace overtures. In the midst of the discussion which followed the issue of the Austrian communication came a bombshell in the shape of the Bulgarian request for an armistice.

The war weariness of Bulgaria had long been apparent to all observers of Central European affairs, and there was no real surprise when M. Malinoff came in to succeed M. Radoslavoff, and to moderate the Bulgarian war aims. The advance of the French and British in Macedonia had begun and a cry had gone up to Germany for help. It was not forthcoming, and on September 26th a Bulgarian delegation, with the authority of the Sobranje, started to get into touch with Entente commanders for the purpose of arranging an armistice.

An outburst of anger throughout Germany was followed by a parliamentary crisis, in which the main feature was the sudden accession to

A BREAD-QUEUE IN BERLIN.

the ranks of the combination of the Majority Socialists, Progressives and some parts of the Centre party, which had favoured a coalition Government in its supreme dissatisfaction of the policy that had been conducted by Count Hertling and von Hintze. The Socialists issued a manifesto setting forth the minimum terms on which they would accept office in a coalition government. These included the acceptance of the principle of the League of Nations, a declaration on Belgium, its restoration, an understanding on the question of an indemnity; the restoration of Serbia and Montenegro; the peace treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest not to hinder the conclusion of peace, and the establishment of civil administration in all occupied territories; autonomy for Alsace-Lorraine; suffrage reform both in the federal states and in Prussia; and the repeal of Article IX, clause 2 (prohibiting members of the Reichstag from becoming members of the Federal Council) and freedom of meeting and the Press. Before the Bulgarian disaster all further opposition to parliamentarisation broke down. On September 30 the Kaiser issued a rescript dismissing Count Hertling and authorizing the preparation of a measure by which the German people should "cooperate more effectively than heretofore in deciding the fate of the Fatherland," and that "men who are supported by the confidence of the people shall to a wide extent cooperate in the rights and duties of the Government." At the same time it was announced that von Hintze had resigned, and that his resignation had been accepted. His brief career as Foreign Secretary had been one of continuous failure. With his eyes on the loot of Russia, he had failed to perceive that the first conditions requisite for bringing it home were the defeat of the Allies in the West and the unity of Germany's own supporters.

The battle of Amiens had been fought on August 8–10 with disastrous results for the Germans. Ludendorff's offensive had definitely failed, and at the Council of August 14 it had been generally agreed by the Army Command that a military victory had become impossible. The view had even been put forward that an immediate overture should be made for an armistice through President Wilson, but the Kaiser had opposed this, preferring to wait for an opportune moment (meaning the next German success in the West) to attempt to come to an understanding through neutral mediation. According to Herr von Berg, Chief of the Kaiser's Civil Cabinet, who was present, there was a section of the Council which favoured Holland as a mediator. The project then failed, but the question of direct appeal to America came up again when Bulgaria had collapsed. The decision that was reached indicates once more the Military party as the substance of which the Reichstag was only the shadow, for it was at this point that the decision was reached to bring in Prince Maximilian of Baden as Chancellor. The post was offered to him with the instruction that he should immediately address a request to President Wilson for the opening of Peace negotiations. The Reichstag, the Press, and the German people were allowed to speculate for 24 hours on the Chancellor crisis, and were then presented with the new Chancellor; but the crisis was in fact military, and must be regarded as part of a manœuvre in the process of avoiding a military disaster.

THE KAISER AND THE KING OF SAXONY.

Prince Maximilian of Baden, first cousin of

PRINCE MAX OF BADEN SPEAKING IN THE REICHSTAG.
The Prince is indicated by a white cross.

the reigning Grand Duke of Baden, closely related by his marriage with Princess Marie Louise of Brunswick to the German Emperor, a General of Cavalry and President of the Baden Upper House, had previously appeared in Imperial German politics as a man of more moderate views, though the Council and the Kaiser could have been under no illusion regarding the type of "democracy" to which he adhered. Still, it was thought he might be acceptable both to the German people and to the Allies. The Army Command was still under the impression that the German nation dearly loved a prince; while in Entente countries there was thought to be the view that Prince Max was supposed to have attempted to exercise a moderating influence on the treatment of prisoners of war by the German Army officials.

On the other hand, the same qualities laid him open to suspicion from both sides of the Reichstag. The Conservatives looked askance at his democratic aspirations, while the more progressive elements were aware of rumours that he was only doing lip-service to democracy. How correct the latter estimate was may be seen from a letter he had written to Prince Alexander von Hohenlohe on the subject of a speech he himself had made in the Baden Chamber, taking for his text the Sermon on the Mount, and suggesting that "not hatred of our foes, but rather love of Germany, should be the soldier's true motive in fighting." In the letter to Prince Alexander, which was dated January 12, 1918, Prince Max had written in explanation of his speech:

> For many a day I have longed to have a good dig at our enemies, and to hold up to ridicule this affected judicial attitude of theirs in the matter of responsibility for the war as well as their cant about "democracy." . . .
>
> As my object was also to laugh to scorn the democratic war-cry of the Western Powers, I had to come to some sort of compromise with my audience about our own internal affairs. As I quite decline to accept any such thing as Western Democracy for Germany and Baden I had perforce to tell my hearers that I perfectly understood their needs. . . .
>
> I wish to have the greatest possible indemnities no matter in what form, so that after the war we may not be too poor. I am not yet in favour of anything more being said about Belgium than has already been said. Our enemies know enough, and in dealing with such a cunning and astute opponent as England Belgium is the only object of compensation we possess. . . .
>
> I have a very poor opinion of the moral disposition of the rulers of our enemies, as well as the terrible lack of judgment among the people whom they rule.

These, then, were the views of the new Chancellor in the previous January. It would have been little short of a miraculous conversion if by September he had found salvation in democracy.

Moreover, it is to be noted that the appointment of this "democratic" Chancellor was made not by the people, but by the Emperor and the Army Commanders, a fact in itself the negation of what was pretended. But the

Socialists declared themselves satisfied, and Prince Max speedily formed his coalition government. The Socialist members were Herr Scheidemann as Minister without Portfolio, Herr Bauer as Minister for Labour (a new office), and Dr. David as Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Prince Max's first endeavour was to attempt to hearten Austria into holding out during the forthcoming negotiations, and he sent (and published) a flamboyant telegram to Baron Burián, praying that the glorious deeds of the armies, the determination of the peoples, and the loyal cooperation of the Governments might lead to an honourable peace. Baron Burián sent a suitable reply. And indeed Prince Max had need of some such device. Austria was showing herself less and less inclined to be bound by her treaty to fight for Germany when Germany was fighting mainly for the retention of Alsace-Lorraine and the best possible bargain in Belgium, to say nothing of aspirations in Poland at Austria's expense.

If we look but a little way beneath the surface of Army schemes and Reichstag politics at this period, we find social Germany and the German Army seething with discontent. The people at home, largely ignorant of the true state of affairs in the field, were yet depressed with all they knew; the soldiers were discouraged by defeat and inclined to believe that the Army leaders, not less than the people at home, had "let them down." These symptoms of Army unrest developed rapidly, and already reports were being received in Berlin by the General Staff on the unreliability of the troops, together with ominous news of outbreaks at the naval ports and strikes and riots in the great cities.

On the top of this the British fought and won the decisive action of Cambrai. They broke the Hindenburg line, while the French took St. Quentin. The Supreme Command, which had been inclined to follow the Kaiser's lead, at any rate to the extent of giving Prince Max plenty of time, suddenly gave way to something like panic. A request was made to Prince Max urging the immediate dispatch of the peace offer owing to the acute danger of the military situation, since a break-through might occur at any moment. The Chancellor has described the progress of negotiations himself *:—

> I made the counter-proposal that the Government should as its first act put forward a detailed war aims programme, making clear to the whole world our agreement with the principles of President Wilson and our readiness to make heavy national sacrifices for these principles.
>
> The military authorities replied to this that no effect could any longer be counted on from such a demonstration: the situation at the front demanded an armistice proposal within 24 hours. If I did not offer it the old Government would have to bring it out.

Next day General Ludendorff telephoned to

HERR VON BERG.
Chief of the Kaiser's Civil Cabinet.

Berlin the draft of a Note to America. This draft scared Prince Max, who replied that the consequences of such action under pressure of military distress would involve the loss of the German colonies, Alsace-Lorraine and parts of Poland—concessions that the Independent Socialists did not yet even contemplate. But the army commanders were in no state of mind for discussion. It has since been stated that General Ludendorff had completely lost his nerve, and one can picture the panic and distraction that agitated Spa and Berlin. Hindenburg peremptorily replied to Prince Max's objections by stating that the Army Command insisted on its demand for an immediate offer of peace. A note in the terms previously telephoned by Ludendorff was thereupon drawn up and was sent to the President of the United States. It requested the President to invite all belligerents to send plenipotentiaries for the purpose of opening

* *Preussische Jahrbücher*, November, 1918.

negotiations. The Note stated that it accepted the programme set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918 (the Fourteen Points) and in his later pronouncements, especially his speech of September 27 (the Four Principles). The Note added that "with a view to avoiding further bloodshed the German Government requests the immediate conclusion of an armistice on land and water and in the air."

At the same time a Note of somewhat similar tenor was dispatched by Austria, and in a speech to the Reichstag Prince Max explained that "Turkey was about to take a similar step."

Prince Max in his speech to the Reichstag made only the slightest reference to the military situation. The political heads of Germany had begun to be more deeply concerned with the internal position of Germany as it would present itself to outsiders. But he laid great stress on the point that "the manner in which Imperial leadership has now been constituted is not something ephemeral, and that when

GUSTAV BAUER.
Minister of Labour in Prince Max's Government, 1918.

peace comes a Government cannot again be formed which does not find its support in the Reichstag and does not draw its leaders from it." The general tone of his speech, taken with the reference in the Note to negotiations, suggest that he still hoped to bargain with the Allies not on the basis of the Fourteen Points of Mr. Wilson, but on the territorial paragraphs of the Reichstag programme. Prince Max himself declared in private that he considered the dispatch of the Note premature.

Though the immediate effect in Germany was one of relief at the prospect of an early—some even thought immediate—termination of hostilities, there were plenty of people among the commercial magnates and the Junkers to raise an outcry. "Our *demarche*," wrote Herr

Dr. EDUARD DAVID.
Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Prince Max's Government.

Walther Rathenau in the *Vossische Zeitung* on the next day, "was over-hasty. The answer will come; it will be unsatisfactory; worse still, it will be negative and humiliating and will demand too much. We must not be surprised if the immediate evacuation of the West, if not of Alsace-Lorraine, is demanded."

Echoing the Junker party at the Council, he advocated a levy *en masse* for a final struggle, a view that was finding considerable support among the Conservatives. It is more than doubtful whether such a scheme could have been carried through, and it served to depict the ignorance that prevailed in Germany as to the true state of the country. The idea was trenchantly attacked by the *Vorwärts*, which pointed out that "there had been such levies in the past, but that they always began by the people freeing its arms for the righteous struggle and eradicating from its ranks elements which did not belong there." It went on to point out that the French had risen *en masse* in 1792, and as a preliminary to this the *masse* had

guillotined Louis XVI and about a thousand aristocrats in the September days, and it concluded: "That, my Conservative gentlemen, is what the 'final struggle' will look like. Choose whether you want it!"

Main Headquarters chose that they did not want it and the idea was not proceeded with. President Wilson replied to the German Note with very little ado. Two points stood out in his answer—that he would not propose an armistice to the Allies so long as the German Armies stood on their soil; and that he desired to know whether the Chancellor was speaking for the constituted authorities of the Empire who had so far conducted the war.

The former was a matter of action and could be arranged; the second had been foreseen in Germany when the new coalition government was formed. In this latter connexion it is necessary to revert to three questions that had been agitating the Reichstag almost from the era of von Kühlmann. These were: The Prussian Franchise, Autonomy for Alsace-Lorraine, and the Imperial Constitution.

The question of widening the antiquated system of class, pluralistic and property voting for the elections to the Prussian Diet had long been a matter of debate. The system was admittedly one of the worst in Europe, and any real scheme of reform could hardly be done by way of amendment. Only complete abolition and the framing of an entirely new electoral system could have brought it into line with modern ideas. But for this very reason it was one of he mainstays of the power of Prussia, and the fight for reform had been bitter. It had now reached the stage at which the Lower House had almost given way to the demand for manhood suffrage and had come into sharp collision with the Upper House. It was well known that the Kaiser did not favour reform, and the fact that in his speech to the workers of Essen he had not even mentioned the subject was not allowed by the Socialists to pass without notice. As for the Upper House of the Diet, it was to retain the hereditary members who had hitherto been in it, also fourteen Burgomasters, the presidents of the Agricultural Chambers, five members of the Evangelical Church, three Catholic bishops, representatives of associations of families distinguished by extensive family property,

ENTRANCE TO THE SEAT OF THE ARMISTICE COMMISSION AT SPA, FORMERLY THE GERMAN HEADQUARTERS.

German officers displaying a white flag.

every university, and a number of other institutions likely to have views of the more reactionary type. As a concession, Industrial Chambers (associations of workmen) were to have twelve seats!

It is possible that if Prussia had had the political foresight to grant autonomy to Alsace-Lorraine at an earlier period of its history events in Western Europe might have taken a very different course. Instead of autonomy the province had been governed in a manner that had become a by-word in Germany and throughout Europe had been crystallized into the word "Zabernism." All attempts on the part of the more moderate elements in the Reichstag to do away with this reproach had been firmly resisted. Successive Chancellors had done lip-service to the need while setting their faces against the act. And now the Wilson Note had arrived without any steps towards the settlement of Alsace-Lorraine having been taken

A SITTING OF THE PRUSSIAN DIET.

With regard to the German Imperial Constitution some little progress had been made. Article IX. of the Constitution had provided that no member of the Federal Council should also be a member of the Reichstag, a provision which effectually excluded the Socialists from participating in the Government. This had been amended so far as to admit the cooperation of the Socialists in Prince Max's Government, though Ministerial nominations were still the prerogative of the Kaiser. But this was only the fringe of the matter. Article XI. read as follows:—

"The presidency of the Federation belongs to the King of Prussia who bears the name of German Emperor. The Emperor has to represent the Empire internationally, to declare war and to conclude peace in the name of the Empire, to enter into alliances and other treaties with Foreign Powers, and to accredit and receive Ambassadors."

This, in fact, was the paragraph which constituted the Kaiser "Supreme War Lord," a title of which he had always been inordinately proud. It was to be doubted whether at the moment of failure he would be so anxious to retain it. On the other hand, by an adroit emendation of the text, the odium of declaring peace as a beaten nation might be shifted to the parliamentarized Government and the Kaiser might escape responsibility. It was the course he had counselled the Tsar to take in 1905.*

The Article was duly amended to read:—

"The assent of the Federal Council and of

* The Willy-Nicky correspondence.

the Reichstag is requisite for a declaration of war in the name of the Empire. Peace treaties, as well as those treaties with foreign States which relate to the subjects of Imperial legislation, require the approval of the Federal Council and the Reich tag."

Other articles were changed to give effect to the responsibility of the Chancellor to the Reichstag for the acts of the Kaiser and to render the counter-signature of the Chancellor necessary for naval and military appointments. Little enough would have been accomplished by these changes in actual practice. They would have been full of loopholes in their application, as no doubt they were meant to be. But they served to satisfy German vanity on the one hand and to enable the Kaiser to "shift the odium" on the other; while their main object was to convince Mr. Wilson that he now had to do with a modern democratized State. The changes were at a subsequent date confirmed by a decree of the Kaiser in which the following characteristic passage occurred:—

On the occasion of this step, which is so momentous for the future history of the German people, I have a desire to give expression to my feelings.

Prepared for by a series of Government acts, a new order now comes into force which transfers the fundamental rights of the Kaiser's person to the people. Thus comes to a close a period which will stand in honour before the eyes of future generations.

Thus the ground had been prepared for all eventualities. But the reply of President Wil on was not at all to the taste of the Army Commanders. Ludendorff by now had recovered from his attack of nerves, while the position at the front had to some extent been stabilized. There occurs in German expert criticism of the fighting at this period a decidedly more hopeful note. The Army Commanders began to think they had been a little over-hasty in sending their demand to Prince Max, and on receipt of the President's reply they represented to the Conference held in Berlin on October 9 that Germany was not obliged to accept all that President Wilson demanded.* But while a great change had evidently come over Main Headquarters the civilians had become more doubtful. When Ludendorff was asked to state plainly how long he thought the army could hold out he could only give very vague replies.

* German White Book, 1919.

VALENCIENNES MUSEUM AFTER THE GERMAN OCCUPATION.
Notices were left that the statues had been removed by the German Military Authorities



PROCLAMATION OF THE GERMAN REPUBLIC IN BERLIN, NOVEMBER 10, 1918.

A conflict of opinion was now in progress between the civilians, who were prepared to take President Wilson's proposals as a "basis for negotiations," and the military party who were for fighting on. It was decided to temporize, and Herr Solf, as one who could be thrown over if necessary, was put up to reply. In a note dated October 12, addressed by him to President Wilson, it was declared that the object of the German Government in entering into discussions would be only to agree upon practical details of the application of the terms laid down in the "Fourteen Points" speech and President Wilson's subsequent addresses. The Note accepted evacuation of the occupied territories, and added that "the Chancellor, supported by the will of the great majority of the Reichstag, speaks in the name of the German Government and the German people."

The Note of Herr Solf, by its lack of straightforwardness, created among the Allied and Associated Powers a very unfavourable impression, and on October 16 President Wilson dispatched a further and much more definite Note. In this he laid it down clearly :—

1. That the process of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice are matters which must be left to the judgment and advice of the military advisers of the Allied and Associated Powers.

2. That no arrangement can be accepted which does not provide absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees for the present military supremacy of the Allied and Associated Armies in the field.

3. That the Allied and Associated Powers will not consent to an armistice so long as the armed forces of Germany continue their illegal and inhuman practices —such as the sinking of passenger ships and their lifeboats by submarines and the wanton destruction of life and property in Flanders and France.

4. That arbitrary power to disturb the peace of the world, such as the Government controlling Germany must be destroyed.

5. That a separate reply would be made to Austria.

This answer, which in effect meant the abdication of the Kaiser, produced a storm at Berlin and at Main Headquarters. The Supreme Command at once desired to break off all peace attempts. A long period of discussion ensued. And at this point in the negotiations the abdication of the Kaiser began to be spoken of and written about, even in quarters hitherto suspected of nothing but the most exaggerated loyalty to the throne. The Socialists of Bavaria passed a resolution that Germany should be reconstituted into a people's State, and the Munich papers called on the Kaiser to give a shining example to his people by sacrificing himself. In vain did the Chancellor reply that "the greater sacrifice was to remain." The tone of the country was menacing; a break-through seemed imminent,

A DETACHMENT OF BRITISH CAVALRY IN SPA.



Ich verzichte hierdurch für alle Zukunft auf die Rechte an der Krone Preussen und die damit verbundenen Rechte an der deutschen Kaiserkrone.

Zugleich entbinde ich alle Beamten des Deutschen Reiches und Preussens sowie alle Offiziere, Unteroffiziere und Mannschaften der Marine, des Preussischen Heeres und der Truppen der Bundeskontingente des Treueides, den sie Mir als ihrem Kaiser, König und Obersten Befehlshaber geleistet haben. Ich erwarte von ihnen, dass sie bis zur Neuordnung des Deutschen Reiche den Inhabern der tatsächlichen Gewalt in Deutschland helfen, das Deutsche Volk gegen die drohenden Gefahren der Anarchie, der Hungersnot und der Fremdherrschaft zu schützen.

Urkundlich unter Unserer Höchsteigenhändigen Unterschrift und beigedrucktem Kaiserlichen Insiegel.

Gegeben Amerongen, den 28. November 1918.

THE KAISER'S ABDICATION.

and the Army had settled the question for itself; peace having been mooted no power on earth could galvanize the soldiers into full resistance again. Throughout Germany there was now clear indication that a disappointment of peace hopes would be fraught with the most serious consequences not only for the State but also for the Throne.

Yet the Army Command still hesitated. Another reply was drafted, though it was of a nature that could have no other purpose than to gain time. This argued that the present strength on the fronts must be made "the basis of arrangements that will safeguard and guarantee" the armistice, and that orders had been sent to the submarine commanders to

cease torpedoing passenger ships—though even these orders might take some time to reach their destinations. Also Article XI. of the Constitution, as amended, was put forward as proof of the desired change in the Government of Germany. At the same time Prince Max met the Reichstag and delivered a speech with the double purpose of convincing the Allies that Germany had been thoroughly parliamentarized, and at the same time convincing his supporters that it had not been overdone in the process. Neither Herr Solf's Note nor Prince Max's speech deceived anybody outside Germany, least of all President Wilson. In his rejoinder to Herr Solf, dated October 23, the President again declared that the only armistice he would feel justified in recommending would be one that would leave the Allied and Associated Powers in a position to make a renewal of hostilities impossible, and to safeguard and

HERR OTTO LANDSBERG.
Minister of Art and Literature.

enforce the details of the subsequent peace. He added:—

> It does not appear that the principle of a Government responsible to the German people has been fully worked out, or that any guarantees exist or are in contemplation that the alteration of principle and practice now partially agreed upon will be permanent.

He pointed out that the German people had no means of commanding the acquiescence of the military authorities in the popular will, and that if the Allies must deal with the "military masters and monarchical autocrats" they must demand not peace but surrender.

There could be no mistaking the plain speaking of President Wilson's communications. In the period covered by them Austria had surrendered and Turkey had asked for an armistice. Yet there were still Generals who thought they could make the disillusioned German troops fight on. General von Mudra and General von Gallwitz were even at this moment seeking at Main Headquarters permission to make a final attempt to show that Germany's position was better than the reports

HERR LIEBKNECHT.
Leader of the Independent Socialists.

had made out. But the rejection of the armistice was now impossible. The German people regarded the war as over, and whenever an attempt to delay its conclusion was suspected the troops rose in revolt. There was now a sudden access of hurried zeal for social reform among the civilian heads. A last effort was made in regard to Alsace-Lorraine to present the Allies with a *fait accompli* of a reformed Alsatian State within the German Empire, and an Alsatian Governor, with an Alsatian Council and Constitution began to be pushed forward. But the Alsace representatives in the Reichstag would have none of it. Dr. Hägy, in the introduction of the draft reforms for first discussion in the Reichstag, said:

> We are cool towards the announced reforms. The present system has lain on Alsace as a foreign domination for forty years. The Zabern affair has become a world affair, and led in no small measure to the world war. In Alsace-Lorraine we do not understand how, in the Reichstag, the Wilson programme can be accepted and simultaneously a new Federal State be created.

Equally unreal and hurried were the debates on the Prussian franchise and the re-drafting of the clauses of the Constitution. In the Prussian Diet the Conservatives fought the extension of the franchise to the last, while in the Reichstag the Conservatives and National



THE GERMAN SHIP MARKGRAF.
The imprisonment of stokers of this ship led to the mutiny at Kiel.

Liberals, in their desire to defeat any alteration in the Constitution, tore the new draft to pieces in their critical examination of its wording, revealing thereby the pasteboard nature of the whole thing. But events in Germany showed that the situation would brook no further delay. While on October 26 the National Liberals and Conservatives in the Reichstag were vowing they would never consent, Herr Solf was penning his dispatch of October 27, in which, with final protestations of Germany's complete parliamentarization, he accepted without reserve the terms on which President Wilson had agreed to mediate for an armistice.

These terms were accepted by the Allies with one important reservation—the clause relating to the Freedom of the Seas. The phrase was ambiguous; President Wilson had never defined what meaning he attached to it, and the Allies stated they could not accept some of the interpretations put upon it. But with this reservation, President Wilson's proposals for an armistice were agreed to. The information was conveyed to the German Government that Marshal Foch alone was authorized to communicate the actual conditions and guarantees, and the German delegates, General von Winterfeld, General von Gündell, Admiral von Müller, and Herr Erzberger, left immediately to get into touch with the Allied lines.

Meanwhile a rapid change had taken place in the outlook in Germany. Public patience had grown threadbare in the last stages of the war, and the delays, coupled with the apparent insincerity of the Government in dealing with the reforms, became unbearable Revolts broke out in many places, clearly foreshadowing a revolution. At Kiel, as usual the first to display storm-signals, members of the Independent Socialist body, emerging from the comparative obscurity that had shrouded their movements since their split with the Majority, held a public meeting to demand the release of some stokers of the battleship Markgraf, who had been imprisoned for refusing to put to sea when the Navy had decided to venture all on a last sea-battle. A procession formed and paraded the town after storming the naval barracks and liberating some of the men in question. In the town they came into collision with a cordon of soldiers, and were fired upon. In the end the demon-

strators gained the day; and by the next morning the control of the town and port was in their hands. Modelling their tactics on those of the Russian revolution, the Independents proceeded to set up in Kiel a Soldiers', Sailors' and Workmen's Council. Next day however, Herr Haussmann, one of the new Ministers, and Herr Noske, the Majority Socialist, arrived in Kiel, and in agreement with the Soldiers' Council (as it had now become) they took over the management of affairs.

The revolt spread rapidly to other towns, Hamburg and Bremen being among the first to show signs of disaffection. Councils were established at both places. At Cologne a general strike was followed by an outbreak of violence and the taking over of the city by a Council. Demonstrations occurred at Dresden and other Saxon cities. In nearly every case the revolt was led by the extreme wing of the Independent Socialists, among whom Ledebour and Liebknecht (who had some time previously been released from prison) were most prominent. In Munich, after three days of demonstration, a Republic was declared for Bavaria, with the Socialist fanatic Kurt Eisner as president. The change came with startling rapidity in Berlin. Herr Ebert, on behalf of the Majority Socialists, had delivered to Prince Max on November 7 an ultimatum demanding immediate conclusion of the armistice, an amnesty for military offences, immediate democratization of Prussia and the Federal States, and the immediate settlement of the Kaiser question. The alternative was the withdrawal of the Socialists from the Government. The Chancellor responded with an appeal to the nation to remain calm while the negotiations proceeded—for the Germans still presumed that they would be permitted to negotiate on the armistice terms. General von Linsingen, Governor of the Mark of Brandenburg, issued an order prohibiting the formation of Soviets; by nightfall he had "resigned." The Sozial Democratische Fraktion, at a meeting with delegates from the Berlin factories, declared they could wait no longer, and immediately after the meeting a general strike was declared. A Council was set up, and appeals for order were issued on behalf of the new Government, signed by Ebert, Scheidemann and Landsberg. Negotiations were then opened with the Independent Socialists for cooperation in the work of Government.

The call for the abdication of the Kaiser had now gathered great force as the urgent need for a cessation of hostilities became more and more imperative. The ultimatum of the Socialists had demanded that the Kaiser should retire and that the Crown Prince should renounce all rights of succession. It is a curious commentary on the habits of thought of the German people that the question was debated by the public and in the Press almost

THE MUTINY AT KIEL.

Part of the crew of the battleship Kaiser, who killed their commander, wounded other officers and hoisted the red flag.

wholly from a constitutional point of view, owing to the fact that the Prussian Constitution made no provision for a regency. It was not yet realized how little dynasties would have to do with the interim period that was to elapse between the break-up and resettlement of Government. Outside Prussia there were ominous signs. The King of Bavaria had fled to Wildenwart, leaving the Munich Soviet in possession of his Palace. The Duke of Brunswick had abdicated, the Grand Duke of Hesse had made way for a "Council of State," the Grand Duke of Baden had announced a National Assembly would be called to settle the future form of Government of the German nation. It was in fact deemed no longer safe for the Kaiser to remain with the troops, just as it had been shown that it was no longer safe for him to remain in Berlin. That night, with a few officers and servants, he made for the Dutch frontier at Eysden by motor-car and crossed into Holland, proceeding (with the consent of the Dutch Government) to the château of Amerongen, the seat of his friend and relative, Count Bentinck. At the same time the Crown Prince deserted his command,

THE EX-KAISER WALKING IN THE GROUNDS AT AMERONGEN.
Accompanied by General Dommes, his Aide-de-Camp.

"an amendment to the Constitution," and even Mecklenburg-Schwerin, politically the most benighted of all the German Federal States, had demanded a parliament and the dismissal of the Grand Duke.

The Kaiser vacillated to the last moment, and some of the contemporary accounts of his vacillations depict him in not too dignified a light. But he gave way at last. On November 9 Prince Max issued a decree that the "Kaiser and King" had decided to renounce the Throne, and with him the Crown Prince also; that Herr Ebert was appointed Chancellor for the period of the Regency, and that and fled to Holland also. On the orders of the Dutch Government he was interned in the Island of Wieringen, at the mouth of the Zuyder Zee.

The German armistice delegation arrived in the French lines at 11 o'clock on the night of November 7. The delegates were accommodated at the village of Haudroy, near La Capelle, and next morning were conducted to the appointed meeting place. There they were met by Marshal Foch and Admiral Wemyss with their staffs. Amid strict formalities they proffered their prayer for an armistice and the text of the Allied conditions was read to them.

The "negotiations" which the Chancellor, the Reichstag, the Army Command and the German people had envisaged found no place in the meeting. There was no provision whatever for discussion; the conditions were to be taken or left within 72 hours. The document contained 35 clauses, and the measures that had been embodied in it carried the fullest guarantee that the suspension of hostilities should be final. There were to be no more "scraps of paper."



HERR KURT EISNER.
President of the Republic of Bavaria.

The German delegates were a little staggered at what they considered the severity of the terms. They had come as plenipotentiaries, but with all their powers, and with all their knowledge of the fate of their country if their signatures were withheld, they hesitated to sign without reference to the Main Headquarters. Slow to realize the meaning of defeat, they even made some show of attempting to bargain, but on this head Marshal Foch left them in no doubt. Six hours before the expiry of the time limit, that is to say at 5 o'clock in the morning (French time) on November 11, the armistice had been signed, and fighting on all fronts ceased at 11 the same morning.

The German State, and with it the German people, had made provision only for victory; defeat, and the consequences of defeat, weighed heavily on them. Appeals had begun to be addressed to allied quarters for mitigation immediately the negotiations had been opened. Through them all there runs a common note—fear of consequences combined with regret at failure and a total absence of any sign of contrition or regret for the evil that had been wrought to the world by the German idea in the four years of terrible war. There runs through them all the same unbecoming lack of dignity in disaster. In the moment of German triumph Herr Ebert had rejected the peace attempts of Mr. Henderson with an emphasis bordering on contempt; yet in the Reichstag on the debate on the Peace proposals he is found saying: "May President Wilson listen to Henderson and his friends, who do not want to apply force! We have declared our readiness to roll the stones out of the way of an understanding." Herr Solf, in an appeal addressed to Mr. Lansing, the Secretary of State, begged the President of the United States to use his influence with the Allied Powers



THE EX-KING OF BAVARIA.

in order "to mitigate these fearful conditions," and adding a threat of consequences if this were not done that savoured of the old Prussian manner if not of the old Prussian spirit. The new President of the Republic of Bavaria, Kurt Eisner, addressed his appeal to the Federal Council at Berne, throwing all blame on the German aristocracy and militarists, and asserting that the new states ought not to suffer for the deeds of their peoples under the old regime.

CHEERING THE PROCLAMATION OF THE BAVARIAN REPUBLIC IN MUNICH.

The two Socialist parties joined in a memorandum to M. Branting, appealing to the Socialist International to use its influence to obtain a mitigation of the conditions: "Some of the terms threaten the very physical existence of the German people, now liberated and ready for peace." A similar manifesto was addressed by the Executive of the Soldiers' Councils to the peoples of France, Italy, England and America, laying all blame on "the accursed Hohenzollern dynasty," and begging the peoples to do their utmost "that the coming peace may be a peace of brotherly understanding." A flood of such manifestoes poured into the German Press from all parts of Germany.

But the Allies, and with them President Wilson, had decided that this time there should be no risks. Beyond a concession of the time limit for the evacuation of occupied territories and one or two minor alterations they suffered no mitigation of the armistice terms, and the German delegates returned to Berlin. Germany had now to learn to realize the extent to which her plot against mankind had failed. The Peace Terms were yet to come; the Armistice was but a foretaste.

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CHAPTER CCCXIII

THE NEW GERMAN REGIME

EFFECTS OF THE ARMISTICE—OCCUPIED GERMANY—SPARTACIST POLICY—THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIES—SOVIET OR REICHSTAG?—CONGRESS OF COUNCILS—QUESTION OF FEDERATION—SPARTACISTS' RIOTS—MURDER OF LIEBKNECHT AND ROSA LUXEMBURG—NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS—THE NEW CONSTITUTION—PEACE RESOLUTION—GERMAN DELEGATION TO PARIS—SCENE AT THE TRIANON—SCHEIDEMANN'S "UNACCEPTABLE"—GERMAN COUNTER-PROPOSALS—A COMPARISON—QUESTION OF WAR-OFFENDERS—ALLIES' CONCESSIONS—ERZBERGER BEHIND THE SCENES—FALL OF THE SCHEIDEMANN CABINET—HERR BAUER GIVES WAY—PEACE SIGNED—WHAT GERMANY LOST.

WITH the signing of the armistice and the abdication of the Kaiser, Germany may be said to have parted with the old régime of the Hohenzollerns. It had often been said that Prussia's only industry was war; here was Prussia's occupation gone. Gone with it were the grandiose schemes of world conquest which the Prussian Junker class had shared with the modern industrialists, and the still more modern professors; gone was the régime which subjected all thought and training and action to war and the glory of war. It had been going for some time; this school of thought saw the turning-point of Germany's fortune in one event of the war, those saw it in another. For the moment it was a matter of historical interest only whether the failure of Germany in the gamble of the world war was due to the Marne, Bismarck, Frederick's statesmen, the Ottos—there was a school of excuse that went even further back, in the time-honoured German professorial style. But whatever the cause, the concrete facts were there.

There was, however, one point on which all Germans agreed to agree—that Germany was not beaten in the field. They were prepared to ascribe their failure to any cause but that. Always a nation of self-deceivers, they could not face the idea that there could be any combination of military power in the world that could beat their own. For this reason surprise is sometimes expressed that the Allies, at the moment when it was wholly within their power to administer to Germany any degree of defeat they chose, should have held their hand and have allowed the armistice to be concluded. "We ought to have smashed them there and then!" is the view that was frequently uttered at the time. But it overlooks what would have been the effect of such a conquest. The Germans said at this point, "It did not pay us to wreck large areas of the earth. Look at us! We are suffering for the destruction we wrought. That is how you will suffer for the destruction you may wreak upon us."

The truth was self-evident. The condition of Germany, mental and physical, was the direct result of Germany's own ill-deeds—in Belgium, in France, still more in Russia, and most of all at sea. Whatever the feeling that Germany ought to suffer direct punishment, it was plain that a military advance into the country, with the attendant destruction of whole countrysides—to say nothing of the loss of life involved by both armies—was certainly not the way to do it. The severest armistice terms, the hardest peace treaty, could not correspond to the

FRENCH TROOPS ENTERING COLMAR, NOVEMBER 21, 1918.
General Castelnau, who had headed the column, is seen on the left witnessing the march of his soldiers

misery Germany had inflicted. But such terms as were possible—progressively severe, and calculated on the basis of first rendering Germany powerless for further harm—were intended to have (as, indeed, they did have) their effect on the whole German people. But compared with Germany's deserts, this degree of moderation, while it could hardly be avoided, had this effect, that it became the habit among Germans to think of Germany as the arbiter of peace, as she had been of war. Throughout the period of the Peace Conference the whole nation clung to the idea that the Army had agreed to desist from fighting in order to spare further bloodshed; and that as they had called in aid the fourteen points of President Wilson, so their construction of those fourteen points should be the one that should govern any negotiations. This basic point of view profoundly affected the attitude of Germany towards the Peace Conference.

The armistice terms had affected—as was intended—not merely the armies in the field, but the Germans at home. The principal terms fell under five heads: cessation of fighting, evacuation of all non-German territories, surrender of material, occupation of German territory as guarantee, and restoration of stolen goods. The whole of the terms breathed precaution. The armistice was not to be an end in itself, but a preliminary step towards a peace that should guarantee the world against a repetition of wars for the fulfilment of any so-called national and imperial mission on the part of Prussia or Germany. Hence the decisive character of the armistice conditions. Experience had tested German good faith, both in the military and in the diplomatic field, and this time nothing was to be left to chance.

The Germans bore with ill grace the terms of disarmament. Accustomed for generations to rattle the sword in all their arguments, they adapted themselves with difficulty to the new conditions, and the habit of threatening continued even after the revolutionary government had settled down. But it is probable that the Occupation clause was the hardest for the Germans to swallow. All through the war it had been their proud boast that no enemy had stood on German soil. It was not strictly true according to the Germans' own claims, for if Alsace was German—as most Germans claimed with more than vehemence—then the French were on a considerable stretch of it in the Vosges; while at an earlier stage of the war Russia had invaded East Prussia with

considerable effect, although to little purpose. But the occupation of the entire provinces of Rhenish Prussia and the Palatinate, with the bridgeheads of Cologne, Coblence, Mannheim and Strassburg, to say nothing of the complete surrender of Alsace and Lorraine, was something that came home to Germany. "Der Rhein, Deutschlands Strom, nicht Deutschlands Grenze," were the words the poet of the Pan-Germans, Arndt of Bonn, had written eighty years before. It was no longer to be Germany's stream, and for the time being Germany's frontier lay beyond the neutral zone some eight miles to the east of it. Rhineland had seen foreign occupation before, the last time almost within living memory, but never on such a scale.

The country designated for occupation by the Allied and Associated Powers contained some of the finest towns and some of the most fertile soil of Western Germany. Cologne, Bonn, Coblence, Mayence, Mannheim, Ludwigshafen, Bingen, Kaiserslautern, Strassburg, Treves, Aix-la-Chapelle, Metz, Saarbrücken, Colmar, Mülhausen—these were a few of the cities surrendered to Allied occupation. There were others of manufacturing and industrial fame—Crefeld, Duisburg, Düren, Neuss, Mülheim, Deutz, while the country comprised the fertile lower Rhine plains, the forest slopes of the volcanic Eiffel, the vineyards of the Rhine, the Moselle and the Ahr, and the coal and iron regions of the Saar. Five or six cathedral cities, the see of a Cardinal Archbishop, three university towns, and the chief centres of the entire business world of Western Germany came under Allied occupation.

The German troops sullenly, but in moderately good order, withdrew across the Rhine and out of sight beyond the neutral zone. British guards occupied strategic posts at the bridge-heads of the middle region, with the Belgians to the north, the Americans immediately to the south, and the French on beyond the Americans. The civil governments remained behind to administer the provinces as the Allies should direct.

Before following the retreating soldiers into Germany—where, once out of touch with pursuit, they broke and deserted in large numbers—we may for a moment glance at the Allied occupation and its effects, since it was designed to last for a period of fifteen years, and therefore to have some character of permanency. A wise step had been taken when the Allies had decided to retain the local administration, but even these administrators had to learn that Germany victorious and Germany defeated were expected to observe different methods. During the first days after the occupation was complete

BRITISH CAVALRY CROSSING THE HOHENZOLLERN BRIDGE, COLOGNE.

CHANGING GUARD ON THE RHINE AT BONN.

the Armies of Occupation had made severe rules regarding the daily lives of the inhabitants. In the pleasure-loving Rhine towns these rules ill accorded with the habits of the populace, who thought any regulation not imposed from above—by which Prussia was meant—could be disregarded with a light heart. It needed but a short experience to convince the Germans that British, French, Belgians, and Americans alike were not to be trifled with, and after a few preliminary prosecutions imposed with great impartiality in the Allied courts for transgressions against the regulation against staying out after hours, the Armies of Occupation were soon on terms of understanding with a population that had learnt its obedience in a far harder system—the iron rule of Prussia. There was no pretence that the occupation was welcomed, or that it was anything but a reminder of miscarried schemes. But the Rhinelanders had occasion to bless it. A proclamation of General Plumer's during the disastrous strikes of the interregnum in Berlin and other parts of Germany illustrates the benevolent attitude of the Allies towards the inhabitants of the occupied territory :—

The situation in the whole of Germany becomes graver every day owing to economic and industrial disturbances and strikes.

Until now the inhabitants of the territory occupied by British troops have been able to live under law and good order and have been spared the bloodshed which has occurred in other parts of Germany. It is in the interest of all the inhabitants that things should continue so. Considerable quantities of food are now available, and its distribution will soon be fully organized.

Strikes and disturbances will not improve conditions, but will only produce misery and disaster, and therefore must not continue. In the interests of the inhabitants of the zone occupied by the British, I therefore ask all to co-operate with me in maintaining order ; this is the only means of sparing the inhabitants the misery which prevails elsewhere.

All disputes and differences of opinion must be settled by the legally prescribed German methods of conciliation. If agreement cannot be reached when all other Courts have been appealed to, the case must be submitted to the British military authorities, who, after a sympathetic and impartial hearing of the parties, and of technical experts, will themselves give a final verdict which shall be binding on both parties.

It is my firm determination to protect the rights of workmen and employees to the fullest extent.

I warn all that the strongest measures will be taken against any persons acting contrary to this proclamation, or in any way against its provisions.

HERBERT PLUMER,
General Commanding-in-Chief, British Army of the Rhine.

April 16, 1919.

While the rest of Germany was overwhelmed with labour troubles and worse, the Rhineland, under the wise government of its temporary rulers, enjoyed a period of peace that went far towards setting it on its feet. Long before the rest of Germany could give any thought to the reconstruction of their trade, the pushing Rhinelanders were already reaching out for the markets of the world.

The Soviets that had been formed as the result of the revolution were not a native German product. The Germans had turned to the model nearest at hand, that of the Russian Bolshevists, among whom the special local conditions of illiteracy and the absence of trade unionism had led to the evolution of the Soldiers and Workmen's Councils. Left to themselves, with their own highly organised industrial workers' system and their implicit faith in their army discipline, the German proletariat would undoubtedly have proceeded on an entirely different plan. As it was they were quick to perceive that the Russian dress did not fit them, and they at once made some hasty alterations. Bolshevism, in fact, had the support only of a very limited section of the Extreme Left, both among the working people at home and in the army. The Spartacist Party (with a section of the Independent Socialists, to be mentioned later) alone sought revolution on Russian lines. They alone desired that the Soviets should be substituted for "the inherited organs of capitalist class rule: the federal councils, municipal councils, parliaments." The more moderate Socialists, the Majority followers of Herr Ebert and Herr Scheidemann, and to a great extent the Minority followers of Herr Haase, were content to capture these organs and to make use of such institutions of the bourgeoisie as served their ends.

The Spartacists, though comparatively few in numbers, figured considerably in the events following upon the revolution. As has been previously described, they had derived their title from a series of letters published in the Chemnitz *Volksstimme* signed "Spartacus." These were the work of several collaborators, Liebknecht being among them. The nucleus of the Spartacus party was thus already in existence, but the extent of its following had all through the war been uncertain. At times the Spartacists would be so dormant as to seem altogether dead; at other times pamphlets of a highly inflammatory character would find circulation in the trenches and in the factories behind the lines in such quantities as to suggest that some very virile and active organization was directing forces that were by no means negligible. This literature was known to be largely financed by Russian money—both Eichhorn and Dr. Oskar Cohn were proved conclusively to have handled Russian funds for propaganda purposes. During the war it had one single aim: that on both sides the soldiers should cease fighting at the bidding of the capitalist and should turn to combine against him. The capitalist, it affirmed, had planned the Serajevo murder, had made the war, and alone stood to gain from it.

OPENING SESSION OF THE "IMPERIAL CONFERENCE OF WORKMEN'S AND SOLDIERS' COUNCILS" IN BERLIN, DECEMBER 16, 1918.

Herr Scheidemann (with head in hand) is seen in the centre of the picture with Herr Landsberg on his right.

With the sudden uprising of the revolution in November the Spartacists had come out into the open. Liebknecht, their chief, and Rosa Luxemburg, his inspirer—that strange, little, old Polish-German cripple whose shrill voice and magnetic personality could sway the mob

in its thousands—were out of prison. They immediately started to carry into practical effect the Spartacist programme, of which the following is an outline as sketched in the party's own publications :—

As an immediate means for making the revolution secure they proposed (1) to disarm the police and all "non-proletarian" soldiers ; (2) that the Soviets should seize all arms, ammunition, and war industries ; (3) to arm the entire adult male population as a workers' militia, and to form a Red Guard for protection against a counter-revolution ; (4) to abolish compulsory discipline, and to introduce the right to elect officers at any time ; (5) that Soviet representatives should take over all political organisations ; (6) to set up a Revolutionary tribunal for the trial of those responsible for the war, and for any counter-revolution ; and (7) the immediate seizure of all food.

ROSA LUXEMBURG,
Revolutionary Leader.

Further plans had been outlined as to how the Spartacists proposed to proceed with political and economic organisation when the revolution had been secured—that is, when the power had been seized. They followed the familiar Russian lines of confiscation of property, government by the many, high wages for little work, cancellation of national debts and nationalisation of industry, the whole set in a permanent atmosphere of "the right to strike."

At first sight it would have seemed that circumstances favoured Liebknecht, since many of the leaders in the early Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils were among his followers. But, as events showed, he never had a real majority, and his supporters were politically so ineffective that they lost hold of the power they had possessed. Perhaps the fall of the Russian revolution from its Marxian ideals to the meanest, vilest and cruellest tyranny the world had seen for centuries, had a restraining effect on Liebknecht's fellow-theorists.

With the example of Russia before their eyes the fact was plain to all serious-minded Germans —and the Germans, in spite of defeat, remained a serious-minded people—that the conclusion of peace must depend upon ordered government. The Majority Socialists, who throughout the war had been in fact a bourgeoisie party, had been quick to seize the main props of the fabric of German government and adapt them to the new conditions. The bulk of the civil administration personnel was still available. The strings of government were already in the hands of the Majority Socialists, who had been represented in the late Government by Herr Ebert, Herr Scheidemann, Herr Bauer and Dr. David. There was here a nucleus of experience. They were, however, well aware that the Minority and those who were still further to the Left were not likely to brook the dictatorship of a party they considered only a little less bourgeois than the bourgeoisie itself. It was therefore a wise move—due mainly to the longer views taken by Herr Ebert—that the Ministers who took over control decided to invite the cooperation of the Minority. The first Cabinet was composed of three Majority Socialists—Ebert, Scheidemann and Landsberg —and three Minority Socialists—Haase, Dittmann and Barth. The six formed "the Council of People's Commissaries." The more important offices of States were parcelled out among them as follows :—

Prime Minister	Herr Ebert
Finance	Herr Scheidemann
Publicity	Herr Landsberg
Foreign Affairs	Herr Haase
Demobilisation	Herr Ditimann
Social Policy	Herr Barth

It is important to remember that this body was self-appointed, having come into existence without any public sanction, and that one of the conditions of "cooperation" between the

DR. AUGUST MÜLLER,
Under-Secretary for Food Distribution.

two wings of the Socialist party was that each should be held responsible only to its own Executive, and not collectively. It was a bold attempt at a critical moment, and though ultimately failure was certain the fusion lasted through a dangerous time until something more stable was ready.

At a very early stage the question was raised of the responsibility of these "People's Commissaries" to the Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils. This body had already achieved a degree of organization whereby a central representative committee called the Executive Council was in more or less permanent session in the Prussian Herrenhaus at Berlin. It should properly have been the governing executive of Germany if the revolution had been what its promoters intended, namely, a complete break with the past. But there had been, as a matter of fact, no such complete break. A short, sharp struggle (on paper) soon decided that while all orders were to be signed by this Council the initiative would continue to come from the People's Commissaries. This agreement declared :—

(1) That the political authority rested with the Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils of the German Socialist Republic ; but

(2) That until the meeting of delegates from all the Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils took place, the Berlin Executive should exercise the functions of all, in agreement with the Berlin Workmen's and Soldiers' Council ; and

(3) That the "People's Commissaries" were entrusted with the duties of government subject to the Berlin Executive's control ; expert ministers were to be appointed by the Commissaries, but the Berlin Executive must be heard before such appointments were made.

It is easy to see from this where the power would ultimately lie. Meanwhile the "People's Commissaries" had appointed a government of "experts." These were as follows :

Foreign Office, Dr. Solf ; Imperial Treasury, Herr Schiffer ; Economic Office, Dr. August Müller ; Demobilization Office, Dr. Koeth ; War Food Office, Herr Emanuel Wurm ; Imperial Labour Office, Herr Bauer, War Ministry, General Scheuch ; Admiralty, Admiral von Mann ; Justice, Dr. Krause ; and Imperial Post Office, Herr Rudlin.

The Executive accepted this Cabinet *en bloc*, and merely stipulated for the appointment of certain Socialists, among them Dr. David, Dr. Kautsky, Herr Noske, Herr Eduard Bernstein and Herr Cohn as under-secretaries.



HERR SCHIFFER,
Finance Minister.

As this, too, had already been done, it is plain that the Berlin Executive had played a small part in the whole affair.

This Government came in for a good deal of criticism from the Extreme Left, who saw in it—as well they might—hardly any difference from the Government of Prince Max. But it was acceptable enough to the parties of the Right They had been clamouring, indeed, for the summoning of the old Reichstag, and the quickness with which they realised that this

was impossible is greatly to the credit of the political sense of Germany's non-Socialist parties. Their ablest writers were soon calling on them to accept the new order with the best possible grace, and to concentrate on the forthcoming National Assembly, for the elections to which it would be necessary to organize. They speedily responded. A new Democratic



VICE-ADMIRAL RITTER VON MANN,
Under-Secretary of Marine.

party was formed, while all the old bourgeois parties took on new democratic names. The Conservatives became the German National People's Party, the Catholic Centre Party became the Christian People's Party, and the National Liberals and Progressives the German People's Party. At once they issued their appeals and began their campaign.

The parties to the Left were divided on the question. There was no agreement in the Executive, which blew hot and cold according as the soldiers or the workmen were in the ascendancy. Herr Richard Müller, however, who shared with Herr Molkenbuhr the chief leadership of this body, indicated at an early stage his conviction that the Constituent Assembly must meet. The only point he made was that there must first be a conference of delegates from all the councils, a necessity that was now being generally conceded in order to give the elections some covering of national sanction. Opposition to the elections now came solely from certain of the Independents and from the Spartacists—and even the Independents were divided. Herr Haase, for instance, was for, Herr Dittmann apparently against; but neither in a very decisive manner. Once again the Minority party was showing its old inherent weakness. It was exposed on either flank, tending to swing to the right when things were going well with orderly government, but to slide away to the left whenever the Spartacists came into prominence. For it was the curse of the Independents that they could not brook the existence of a party further to the Left than themselves. The Spartacists might have been thought to be wholly opposed to the National Assembly, and most of their speakers denounced it from the first, though Liebknecht and others of political experience were known to favour at least some similar scheme. By this time, however, the great majority of the workpeople, who had spent all their lives under settled government, were beginning to desire some form of rule, and the best the Spartacists had to offer (this only by the right wing of them) was a

MAJOR-GENERAL SCHEUCH,
War Minister.

Haase-Liebknecht Government. This proposal was the fortuitous result of a leaning of the Independents to the left, and the idea collapsed immediately when Herr Ebert, speaking at the Social Democratic Committee meeting for the whole of Germany, warned all Socialists that the Majority could tolerate no such combination. At this meeting the views of Communists and Independents and Spartacists were faithfully dealt with, and a sharp note of opposition to dictatorship by any class was noticeable.

Similar struggles went on in each of the

Federal States. Space would not permit the dealing with them all. In general it may be said that Bavaria led the way to all Germany, both as regards the evolution of orderly government and the opposition to it. For it may be said that the struggle between the Socialists and the bourgeoisie on the one side and the Spartacist-Communists on the other was fought out with greater bitterness in Munich than in any other part of Germany. Here the Spartacists showed the greatest ruthlessness and determination; here, perhaps by the fact that opportunity develops ability, the moderates showed the greatest determination and the greatest skill in steering their ship of state through a storm beside which the riots in Berlin were but a capful of wind.

A conference of the representatives of the revolutionary governments of the Federal States met at the end of November in Berlin. It had in view more the question of an early peace than the decision of any form of government, which was thought less urgent But it was clear that the Government must be one which the Entente Powers would recognize, and therefore the question of the National Assembly was constantly before the meeting. The following further stage in the government of Germany was reached:

(1) The unity of the German Republic, while safeguarding the rights of the component Federal States.

(2) The convocation of a Constituent Assembly as soon as possible.

(3) The Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils meanwhile to be the representatives of the People's will.

(4) The Government to do its best to bring about an early preliminary peace.

BERLIN.

The Federal representatives then returned to their centres. Their hands were busy enough with their own local forms of government, and they were glad enough to leave larger affairs to a central government. The Spartacists had everywhere become more insistent and there were threats of renewed risings on all hands.

The People's Commissaries voiced the almost general view when they decided that the elections to the National Assembly should be held in February subject to the assent of an assembly of all the German Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils, which was fixed for December 16. At the same time they passed an electoral scheme for the voting, which showed

signs of long preparation. It differed from the former manhood suffrage for Reichstag elections in two important respects : there was no longer any sex disqualification and the voting was by proportional representation. While not a perfect scheme, it had the merit of making the new Assembly fairly representative of all classes. The arrangements for the election at once had the support of the Soldiers' Councils, the Non-commissioned Officers' Associations and the Guards' Committees.

Only the Spartacists and that section of the Minority Socialists which continued to adhere to them showed any opposition to the proposal. The Minority inside the Cabinet appear to have been divided on the subject, but Herr Haase was certainly in favour of it, and he carried with him the best brains of his party. On the other hand, the extremists of his group and the extremists of the Spartacists showed great anger, denouncing the National Assembly as designed to wreck the revolution, and declaring for a unified (as opposed to a Federal) Germany with a dictatorship of the proletariat for securing the safety and the fruits of the revolution. The phrases had become glib *clichés* in the mouths of their leaders, and had passed from political arguments to battle-cries.

A preliminary brush between the Extremists and the party of orderly government occurred on December 6, when a procession marching towards the Wilhelmstrasse came into collision with strong posts of armed soldiers who fired on them with machine-guns, some twenty persons being killed. This happened immediately after a declaration in support of the Ebert-Haase Government had been made by the Guards who had been drafted into Berlin as a measure of precaution. It is probable that the soldiers were acting with good intentions but without political direction, and the incident served to inflame the Extremists still further. Liebknecht exploited it for all it was worth, but the presence of the loyal troops and the knowledge that they would fire on the mob had a temporary restraining influence on his followers. Meanwhile, as a result of the division of authority which was apparently at the root of this affray, a further agreement was come to between the People's Commissaries and the Executive of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils, by which the latter now had only a controlling right but no power of executive. Thus gradually the inheritors of the Soviets were being politically disarmed. They made no particular complaint, and it is apparent that the Majority Socialists, who now held the balance of power in the Executive, were

STREET DEMONSTRATION IN BERLIN BY REVOLUTIONARIES CARRYING A RED FLAG.

determined not to embarrass their colleagues in the Cabinet. As for the rank and file, they were busy choosing delegates for the Congress of Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils. This went by election in the individual councils and resulted almost everywhere in the triumphant victory of the Majority Socialists, who defeated the Minority party by an average of two to one.

The Congress of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates met in the Prussian Diet building on December 16. The proceedings were marked by considerable disorder, both inside the building and in the square. But the temper of the congress was shown at an early stage when a motion to admit Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg was heavily defeated. While Herr Richard Müller was giving an account of his stewardship in the Berlin Executive a delegation of Spartacists broke in upon the meeting demanding the abolition of the Ebert-Haase Cabinet and government by Soviets alone. The proceedings, in fact, suffered several such incursions, but out of the Congress came the very definite conclusion that the masses of the people desired the National Assembly, and that the Independents and Spartacists who opposed it did not control the numbers they claimed. The more moderate Independents who followed Haase and Dittmann gave their support to the National Assembly; their main difference with their Majority colleagues was that they desired to retain also the Workmen's Councils. It was now clear that this issue must be fought out, and the matter became a question of opportunity.

An occasion arose in connexion with a riot on the part of some sailors, who had come to Berlin from Kiel early in the revolution and who had their quarters in the Schloss. With their Spartacist supporters, they were said to number some 3,000, mostly armed. Herr Ebert, regarding their presence as a menace to the safety of the city, ordered their reduction, and instructed Commandant Wels, who was in charge, to withhold their pay until they obeyed the order to return to Kiel. An armed outbreak by the sailors, supported by the Spartacists, followed immediately; the sailors occupied the Chancellery and the Kommandatur and held the commandant prisoner. A meeting of the People's Commissaries was called, and it is a significant fact that only Ebert, Scheidemann and Landsberg were present. These issued an order to General Lequis to "do what was necessary to liberate Wels." The general brought out his division, and during the night surrounded both the

CONFERENCE OF THE GERMAN ALLIED STATES UNDER PRESIDENT EBERT IN BERLIN, DECEMBER, 1918.

Schloss and the royal stables, bringing his field guns to bear on the sailors' positions. In due course the sailors were driven to negotiate; but the use of armed force sent further large sections of the Minority over to the extremists, while Herr Haase, Herr Barth, and Herr Dittmann, disclaiming all responsi-

HERR NOSKE,
Minister for the Army and Navy.

bility for the outbreak, resigned from the Council of People's Commissaries. This was, no doubt, just what the Majority Socialists wanted. In their places Herr Ebert brought into his Cabinet Herr Noske (the "strong man" of the Majority Socialists) to control the army and navy, and Herr Wissel (who had beaten Stadthagen, the Independent, in the Reichstag by-election) to control social policy. The third post was not filled up.

The Spartacists held a conference for the Extremists of the whole country on December 30, and showed at once that they too were divided on the question of a National Assembly. There was displayed the strange spectacle of Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg advocating that the Spartacists should take part in the elections and being beaten by the more extreme Extremists by 63 to 23 votes. Not that Liebknecht was more moderate than the abstentionists; more probably he hoped to wreck the Assembly from within. But the followers (by whom he was really ruled) decided otherwise, and they now began to prepare for a stiffer fight.

The President of the Berlin police—Eichhorn—had owed his appointment to the Soviets at the time of the revolution. He had remained in this position in spite of attempts to get rid of him, though it was known that he supported the Spartacists. During the sailors' fight at the Schloss he had hampered the military in every way, and had even armed the factory workers from a store of weapons he had accumulated. It was further known that he had been in receipt of money sent by the Russian Bolshevists for supporting armed revolution, and that he had disarmed all civilians except those who could produce Spartacist membership cards. In due course the Prussian Government (under which he held his post) was induced to dismiss him. He refused to vacate the Police Presidency, and rallied the support of several classes of young soldiers then in Berlin, besides the armed

HERR WISSELL,
Minister for Social Policy.

Spartacists, occupying at the same time the *Vorwärts* Building, the Telegraph Office, the Post Office, and the head offices of the railway administration.

The attitude of the Government was at first in doubt, but the arguments of Herr Noske, that weakness would lose all, and that a display of strength would probably bring out the people to the Government's side, carried the day with his colleagues. The decision proved the right one. Herr Noske demanded at once that all buildings should be evacuated, and at the same time he opened a recruiting office for trade unionists "to arm themselves against the terror." A great accession of strength and public support was the immediate result of his firmness.

Liebknecht meanwhile was going about encouraging his supporters, declaring that all preparations had been made "to overthrow

THE SPARTACIST RISING IN BERLIN.
A Street Scene during a Shooting Affray.

the Government, to arm the proletariat, and to carry out the radical programme." So far the struggle, even where buildings had been occupied, had not been attended with bloodshed. The fighting really began on the following day, January 6, when the Spartacists, growing increasingly bolder, marched down the Leipzigerstrasse and fired on some supporters of the Government outside the Wertheimer store. They then made for the Schloss, expecting there to be joined by the Naval Division, the only disciplined body whose support they counted on. But the Naval Division failed them and declared its "neutrality," to their intense chagrin and dismay

Fighting altogether went on throughout the week. On the Spartacist side the time was devoted to the occupation of the newspaper quarter, the railway, post and telegraphic centres, and similar points of communication, the paralysis of which seems to have been the backbone of their plan. Herr Noske, for his part, left Berlin to take care of itself while he went to organize troops, which he did with some deliberation and thoroughness. Eichhorn had taken the *Sicherheits* police with him. Herr Noske caused the question to be put to the Berlin Executive of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils as to whether Eichhorn had been properly dismissed, and when that body decided that he had, Herr Noske caused the result to be made known among the police, with the result that two-thirds of the force deserted Eichhorn. The Berlin garrison also went over to the Government. The rest of the fight was the gradual recapture of the buildings and railway stations which the Spartacists had occupied. By January 14 the latter were making their last stand at the Botzow brewery and the Silesia station, which surrendered in due course. Eichhorn fled. Herr Noske was the hero of the hour, and when, at a democratic meeting, he declared, "I shall retain in Berlin the number of troops necessary to secure the elections to the National Assembly, which will take place in a week's time, and to conduct them in an orderly way," he was cheered for this sentiment with a vehemence that might have belonged to the old régime.

These events marked the victory of the revolution, and the way was now clear for the elections to the National Assembly. Berlin was "cleared up" and the city placed under a kind of martial law, divided into seven military districts and ruled by a Prussian

ARMED SPARTACISTS HOLDING A STREET IN BERLIN.

general after methods thoroughly understood by the Berlin people, who had seen them in force for two generations and appreciated a "government that could govern." Many arrests were made, though the subsequent proceedings were, with one highly discreditable exception, carried out with moderation. The exception was the arrest of Liebknecht, and with him Rosa Luxemburg. The two had attended a meeting of Spartacists in Wilmersdorf, possibly to debate their failure and to hatch further plans. The house where they met was surrounded. Both were captured and taken, first to the headquarters of the Reinhardt Regiment and afterwards separately in the direction of the Moabit. Both were murdered. Liebknecht was said to have been shot whilst attempting to escape, though the surgeon's examination of his injuries showed that to have been impossible. Rosa Luxemburg was shot while sitting in the car, and her body thrown into a canal, from which it was afterwards recovered. Three officers of the Garde Kavallerie Division were later arrested in connexion with the murders, Captain von Pflugkh-Harttung, Lieut. Vogel and Lieut. Liepmann. They were tried by a military court and virtually acquitted. The murders throw light on the darker undercurrents of reaction that were then beginning to develop.

In due course the elections were held. They passed off without further incident, though Spartacist rumblings were ominous throughout the country. Of the 421 seats the Majority Socialists secured 163, the Christian People's Party (Centre) 88, the German Democratic Party 75, German National People's Party 42, German People's Party 21, Independent Socialists 22, with 10 adherents to minor causes, such as Guelphs, Danes, etc. Twelve seats had been allotted for Alsace and Lorraine, but the victorious Powers forbade these elections—indeed, Alsace and Lorraine had both passed formally into French hands, and were to be regarded henceforth as part of France.

The results left the Majority Socialists in great strength, while the Centre also emerged stronger than before. The Independents had been virtually routed, while the Conservatives and bourgeois parties could by no conceivable combination defeat the Government. The Spartacists had held aloof. It was thought that their plan was to render the Assembly powerless by organising great strikes in Berlin on the eve of its convocation, but the project was defeated by the decision to hold the Assembly

at Weimar—nominally out of consideration for the non-Prussian states. There the Assembly met on February 6, in the theatre, which had been hastily adapted to parliamentary requirements.

Before the Assembly met the various parties held preliminary meetings, as had been the custom in the old Reichstag. Importance attaches only to those of the two Socialist wings. In the programme of the Majority were four points: safeguarding of the revolution, resumption of economic life, an early peace, and a supply of food. The Independents laid down no definite programme. Herr Kautsky characterized their position in a few terse sentences. They had had to choose, he said, between the newly formed Spartacus group and the Social Democrats (Majority), and they had chosen a middle course, which meant nothing at all. By their inability to come to an understanding with either they had lost their power to attract, and had lost all credit in the eyes of the masses.

One other important step was taken before the Assembly met. Herr Scheidemann allowed himself to be interviewed in order to make a pronouncement of great moment. He said:

The National Assembly is the unmistakable expression of the people's opinion. Only the Independents try to discredit it. They say the Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils are the sole gain of the revolution. Such councils may be suitable for Russia, which never had any organized labour.

The councils may have had their uses in a revolutionary transitional period, and no doubt they did a good deal of useful work, but the transitional period has come to an end with the election of the National Assembly, and such councils are only obstacles in the way of regular administration.

This virtually marked the abolition of the Councils as a power to affect the machine of government. Angry protests were heard for a while, but the National Assembly, brushing all aside, settled down to its work of peace. It was now supreme.

Except for the inclusion of women members the National Assembly differed little from the old Reichstag. Dr. David was elected president, with Herr Fehrenbach and Herr Dietrichs as vice-presidents, but the arrangement was only temporary, and in a few days Herr Fehrenbach became president, with Herr Schulz as vice-president. Dr. David then led the Majority Socialists, Herr Haase the Minority, Herr Gröber the Centre (Herr Erzberger being engaged on the armistice commission), Herr Heintze the National Liberals, Count Posadowsky the Conservatives, with Count Westarp as his lieutenant. The new government was

QUELLING THE SPARTACIST RISING IN BERLIN: A FIELD GUN IN THE BELLE ALLIANCE PLATZ.

predominantly Majority-Socialist, and included Herr Scheidemann (Prime Minister), Herr Bauer (Labour), Herr Landsberg (Justice), Herr Noske (Defence), Herr Wissel (Economic Affairs), Herr Schiffer (Finance) and Dr. David (without portfolio). But it also included Count Brockdorff-Rantzau (Foreign Affairs), Dr. Preuss (Home Affairs), Herr Erzberger and Herr Gothein (without portfolio). That the fact might not be lost sight of that Germany was still in essence a military State, the Prussian Minister of Defence was included, but without a vote. Well might it be remarked that, as far as the personnel of the Government was concerned, the revolution need never have taken place.

The cooperation of the Independent Socialists was not sought. On the election figures no claim could lie, and Herr Ebert, at the Majority Socialist party meeting, declared that such cooperation "would have increased the chaotic condition of Germany."

Since the purpose of the National Assembly was to give Germany a constitution in accordance with the demands of the Allies, steps had previously been taken to prepare a draft, the work being undertaken by the eminent Prussian law official Dr. Preuss, Minister of the Interior. This contemplated a Germany divided differently from the old division by states, and would have reduced the predominance of Prussia. It was objected to, however, by all the parties by the Conservatives and Centre as departing too far from the old federation, and by the Socialists as not sufficiently consolidating the new order. It formed, however, the basis of the constitution as ultimately adopted. It provided for a federated people's State, an elective Reichstag, and an elected President, and it accorded certain fundamental rights to the people in relation to freedom of thought, belief, and action. On the question of the competency of the President in relation to foreign states, Article 63 read as follows :—

> The President of the Empire has to represent the Empire in international relations, to conclude treaties of alliance with foreign powers, and to accredit and receive Ambassadors.
>
> Declarations of war and conclusions of peace are made by a law of the Empire.
>
> Treaties with foreign states, touching matters concerned with Imperial legislation, require the assent of the Reichstag.

This was the new reading of Article XI. of the old constitution, by which the Kaiser had held the office of War Lord. The Reichstag

A BERLIN POLLING STATION DURING THE ELECTIONS FOR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

(as the National Assembly became under the new constitution) thereby established itself the authority to make peace.

Herr Ebert, who had been elected provisional president of the newly constituted State, delivered an opening speech, the major part of which, though delivered to the National

DR. HUGO PREUSS,
Minister of the Interior and Framer of the Constitution.

Assembly, was really addressed to the Inter-Allied Supreme Council in Paris.

In this he represented Germany as militarily unbeaten The hunger blockade and food shortage had handed Germany over to the enemy powers. Kaiserism had been abolished for ever, but in the actions of Germany's enemies—the armistice terms, the occupation of the Rhine territories, the continuation of the blockade the retention of Germany's prisoners—there was no sign of recognition of the new order. There was no justification for imposing upon the young Socialist Republic conditions that had been drawn up for the old Hohenzollern regime. "Germany laid down her arms in confidence, trusting to the principles of President Wilson. Now let them give us a Wilson peace, to which we have a claim."

This was the keynote of the conditions under which Germany proposed to enter the Peace Conference. It was echoed by Herr Scheidemann in his outline of the foreign policy of the Government, which he defined as :—

(1) Immediate conclusion of peace ; maintenance of the principles of President Wilson ; a peace of violence to be rejected.
(2) Reconstitution of a German colonial sphere.
(3) Immediate return of German prisoners of war.
(4) Equal rights of participation in the League of Nations ; simultaneous and mutual disarmament ; compulsory arbitration to prevent war ; abolition of secret diplomacy.

For this policy Herr Scheidemann stood valiantly throughout the period of his ministry. That it was not for Germany to make terms on which she would agree to peace must have been evident to him. But, a politician before all, he had no intention of being the person who should sign a peace that the Allies might think just. He had even then the spectacle before him of Herr Erzberger attacked on all sides because he had signed the armistice.

The eyes of all Germany were turned in the direction of Paris from the day of the first meeting of the Peace Conference. By now the German people were aware that they were not to be invited to participate in the Council's deliberations, but they still hoped for negotiations on its findings. It was to the advantage of Germany that the attempt to prevent all discussion and news of the Council broke down, and the published statements of the Entente

DR. KONSTANTIN FEHRENBACH,
President of the Reichstag.

Press served the German Government as a guide in forming its comment and objections as the debates proceeded. As the details of the proposals leaked out they were discussed point by point in the National Assembly. The general point of view, "A Peace of Justice," was kept in the foreground. It was at first difficult to force a clear-cut debate in the National Assembly, partly because the Government's information was based on hearsay and rumour, and partly, also, because of the insistence with which home affairs continued to force themselves on public attention. Nevertheless, the Democrats, Centre and Majority Socialists at an early stage placed their views

BERLIN'S PROTEST AGAINST BOLSHEVISM.
A Demonstration of the Combined Democratic Parties.

on record in the National Assembly in the form of a peace resolution. This declared "The German people did not lay down its arms until it had come to an agreement with its enemies on President Wilson's points, and it counts on the inviolability of this promise." The resolution protested against France treating Alsace-Lorraine as French territory even before the conclusion of peace. It protested in advance against the steps being taken in the Saar district, as pointing to annexation by France. It protested against the demarcation line which the Conference was said to have drawn in regard to the new Poland, and called upon the German Government to ward off any further attempts of the Poles to enter German territory. It demanded the raising of the blockade, the supply of raw materials to Germany, and the return of the German prisoners of war. It protested against the terms on which the armistice had been prolonged (the original terms had not been fulfilled), and it concluded with a protest before the whole world at treatment calculated to "drive the German people to desperation."

The resolution is interesting as revealing that the German mind had undergone not the slightest change. The protest had all the familiar features of Prussianism. But the armistice had been well attended to, and a protest after the true Prussian manner was impossible. Nor was the threat of Bolshevism —for that was frankly stated to be the implication of the last sentence—to be taken too seriously, since the Majority parties of the Reichstag had shown, and continued to show, their deep-rooted distrust of extreme measures. The resolution, which carried a vote of confidence in the Government, was carried. The Conservatives, who later on introduced a similar but slightly stronger resolution, joined the Independent Socialists in voting against it; but it reflected the views of them all.

The protest, which was intended as a message to the Paris Conference, was echoed throughout Germany. The general trend of the debate in Paris was now widely known, and it was possible to construct something of a rough draft of the treaty's main outline. The monarchist reactionaries gave vent to a great burst of anger when the proposals for the limitation of the German Army were forecasted. They had stayed their hand and held their peace against the new rulers of Germany in the

hope that a reconstruction of the Army would soon put at their disposal a weapon with which they could back their views on a possible restoration. Accordingly, the National Assembly rang with their impassioned protests that the terms of President Wilson allowed no such limitation. They likened the proposal to that of Napoleon at Tilsit, and promised it just as long a life, declaring that "a new German army is an internal German matter and must be so regarded by the Entente."

by the Great Powers; or, failing that, autonomy under British protection; or, if not, then autonomy under American protection; or, as a last resort if all these failed, autonomy under French protection. Needless to say, these proposals carried no weight with the Allies, who regarded the question as settled. The National Assembly was found advocating a referendum, and the idea of self-determination found a wonderful band of new adherents among the traditional oppressors of Alsace and

A SITTING OF THE GERMAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN THE THEATRE AT WEIMAR.

The question of self-determination by local referendum for the non-German territories that had been forced by Prussia's frontier policy into the German Empire was canvassed with equal eagerness. In the case of Alsace-Lorraine the question of self-determination did not arise. Quick to see that all hope of retention of these provinces by republican Germany must be abandoned, the German industrials and other Germans who had sought and made their fortunes in the Reichsland started a vigorous propaganda campaign in favour of autonomy. A Committee of Autonomists was set up, and its members issued protests against union with France, which, they declared, would spell ruin. They demanded neutrality, guaranteed

Lorraine. Herr Scheidemann advanced a specious pretext for this new attitude: "If, as regards Alsace-Lorraine, we urge a referendum, it is not in the furtive hope of rendering void a point in Wilson's programme, but in order to destroy for all time ideas of revenge and new accusations of tyranny."

This was the new attitude of Germany towards a referendum for Alsace-Lorraine. Very different was the attitude of German statesmen and the German Press towards the proposals of the Peace Conference for a referendum in the districts where Belgians, Danes and Slavs, torn from their parent lands by the rapacity of Prussia, now sought freedom by a plebiscite. In each of the areas, in Malmedy,

on the Belgian frontier, where a handful of French-speaking Walloons had held out against Prussianizing efforts; in Schleswig, where the Danish language was proscribed; in Posen, where the oppression of the Poles had become a by-word; in East Prussia the idea of a plebiscite was combated and further oppression instantly instituted by the civil officials.



THE NATIONAL THEATRE, WEIMAR.
The original seat of the National Assembly.

By the end of April the Paris Conference had so far prepared the draft of the Peace Treaty that a summons could be sent to Berlin inviting representatives of the German Government to Versailles to receive the text. Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, the Foreign Minister, in announcing the receipt of the invitation, allowed it to be understood that Berlin had been asked to send a diplomatic courier to Versailles "to receive the draft Treaty at the hands of the Allies." This distortion of meaning was made intentionally, and a group of minor officials was appointed. Thereupon the Supreme Council informed the German Government (in reply to what seemed quite unnecessary discourtesy) that they had been prepared to receive plenipotentiaries. In passing this announcement on to the German people the German Foreign Office indicated that the "change" in form from minor officials to plenipotentiaries constituted a diplomatic victory for Germany, in that it must imply negotiations and not mere submission. The hopes of the German people were artificially raised; though they distrusted their own diplomatists they now thought that there would be an opportunity by negotiation to mitigate the terms, the severity of which could no longer be in doubt. The incident illustrates the frame of mind in which Count Brockdorff-Rantzau and his colleagues went to Paris; it must also have prepared the Council in advance for chicanery and intrigue.

The German delegation was chosen by the Government. Although the Allies had asked for plenipotentiaries, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau stipulated from the first that he should have the right to refer the treaty to Berlin before signing it. It is interesting to note that Herr Scheidemann was opposed to this precaution. Both he and the Count desired the same thing—to avoid bearing the final onus of assent. Five other delegates were chosen: Herr Landsberg, Minister of Justice in the Scheidemann Cabinet; Herr Giesberts, Minister of Communications; Herr Leinert; Dr. Carl

COUNT BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU,
Foreign Minister. Headed the German Delegates appointed to receive the Peace Treaty.

Melchior; Professor Schücking. Two ministerial directors (permanent Secretaries of State), Herr von Stockhammern and Dr. von Simons, accompanied the delegates as advisers, and Dr. von Haniel, the ex-Ambassador, went with Count Brockdorff-Rantzau as his special adviser. There were besides 11 officials from the Foreign Office, 18 other ministerial officials, a number of experts in economic, naval, military and territorial questions, and minor and clerical staff.

The delegation left Berlin on April 28. Theirs was not a mission of triumph, and they made

their departure from a Potsdam railway siding as quietly as possible, arriving at Paris on May 1. To avoid publicity their train was stopped at the little station of Vaucresson, between Paris and Versailles. There they were presented by Baron von Lersner to the Prefect of the department of Seine et Oise, who, addressing Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, said: "Excellency, as prefect of the Department, and in the name of the Government, I am charged to receive the delegation of the German plenipotentiaries. I have the honour to salute you." He then introduced the delegation to Colonel Henry, chief of the French Military Mission, who had been appointed to act as their intermediary.

The German delegation motored to Versailles. The chief delegates were lodged in the Hotel des Reservoirs, an old and historic hotel, once the residence of La Pompadour, the others in

THE PALISADE IN THE PARK AT VERSAILLES.
Limiting the German Delegates' freedom of movement.

the immediate neighbourhood. Their hotels backed on to the park of Versailles. Here the Germans were to live during their stay in France, with access to the park but not otherwise free to leave their hotels. Formalities occupied some days. The exchange of credentials and their examination by the Verification of Powers Committees took place on the first day. Delay was caused owing to the temporary withdrawal from the Conference of the Italian delegates, due to differences of opinion on Italy's territorial rights; but this was got over at the last moment, and the Italian delegates returned

The delegates were summoned to the Hall of the Trianon Palace at three o'clock on the afternoon of May 7, and were accompanied by Herr von Stockhammern, Dr. von Simons and Dr. von Haniel. There they were conducted to seats facing a table at which there sat in the centre, as president, M. Clemenceau, with President

COUNT BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU
arrives to receive the Peace Treaty.

Wilson and the American delegates on his right and Mr. Lloyd George and the British delegates on his left—the democracies of the world summoning the last remnants of absolutism to account. The proceedings were brief indeed, lasting barely an hour. M. Clemenceau, addressing the German delegates, observed that the time had come for Germany to make full reparation for the war so cruelly imposed. "The Second Peace of Versailles," he added, "has been too dearly bought for us not to ask for the full satisfaction which is our due." He then informed the delegation that it would be given fifteen days in which to frame its observations on the Treaty, which would have the consideration of the Council.

On behalf of the German delegation only Count Brockdorff-Rantzau spoke. M. Clemenceau had risen to his feet in addressing him, but Count Brockdorff-Rantzau made his reply seated. Whatever the intention—and attempts at explanation were afterwards made—the effect was to suggest that not even dire adversity could cure the Prussian of his arrogance. But the Count was respectfully listened to. The main features of his reply were that while the former German rulers were responsible for the German share in the war guilt, all Europe shared the responsibility for the war itself,

and that the Germans were willing to collaborate in the creation of a new world based on the fourteen points of President Wilson. "We are not quite without protection," he exclaimed. "You yourselves brought us an ally. The Allied and Associated Governments forswore in the time between October 5 and November 5 a peace of violence, and wrote

MARSHAL FOCH ARRIVES AT THE PALACE.

'A Peace of Justice' on their banners. . . . The principles of President Wilson have thus become binding for both parties to the war. . . . You will find us ready to examine on this basis the preliminary peace which you have thus proposed to us."

Intriguers to the last, Count Brockdorff and his party were assuming an attitude consistent with the previous communications. The appeal was not to President Wilson's points, but to Germany's interpretation of them. Count Brockdorff laid bare the mechanism of the negotiations regarding the armistice, and invested them with the character of a piece of sharp practice in a questionable deal. He talked of the willingness of Germany to examine the "preliminary peace" as though further business might be done on Germany's terms, with a hint of threat if rejected. The Council remained unmoved and offered no immediate comment. The Germans were left to file from the hall first, and it was noticed that after this display of strange manners the French officers present solved the delicate question of saluting by removing their hats and holding them in their hands.

The scene in the Hall at the Trianon Palace was memorable for two reasons. In the heart of every Frenchman present there was probably a feeling of thankfulness and gratitude that the scene enacted on a former occasion, when Germans stood as conquerors and Frenchmen as suppliants, was now to be wiped out of memory by the justice of time; while in the minds of the Germans there must have reigned a puzzled despair of miscarried schemes, in which that earlier scene at the Trianon had been such a promising step. M. Clemenceau had participated in France's downfall and had seen what the German in his triumph could do to his enemies: the world could only admire his moderation.

No time was lost in transmitting the terms of the Treaty to Berlin. Their general outline became known the same evening. To the Ministers and to those whose business it was to follow events the outline did not expand—though it confirmed—what was already known or feared. But the German people, and to some extent the German Press, were not prepared to face in reality what they had grown accustomed to in rumour. A great outcry was raised. The curtailment of German territory alone presented a formidable part of the penalty. Alsace and Lorraine were lost, a territory of 5,600 square miles; Poland received from Posen territory equal to about 11,000 square miles; territory in East and West Prussia was to be given up equal to about 13,000 square miles; and in the region of Malmedy about 400 square miles was ceded to Belgium. Besides these there were certain areas in which plebiscites were to be taken to settle the question of frontiers by racial districts—or, as it was now called, self-determina-

tion. These plebiscites were to take place in districts of Prussia, Schleswig, and a further district on the Belgian border; while Danzig was to be a Free City, and a strip of land ceded to Poland giving access to the port and the sea.

The outcry was well staged, and it reached a considerable volume. Herr Ebert immediately issued a proclamation in which he declared that Germany had borne the hard armistice conditions in the hope of a peace of right on the basis of the Wilson Note, but that

THE GERMAN DELEGATES LEAVING THE TRIANON PALACE AFTER RECEIVING THE TREATY.

For an illustration of the scene in the Hall of the Palace, see Vol. XXI., p. 168.

what was now given in the peace terms was a contradiction of that promise.

The terms, he declared, would be unbearable for the German people, and also impracticable, even if they put forth all their powers. Violence without measure of limit was to be done to the German people, but the German people's government would "answer the peace proposals of violence with a proposal of a peace of right on the basis of a lasting peace of nations."

Once again it must have occurred to many minds outside Germany to compare Germany's reception of her fate by the Second Peace of Versailles with the dignified attitude of France when she learned the harsh conditions of the First. But the Germans had conveniently short memories. When the German Peace Council of the National Assembly met in Berlin, Herr Fehrenbach, who presided, declared the peace had gone beyond the most pessimistic forecasts. Herr Scheidemann, casting dignity to the winds, said that—

Germany had that day drunk the last dregs of degradation, that the terms were a sentence of death at a more or less distant date, but that the Government hoped to reach an agreement by way of negotiation. The note was unacceptable as it stood, but the Government had instructed the Delegation to present a counter-note with the Government's views and to request an oral discussion.

The word "unacceptable" was at once caught up as its keynote by the German Press, and perhaps more was imported into its meaning than Herr Scheidemann had intended. At any rate, he was soon found qualifying it. Three days afterwards he declared in an interview that he had come to the opinion that it would be possible to form a Government which would sign the peace terms, though it was doubtful whether it would be one that would

DEMONSTRATION IN BERLIN AGAINST THE TREATY PROVISIONS REGARDING POSEN AND DANZIG.

satisfy the Entente. This was a challenge pointed at the Independents and Extreme Left parties; however, they ignored it.

The expert commissions attached to the German delegation were not idle meanwhile. Within a week Count Brockdorff-Rantzau and Herr Landsberg had returned from Germany—whither they had gone with the text of the Treaty—and handed to M. Clemenceau three interim notes. The first was a reasoned economic statement. As a summary of the main features of what Germany stood to lose by the Treaty it was reasonably fair, while its conclusions showed that the penal clauses of the Treaty as an act of justice were beginning to come home to the German mind. The note pointed out that Germany, as constituted before the war as an agrarian state, could support a population of 40 millions, while as an industrial state she was supporting 67 millions. The foodstuffs imported were 15 million tons, and 15 million persons depended directly on foreign trade or shipping, or indirectly through the working up of raw materials

It then proceeded to enumerate the obligations under which Germany lay. Germany had to deliver up her commercial tonnage, ships under construction, and for the next five years would have to build primarily for the Allies. The colonies had been lost; the territorial losses involved corn regions that would mean a drop of 21 per cent. in foodstuffs produced, the loss of one-third of the coal production, nearly three-quarters of the iron ore production, and three-fifths of the zinc production.

The note postulated that a vast population of Germany would be obliged to emigrate—but where to? On this point the economic experts were under no illusion as to what the rest of the world thought of its Germans. "There would be an embargo on German emigration, while hundreds of thousands of Germans would be banished from the states that had been at war with Germany." The nation, it was declared, was broken in health by the blockade, and if the Treaty was passed it would be a sentence of death on millions of German men and women.

Count Brockdorff-Rantzau's second note disputed the question of an indemnity. It protested that the German people did not wish the war, and would never have undertaken a war of offence. The claim for indemnification by Germany of the Allied and Associated Powers was contested on the ground that the responsibility for the war had not been determined. If any Allied Commission had investigated this question, the delegation asked that it might be furnished with a copy of such report

The third note dealt with territorial changes from the point of view of nationality. It declared that, in regard to the allotted territories of Alsace and Lorraine, Moresnet and Poland, large areas inhabited solely by Germans had been taken away ; and that while Germany was aware that in some districts the Poles considered themselves non-Germans, and that certain inhabitants of Schleswig looked towards Denmark, Germany had been ready to conciliate the Poles and to come to an agreement with Denmark for a new frontier. But the readiness of the German Government, it explained, did not extend to regions not

HOME-COMING OF DANES OF SCHLESWIG WHO HAD BEEN FORCED TO FIGHT BY THE GERMANS, AND WERE TAKEN PRISONERS BY THE ALLIES.
They were repatriated in April, 1919.

A SITTING OF THE MINISTRY IN THE CASTLE AT WEIMAR.
Left to right: Herren Rauscher (Press Chief), Robt. Schmidt, Schiffer, Scheidemann, Dr. Landsberg, Wissel, Bauer, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dr. David, Herren Noske, Gothein, Dr. Bell.

indubitably inhabited by a population of a foreign race. It was not permissible that German populations and regions should be "bartered by the Peace Treaty from their present sovereignty as though they were counters in a game." The note protested against the proposals for a French control of the Saar region for fifteen years, while France was being compensated for the destruction of her own coal mines by the Germans. In "this partly Prussian, partly Bavarian region," the entire population was claimed to be opposed to such severance. The plebiscite at the end of the fifteen years depended on Germany being able to buy back the coal undertakings, a condition which was quite out of the question.

The note added that Germany was prepared to come forward with a much better proposal, on which agreement might be reached without difficulty, for the delivery of as much coal as would satisfy French demands. This could be obtained from the region of the Ruhr, and there need then be no disturbance of the *status quo* in the Saar district.

Apart from these special notes a further long note was delivered on behalf of the German Government, covering 119 foolscap pages. It is possible here to give only the briefest summary. Many of its statements and figures were questionable, and in places absolute misstatements were made. The view in Germany was that the protest was slightly overdone, but it gives an insight into the official German mind.

This note began with the familiar protest that the peace did not square with President Wilson's fourteen points, though no attempt was made to take those points *seriatim* and show the discrepancies—in all probability the only argument that would have moved the Allies—the inference being that Germany did not care to risk such a comparison. Another now familiar protest was made that the war was against an imperialistic and irresponsible Government, for which the German people, ruling its own future for itself, should not be made to suffer. The note affirmed that to restore any part of Schleswig to Denmark, Upper Silesia to Poland, to separate Memel, to isolate East Prussia, to declare Danzig a free city—all these things made the peace a peace of might, instead of a peace of right, as agreed by the Allies under the terms of the Armistice Notes. It declared that the economic terms, and the claim that German citizens must be handed over to the courts of hostile powers, were contrary to the "innate rights of nations." It declared that the decisions regarding the Saar, the districts of Eupen and Malmedy on the Belgian frontier, the provinces of

Alsace and Lorraine, were in opposition to the principle of self-determination, in that the views of the people of these districts had not been taken anew by popular vote. It estimated that thereby two and a half million Germans were being "torn away from their native land." The Treaty, the note said, involved the utter destruction of German economic life, and condemned the German people to financial slavery; while Germany's creditors would not be able to obtain the immense sums required from a pauperized country. The delegation felt itself called upon, therefore, to make counter-proposals, which it did to such effect as almost to rewrite the Peace Treaty.

Before considering these proposals it is of interest to compare the protests of Germany beaten with the well advertised schemes of Germany victorious. During the submarine war German economists had made no secret that, apart from the aim of "bringing England to her knees by a submarine hunger blockade," Germany had in view, as being almost more important, the crippling of England's overseas trade by the destruction of her mercantile marine. Therefore Germany's plea that the terms would ruin her own foreign trade, "on which fifteen millions depended," could have been answered by the statement that it was the application, *mutatis mutandis*, of her own policy. As to the lost colonies, Germany had only to refer to the Lichnowsky memoir to remind herself of the fact that she was, in the years before the war, in a position to acquire honestly a colonial empire quite as extensive as she could have managed for generations. But she had preferred the method of plunder, in the illusion that it would be cheaper, and it had failed. As to the curtailment of Germany's production of coal, iron, and zinc, Germany admitted that the destruction of the Belgian and French mines and industry had been part of a policy to defeat competition that was to bear fruits after a victorious end to the war, and was not at all the work of irresponsible soldiery. No more was being asked than that these damages should be made good; but if punitive reparation had been demanded, Germany could not have denied that it was in accordance with her own economic theories. The declaration regarding the areas ceded to France, Belgium, and Poland could have deceived no one—even among the Germans themselves. The fact that there were Germans in these districts was due to Prussia's policy



SOME OF THE DYNAMOS STOLEN BY GERMANY RECOVERED IN BELGIUM.

SOME OF THE LOOT LEFT BEHIND BY THE GERMANS COLLECTED AT NAMUR.

of colonization in the areas she had throughout her history forcibly added to her kingdom. Bismarck's plantation policy in Poland had been no secret; it had been defeated by the greater virility and the more tenacious patriotism of the Poles themselves, so that districts overwhelmed with oppression and spoliation had remained indisputably Polish. Moreover, no Prussianizing had been able to alter Moresnet. And the Germans might have asked themselves what would have been the result of a plebiscite in Alsace and Lorraine in 1871. What of the young Alsatians and Lorrainers, born under French rule, yet forced by the Prussian conqueror into the Prussian Army? On the question of indemnities they had need only to recall the boast of Herr Helfferich when Finance Minister, that Germany would after the war be surrounded by a string of states paying tribute; or Count Roedern's unforgotten speculation regarding Germany's position after the war: "We do not yet know what indemnities we shall get." As to annexations, the ink was not long dry on the Brest-Litovsk and Bukharest Treaties, while the plans of Ludendorff for the annexation of a vast tract of France beyond Lorraine had only lately become known. As for bartering peoples, had not Belgium been regarded all through the war as a pledge to bargain with? To all these things the Majority Socialists, no less than the Junkers, had been party.

We can form but a dim idea of what the Peace Treaty would have been if Germany had won: but the Germans themselves have outlined for us their view of what the German loser considered—not fair, but the best obtainable. In the German Government's note disarmament was treated as a mutual affair; Germany would reduce her forces and dismantle her fortresses provided that similar reduction was general and that there should be no special supervision of the process. Germany was prepared to supply coal to France, but not to hand over, even temporarily, the Saar mines. It was declared that the district of Moresnet and Eupen-Malmedy had a majority of Germans, and that as reparation to Belgium Germany was prepared to supply Belgium with wood from the Eupen forests. It was declared that, as Alsace-Lorraine was mostly German, Germany, as reparation for not taking a plebiscite in 1871, was prepared to offer the inhabitants choice between union with France, union with Germany as a "free" state, and complete independence.

In regard to the new Poland, Germany proposed to cede to Poland such districts of West Prussia as were "indisputably" Polish. On the other hand, Upper Silesia, the bulk of West Prussia, the whole of East Prussia, Posen and the city of Danzig were declared to be German pure and simple, and Germany did not propose to give them up. The fact that a non-German language was spoken in many districts was "in itself of no importance." In regard to the Memel district, on the borders of Lithuania, the Germans claimed that here the Germans were

THE PEACE TREATY ARRIVES FOR SIGNATURE.

68,000 to the Lithuanians' 54,000, and that the majority of the Lithuanians also spoke German. The German view on this point added the following threat:

> If any German territory is ultimately ceded to Poland, Germany must protect its former nationals. That is all the more necessary because the Poles have not so far shown themselves trustworthy protectors of the national and religious rights of minorities.

The German note contented itself with proposing in regard to Schleswig another boundary and a different system of voting and control of the plebiscite. This was not explained.

In regard to colonies, Germany claimed "the right to co-operate in the joint task of mankind as a great civilized nation." Forgetful of her shameful record in German East Africa, among the Herreros of German South-West Africa, and in the Cameroons—names of ominous memory—she proposed an impartial hearing of the colonial question before a special committee. Compensation was claimed for Shantung, and all restitution and reparation for territory that belonged to the former Russian Empire was peremptorily refused.

On the question of reparation, Germany accepted the obligation to pay for damages sustained by the civil populations in Belgium and France, but not in Italy, Montenegro, Serbia, Rumania and Poland. She conceded responsibility for Belgian loans, but declared the Allies' estimates of these and of the civilian damage to be excessive. A German Commission was proposed for cooperation with the Reparation Commission, with the reference of disputes to a mixed neutral Court of Arbitration. But the condition was made that reparation could only be made if German territory were not divided up, industrial and food bases not destroyed, and overseas connexions, colonies and mercantile fleet retained. Germany proposed to indemnify France for the destroyed coalfields by exporting to France coal equal to the difference occasioned by the destruction of French mines, the maximum to be 20 million tons for the first five years and five million tons thereafter, in return for adequate supplies of minerals for her smelting works from Lorraine. Proposals for money payments of reparations were to be based on an annuity to be paid each year in proportion to Germany's revenues. Finally, oral negotiations were proposed.

In concluding paragraphs the trial of the ex-Kaiser was refused. Germany, while declaring herself prepared to see that violations of international law were punished with full severity, could only consent to this being done after trial by an international tribunal on which Germany should be represented.

In return for Germany conceding a peace of this kind the armies of occupation were to be withdrawn from Germany within six months after its signature.

It is impossible in the brief space at disposal to give more than this bare outline of the

THE SIGNING OF THE PEACE TREATY: PRESIDENT WILSON AFFIXING HIS SIGNATURE.

He is sitting, pen in hand, at the table beneath the third from the right of the row of windows. All the signatures were affixed at this table.

German objections to the Treaty, and the counter-proposals made by the delegates on behalf of the German Government. An extension of time had been granted on Germany's request, but the reply of the Allies was soon forthcoming. The concessions made were principally the following:

In regard to reparation, the Germans may submit proposals within four months. Within another two months the Allies will reply, and the final amount due from Germany may then be fixed. In the meantime the terms of the Draft Treaty must be accepted as definitive.

It is indicated that Germany may be admitted to the League of Nations at "an early date" if she proves by her acts that she intends to fulfil the conditions of the Peace.

A plebiscite for Upper Silesia is offered.

Germany need only reduce her army to 200,000 men within three months. The rate of the reduction to the stipulated 100,000 men will be reviewed every three months.

With the reply were the observations that July 1914 was not the only period to be considered in relation to the responsibility for the war, but the whole history of Prussia, which had been one of "domination, aggression and war"; that punishment of those principally responsible for the war was essential to justice; that the treaty was in accord with President Wilson's fourteen points; that the plan of the Saar Basin was the only method by which compensation for the destruction of her coalfields could be secured to France; that no part of Germany outside the former kingdom of Poland had been included in the restored Poland; and that the German objections to a plebiscite in East Prussia were "inexplicable." As to the German claim that the fourteen points had been violated, President Wilson made the following statement:

Our Treaty violates none of my principles. If I thought otherwise I should not hesitate to confess it and should try to retrieve this error. But the Treaty which we have drawn up is entirely in accordance with my fourteen points.

The reply of the Allies to the German objections and counter-proposals was handed to the German delegates in a simple and formal ceremony in the Hotel des Reservoirs. With it the intimation was conveyed that the time limit expired in five days, but that as a concession to the German demand for more time—though the time limit had originally been fixed on the estimate of the Germans themselves—a further 48 hours would be granted. The reply to be awaited would be "Yes" or "No."

With this the German delegation returned home. Meanwhile the discussion, both formal and informal, had gone on, a section of the German public clinging still to the idea that the peace might not be signed, and that Germany might be spared what they described as "humiliation." Opposition centred chiefly on two points. The one was the admission that Germany alone was responsible for the war; the other was the demand for the trial of the ex-Kaiser and his war-makers. Compared with these two points the plebiscites, the reparations, the restorations, bulked as nothing; they were unpleasant and bitter,

HERR ERZBERGER.

but the "young German Republic" was Prussian and predatory by instinct, and could at least understand them. To touch the sacred person of the Kaiser or to admit that Germany could be wrong was to commit sacrilege.

Proposals had been made to put the Treaty to a plebiscite of the whole nation. They were soon abandoned. The Government could not risk the possibility of disturbance that would have followed, even if there had been time to inaugurate the cumbrous machinery that the process would have demanded. There had been a proposal, backed by a section of the Prussian Evangelical Church, to sign, with mental reservations, and work for a combination of Continental nations against England. But the attitude of France at Versailles was sufficient to dissipate any such idea; the day for German intrigues against the Entente, a habit begotten of the war, had gone by.

It seemed plain from the first that neither Herr Scheidemann nor Count Brockdorff-Rantzau would be among the signatories or even supporters of signature. Herr Scheidemann was tied to the word "unacceptable"



THE FIRST AND LAST PAGES OF SIGNATURES TO THE PEACE TREATY.

that he had used at an earlier stage, though, in the Social Democratic Congress at Weimar held after the Treaty had been received, he had deprecated the repetition of "that hard word," and had made the admission that "not all the demands of our opponents are unjust." In the same meeting Herr Eduard Bernstein had taunted his fellow-Socialists with crying: "No plebiscite—it might turn out badly!" There were, in fact, signs already at the meetings of the various party factions at Weimar on the eve of the summoning of the National Assembly that a majority could almost certainly be found for signing on any terms. As for the German people, their attitude was well summed up in the review of the conditions by Herr Harden:

> The present terms are mild in comparison with those which the Germans themselves proposed to inflict had they been successful, or in comparison with those they actually inflicted at Brest-Litovsk.
>
> The German nation does not yet understand what has happened, or why the Empire has aroused such anger among the nations. Millions of Germans still believe in an encircling plot to which Germany fell a sudden victim in 1914. Others with equal stupidity rely on the Marxian doctrine and believe that capitalism was the cause of the war.

The country being still stunned and apathetic, Ministers had the field to themselves. But Weimar remained undecided. There was a majority in the Cabinet against unreserved signature of the Treaty; there was a majority in the National Assembly in favour. The German Peace Commission met at Weimar on June 17, and Count Brockdorff-Rantzau arrived during the night. It was then decided that the Treaty should be put before the National Assembly with the two reservations on war guilt and the trial of the ex-Kaiser. That Count Brockdorff-Rantzau would not sign was at once apparent, and it was also clear that if he left the Cabinet the other Democrats would follow him. On the other hand it was thought that Herr Müller might sign, and could possibly form a cabinet.

At this stage of the proceedings Herr Erzberger once more began to make his influence consciously felt behind the scenes. He alone appeared to have a clear grasp of the situation as it would present itself to the Allies; he alone appears to have realised that there was now no time for delay, that the armies of Marshal Foch were ready for a further advance, that refusal to sign would be an invitation to the Spartacists to create further troubles. Despite the campaign that had been waged against him as the negotiator of the armistice—the Pan-Germans had successfully created the legend that he had given away far more than was necessary—he commanded a good following in the Assembly among the Centre and the Majority Left. That he could carry

Herr Scheidemann with him in any cabinet was out of the question, but there were many of the Socialists who were quite prepared to listen to him and to save the country at all costs from a further advance of the Entente and a further adventure with Spartacism.

The Cabinet was now sharply divided, not so much on the question of signing—for that in some form or other had already come to be regarded as a foregone conclusion—as on the all-important question of who should sign. So far, Herr Erzberger had with him only Herr Hermann Müller, Herr Noske, Herr Schmidt, Herr Wissel and Herr Bauer, with perhaps Baron von Richthofen. On June 20, only three days before the extended time limit was to expire, Herr Scheidemann resigned. He had in the National Assembly an easy majority for signing with some forms of reservation, and if he had reduced the matter to the minimum of the two protests—the question of war guilt and the trial of the Kaiser—he could have carried with him three-quarters of the Centre, a third of the Democrats, 90 per cent. of his own supporters and all the Independents. But he chose otherwise.

A plain hint was given to Germany that the sands were running out. The Rhine armies made all preparations for an advance. On all fronts the order to prepare for an advance was given and the troops fell into mobile formations, with guns, transport, air material and ordnance on a war footing. The word went through the German Press that Essen, Frankfort and Mannheim were next to be occupied—and the Germans had been determined at all costs, and for reasons of their own, to keep Frankfort outside the zone of occupation.

An attempt to form a cabinet by Herr Hermann Müller failed. It was then that Herr Erzberger played his card. Herr Bauer, who had been Labour Minister in Prince Max's Cabinet, now came forward, and quickly secured a Government of Majority Socialists, with the programme that signature with reservations was to be put forward. On the night of June 22 Herr Bauer had formed his ministry. Herr Erzberger remained in the background as Finance Minister, but his was the "power behind the throne." A vote of confidence was at once introduced. It took the form of declaring that the German Republic was ready to sign the Peace Treaty, without, however, admitting that the German people was the author of the war, and without undertaking the obligations relating to the trial of the Kaiser and the surrender of war criminals. This was carried by 236 to 89, with 68 abstentions, and was conveyed to M. Clemenceau the same evening. But the Supreme Council replied with much sternness that the time for discussion was past, that they could acknowledge no qualification or reserve, and that less than 24 hours remained of the time within which the German Government must make its final decision.

HERREN MÜLLER AND BELL,
who signed the Treaty on behalf of Germany.

The game was now up, and Germany knew it. Capitulation followed on the next day, when Herr Bauer, in a final protest, admitted that the hour of protest had passed. "Let us sign!" he exclaimed. "That is the proposal which I make to you on behalf of the entire Cabinet—to sign unconditionally." The advice was taken; by a large majority the proposal of the Government to sign unconditionally was

THE PALACE OF VERSAILLES.
The Galerie des Glaces, in which the Treaty was signed, is indicated by a X upon the roof, on the left of the picture.

carried. This decision was conveyed to the Supreme Council by Herr von Haniel—Count Brockdorff-Rantzau having meanwhile resigned his post as delegate—in the following note :

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has instructed me to communicate to your Excellency the following :

The Government of the German Republic has seen with consternation from the last communication of the Allied and Associated Governments that the latter are resolved to wrest from Germany by sheer force even the acceptance of those conditions of peace which, though devoid of material significance, pursue the object of taking away its honour from the German people. The honour of the German people will remain untouched by any act of violence.

The German people, after the frightful sufferings of the last few years, lacks all means of defending its honour by external action. Yielding to overwhelming force, but without on that account abandoning its view in regard to the unheard-of injustice of the conditions of peace, the Government of the German Republic therefore declares that it is ready to accept and sign the conditions of peace imposed by the Allied and Associated Governments.

There remained only the formality of signing at Versailles, which is described on another page, and of ratification. In spite of a last attempt on the part of the Conservatives in the National Assembly to pass a resolution reserving the question of the trial of the ex-Kaiser, ratification was agreed to on July 9 by 208 votes to 115 ; it had been approved by the Federal Assembly two days previously. Thus ended Germany's great adventure.

On July 7, while services of thanksgiving were being held in England and the Allied countries, the churches of Germany held everywhere services of mourning as the country buried its lost hopes. Special prayers were offered up and the church bells were tolled as for a funeral. The prayers took the form of intercession that Germany might rise again to her position in the world of nations and yet live to accomplish her destiny. The supplications of a " humble and contrite heart " found no place in them.

In concluding this chapter, we may recall the position Germany had held before the war, and the things she hoped to gain by war Bismarck's ideal of a unified Germany had been achieved with the war of 1870-71 ; thenceforth the forward march of Germany might have been expected to lie along the paths of economic development. In the period between the end of the Franco-Prussian war and the outbreak of the world war of 1914, the progress of Germany had been little short of marvellous ; in the history of national evolution there is probably nothing to compare with it. In

that brief period the German genius for order and organization, for logical thinking and for industry in action, had brought the country to the forefront of the nations. Germany's internal organization, her municipal government, her social legislation and her application of science to industry had set a model that found its imitators throughout the two hemispheres. German trade had multiplied itself, German cooperation in all that spelt progress had been sought, and Germany therein had great reward. It was her boast that wealth was more evenly divided and the average standard of living higher than anywhere else in Europe.



THE GERMAN COLONIES LOST IN THE WAR.
Germany and the Colonies she owned in 1914 are shown in black.

Yet behind this façade which Germany presented to an astonished and admiring world, there were ever seen to lurk two spectres—indebtedness and militarism. Germany had gone ahead too fast, and when the war came it merely postponed a financial crash that must sooner or later have brought down the whole front. War, as had been said, was ever Prussia's only industry, and Prussia, as the true inheritor and master of the rest of Germany, could conceive of no security that was not based on the sword. The Prussian conception of property was plunder held by strength—and strength had become a costly thing.

In the years immediately before the war foreign policy had acquired a sinister meaning—Markets. Of no country was this more true than of Germany; in fact, the idea of commercial policy as the main end of international relations can be traced to a German conception. On this head Germany could not complain of her position in the world. In fair competition she was holding her own, while in that kind of competition that the commercial world had hitherto thought not quite fair—the subsidy, the cartel, the disposal of the results of over-production—Germany set the pace. Her commercial magnates were of mushroom growth, but they were earning high profits. In certain staple articles of manufacture Germany was supreme; in others, while backward, she was gaining daily. Germans everywhere showed remarkable enterprise in seeking new markets, in ousting old competitors, in creating new demands, in adaptability to local needs. Industries were organized and production was controlled; where competition was felt to be specially keen, State support was forthcoming to help the new industry on to its feet. A banking system, with the widest possible ramifications and sources of secret information, was at hand to help German traders in foreign markets. If there was a weak spot it was over-organization and over-assistance; for commerce is a hardy plant and thrives best in the open.

Perhaps it was because great riches seemed to have come so easily within grasp that the German political directors, from the Emperor downwards, had planned the destiny of the

country on heroic lines. Their visions were of a great German Empire stretching south-eastward through Asia in the temperate belt, flanked on either side by states under German influence and German tutelage. The *Drang nach Osten* had been the motive power impelling German policy for a generation. The Germans had dreams of a great Central European Empire, of which Germany should be the nucleus and the controlling spirit, and of which the Samurai should be the Prussians. It was to take in Austria, and stride across the Balkans to Turkey. The states flanking it were to be under its control in varying degrees—perhaps, as in the case of Luxemburg, in economic fetters, or, as in the case of Holland, in political independence but shorn of commercial power, or, as in the case of Sweden, a more or less willing entrant into the German family of states. Wide steps towards the accomplishment of these ideas had been taken already, not only in the Northern States of Europe, but also in Northern Italy, in Switzerland, in Rumania. The German plans in regard to Belgium, had Germany won the war, illustrate what was thought to be Germany's interest when it came to economic arrangements.

Relations were well established with Turkey. The bargain between the German military state and the German industrials had been: "We will make you war and you shall make us rich." Accordingly, as befitted so martial a race as the Turks, the penetration of Turkey was at first the business of the soldier. The German industrial was not slow in following him, and between them the policy of the Baghdad railway was mapped out. How thoroughly the Germans had penetrated into Asia Minor and into Mesopotamia may be estimated from the trouble the campaigns in the Near and Middle East cost Great Britain. And from Baghdad the German schemes extended to Persia, and from Persia into China, where German trade had long obtained a share of the trade with enormous ramifications.

These were the places in the sun that Germany most coveted, but she did not despise those in less temperate zones. Bismarck had been opposed to a colonial policy—he declared that it would be the undoing of Germany—but his successors thought otherwise. Germany had a large colonial empire in German East Africa, German South-West Africa, in Togoland, in the Cameroons, in the Pacific. It had been a ghastly failure. The idea that colonies are things to be exploited for the benefit of the white man, and that the interests of the natives can be neglected, that every black man is a nigger, and that every Prussian sergeant is a born colonist, are deeply rooted in the German mind. Yet with the failure of her own colonies before her eyes, with their lack of development of everything but officialdom, Germany coveted others. The world will not soon forget the shameful bargain in regard to the French Colonies which Germany sought to make with Great Britain in the negotiations before the war, while a satisfactory arrangement was on offer to Germany in the case of the purchase of the Portuguese African colonies. Germany had other schemes of a far-reaching nature in the Eastern Archipelago and the Pacific. And more than this were the schemes of colonisation by peaceful—if aggressive—penetration. Germany's projects in South America had long been watched with a jealous eye no less by the Latin American States than by the United States of America. And there also the German population had secured a hold on the trade and finance of the country that made them citizens to be reckoned with.

These, then, were the stakes Germany chose to play for. They constituted a menace to the world, yet if Germany had chosen to play her game slowly there is no knowing how much more of the programme she might not have achieved. But Germany was a nation in a hurry. Her schemes threatened nothing less than the abolition of human liberty, and the whole world rose against it. She failed; and the story of her failure is told in the terms of the Peace Treaty.

CHAPTER CCCXIV.

BRITISH PROPAGANDA IN ENEMY COUNTRIES.

PROPAGANDA IN WAR AS THEORY AND IN OPERATION—GERMAN ACTIVITIES—EARLY BRITISH PROPAGANDA WORK—WELLINGTON HOUSE—THE DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION—THE FORMATION AND SCOPE OF THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION—VISCOUNT NORTHCLIFFE BECOMES DIRECTOR OF PROPAGANDA IN ENEMY COUNTRIES—OPERATIONS AGAINST AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, GERMANY AND BULGARIA—METHODS OF DISTRIBUTION OF LITERATURE—TRIBUTES TO LORD NORTHCLIFFE'S WORK FROM HINDENBURG, LUDENDORFF, AND THE GERMAN PRESS.

BEFORE 1914 the function of propaganda in war was little understood. In operation during the war under skilful direction it achieved marvellous results. Yet, when badly controlled, it was worse than a failure.

The Germans made first use of it as a serious weapon, putting into practice the doctrine of Clausewitz, who laid down that war must be waged with the whole force of a nation. But in the twentieth century no ruler, be he ever so autocratic, could conduct a protracted war, or a war bringing a heavy burden on his people, or that sways doubtfully, unless supported by public opinion. Therefore the capture and control of the public opinion of the nation were vital factors in the successful waging of war. Scarcely less important was the influencing of foreign opinion, especially if such influence could be made to reach enemy countries.

Propaganda may be defined as the attempt to control public opinion. It had four objectives—the control of :

(*a*) Home opinion.
(*b*) Neutral opinion.
(*c*) Allied opinion.
(*d*) Enemy opinion.

On both sides, home propaganda proclaimed the certainty of victory, explained reverses, lauded naval and military successes, described the national economic strength, financial resources, power of organization, the overcoming of difficulties in supply of food and raw materials and so forth.

Neutral opinion was influenced with the propagation of all the themes mentioned in the preceding paragraph, special attention being directed to explaining as necessities of war all those steps which interfered with the rights of neutrals, or which had been harmful to them, and all war aims were presented in the mildest possible fashion. Again these same themes were used for maintaining the prestige of the nations in the eyes of their allies, and in encouraging the allies to maintain their efforts at the highest possible pitch. In the enemy propaganda both sides claimed that they were winning and must win the war, and the Germans made many attempts to sow discord among the countries allied in opposition. Much of the German propaganda was so crude and palpably untrue, many of the methods employed were so unscrupulous, that frequently by excess it produced the opposite effect to that desired.

A high British authority, who had closely studied German propaganda during the war, pointed out that there was a chaotic exuberance of different points of view. He quoted the distinguished German professor, Dr. Karl Lamprecht, who, in a lecture given at the end of 1914, when the Germans thought that their victory was secure, deplored the modern tendency of Germans to misunderstand other nations. "When the war came," he said, "everyone who could write obtained the largest possible goose quill and wrote to all his foreign friends, telling them that they did not realise what splendid fellows the Germans were, and not infrequently adding that in many cases their conduct required some excuse. The effect was stupendous. I can speak with the

most open heart on the subject," he added, "for amongst the whole crowd it was the professors who were most erratic. The consequences were gruesome. Probably much more harm came to our cause in this way than from all the efforts of the enemy. None the less, it was done with the best intentions. The self-confidence was superb, but the knowledge was lacking. People thought that they could explain the German cause without preparation. What was wanted was organization."

The Germans made great play among their own people of their enemies' "encircling policy," pointing out the danger to Germany, and contending that German militarism was the necessary consequence of the position of Germany surrounded by powerful enemies, the Russian danger, and the "English jealousy of German commercial success." As it was not easy to square this theory with the actual German plan of campaign, including the invasion of Belgium, the plea was advanced that an offensive was merely the best means of defence. Violent reports about the English "starvation plan," the violations of the laws of war by all the Allies, and the use of dum-dum bullets and of black troops, were spread broadcast over the Central Empires and the neutral countries. Great efforts were made to convince their own people of the historic mission, high culture and civilisation, and real freedom of Germany. They proclaimed that German victory would be for the good of the world. Moreover, they pointed out that the great and expanding German people required an outlet for their talent, organizing capacity, capital and manufacturing products, and that, as Germany arrived too late to obtain her real place in the sun, German rights had to be secured by force, from England in particular. Especial emphasis was laid upon the assertion that the growth of the "English Empire" was an accomplishment of "successful piracy," and that England must now be made to "disgorge."

HOME PROPAGANDA: EXHIBITION OF WAR PICTURES AT THE GRAFTON GALLERIES.

German propaganda in neutral countries laid great stress on the gain that would come to neutrals from "the freedom of the seas," and care was expended in showing that the victory of the Allies would be disastrous to neutrals. This was especially manifest in the United States before that country came into the war. In allied countries it was strongly urged that Germany and her allies had common interests, and that a great future lay before

EXHIBITION OF WAR RELICS AND PHOTOGRAPHS AT THE ROYAL ACADEMY: BRITISH SECTION.

Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey, when, by the help of Germany, the power of England, France and Russia had been broken.

In endeavouring to control the opinions of their enemies Germany proclaimed far and wide that she was winning, but in the later stages of the war she shifted her ground by harping on the theme that the Allies could not win, and that the greater time they were in realising this the greater would be their losses. Many attempts were made to stir up disaffection between the Allies, and the favourite topics were that England was not taking her fair share of the burden, that Britain intended to retain Belgium and the northern part of France, that Britain was using France and Russia merely for her own selfish ends, and that the interests of the Balkan Powers could not be reconciled. Other attempts were made to stir up disaffection within Allied countries. Ireland, South Africa, India, Egypt and Mohammedan countries, were examples in the case of Britain; Algeria in the case of France. Pacifism in Allied countries was encouraged. But, despite the great expenditure of effort, Caporetto was the only success worth mentioning which she achieved.

For too long a time the British Government neglected propaganda, both for defensive and offensive purposes, gravely under-estimating its

EXHIBITION OF WAR RELICS AND PHOTOGRAPHS AT THE ROYAL ACADEMY: CANADIAN SECTION.

effectiveness. Those few who realised its potentialities worked enthusiastically but lacked support, encouragement, and guidance in policy. The presentation of isolated facts, the influencing of opinion on particular matters, were alike

MR. C. F. G. MASTERMAN,
In charge of "Wellington House," one of the earliest British propaganda departments.

of little avail unless there was an underlying foundation of sympathy on the part of the people thus to be influenced. Such a foundation in its turn could only be built up by a consistent propaganda policy. The lack of realization of this basic principle was the chief reason for the failure of much early British propaganda work, with all the advantage it possessed of having on its side the righteousness of the British cause and the universal loathing of German militarism and *Kultur* in theory and in practice.

One of the earliest propaganda efforts of the British Government was the formation of a department under the Rt. Hon. C. F. G. Masterman for the production and distribution of books, pamphlets, maps, photographs and articles for use in Allied and neutral countries. This department was always known as Wellington House, from its location in the Buckingham Gate office of the National Health Insurance Commission. Many of its publications were ably produced, but the overseas transport and distribution of bulky parcels were difficult problems When these were overcome there was no assurance that the printed word would be read, even if received, by those whom it was intended to influence. Later came the setting up of a Department of Information under the auspices of the Foreign Office. Mr. John Buchan was appointed head of the Department, for which Sir Edward Carson assumed Ministerial responsibility.

Slowly the march of events forced the Government to appreciate the efficacy of propaganda, and some semblance of a serious effort was begun. At length, in February, 1918, the long-overdue Ministry of Information was set up under the very efficient direction of Lord Beaverbrook, who was already a member of the Government with the sinecure office of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. Lord Beaverbrook took prompt and vigorous charge of propaganda in Allied and neutral countries and in Turkey.

[*Bereford.*

MR. JOHN BUCHAN,
Head of the Department of Information.

Associated with him, supervising various sections of the Ministry, were Lord Rothermere. Sir Roderick Jones, Mr. John Buchan, Mr. Arnold Bennett, Mr. Harold Snagge and Mr. Evelyn Wrench. Wellington House and the Department of Information were absorbed into Lord Beaverbrook's department. For general administrative purposes such countries as France, Russia, Italy, Sweden and Holland were each allotted to a "National," while "Nationals"

were also appointed for Scandinavia, India, the United States, South America and other parts of the world. These "Nationals" met together in conference twice a week to discuss the details of their campaign. The methods adopted in the United States have already been described in Chapter CCCVI., pages 100 to 108, and similar methods, adapted to local circumstances, were employed in other countries.

So as not to offend political susceptibilities the work of explaining at home the reasons for Great Britain's participation in the war was undertaken by the National War Aims Committee, which consisted of representatives of all political parties and all religious denominations.

VISCOUNT ROTHERMERE,
Who was associated with the Ministry of Information.

It was assisted by local committees, established throughout the country. As far as possible each local committee was equally representative of the different parties.

A special department of the Ministry of Information, in charge of Colonel W. J. Galloway, acted as hosts in the British Isles to parties of representative visitors from the Dominions and from Allied and neutral countries who came as the guests of the Ministry to study the British war effort. Another admirably organised department, under the late Sir Bertram Lima, arranged the wonderful supply of photographs of Britain at war on land, sea, in the air, and in the great workshops.

A third most important department of the Ministry harnessed to the cause of the Allies that great educational and publicity agent, the cinema, and produced and distributed throughout the world wonderful films. Sir William Jury, with his great technical knowledge of cinematography, managed this department. Such films as that entitled "The Battle of the Somme" attracted and amazed millions of

LORD BEAVERBROOK,
Minister of Information, 1918.

people all over the globe, graphically portraying alike to Anglophile and Anglophobe eyes and minds the story of British prowess. Where there were no picture houses, as, for instance, in rural parts of Italy, Sir William Jury sent "cinemotors"—big lorries carrying all the necessary paraphernalia for improvised open-air cinema shows—to the great wonderment and edification of innumerable villagers.

Simultaneously with the Ministry of Information a department was established under Viscount Northcliffe to undertake propaganda in the enemy countries of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria.

It is not generally remembered that Lord Northcliffe, at the suggestion of General Swinton, prepared some pamphlets for distribution among the German troops as far back as October, 1914.

Propaganda in enemy countries was of an essentially different nature to that carried on

THE LATE SIR BERTRAM LIMA,
Organizer of War Photographs Section of the Ministry of Information.

elsewhere. Throughout the war it was known that the truth was being withheld from enemy armies and peoples by their leaders because of the lowering of *moral* which would follow the publication of inconvenient facts.

When Lord Northcliffe took charge of the work, coordinated existing agencies, laid down policies for propaganda approved by the Foreign Office, and began an energetic campaign, the results achieved astonished friend and enemy alike. Abundant testimony to its devastating effect on enemy armies and populations came from innumerable enemy sources. The results achieved were out of all proportion to the size of the staff employed and the amount of money expended. Many have contended that had

MR. HAROLD SNAGGE,
Secretary of the Ministry of Information.

such an effort been made in 1916 instead of being delayed until 1918 the war would have been more quickly won. This cannot be more than inference, but it is undeniable that the British Government stayed its hand in this respect far too long.

Great credit is due to those who persevered amid all kinds of discouragement in the early years of the war. For a long period Mr. S. A. Guest, a Civil Servant attached to the National Health Insurance Commission, worked almost single-handed. Although lacking support, he set up agencies by which propagandist literature was smuggled into Germany through Holland, Scandinavia and

SIR WILLIAM JURY,
Head of the Cinematograph Section of the Ministry of Information.

Switzerland. The names of the persons who carried out this highly dangerous work or the methods employed can never be revealed. It was not until Lord Northcliffe's department was formed and Mr. Guest and his small staff became incorporated with it that the value of his constant work was fully realized. With renewed energy and a free hand he was able to develop new channels of distribution in co-operation with the other sections of Lord Northcliffe's department.

Better known, although no more appreciated, was the work of the Military Intelligence Department of the War Office. A special sub-section of this department had been set up at Adastral House to prepare leaflets

COLONEL GALLOWAY,
Head of the Hospitality Section of the Ministry of Information.

in German for distribution by aeroplane over the lines among the German troops on the Western front. After aeroplanes had been used for a short period in 1917 for this purpose two British airmen were captured by the enemy and were tried by court-martial, and threats, which could have been met by reprisals, were made that any others detected dropping propaganda material would be shot. The War Office thereupon feebly decided to discontinue the use of aeroplanes for the distribution of propaganda material. Laborious research for a satisfactory substitute for aeroplanes was made, with the cooperation of the Aerial Inventions Board and the Munitions Inventions Department, but it was not until the early part of 1918 that it was decided that paper balloons could be fairly satisfactorily used. This work was developed by the War Office as successfully as was possible with such poor substitutes for aeroplanes.

In the summer of 1918 the work of preparing the leaflets was transferred to Crewe House, but the distribution was always organized and carried out by the War Office in close association with the Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries. Lord Northcliffe, who had publicly declined a seat in the Cabinet, became Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries in February 1918. It was arranged that he should report directly to the Prime Minister although, of course, keeping in close touch with the Ministry of Information. He gathered round him a number of remarkable men possessing expert knowledge of Continental politics, of the psychology of enemy peoples, and of publicity methods. All three qualifications were vitally necessary to the complete equipment of the department. The central office of the department was at Crewe House, which, by the generous public spirit of the Marquis and Marchioness of Crewe, had

A MINISTRY OF INFORMATION CINEMOTOR.

been placed at the disposal of the Government. Crewe House became as well known in the Chancelleries of Europe for its propaganda politics as it had been in Great Britain as a social centre for national politics.

Lord Northcliffe realized that inter-allied cooperation in propaganda against the enemy would mean greatly increased results. A small inter-allied committee met at Crewe House early in February. There were present, besides Lord Northcliffe and his principal assistants, Lord Beaverbrook, Mr. C. J. Phillips of the Foreign Office, Monsieur Franklin-Bouillon (representing France) and Signor Gallenga-Stuart (representing Italy) and their assistants, together with representatives of the United States. Lord Northcliffe thus formed an inter-allied link which was strengthened from time to time until it resulted in the coordination of policies, methods and organizations.

Lieut.-Colonel Sir Campbell Stuart, K.B.E., who was Vice-Chairman of the London Headquarters of the British War Mission to the United States, was appointed Deputy Director of the Department and achieved great success in that capacity. A strong advisory committee was formed of the following well-known men of affairs and publicists :—

Colonel the Earl of Denbigh, C.V.O.

Mr. Robert Donald (then Editor of the *Daily Chronicle*)

Sir Roderick Jones, K.B.E. (Managing Director of Reuter's Agency).

Sir Sidney Low.

Sir Charles Nicholson, Bt., M.P.

Mr. James O'Grady, M.P.

Mr. H. Wickham Steed (Foreign Editor, and later Editor-in-Chief, of *The Times*).

Mr. H. G. Wells.

Secretary, Mr. H. K. Hudson, C.B.E.

This Committee held fortnightly meetings at which the progress of the work was reported and discussed. Mr. C. J. Phillips and Commander (now Sir) Guy Standing, R.N.V.R., attended these meetings and also the daily meetings of the heads of the different sections at Crewe House in the capacity of liaison officers of the Foreign Office and the Admiralty respectively. They rendered invaluable services as did later Captain Chalmers Mitchell, who previously had been in charge of the War Office propaganda section at Adastral House.



A CINEMOTOR OPEN PREPARATORY TO A DISPLAY.

The short daily meetings at Crewe House were highly successful, as they enabled every responsible member of the staff to keep in touch with all his colleagues' activities. The discussions were fruitful in leading up to suggestions for new channels of distribution and for the production of new literature and in the maintenance of a common policy.

Ludendorff showed in his "Memoirs" that he had discovered the secret of the success of

("At Home" photo by Ernest H. Mills, for G. E. Houghton, Ltd., Margate.

VISCOUNT NORTHCLIFFE,

Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries.

Lord Northcliffe's department. Propaganda, he wrote, should be "the pace-maker for policy, and should form opinion without opinion realizing that it is so being formed." This was the first and principal maxim of Crewe House. The second was to tell the enemy the plain truth, and nothing but the truth, without *suggestio falsi* or deft "interpretation."

The immediate task confronting Lord North-

cliffe was the definition of propaganda policy, according with that of the Government where the Government policy had already been formulated. In other cases, which were not infrequent, memoranda suggesting main principles of policy were submitted for Cabinet or Foreign Office concurrence.

Surveying the whole field, Lord Northcliffe and his advisers came speedily to the conclusion that, as success would naturally come quickest if the weakest link of the chain of enemy States were attacked, Austria-Hungary offered greatest opportunities. Of the 31,000,000 inhabitants of the Empire of Austria less than one-third were of German sympathies. The

[Hoppé.

SIR CAMPBELL STUART, K.B.E.,
Deputy Director of the Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries.

remaining two-thirds—Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Rumanes, Italians and Southern Slavs—were actively or passively anti-German. In Hungary one-half of the population of 21,000,000 was anti-German. Thus, of Austria-Hungary's total population, 31,000,000 were anti-German and 21,000,000 only were pro-German.*

The greatest blow which could be struck at the Dual Monarchy was the active encouragement and support of these anti-German and

* The Ethnographic map of Austria-Hungary published in Chapter XXXVI (pages 216, 217) strikingly illustrates the preponderance of the anti-German populations.

[Speaight

THE EARL OF DENBIGH,
Member of Enemy Propaganda Committee.

pro-Ally peoples and tendencies. The chief means of accomplishing the desired effect were agreed to be the insistence by the Allied Governments and the United States upon their determination to secure democratic freedom for the races of Austria-Hungary on the

[Elliott & Fry.

SIR RODERICK JONES, K.B.E.,
One of the Directors of the Ministry of Information.

principle of "government by the consent of the governed"; the appreciation of the fact that the war could not be won without the removal of the anti-German Hapsburg peoples from German control; the use of such already existing agencies for propaganda among the anti-German peoples as the Bohemian (Czecho-Slovak) National Alliance, the Southern Slav Committee, and certain Polish organizations;

[Elliott & Fry.

SIR SIDNEY LOW,
Member of Enemy Propaganda Committee.

and the encouragement of an *entente* between Italy and these anti-German peoples.

To prevent misapprehension, the point must be emphasized that this was a constructive programme calculated to form a basis for a future federation of free non-German peoples in Central Europe, while gradually paralyzing the striking power of the Austro-Hungarian armies which were about to undertake a decisive offensive against Italy.

The greatest difficulty in the way of linking up the pro-Ally Hapsburg peoples with each other and of mobilizing their influence on the side of the Allies lay in the existence of the London Treaty of April, 1915, by which Russia, Great Britain, and France had promised to Italy certain territories inhabited by the Southern Slavs. As long as Allied policy was represented only by this Treaty, it appeared impossible to convince the Southern Slavs that the Allies really wished them well. Under the influence of the Southern Slav Unitary Declaration, concluded at Corfu on June 20, 1917, by the President of the Southern Slav Committee, Dr. Trumbitch, and Mr. Pashitch, on behalf and with the assent of the Government of Serbia and the leading public men, the movement for union with Serbia which had long existed among the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes of Austria-Hungary took definite shape and affected the Southern Slav regiments of the Austro-Hungarian Army. This development of the movement disquieted the German military authorities and hastened their decision to take direct control of the Hapsburg forces. This they did in October, 1917, and organized the offensive which broke the Italian line at Caporetto.

As soon as the Italian line had been established on the Piave, an attempt was made in London by Mr. Wickham Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson, subsequently directors of the Austrian section of Crewe House, and other members of the Serbian Society of Great Britain, to promote conferences between leading Italians and members of the Southern Slav Committee with a view to establishing a general agreement that



[Russell

MR. JAMES O'GRADY, M.P.,
Member of Enemy Propaganda Committee.

might serve as a basis for a solution of the Italo-Southern Slav question. General Mola, the Italian Military Attaché in London, attended those conferences, and contributed greatly to their success. A memorandum containing roughly the general points under discussion was communicated to the Italian Prime Minister, Signor Orlando, in London, in January, 1918. At the suggestion of Mr. Steed, Signor Orlando thereupon received Dr. Trumbitch, and after considerable discussion with him, invited him to Rome. In the meantime an

influential Italian parliamentary committee, representing both Houses of Parliament, sent one of its members, Dr. Torre, to London, with the object of establishing, if possible, a definite basis of agreement. After much negotiation, in which Mr. Steed, Dr. Seton-Watson, and Sir Arthur Evans took part, the agreement was concluded, which was subsequently ratified by the Congress of the Hapsburg Subject Races held at Rome, with the assent of the Italian Government, on April 8, 9 and 10. The terms of this agreement, together with the general resolutions of the Congress, in which it was embodied, are given below. The resolutions



[*Elliott & Fry.*

MR. ROBERT DONALD,
Member of Enemy Propaganda Committee.

received the public adhesion of several Italian ministers, including the Prime Minister and Signor Bissolati :—

"The representatives of the nationalities subjected in whole or in part to the rule of Austria-Hungary—the Italians, Poles, Rumanes, Czechs, and Southern Slavs—join in affirming their principles of common action as follows :

"(1) Each of these peoples proclaims its right to constitute its own nationality and State unity, or to complete it, and to attain full political and economic independence.

"(2) Each of these peoples recognizes in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy the instrument of German domination and the fundamental obstacle to the realization of its aspirations and rights.

"(3) The assembly recognizes the necessity of a common struggle against the common oppressors, in order that each people may attain complete liberation and national unity within a free State unit.

"The representatives of the Italian people, and of the Jugo-Slav people in particular, agree as follows :

"(1) In the relation of the Italian nation and the nation of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes —known also under the name of the Jugo-Slav nation—the representatives of the two peoples recognize that the unity and independence of the Jugo-Slav nation is a vital interest of Italy, just as the completion of Italian national unity is a vital interest of the Jugo-Slav nation. And, therefore, the representatives of the two peoples pledge themselves to employ every effort in order that during the war and at the moment of peace these ends of the two nations may be completely attained.

"(2) They declare that the liberation of the Adriatic Sea and its defence against every present and future enemy is a vital interest of the two peoples.

"(3) They pledge themselves also, in the interest of good and sincere relations between the two peoples in the future, to solve amicably the various territorial controversies on the basis of the principles of nationality and of the right of peoples to decide their own fate, and in such a way as not to injure the vital interests of the two nations, as they shall be defined at the moment of peace.

"(4) To such racial groups (nuclei) of one people as it may be found necessary to include within the frontiers of the other, there shall be recognized and guaranteed the right of their language, culture, and moral and economic interests."

The conclusion of the Italo-Jugo-Slav agreement in London had made it possible to begin propaganda against Austria-Hungary on the lines suggested by Lord Northcliffe.

During the interval between the conclusion of the Italo-Jugo-Slav agreement and the meeting of the Rome Congress, Lord Northcliffe sent Mr. Wickham Steed to Italy at the head of a special mission which, with the support of the Italian Prime Minister and the Italian Commander-in-Chief, and of the British and French commanders, organized at Italian Headquarters a permanent Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission that arranged for the distribution of propaganda literature, in the chief

An die deutschen Soldaten !
Es ist nicht wahr
dass wir, Franzosen, die deutschen Gefangenen erschiessen oder misshandeln.
IM GEGENTEIL,
unsere Kriegsgefangenen werden gut behandelt, und bekommen gut zu essen und zu trinken.
Diejenigen von euch, die dieses erbarmlichen Lebens überdrüssig sind, können sich ohne Angst den französischen Vorposten unbewaffnet melden.
Sie werden dort gut empfangen werden.
Nach dem Krieg, darf jeder wieder nach Hause.

DISTRIBUTION OF LEAFLETS BY AEROPLANE IN THE FIRST MONTHS OF THE WAR.

Austro-Hungarian languages, among the Austro-Hungarian troops at the front. Representatives of each of the principal subject races were attached to the Commission to supervise the drafting and printing of the literature.

Lieut.-Colonel Granville Baker remained permanently at Italian Headquarters as representative of Lord Northcliffe's department. He received every assistance and encouragement from General (now Sir Charles) Delmé Radcliffe, head of the British Military Mission. The actual work of distribution of leaflets and other propagandist material was naturally directed by representatives of the Italian military authorities. After the Rome Congress this organization distributed by aeroplanes, contact patrols, balloons and rockets, many million leaflets based upon the resolutions of the Rome Congress. Gramophone records of Czecho-Slovak and Southern Slav songs were secured by the British Commissioner, and used in the front line trenches. The Commission also published a newspaper in the Czecho-Slovak, Southern Slav, Rumanian and Polish languages, containing news collected mainly from the Austro-Hungarian Press, by a special Italian office which Professor Borgese had set up at Berne


Karta koja prestavlja veliku ofensivu Saveznika sa rezultatima postignutim od 9. Avgusta do 1. Septembra.
Linija sa koje je počela ofensiva Saveznika 9 Avgusta.
linija dostignuta 1. Septembra.
linija Hindenburgova.
U ovoj ofensivi od 15 Juia do 31. Avgusta Saveznici zarobiše 140.000 Nijemaca od kojih 2674 Oficira, 2500 topova, 1734 vatrometa, 13783 mitraljeza, te ostali ogroman ratni materijal.
Jugoslovenski Odbor.
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A MANIFESTO ISSUED BY THE JUGO-SLAV COMMITTEE.

Hrvati i Slovenci.

...enzia Stefani" službeno objavljuje:

Odlukom ministarskog vijeća od 8. Septembra, talijanska Vlada izvijestila je saveznićke Vlade, da Ona smatra pokret Jugoslovena za postignućem nezavisnosti i stvaranja slobodne Države kao načelo za koje se Saveznici bore i kao uslov jednoga pravednog i dugog mira".

Vlade savezničkih država odgovorile su, da sa zadovoljstvom primaju ovu izjavu talijanske Vlade.

Jugosloveni.

Ovom istoriskom i sudbonosnom izjavom Italija postavlja kao svrhu za koju se bori: rušenje Austro-Ugarske monarhije onake kakva je danas i podizanje na razvalinama njenim, nezavisne i ujedinjene države Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca.

Ovu plemenitu odluku njezinu, prihvaćaju i svi Saveznici naši.

Vojnici.

Uloga koju je Italiji povjest dodjelila, manifestirala se danas jače nego ikad. Kao zaštitnica slabih, nosioc slobode i one misli za koju Saveznici već četiri godine ratuju, njezina sviha za koju se bori, nije mir Brest-litovski i Bukureški, nego sloboda slabih i potlačenih.

Zato otvorice oči. Upamtite, da boreći se protiv nje, borimo se protiv sebe, protiv potomstva našeg, protiv slobode i ujedinjenja našeg.

Živila Italija, živila ujedinjena i slobodna Jugoslavija. Živili Saveznici naši.

D.r ANTE TRUMBIĆ
predsjednik Jugoslovenskog Odbora.

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A JUGO-SLAV MANIFESTO SIGNED BY DR. TRUMBITCH.

It has the National Colours printed across it.

The propaganda thus initiated deranged the Austrian military plans for the great offensive against Italy intended for the middle of April, 1918. During May and June it induced many Austrian soldiers, belonging to the subject races, to come over to the Allied lines. Then the offensive was planned for June, and was delayed about ten days. From the deserters the Allied commanders were completely informed of the Austrian plans and dispositions.

The delay proved to be very important, because when the offensive came the Piave rose behind the Austrian army and converted the attack into almost a disaster. There is reason to believe that many ammunition dumps behind the lines were blown up by the Czechs. A rumour was spread in the Press that the Southern Slavs had been fighting desperately against Italy, but this was officially denied

The divisions in question were a mixture of Germans, Magyars, Poles and Ruthenes. It appeared that the Southern Slav divisions had been divided up and mixed with "reliable" troops, which showed that the Austrians were afraid of them. The prisoners taken, as a rule, expressed willingness to volunteer at once. Dalmatian prisoners showed great enthusiasm for Jugo-Slavia and the Allies. The Austrians detached machine-gun sections to deal with attempts at desertion *en masse* during the offensive. Desertions of single men or parties were frequent during the action—indeed, one whole company of Jugo-Slavs went over.

and independent Southern Slav State. Some weeks later the Italian Cabinet, after much discussion, responded to this invitation, but its action was naturally less efficacious than it would have been had it been more prompt.

Propaganda by these various methods continued to exert an ever-increasing influence on the Austro-Hungarian Army. News of the victorious progress of the Allied armies on the Western front was sent over the lines continually, and kept well up to date. Desertions and disorder increased among the ranks of the enemy's army to such an extent that, finally, in the last days of October, one vigorous attack



MR. H. WICKHAM STEED,

DR. R. W. SETON-WATSON,

Directors of the Austrian Section of Crewe House.

After the Piave victory the Italian Commander-in-Chief expressly recognized the great value of the propaganda in helping to prepare it. It is possible that, had the official policy of the Italian Government during May and June been less reticent in regard to the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs, the victory on the Piave might have been decisive. The reticence of Italian policy proved, indeed, so severe a handicap upon the work of propaganda, that at the Inter-Allied Enemy Propaganda Conference, convened by Lord Northcliffe in London on August 14th, a resolution was passed, with the assent of the British, French, American and Italian delegates, inviting the Italian Government to take the initiative in making a public declaration in favour of the creation of a united

started by British divisions brought down in a crumbling mass an army which had for centuries shown a surprising capacity for recovering from defeat.

When the collapse of Bulgaria took place, not a moment was lost in using the new field of operations thus opened out against Austria-Hungary; and it was decided to establish a Propaganda Commission on the Balkan front on lines similar to the Commission at the Italian G.H.Q., though, of course, adapted to the new circumstances. Colonel Granville Baker was despatched to Salonica, and arrangements were already being made for the printing and distribution of leaflets (some were actually used) and the despatch of a small expert staff which would be in specially close touch with

the Jugo-Slavs and Rumanians as border races. Fortunately, however, events altogether outdistanced these preparations. The defeat and dissolution of Austria-Hungary rendered the further work of the department superfluous.

Office continued the preparation of leaflets suitable for dropping over the German lines This work was in charge of Captain Chalmers Mitchell, F.R.S., who had made a comprehensive study of German propagandist litera-

PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS DESCENDING ON VIENNA FROM AN AEROPLANE.

While the operations against Austria-Hungary were thus being engineered, propaganda in Germany had been left in the hands of the existing agencies. A special section of the Military Intelligence Department of the War

ture. Besides these leaflets in German, this section prepared a weekly newspaper in French (entitled *Le Courier de l'Air*) for French and Belgian inhabitants in territory occupied by the Germans, and also made reproductions of

letters, written by German prisoners in British hands, for distribution over the German lines. Mr. Guest also continued his admirable work of circulating books and pamphlets in Germany through non-military channels

After the campaign against Austria was successfully launched, Crewe House turned its attention to Germany. Mr. H. G. Wells agreed to take charge of propaganda against Germany, with the cooperation of Dr. J. W. Headlam-Morley. Much study was devoted to the exact line of policy to be followed, and on May 27 Mr. Wells submitted a long memorandum to the Committee on this subject. A letter summarizing this memorandum, surveying the existent conditions in Germany, and outlining the lines upon which propaganda could be based was sent to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with the object of drawing the attention of the Government to the need of a public and authoritative statement of policy from the Allied Governments.

The memorandum set out that propaganda in Germany, as in other enemy countries, must obviously be based upon a clear Allied policy. Hitherto Allied policy and Allied war aims had been defined too loosely to be comprehensible to the Germans. The real war aim of the Allies was not only to beat the enemy but to establish a world peace that precluded the resumption of war. Successful propaganda in Germany presupposed the clear definition of the kind of world-settlement which the Allies had determined to secure and the place of Germany in it.

The points to be brought home to the Germans were :

1. The determination of the Allies to continue the war until Germany accepted the Allied peace settlement

2. The existing alliance as a Fighting League of Free Nations was to be deepened and extended and the military, naval, financial and economic resources of its members pooled until

(*a*) Its military purpose was achieved, and

(*b*) Peace was established on lasting foundations

One of the first requisites was to study and to lay down the lines of a practical League of Nations. The present alliance must be taken as the nucleus of any such League Its control of raw materials, of shipping, and its power to exclude for an indefinite period enemy or even neutral peoples until they subscribe to and give pledges of their acceptance of its principles should be emphasized. It must be pointed out that nothing stood between enemy peoples and a lasting peace except the predatory designs of their ruling dynasties and military and economic castes ; that the design of the Allies was not to crush any people, but to assure the freedom of all on a basis of self-determination to be exercised under definite guarantees of justice and fair play ; that, unless enemy peoples accepted the Allied conception of a world peace settlement, it would be impossible for them to repair the havoc of the present war, to avert utter financial ruin, and to save themselves from prolonged misery ; and that the longer the struggle lasted the deeper would become the hatred of everything German in the non-German world, and the heavier the social and economic handicap under which the enemy peoples would labour, even after their admission into a League of Nations.

The primary war aim of the Allies thus became the *changing of Germany*, not only in the interest of the Allied League but in that of the German people itself. Without the honest cooperation of Germany disarmament on a large scale would be impossible, and without disarmament social and economic reconstruction would be impracticable. Germany had, therefore, to choose between her own

Poselství prof. Masaryka československému vojsku v Italii.

Prof. *T. G. Masaryk* poslal z Washingtonu prostřednictvím král. italského velvyslanectví československému autonomnímu vojsku v Italii tento vzkaz :

" Bratři ! Rakousko-Uhersko, chtějíc zlomiti ve vlasti opozici československou, tvrdilo, že naše vojsko je sebranka, jež nemá ani politického ani vojenského významu. Vypuštilo dokonce lež, že naše vojsko se skládá z Rusů a jiných národností a že nestává vojska československého. Náš národ neuvěřil tomuto klamu a zůstal nesmiřitelným a hrdým na své vojsko. Tehdy Rakousko-Uhersko pokusilo se zasaditi rozhodnou ránu našemu národu tím, že by zničíc vás zničilo vojsko jeko. Chtělo zmocniti se naší vlajky odboje a samostatnosti, symbolu víry a aspirací našeho národa.

" Bratři ! Vaše vůle, váš dalekozírný hled překazily plány nepřítele. Náš prapor vlaje ještě hrdě na posici svěřené vaší ochraně. Náš národ pozná vaše hrdinské činy a všechna srdce se pohnou hlubokou vděčnosti k vám. Chloubou nad vámi a hrdou vzpomínkou padlých bratrů.

" Jako váš vrchní velitel posílám vám svůj nejsrdečnější dík za udatnost, kterouž jste znova přispěli k vítězství našeho národa, Italie, Spojenců a celého lidstva.

Nazdar ! "

T. G. Masaryk.

Nutkalo nás pochlubiti se vám uznáním našeho milovaného vůdce, jenž nás i národ náš dovede k vítěznému cíli.

Jsme přesvědčeni, že i vy, ve shodě s celým národem, vidíte spásu Vlasti a uskutečnění našich svatých práv jen v rozbití Rakouska.

Až poženou vás, abyste nastavili prsa za proradnou dynastii, k níž národ nemá závazků, najdete jistě příležitost odpovědět vhodně na staleté útisky a zachránit se pro lepší budoucnost !

Nazdar !

Vojáci-dobrovolci československé armády v Italii.

V Italii 2. října 1918. 420.

MANIFESTO TO CZECH SOLDIERS,
Signed by Professor Masaryk.

permanent ruin by adhering to her present system of Government and policy and the prospect of economic and political redemption by overthrowing her militarist system so as to be able to join honestly in the Allied scheme of world organization. It had become manifest that for the purposes of an efficient pro-Ally propaganda in neutral and enemy countries a clear and full statement of the war aims of the Allies was vitally necessary.

such as could, if presented in a suitable form, be made to do something to strengthen whatever 'opposition' exists in Germany.

"From such information as is available as to the internal condition of Germany two points emerge which are of the greatest importance for immediate purposes:

"(*a*) There is much evidence that the German people as a whole desire above all a cessation of the war. They are suffering more

CREWE HOUSE,

Headquarters of the Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries.

In his letter to the Foreign Secretary Lord Northcliffe wrote:

"I wish to submit to you the following general scheme of policy as a basis for British—and eventually Allied—propaganda in Germany. Propaganda, as an active form of policy, must be in harmony with the settled war aims of the Allies:

"The object of all propaganda is to weaken the will of the enemy to war and victory. For this purpose it is necessary to put in the forefront the ultimate object of the Allies, and the use which they would make of victory, for this is the matter with which the Germans are most concerned. . . It appears to me, however, that our war aims, as I understand them, are

than their opponents, and war weariness has advanced further with them than it has with us. They acquiesce in the continuance of the present offensive chiefly because they are assured by their leaders that this is the only way in which a speedy peace can be achieved. It is, therefore, necessary to impress upon them that they are face to face with a determined and immutable will on the part of Allied nations to continue the war at whatever cost, notwithstanding German military successes, and that for this reason military success is not the way to bring about the peace they desire. It must be made plain that we are prepared to continue a ruthless policy of commercial blockade

"(*b*) Side by side with this we have another motive of the highest importance. One of the chief instruments of the German Government is the belief which they foster that any peace that the Allies would, if they had their way, impose would mean the internal ruin of Germany, and this again would mean that each individual German family would find itself without work, without money, and without food. As against this it is necessary to impress on the German nation that these results might happen, but that they can be avoided They will happen if the Government of Germany continues to carry out its openly avowed design of subjecting the other free nations of Europe to its domination. They can be avoided if the German nation will resign these projects of domination and consent to accept the Allied scheme for a new organization of the world.

"These two points (*a*) and (*b*) must be kept in close connexion; the first provides the element of fear, the second provides the element of hope. . . .

"Hitherto Allied policy and war aims have been defined too loosely to be comprehensible to the Germans, and there have been apparent inconsistencies, of which they have quickly taken advantage. Moreover, it has been possible for German writers to misrepresent our war aims as dictated by Imperialistic ambitions, similar in kind to those by which they are themselves actuated, and involving 'annexations and indemnities,' such as have in the past been too often the result of victory in war. I take it that the real object of the Allies is, after defeating Germany, to establish such a world peace as shall, within the limits of human foresight, preclude another conflagration. It seems necessary, therefore, that the separate aims which would, of course, be maintained, such as the restoration of Belgium, the liberation of Alsace-Lorraine, the establishment of civilized government in Mesopotamia and Palestine, should be put forward in their proper places as individual but essential points in the general scheme for the settlement of world politics on a basis which would go far to remove the causes of future wars.

"Any such scheme would, in effect, amount to the constitution of a 'League of Free Nations.' It is, I presume, generally understood that eventually Germany would be invited to take her place in such a League on condition that she accepted the principles of its foundation. Her admission to the League would be in itself her guarantee against the establishment of, *e.g.*, a hostile monopoly of raw materials. Our terms of peace, therefore, can be represented as the conditions on which Germany should be invited to take her part in such a League. In order to secure the economic benefits she would have to accept the political conditions. If this is so, the task of propaganda is greatly lightened, for it would be easier to put our aims in such a form as to make them to some extent acceptable to the moderate elements in Germany

Deutſche Kriegsgefangene kommen hinter den engliſchen Linien an, wo ſie von ihren Kameraden,
die ſie einer guten Behandlung verſichern, begrüßt werden.

LEAFLET PORTRAYING CONTENTED CONDITION OF GERMAN PRISONERS IN BRITISH HANDS.

than if they were put forward merely as terms to be imposed on a defeated enemy.

"It is, however, obvious that propaganda conducted on these lines will be of little use unless it is supported by public and authoritative statements from the Allied Governments. Otherwise, it would be represented that the real object is to beguile Germany into accepting a peace renunciation, and that, as soon as this object has been achieved, these schemes will be repudiated, and a weakened Germany will find herself face to face with an Anglo-Saxon combination which aims at dominating the world, and keeping Germany permanently in a

position of political and commercial inferiority. . . ."

Mr. Balfour replied that this "important letter" must be brought before the War Cabinet, and that he was in general agreement with the line of thought. Eventually the War Cabinet approved the letter as a basis of propaganda, but no public declarations of the character suggested by Lord Northcliffe were made.

Meanwhile Mr. Wells had been laying bases for work upon the lines suggested. He kept

A MEDALLION STRUCK IN "DISHONOUR" OF LORD NORTHCLIFFE
by the Germans, whose undying hatred he earned as Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries.

closely in touch with the associations formed to promote a League of Nations. He took up the idea of setting before the German people a vision of a new Germany which should renounce aims of world-domination and return to peaceful and beneficent activities in the fields of art, science and industry, with which the greatest names of German history were honourably associated. Mr. Wells also began a systematic collection of facts bearing upon the application in Great Britain of science to industry; the object of this was to show the Germans that we were emancipating ourselves from dependence upon them in the matter of products of scientific manufacture.

Mr. Wells, however, was not able long to continue his work. On July 17th he offered his resignation, which was accepted by the Committee on July 23rd, and Mr. Hamilton Fyfe was appointed organizer and conductor of German propaganda in his stead.

About this time the work of preparing leaflets for dropping among German troops was transferred from Adastral House, and Captain Chalmers Mitchell and Mr. Guest both became attached to Crewe House. Now it was possible for the German section at Crewe House to make its own printing arrangements, and plans were made for daily bulletins of war news and leaflets explaining to the Germans the hopelessness of continuing the struggle, to be produced with the same speed as that of a daily newspaper and dispatched to France for distribution by balloons within forty-eight hours of their being written. This called for rapid work on the part of the printers, Messrs. Harrison & Son, and at Messrs. Gamage's, where the leaflets were attached to the balloon "releases"; their cooperation was willingly given, and was a most valuable aid.

The War Office undertook the necessary organization for transporting these "releases" to the front, and for the inflation and dispatch of balloons. These were made of paper, cut in longitudinal panels, with a neck of oiled silk about 18 inches long. Their diameter was approximately 20 feet, and their height, when inflated, 8 feet. They were inflated nearly to their full capacity, being sent up with from 90 to 95 cubic feet of hydrogen. The weight of the balloon was under one pound, and the weight of propaganda just over four pounds. The propaganda leaflets were attached to a fuse of treated cotton, similar to that used in flint pipelighters, and burning at the rate of an inch every five minutes. The string of the leaflets was fastened to the neck of the balloon, and just before liberation a slit was cut in the neck to allow for the escape of gas, and the end of the fuse was lighted. The weights were adjusted so that the balloon rose sharply into the air to a height of several thousand feet before the loss of gas due to expansion would have destroyed the free lift. At this point

Heer und Heimat

November 1918. 10 Pfg.

Verhängnisvolle Fahrt.

Am Steuerrad.

„Ich wollte das deutsche Volk würde in größerem Maße als bisher mitarbeiten die Geschicke des Vaterlandes zu gestalten" — Der deutsche Kaiser an den Grafen Hertling.

Setz du dich 'mal ein Bischen ans Steuerrad, jetzt sind wir übers Gröbste hinaus
Deutsches Volk
Geschicke des Vaterlandes
Niederlage

Dem Führer wird's unheimlich —

Wird der Chauffeur herausgeschmissen?

Und er hatte Grund dazu!

A REDUCED FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST PAGE OF A NEWSPAPER DROPPED INTO THE GERMAN LINES JUST BEFORE THE ARMISTICE.

Heer und Heimat

November 1918. 10 Pfg.

Der Ruf zur Einigkeit.

Das Ideal.

Es wird zum „Sammeln" geblasen.

Das verlorene Paradies.

„Wie anders, Gretchen, war dir's."—Goethe's "Faust."

Wie anders, Deutschland war dir's vor dem Kriege
Den deine Herrschbegier zu Stand gebracht;
Du schrittest selbstbewußt von Sieg zu Siege,
Den Gipfelpunkt erreichtest deiner Macht;
Unangerührt, besitzend zur Genüge
Das Erdengut, den Ruhm, die weltliche Pracht;
Du hattest ja wonach die Menschheit trachtet,
Und warst, wenn nicht geliebt, so doch geachtet.

Und jetzo welcher Ekel, welcher Schauer,
Wenn bloß der Name Deutschlands wird genannt!
Um dein verlor'nes Glück wie tiefe Trauer,
Die Ehre hin, die Seelenruh verbannt!
Du liegst, getrennt durch eine eiserne Mauer
Die dein Verbrechen zwischen uns gespannt,
An deinem falschen Ideal gebunden—
Und alle frühere Herrlichkeit verschwunden

Die Wirklichkeit.

„Getrennt marschieren, vereint schlagen." — Moltke.

Der Krieg wurde in Potsdam beschlossen.

Im ungarischen Parlament behauptet Graf Tisza während einer Debatte über den Ursprung des Krieges, daß das Ultimatum an Serbien bei einer Konferenz aufgesetzt wurde, bei der kein deutscher Vertreter zugegen war.

Ein Abgeordneter: „Nicht in Wien, sondern in Potsdam."

Graf Tisza erwiderte: „Weder in Potsdam, noch irgendwo anders."

Der Abgeordnete: „Das Ultimatum wurde nicht in Potsdam beschlossen, aber der Kriegsausbruch wurde dort beschlossen."

„Eine Prophezeiung.

Die holländische Zeitung Handelsblad meldet, daß ein soeben aus Deutschland nach Holland Zurückgekehrter an einer wichtigen Fabrik in Riesenbuchstaben geschrieben sah:

„Dauert der Krieg noch ein Jahr
Geht es Wilhelm wie dem Czar."

the first bundle of leaflets was liberated from the fuse, and this process continued until the end of the run, when the last bundle was released.

The total time-length of the fuse and the attachment of the propaganda to it were calculated according to the area which it was desired to reach, and the average strength of the wind The experimental improvement of

MR. H. G. WELLS.
In charge of Propaganda against Germany.

the " dope " with which the paper was treated in order to prevent loss of gas by diffusion, and the manufacture of balloons of double the standard capacity, had placed runs of upwards of 150 miles well within the capacity of the method before the Armistice suspended operations, but the bulk of the propaganda was distributed over an area of from ten to fifty miles behind the enemy lines.

The distribution unit at the front consisted of two motor lorries, which carried the balloons, hydrogen cylinders, and personnel to a convenient spot, generally from three to five miles behind the front line. Thence the balloons were sent up. Fortunately, during the late summer and autumn the wind was almost consistently favourable for their dispatch.

Nevertheless, distribution by aeroplane was the ideal method, and the Army Council's decision to discontinue the use of aeroplanes for the purpose (to which reference has already been made) was a serious setback to Lord Northcliffe's work. Balloon distribution was dependent upon favourable winds, and could only be performed in one direction, whereas aeroplanes could cover a much more extensive area at great speed. On several occasions Lord Northcliffe pressed for the resumption of their use. Lord Milner replied to the first request early in May, to the effect that the British authorities were disputing the German contention that the distribution of literature from aeroplanes was contrary to the laws of war, and had given notice that they intended to institute reprisals immediately on receiving information that any British airmen were undergoing punishment for similar action. Although distribution by aeroplane on the Western Front had been temporarily suspended, they held themselves free at any moment to resume it, and meanwhile literature continued to be distributed there by other and, as they thought, more effective means. *Yet they*

[Elliott & Fry.

MR. HAMILTON FYFE.
Succeeded Mr. Wells in the Direction of Propaganda against Germany.

admitted that there had been no stoppage of the use of aeroplanes for the purpose on the Italian Front.

A month later, Lord Northcliffe again wrote, asking if anything had been done to cancel the temporary suspension of the distribution of leaflets by aeroplane on the Western Front. He and his co-workers felt strongly that propaganda work against Germany was being severely handicapped by disuse of this method of distribution, especially as, according to his information, the Germans themselves con-



TESTING LIFTING POWER OF PAPER BALLOONS.

tinued to drop leaflets over the British lines from aeroplanes. He could not believe that distribution by balloon was anything like as accurate, or therefore anything like as effective.

Many weeks passed before the War Cabinet agreed to the resumption of the use of aeroplanes, and then the Air Ministry raised further objection. Finally all objections were overcome, but not until the end of October. In one week 3,000,000 leaflets were prepared for the interior of Germany, and the distribution of these was begun just before the Armistice stopped such operations.

In the meantime the best possible use had been made of balloons. In the beginning of August it became important to increase the speed of distribution, particularly because early news of the military successes of the Allies, concealed by the Germans from their own troops, became valuable propaganda. It was therefore arranged that the leaflets should be divided into two categories, "stock" leaflets, the contents of which would not lose their value by a little delay, and "priority" leaflets, containing matter of urgent importance. It was agreed that the latter should be printed three times a week, each leaflet being of uniform length and printed in an edition of 100,000 copies. The issue and rapid dispatch of these continued from August until the signing of the Armistice. Of the "stock" leaflets produced by Crewe House, over nine millions were attached to releases, and sent to France between August and November.

During the month of August, then, the number of leaflets dropped over the German lines and behind them reached a figure of well over 100,000 a day. Written in simple language, they aimed at letting the Germans know the truth, which was being concealed from them by their leaders. They gave information as to the progress of the war in all theatres, and showed at a glance the territory gained by the Associated Nations by means of shaded maps. Great stress was laid upon the large numbers of troops arriving daily from the United States. By the use of diagrams, the steadily progressive increase of the American forces was strikingly illustrated. German losses were insisted upon and the futility of making further sacrifices in a losing cause.

The large number of prisoners taken with leaflets in their pockets proved that these were doing their work. The German commanders issued orders against their being read Some

offered rewards for all leaflets handed to officers. Others threatened punishment if they were not given up. This is an example of the notices which appeared in German Army Orders :

ORDERS REGARDING PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS.

The distribution of propaganda leaflets from English aeroplanes and balloons has of late considerably increased.

It is the duty of every officer and man immediately to hand in such leaflets to his unit.

Any officer or man found to be in possession of such leaflets after their having been found, or attempting to send same home, is to be very severely dealt with.

(From Standing Orders of the 11th Reserve Division).

An equally severe warning was given by the Deputy Commander of the VIIth Army Corps in the *Düsseldorfer Nachrichten* of September 22 :

Our opponents have recently been endeavouring with enhanced zeal to produce discontent among the German people by spreading mischievous leaflets in the interior. These leaflets are mostly dropped over the country in



INFLATING THE BALLOONS AND ATTACHING LEAFLETS.

paper or indiarubber toy balloons by means of a mechanical dropping apparatus, and they are further spread by enemy agents. Although, in view of the sound sense of the people, it is only to be expected that they will of their own accord resist these enemy machinations, it is nevertheless emphatically pointed out that it is the patriotic duty of every German in whose hands such leaflets, paper balloons or indiarubber balloons fall, to deliver them to the nearest police authorities and to denounce to the police the agents who spread such leaflets.

In the *Weissenburger Zeitung* of August 29, 1918, the following notice was published:

It is prohibited to retain pamphlets, books and leaflets, and pictures of the enemy propaganda. For the delivery of unknown specimens a bonus will be paid as follows

3 marks (3s. nominal) for the first copy.
30 pfg. (4d. nominal) for other copies.
5 marks (5s. nominal) for a book.

In the *Frankfurter Zeitung* Herr F. Stossinger characterized British propaganda as "The most complicated and dangerous of all." "Countless are its activities," Herr Stossinger declared. The result of this and other articles in the same complimentary vein was the stirring-up in Germany of an agitation for counter-

Heute sind wir auf dem Rückzuge.
Nächstes Jahr werden wir vernichtet werden.
Amerika, welches jetzt 1 750 000 Mann in Frankreich hat, hatte Anstalten getroffen bis nächstes Jahr 3 500 000 zu senden.
Aber jetzt, angesichts der Weigerung der deutschen Regierung einen echten Friedensvorschlag zu machen, hat sich Amerika entschlossen die Anzahl zu vergrößern.
Bis nächstes Jahr wird Amerika 5 000 000 Mann an der Westfront haben.
Was sagen unsere Führer hierzu — unsere Führer, die erklärten, daß Amerika keine Gefahr für uns wäre, weil unsere U-Boote es daran verhindern würden, Truppen nach Europa zu schicken?
Was sagen wir dazu, wir, die wir durch die ungeheure Zahlenüberlegenheit vollständig erdrückt werden?
Das Zunehmen der amerikanischen Armee an der Westfront.
1917 100 000.
1918. 1 750 000.
1919. 5 000 000.

A LEAFLET SHOWING THE GROWING STRENGTH OF THE AMERICAN ARMY IN THE FIELD.

Wo die Hindenburg-Linie durchbrochen ist



● Diese Karte zeigt genau wo die englischen Truppen sich einen Weg durch einen wichtigen Teil der Hindenburg-Verteidigungslinie erzwungen haben. Die gezackte Barre von Norden nach Süden deutet diese Verteidigungen an. Die schwarze Barre zeigt die von den Engländern erreichten Stellungen. Ihr Vordringen dauert an In Flandern sind die deutschen Heere in vollem Rückzug, der Kemmel-Berg ist aufgegeben. „Schweren Herzens verließen ihn unsere Truppen," schreibt Karl Rosner, Kriegsberichterstatter des „Lokalanzeigers."

LEAFLET SHOWING THE BREAKING OF THE HINDENBURG LINE.

propaganda. "In propaganda the enemy is undoubtedly our superior," admitted the Minister for War, General von Stein, in the Berlin *Morgenpost* on August 25.

To the same effect wrote the *Rheinische-Westfälische-Zeitung*:

At any rate, the British Propaganda Department has worked hard. Had we shown the same activity in our propaganda perhaps many a thing would have been different now. But in this, we regret to say, we were absolutely unprepared, but we hope that by now we have learned differently.

And the *Deutsche Tagezeitung*:

We Germans have a right to be proud of our General Staff. We have a feeling that our enemies' General Staff cannot hold a candle to it, but we also have the feeling that our enemies have a brilliant Propaganda General Staff, whereas we have none.

The creation of a Ministry of Propaganda was, therefore, urgently demanded, and a German Army order, captured towards the end of October, showed that some such organization had been established.

All this time the most violent attacks were being made upon the British Enemy Propaganda Department. It was accused, rightly, of being responsible for the nervousness of the German nation, and for its waning confidence in its leaders But the means by which it had

caused nervousness and sapped confidence were not understood. The German leaders and newspapers declared the agency at work to be lies. For example, in the Bavarian Lower House of Parliament during August the Bavarian Minister for War, General von Hellingrath, referred to rumours in circulation, which, according to the Munich correspondent of the *Kölnische Zeitung*, were "so wild and extravagant that one hardly understands how they can be credited and passed on among certain classes of the people."

"These rumours," the Minister said, "are nothing but the result of the industrious and determined agitation which our enemies carry on in the interior through their agents."

The editor of the Berlin *Lokal-Anzeiger*, Herr von Kupferr, dealt in a leading article with the effect of these same rumours in the North of Germany. They had produced, he wrote, "a carnival of soul-storms, idiotic terror, and criminal irresponsibility," and he went on:

> The main thing is to remember the source of such rumours and to bear in mind what their object is. Their object is to demoralize us and, by so doing, turn into realities what otherwise would remain merely nightmares. One would have to be really blind not to see that these things radiate from that organization in England formed to shatter the German nervous system by means of shameful and impudent lies. Is not the figure of Lord Northcliffe, the great Propaganda Chief of the English Home Army, pilloried in world-history for all time?
>
> Is anybody in doubt as to the purpose of this propaganda? Does not everybody know that the generalissimo of this campaign of mendacity has unlimited funds at his disposal in order to circulate streams of lies through neutral channels with devilish cunning and almost impressive skill? Does not everybody realize that the Northcliffe propaganda is too shrewd to work by means of mere newspaper tales that could easily be disproved, and therefore resorts to the much more subtle method of carrying unrest, disloyalty and alarm into our country and into the lands of our allies by means of verbal communications of all sorts? Paid rascals are systematically employed for this purpose. It is this sort of person who propagates these wild stories in Germany and upsets our sense of proportion in connexion with war events. These are the facts. Let people bear them in mind before they promote the Northcliffe Propaganda by repeating every bit of washerwoman's gossip as gospel, even though it be without the slightest foundation in fact.

The same rumours circulated in and around Hamburg, and on September 14 the widely-read shipping journal *Hansa* printed the following:

> God be thanked! At last we are just beginning to recognize what the hour of war demands; what our duty as Germans and as citizens. Despondency, discontent, depression, hanging heads, grumbling! We meet them at every step and turn, but we did not know their origin, these growths of evil fantasy. We did not understand what meant these secret whispers about alleged unfavourable news from the front, these exaggerated reports, fraught with misfortune, which passed so glibly from mouth to mouth. One had heard this, another that, but always it was something bad in regard to our military situation. Nothing definite was ever mentioned. There were only suggestions, which proved to be chimeras as soon as ever they could be run to earth. They were the birth of ignoble defeatism. Yet there they were, invisibly surrounding us, disturbing our spiritual balance, darkening our temper; like an epidemic, like poisonous bacilli, they flew hither and thither in all directions through our German air.
>
> Whence came they? Who brought them to us? To-day we know. To-day we can recognize the origin of this depression of German will-power. It was the long-advertised publicity offensive of the Entente directed against us under England's lead, and under the special direction of that unprincipled, unscrupulous rascal, Northcliffe.

These diatribes were founded in misconception. The unrest in Germany, with the

ATTACHING LEAFLETS TO A BALLOON.

spreading of wild rumours to which unrest always gives birth, were caused indeed by British propaganda; this propaganda used as its ammunition, however, not lies, but solely the truth. It was because they began to realize the truth that the German people felt nervous and depressed. It was because the failure of the U-boats and the coming of the Americans, and the solidarity of the Allies and the weakening of their own military power were now revealed to them, in spite of their leaders' efforts to keep them still in ignorance. It was because of their enlightenment on these and other matters that the Germans were seized with panic, a panic which culminated towards the end of October in complete collapse, and, during the first days of November, in revolution.

The rumours were as rife among the troops as among the civil population. There is ground, indeed, for belief that the soldiers communicated to their relations and friends the uneasiness they felt upon learning how matters really stood. An order issued by General Ludendorff said :

There has been an increase in the number of complaints received from home that men on leave from the front create a very unfavourable impression by making statements actually bordering on high treason and incitement to disobedience. Instances such as these drag through the mud the honour and respect of the individual as well as of the whole Army, and have a disastrous effect upon the *moral* of the people at home.

in my hands, and it is not to be doubted that our enemies are in that, also, our masters, for the pamphlets are so well produced that anyone who is not on the look-out is very likely to fall a victim to them.

One effect of telling the Germans the truth was to make them distrust their official *communiqués*. "We have in our dear Fatherland to-day," wrote the *Kölnische Zeitung* on September 11, "great numbers of innocent and ingenuous minds, who doubt the plain statements of the German Army reports, but believe the false reports and omissions of the enemy. To prove constantly the contrary to them is a

NOTING THE DIRECTION OF THE WIND AND THE POINTS AT WHICH THE LEAFLETS WILL FALL.

Certainly the discipline and the confidence of the German Army declined steadily as the year wore on. In the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* for September 11 a letter from the front said :

Leaflets destined to cause low spirits and despair, or to send deserters to the enemy, are being showered down in thousands in certain places and their surroundings. It is this combat, waged openly or secretly, which, particularly at home, produces low spirits and despair. Here you find statements that Hindenburg was once regarded as a Divinity, but that his laurels are beginning to fade, which is quite evident from the way the enemy advance daily ; that our troops have lost courage, whole companies are deserting to the enemy, and such like things.

In another letter to the same newspaper, published on August 20, the writer said :

Our enemies have recently been very busy distributing leaflets from the air. I have had two of these leaflets

rather thankless task, but of which one should never tire."

It was, indeed, a thankless task to try to keep the truth from the whole German nation. "Warn your brothers, your sons, your husbands, not to believe the enemy's leaflets," was one of "Ten Commandments for German Women," published by the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* on October 20, but it was then too late to maintain the lie-system by which the German resistance had been stimulated for so long.

That the enemy leaders and newspapers made so loud an outcry against British truth-propaganda proved that it was effective. The first sign that Lord Northcliffe's department was meeting with the success hoped for was the

THE TWO SIDES OF A LEAFLET REPORTING THE ALLIES' ADVANCES AGAINST BULGARIA AND IN SYRIA.

TRUPPEN-NACHRICHTENBLATT. 1013

Deutscher General flüchtet.

Die Türken halten Liman von Sanders für ihr Unheil verantwortlich.

Zwei Armeen vernichtet.

Bulgaren werden auch auf ausgedehnter Balkanfront verfolgt.

Düstere Stimmung des Grafen Hertling.

Der Sieg der englischen Truppen in Palästina über die vom deutschen General Liman von Sanders befehligten türkischen Truppen hat sich entwickelt und hat viel größere Dimensionen angenommen als die ersten Berichte andeuteten

Zwei türkische Armeen, die 7. und die 8., haben aufgehört zu existieren.

Ihr ganzes Train, alle ihre Geschütze, ihr ganzes Kriegsmaterial ist erbeutet worden 30000 Mann ergaben sich.

Die wenigen, die dem Tode oder der Gefangenschaft entgingen, flüchteten in kleinen, zusammenhangslosen Gruppen über den Jordanfluß und treiben sich nun im Lande herum.

Jetzt verfolgen die Engländer die 4. türkische Armee, welche auch in Gefahr steht vernichtet zu werden. Auf jeden Fall ist der türkische Widerstand in Palästina entgültig gebrochen.

General Liman von Sanders, der deutsche Befehlshaber, der so vollständig überrascht und vom feindlichen Hauptquartier an Führung so übertroffen wurde, flüchtet vor den Engländern.

Die Türken behaupten sie seien verraten und von den deutschen Offizieten, die ihren Streitkräften vorgesetzt waren, ins Unglück geführt worden.

Palästina ist ihnen nun auf ewig verloren Die Heiligen Stätten sind von der Muselmannherrschaft befreit. Die Entente hat sich verpflichtet Palästina dem jüdischen Volke zurückzugeben.

Der Sieg der französischen und der serbischen Truppen über die Bulgaren im Balkangebirge hat sich in schlagender Weise entwickelt.

Die Bulgaren ziehen sich jetzt auf einer Front von

160 Kilometern zurück

Sie haben dem Vordringen der Ententetruppen keinen starken Widerstand entgegengesetzt Die deutschen Niederlagen an der Westfront haben sie sehr niedergedrückt und ihren Kampfgeist geschwächt. Wir wissen, daß es nutzlos ist den Kampf fortzusetzen.

Dies weiß auch Graf Hertling, der Reichskanzler Er hat dem Hauptausschuß des Reichstags gesagt, daß tiefe Unzufriedenheit weite Kreise der Bevölkerung ergriffen hat. Was empfiehlt er? Daß das deutsche Volk das alte, sichere Vertrauen auf Hindenburg und Ludendorff bewahren soll, in der Hoffnung, daß sie die Lage ein wenig bessern möchten Aber er weiß, wir wissen und alle Welt weiß, daß sie sie nicht bessern können,

nur das deutsche Volk selbst

kann eine Besserung herbeiführen dadurch, daß es der Autokratie und dem Militarismus, dem Alldeutschtum und den veralteten Lächerlichkeiten, andere Völker schon längst abgeschafft haben, ein Ende macht



Diese obere Karte stellt die Einkreisungsbewegung der Engländer, welche die türkischen Streitkräfte unter General Liman von Sanders vernichtete dar

Die untere Karte zeigt das durch die französischen und serbischen Truppen, welche den Bulgaren die schwerste Niederlage, die sie während des Krieges erlitten haben beigebracht haben, im Balkan gewonnene Gelände

manifesto of Marshal Hindenburg which appeared early in September. The text of this ingenuous confession that the truth was gaining ground read as follows:

We are engaged in a hard struggle with our enemies. If numerical superiority alone guaranteed victory, Germany would long since have lain shattered on the ground. The enemy knows, however, that Germany and her Allies cannot be conquered by arms alone. The enemy knows that the spirit which dwells within our troops and our people makes us unconquerable. Therefore, together with the struggle against German arms, he has undertaken a struggle against the German spirit; he seeks to poison our spirit and believes that German arms will also become blunted if the German spirit is eaten away.

We should not take this plan of the enemy lightly. The enemy conducts his campaign against our spirit by various means. He bombards our front, not only with a drumfire of artillery, but also with a drumfire of printed paper. Besides bombs which kill the body, his airmen throw down leaflets which are intended to kill the soul.

Of these enemy leaflets our field-grey men delivered up:

In May	84,000
In June	120,000
In July	300,000

A gigantic increase! Ten thousand poisoned arrows daily in July; 10,000 times daily the attempt to deprive the individual and the whole body of belief in the justice of our cause and of the strength and confidence for ultimate victory! We can reckon, in addition, that a great part of the enemy leaflets will not have been found by us.

Poisoning the Home Spirit.

But the enemy is not merely satisfied in attacking the spirit of our Front, he wishes above all also to poison the spirit of our home. He knows what sources of strength for the Front rest in the home. True, his aeroplanes and balloons do not carry these leaflets far into our homeland; they lie far from it in the lines in which the enemy vainly struggles for victory by arms. But the enemy hopes that many a field-grey soldier will send home the leaflet which has innocently fluttered down from the air. At home it will pass from hand to hand and be discussed at the beer-table, in families, in the sewing-room, in factories, and in the street. Unsuspectingly many thousands consume the poison. For thousands the burden the war in any case imposes upon them is increased, and the will and hope for a victorious issue of the war is taken from them. All these again write their doubts to the Front, and Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau rub their hands.

The enemy attacks the spirit of the home in another way besides. The silliest rumours, designed to break our inner power of resistance, are put into circulation. We find them simultaneously in Switzerland, in Holland, and in Denmark. Thence they spread like a wave over the whole of Germany. Or they emerge simultaneously, agreeing in silly details, in the remotest regions of our country—in Silesia, in East Prussia, in the Rhineland—and wend their way thence over the remainder of the home territory. This poison works on the men on leave and flows in letters to the Front. Again the enemy rubs his hands.

The enemy is ingenious. He knows how to mix the little powder for everyone. He decoys the fighters at the Front. One leaflet runs:

"German soldiers! It is a shameful lie that th

French ill-treat German prisoners. We are not brutes; only come over to us without fear; here you will find a most considerate reception, good food, and a peaceful refuge."

Ask brave men who have succeeded with unspeakable difficulty in escaping from the enemy captivity about this. Plundered to the utmost in wire compounds, roofless, goaded by hunger and thirst into treasonable utterances, forced by blows and threats of death to betray their comrades, spat upon, pelted with filth by the French populace while being driven to hard labour, that is what the paradise that the enemy conjures up really looks like.

Reproductions of original letters written by prisoners are also thrown down, in which these men describe how well it goes with them. God be praised, there are still also decent and humane commandants of prisoners' camps in England and France; but these are the exception, and the letters the enemy throws down are only of three or four different kinds. But he sends these multiplied by many thousands of copies. The enemy intimidates the faint-hearted by saying:

"Your struggle is hopeless; America will settle you; your submarines are no good; we are building more ships than they sink; after the war we shall debar you from getting raw materials, then Germany's industry must starve. You will never see your colonies again."

That is the tone of the leaflets: now enticement, now threat.

German Facts and Fancies.

What is the real situation? We have enforced peace in the East and are strong enough to do it in the West, notwithstanding the Americans; but we must be strong and united: that is what the enemy is fighting against with these leaflets and rumours. He wishes to deprive us of faith and confidence, will and force.

Why is the enemy continually seeking new allies in the struggle against us? Why does he try to press nations still neutral into the struggle against us? Because in strength we are his equals.

Why does he incite black and other coloured men against German soldiers? Because his will is to destroy us.

Again, the enemy says another thing:—

"You Germans, your form of government is wrong. Fight against the Hohenzollerns, against capitalism; help us, the Entente, to give you a better form of State."

The enemy knows perfectly what strength resides in our State and Empire; but that is precisely why he combats it. The enemy also seeks to tear open old wounds in the German body politic. With his leaflets and by rumours he attempts to sow division and distrust among the Federal States. At Lake Constance we confiscated many thousands of leaflets conveyed to Bavaria and intended to excite anger against the North Germans. They wish to destroy the German Empire, which for centuries was the dream of Germans, and which our fathers won for us, and to condemn Germany to the impotence of the Thirty Years' War.

The enemy also wishes to shake our loyalty to our allies. He does not know the German way and the word of a German man. He himself sacrifices his allies; he who is England's ally dies of it.

Traitors to the Fatherland.

And finally the enemy sends not the least dangerous of his poisoned arrows dipped in printers' ink when he throws down the utterances of German men and German newspapers. The utterances of German newspapers are torn from their context. Regarding the utterances of Germans which are reproduced, remember that at every time there have been conscious and unconscious traitors to the Fatherland. Most of them reside abroad in neutral countries, in order not to be obliged to share our struggle and our privations or to be condemned by our Judges as guilty of high treason. Nor have champions of extreme party tendencies any right to claim to speak for the generality of the German people.

It is our strength, but also our weakness, that even in war we allow unrestricted utterance to every opinion. We still tolerate the reproduction in our newspapers of enemy Army reports and the speeches of enemy statesmen, which are weapons of attack directed against the spirit of the German Army and people. This is a sign of strength, because it proves a consciousness of might. But it is a weakness because it allows the enemy's poison to find an entrance among us.

Therefore, German Army, German Homeland, if one of these thrown-out pieces of poison in the form of leaflet or rumour comes before your eyes and ears, remember that it originates with the enemy. Remember nothing comes from the enemy which is not harmful to Germany. Everyone must be mindful of this, whatever his position or party. If you meet anyone whose name and origin indeed are German, but who by nature stands in the enemy's camp, keep him at a distance, despise him, put him publicly in the pillory in order that every other true German may despise him.

Defend yourself German Army, German Homeland!

It is an interesting comment on Marshal Hindenburg's figures that in August the number of leaflets issued by the Enemy Propaganda Department was 3,958,116, in September 3,715,000, and in October 5,360,000, while in the first ten days of November, before the armistice put an end to our activities, 1,400,000 were sent out.

General von Hutier, of the Sixth German Army, followed Hindenburg a week later with the following appeal:

The enemy begins to realize that we cannot be crushed by blockade, superiority of numbers, or force of arms. He is, therefore, trying a last resource. While engaging to the utmost of his military force he is racking his imagination for ruses, trickery, and other underhand methods of which he is a past master, to induce in the minds of the German people a doubt of their invincibility. He has founded for this purpose a special Ministry ("The Ministry for the Destruction of German Confidence"), at the head of which he has put the most thoroughgoing rascal of all the Entente—Lord Northcliffe. He has been given billions for use in influencing opinion in the interior of the country and at the Front by means of paid agents, the assassination of Ambassadors, and all the other ways in favour with the Entente.

The method of Northcliffe at the Front is to distribute through airmen a constantly increasing number of leaflets and pamphlets; the letters of German prisoners are falsified in the most outrageous way; tracts and pamphlets are concocted, to which the names of German poets, writers and statesmen are forged, or which present the appearance of having been printed in Germany, and bear, for example, the title of the Reclam series, when they really come from the Northcliffe Press, which is working day and night for this same purpose. His thought and aim is that these forgeries, however obvious they may appear to the man who thinks twice, may suggest a doubt, even for a moment, in the minds of those who do not think for themselves, and that their confidence in their leaders, in their own strength, and in the inexhaustible resources of Germany may be shattered.

Fortunately, Northcliffe, the Minister for the Destruction of German Confidence, forgets that German soldiers are neither Negroes nor Hindus, nor illiterate French, English or Americans, incapable of seeing through such machinations. Explain these infamous attempts to your young and inexperienced comrades, and tell them what our mortal enemy expects of them, and what is

at stake. Pick up the leaflets and pamphlets and give them to our commanders for transmission to the High Command, which may be able to make valuable deductions from them as to the aims of our enemies. You will thus help the Command, and you will also help to hasten the hour of victory.

Later, the contention that British propaganda leaflets contained merely lies had to be dropped. Experience proved it to be baseless. A "high officer at the front," writing to the *Kölnische Zeitung* (October 31st), said, in

from German Socialist newspapers, and by the leaflets dealing with the numbers of Americans arriving in Europe; with the Allied war aims and with German food conditions, and with the Allied victories on the Western front, in Italy, the Balkans and Palestine.

Perhaps the most striking tribute of all was that of Ludendorff, who, in his memoirs, contended that Germany was beaten not by arms, but by the moral collapse of the German

DISPATCHING BALLOONS.

describing the demoralization of the German Army, caused by retreat:

What damaged us most of all was the paper war carried on by the enemy, who dropped daily among us 100,000 leaflets, which were extraordinarily well distributed and well edited.

A report to the British Foreign Office, dated September 5th, stated:

Leaflets thrown by Allied airmen have much more effect now. Instead of being thrown away or laughed at, as was often the case in the past, they are eagerly picked up and read. There is no doubt that recent events have seriously shaken the *moral* of the German people and Army. One of the returned officers mentioned above said that if the Entente knew what poison these leaflets, etc., were working in the minds of the German soldiers they would give up lead and bombard with paper only in future.

Prisoners bore testimony to the wide circulation of the leaflets among German troops. They were much sought after and discussed, especial interest being aroused by extracts

soldier. This moral collapse of the German soldier, according to him, was in part produced by Lord Northcliffe's deadly propaganda and in part by the demoralization of the German home population, which he again ascribes in equal degrees to the same propaganda and to the feebleness of the German Government in counteracting it. In a very noteworthy passage he says:

Lloyd George knew what he was doing when, after the close of the war, he gave Lord Northcliffe the thanks of England for the propaganda he had carried out. Lord Northcliffe was a master of mass-suggestion. The enemy's propaganda attacked us by transmitting reports and print from the neutral States on our frontier, especially Holland and Switzerland. It assailed us in the same way from Austria, and finally in our own country by using the air. It did this with such method and on such a scale that many people were no longer able to distinguish their own impressions from what the enemy propaganda had told them. This propaganda was all the more effective in our case as we had to rely, not

on the numbers, but on the quality of our battalions in prosecuting the war. The importance of numbers in war is incontestable. Without soldiers there can be no war. But numbers count only according to the spirit which animates them. As it is in the life of peoples, so it is also on the battlefield. We had fought against the world, and could continue to do so with good conscience so long as we were spiritually ready to endure the burden of war. So long as we were this, we had hope of victory and refused to bow to the enemy's determination to annihilate us. But with the disappearance of our moral readiness to fight everything changed completely. We no longer battled to the last drop of our blood. Many Germans were no longer willing to die for their country.

The shattering of public confidence at home affected our moral readiness to fight. The attack on our home front and on the spirit of the Army was the chief weapon with which the Entente intended to conquer us, after it had lost all hope of a military victory.

He mentioned that in the spring of 1918 a leading statesman of the Entente confessed that it was the general and complete belief of the Allied Governments "that the German Army on the Western Front cannot be conquered by military means," but added that it could be broken by working on German opinion

Of the German propaganda methods he speaks with utter contempt:

Our foreign propaganda rendered us no service. . . . Our political intentions and decisions were so violently sprung upon the world that they often seemed to have been arrived at brutally or in an offhand manner. A far-seeing propaganda with large ideas would have prevented this. . . . Only with great effort could the German propaganda make its influence felt; in its working it showed itself, notwithstanding all the pains that were taken with it, unequal to the greatness of its task.

In his account of the fighting in 1918 (which must be taken in conjunction with the disclosures in the German White Paper (*Vorgeschichte des Waffenstillstandes*, Berlin, 1919), Ludendorff again and again referred to the decline in German *moral*. After the great offensive of March 21 the men on leave returned in a detestable spirit, he said, from Germany. Reinforcements and drafts brought from Germany proved untrustworthy. On the eve of his last offensive, that of July 15, he says:

The Army complained of the enemy propaganda. It was the more effective because the Army was rendered

Türkiſche Armee in Paläſtina vernichtet.

Kein weiterer Widerſtand gegen die engliſchen Truppen.

Glänzendes Umkreiſungs-Manöver.

20 000 Gefangene.

Türkiſches Volk aufgebracht gegen Deutſchland weil es es einem nicht wieder gutzumachenden Unglück entgegen geführt hat.

Die türkiſche Armee in Paläſtina hat aufgehört zu exiſtieren Die Engländer überraſchten ſie, durchbrachen die Front, ſchickten große Kavalleriemengen durch, ſchnitten alle Rückzugsrouten ab, ſchloſſen die Türken vollſtändig ein

Zwanzig Tauſend ergaben ſich, eine große Anzahl wurde getötet, nur einigen Nachzüglern gelang es zu entkommen. Das Heilige Land iſt von der Muſelmann-Herrſchaft, die die deutſche Regierung nach Kräften aufrecht zu erhalten ſtrebte, befreit Kein härterer Schlag hätte die Türkei treffen können. Ihre beſten Truppen ſind vernichtet. Die Stimmung der Türken gegen Deutſchland iſt eine äußerſt bittere Sie drohen öffentlich damit ſich gegen die deutſche Regierung zu wenden

Die Bulgaren ſind auch kaum weniger gegen Deutſchland erbittert. Sie werden immer noch von den franzöſiſchen und ſerbiſchen Truppen, die ſie 64 Kilometer zurückgetrieben haben, im Balkangebirge verfolgt Ihre Niederlage iſt zu einem vollſtändigen Unheil geworden.

Auf der Weſtfront gewinnen die engliſchen und franzöſiſchen Truppen immer noch Terrain, langſam, aber ſtändig, jeden Tag ein wenig.

Überall befinden ſich Deutſchland und ſeine Verbündeten auf dem Rückzuge.

Leſet keine Flugblätter, die ihr zufällig finden möget, ſagen Feldmarſchall Hindenburg und General von Hutier.

Warum?

Weil ſie wiſſen, daß die Flugblätter die Wahrheit, welche ſie und die Regierung uns verhehlen wollen, enthalten.

Sie fürchten die Wahrheit. Wenn das deutſche Volk ſie kennt werden die Regierung und der Militarismus weggefegt werden.

Leſet umſeitig von den Erfolgen der Entente-Mächte und fragt euch —

Wie lange kann dies noch ſo weiter gehen?

Karte zur Veranſchaulichung des türkiſchen Unheils.



Die ſchwarzen Linien und Pfeile ſtellen die engliſchen Streitkräfte dar. Die Türken befanden ſich zwiſchen Samaria und Nablus. Sie ſind vernichtet worden. Ihre Armee exiſtiert nicht mehr.

NEWS FOR GERMAN TROOPS OF CRUSHING TURKISH DEFEATS IN PALESTINE.

impressionable by the attitude at home. . . . The enemy propaganda had seized on Prince Lichnowsky's pamphlet, which, in a way that I myself could not explain, placed on the German Government the responsibility for the outbreak of war. And this, though his Majesty and the Chancellor again and again asserted that the Entente was responsible.

The Army was literally drenched with enemy propaganda publications. Their great danger to us was clearly recognized. The Supreme Command offered rewards for such as were handed over to us, but we could not prevent them from poisoning the heart of our soldiers.

The immediate results which Ludendorff ascribed to this "drenching" were "a notable worsening of the spirit of the Army"; a plot of 1,600 Alsace soldiers to desert to Holland; malingering among the reservists; particularism among the Bavarians, who began to hate the Kaiser and Kaiserin; sharp criticism of the Staff and of the officers. These were grim signs; they were followed by the failure of the German troops in all directions.

On July 18, when Foch made his first counter-attack, "our infantry did not everywhere offer a firm front. A division which had been regarded as good gave way south-west of Soissons. Three divisions in reserve, which were not quite fresh, did not fill the gap"—as they should have done. But the blackest of all days in the war for the German Army, and the day when the effect of the propaganda was most felt, was August 8, according to Ludendorff and his Staff, when the British Fourth Army struck its great blow in the battle of Amiens. In the great British assault on the Hindenburg Line, which began on September 27, just as Ludendorff was hoping that he might play the winter out from this position, he admits that the German troops were badly beaten, though all the preparations on the German side had been of the best. This great defeat, coinciding with the collapse of Bulgaria, which Ludendorff also ascribed to the Allied propaganda, caused panic in the German Government, and

TRUTH FOR GERMANS ABOUT THE ALLIES' PROGRESS ON THE WESTERN FRONT.

Was die Verbündeten gewonnen haben.

Wieder auf der Linie von vorigem März



Das ganze Gelände ist von den deutschen Heeren zwei Mal gewonnen und zwei Mal verloren worden. Wieviel Blut ist vergossen und wieviel Elend verursacht? Zu welchem Zwecke? Denkt darüber nach!

1011

Weitere Erfolge der Entente; der deutsche Rückzug dauert fort.

Während der vergangenen Wochen ist westlich von Cambrai und St Quentin gekämpft worden, der Kampf erreichte einen Grad der Heftigkeit, der dem irgend eines Kampfes im Verlauf des ganzen Krieges völlig gleichkam

Gleichzeitig wurde von deutscher und von englischer Seite angegriffen; auf beiden Seiten wurde mit hartnäckiger Entschlossenheit gekämpft, aber

die Engländer trugen den Sieg davon

Sie schlugen den deutschen Angriff zurück, machten viele Gefangene, und töteten, dank der Art und Weise, in der die deutschen Truppen unter mörderischem Maschinengewehrfeuer vorwärts getrieben wurden, eine ungeheuere Anzahl

Der englische Angriff gelang. Die deutsche Linie wurde näher an St Quentin zurückgedrängt

Zehn tausend Gefangene

wurden gemacht und eine Anzahl von Geschützen erbeutet. Die Außenwerke der Siegfriedlinie sind in englischem Besitz, trotz der entschlossenen und mutigen Anstrengungen der deutschen Truppen sie zu halten. Die letzteren zogen nicht „planmäßig" zurück, sondern weil sie im offenen, ehrlichen Kampfe den

Kürzeren gezogen hatten.

Die Operationen der Ententestreitkräfte haben keineswegs ihren Abschluß gefunden, wie von militärischen Schriftstellern vor acht Tagen in den deutschen Zeitungen berichtet wurde. Die deutschen Streitkräfte haben nicht standhalten können. Die Franzosen bedrohen Laon und den Chemin des Dames und drängen täglich in diesen Bezirken die Deutschen weiter zurück.

Auf der Balkanfront sind

die Bulgaren vollständig geschlagen

und ziehen sich immer noch zurück. Die französischen und serbischen Truppen sind 20 Kilometer vorgedrungen. Viele Tausende von Bulgaren haben sich ergeben. Die Schuld für die unheilsvolle Lage, in der Bulgarien sich befindet, schreiben die Gefangenen Deutschland zu.

Der österreichische Vorschlag eine geheime Konferenz unter Vertretern der kriegsführenden Nationen abzuhalten um

die Möglichkeit des Friedens

zu diskutieren, ist von den Vertretern der Arbeiter- und Sozialistenparteien, versammelt bei der Londoner Konferenz, als mehr von der Angst die Monarchie zu stärken inspiriert als durch einen Wunsch wirksam zur Beilegung des Weltkrieges beizutragen, bezeichnet worden.

Keine Stimme erhob sich zu Gunsten der Annahme des österreichischen Vorschlags

even at the German Headquarters, if we accept the evidence in the German White Paper. On October 28, 1918, General Gallwitz informed a German Government Council that the *moral* of the German soldiery was bad. A correspondent of *The Times* wrote in its issue of October 31, 1919:

> It is quite certain in view of this evidence from the most important German leaders that the British enemy propaganda hit the German Armies very hard, and that, even if we heavily discount Ludendorff's statements, it greatly accelerated the Allies' victory. That was certain in any case, but the best soldiers in the summer of 1918 thought that it could not be gained before August, 1919. Good propaganda probably saved a year of war, and this meant the saving of thousands of millions of money, and probably of at least a million lives.

While this intensive leaflet warfare was being waged a no less vigorous campaign was in operation against all three countries through non-military channels. New means of introducing specially selected literature into enemy countries were constantly being devised, and, despite increasing vigilance, evidence regularly reached Crewe House of the effectiveness of the work.

Articles were inserted in neutral newspapers known as being read in German newspaper offices. These were often quoted in enemy publications, as were a cleverly written series of pseudo pro-German "London Letters," which, for instance, purported to reveal the seriousness of the food position in England, but in reality would lead the German reader to institute comparisons with the much worse conditions prevalent in Germany. Articles were actually sent through neutral sources to enemy newspapers and published. Much assistance was rendered by some of our leading statesmen who gave interviews for publication in neutral countries on topics interesting to Germans. These, too, were much quoted in the enemy Press.

No opportunity was lost of endeavouring to influence neutrals prominent in all walks of life who came into contact with enemy opinion, and enemy subjects living in neutral countries received attention from agents of Crewe House.

Much valuable educative work among German prisoners of war in England was accomplished by the late Sir Charles Nicholson, Bart., M.P., assisted by a sub-committee, in arranging for the distribution of books, pamphlets and newspapers to the camps. Such works as Prince Lichnowsky's Memorandum on the causes of the war, and *Gerade weil ich Deutscher bin*, were found effective, and journals such as the *Arbeiter Zeitung* of Vienna helped to set before German prisoners the real state of affairs in their country and in Austria.

Special difficulties had to be overcome before the work against Bulgaria could be vigorously prosecuted. After much patient preliminary spade work the policy to be adopted was defined, and approved by the Foreign Office. Emphasis was laid upon the need for an Allied decision in favour of Southern Slav, Rumanian and Greek unity as a preliminary to any arrangement with Bulgaria and the need for consulting the Serbian and Greek Governments before negotiating with Bulgaria. It suggested as pre-

Magyar Katonák!

Kiért harcoltok ti!

Ausztria császárjáért és Magyarország királyjáért!

Vagy pedig a németek császárjáért?

Ti csakis a németek császárjáért harcoltok. Ausztria császárja átengedte nekik a hadsereget és államainak a kincstárát. Ausztriát évre egy rendkívüli szerződéssel melynek tartalmát előttetek eltitkolják.

A ti ujságaitok is hirdették a »Waffenbund«-ot, melyet 1918 május 12-én kötöttek a ti uj gazdátok és a ti régi gazdátok között.

De ti magyarok ékiknek ősei annyi vért áldoztak mert szabadok akartak lenni, ti nem tudjátok az igazságot.

Ime lássátok milyen magyok a németek szerint.

A »Frankfurter Zeitung« május 13-án igy szól: **Kell hogy az uj szerződés véglegesen megpecsételje Ausztriának mint független államnak az eltünését és Németország részéről a Habsburg monárkiának a birtokbavételét.**

És a Deutsche Zeitung május 19-én megjegyzi: »Középeurópa szövetségének töképpen erőre van szüksége és pedig sokkal többre mint a mennyije a háboru kitörésekor volt. Ausztria-Magyarország nem volt eléggé elkészülve. **A Weffenbund szerint Ausztria-Magyarországnak épp oly mértékben kell fegyverkeznie lakosainak arányában mint Németországnak.** Nem szabad többé hogy előforduljon hogy ha a delegációk megszavazzák rendkivüli hiteleket katonai célokra, hogy aztán hossza idők múljanak el mielőtt az összeget folyósitják mert vagy az osztrák vagy a magyar pénzügyminiszter kijelenti hogy nincs pénze; vagy pedig hogy a delegációk megszavazzák az ágyukat, de a **magyar parlament** megtagadja a rekruták szükséges számarányát úgy hogy aztán meg vannak az uj ágyúk de hiányzanak a kezelésükre szükséges katonák.«

Még világos?! Küzdeni a németek örült hóbortjáért melyet uralkodni akarnak az egész világon. Harcolni még évekig, magyar vért ontani a németek tiszteletére még évekig és évekig.

Természetesen a »Neue Freie Presse« ujjong és hirdeti (május 14-én) hogy az uj szövetség »különösen Ausztria németjeinek a győzelme«.

MANIFESTO TO MAGYAR TROOPS.

liminary conditions to the establishment of friendly relations with Bulgaria:

(*a*) The expulsion of King Ferdinand and his family;

(*b*) A complete rupture with Germany;

(*c*) Establishment of a democratic government;

(*d*) The orientation of Bulgarian policy in the direction of a Balkan Confederation under the ægis of the Allied Powers and of the United States.

Contact with Bulgaria was mainly established through Switzerland, and a constantly increasing pressure was brought to bear. Elaborate

preparations for the publication and distribution of a Bulgarian newspaper had just been made when Bulgaria collapsed, and further propaganda became unnecessary.

As these multifarious activities came into full operation it became evident that added effectiveness would result if they were co-ordinated with those of Allied and Associated Powers who were already cooperating to some extent. With this object in view Lord Northcliffe, with the assent of the British Government, sent invitations to the French, Italian and United States Governments to appoint delegates to an Inter-Ally Conference on Propaganda in Enemy Countries. These invitations were cordially accepted, and the Conference was held on August 14, 15 and 16, 1918. The whole field of work was surveyed, and fruitful discussions of policies, methods of production, and distribution of propaganda material took place. It was resolved to create an Inter-Allied body for enemy propaganda. To maintain close contact with the French propaganda department, Colonel the Earl of Onslow, who had previously organized the distribution work at General Headquarters, became the department's representative in Paris.

As time went on it became clear that the Allied military pressure and the weakening of the German troops' *moral*, through defeat and propaganda effort, was the beginning of the end. Lord Northcliffe's Committee came to the conclusion that a policy of peace propaganda should be quickly formulated for use not only in enemy countries but also to explain to Allies and neutrals the general principles underlying British peace aims. It seemed, however, desirable that this basis of policy should not be the work of Crewe House alone, as the earlier documents were, but ought to be discussed by representatives of all departments in any way concerned with propaganda work. Invitations were, therefore, addressed to :

The War Cabinet.
The Admiralty.
The War Office.
The Foreign Office.
The Treasury.
The Air Ministry.
The Colonial Office.
The India Office.
The Ministry of Information.
The War Aims Committee.
The Overseas Bureau.

Each was asked to appoint a representative to attend the meetings of a Policy Committee.

This Committee met for the first time on October 4, Sir Campbell Stuart taking the chair in the absence, through illness, of Lord Northcliffe. At this and subsequent meetings a memorandum embodying the basic principles of a just and lasting peace was discussed and agreed upon as a policy for common use. Soon afterwards the armistices were signed and the Policy Committee was dissolved.



[*Russell.*

THE LATE SIR CHAS. NICHOLSON,
Member of the Enemy Propaganda Committee.

On the day following the signing of the Armistice with Germany Lord Northcliffe resigned his post. The following is the text of the letters which passed between him and the Prime Minister :

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

The signing of the last armistice with our enemies has necessarily brought the labours upon which I have been engaged for the past year to a close. The very nature of the armistices themselves necessitates the termination of enemy propaganda, and I beg, therefore, to request you to accept my resignation of my post as Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries.

I wish to thank you for the confidence you have reposed in me in appointing me to this office. I have endeavoured, with the assistance of a most able Committee and of an untiring staff of experts, to render the very

best possible services to the Government and to the country.

Believe me, dear Prime Minister,
Yours sincerely,
NORTHCLIFFE.

In reply, the Prime Minister wrote on the same day:

MY DEAR NORTHCLIFFE,

I have received your letter, and I agree with you that the office of Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries is rendered unnecessary by recent events.

In accepting your resignation, I wish to assure you how grateful I am for the great services you have rendered to the Allied cause while holding this important post. I have had many direct evidences of the success of your invaluable work and of the extent to which it has contributed to the dramatic collapse of the enemy strength in Austria and Germany.

I shall be glad if Sir Campbell Stuart, the present Vice-Chairman of the Mission, will remain in office as Acting Chairman of the Mission until December 31, 1918, in order to wind up its activities.

Ever sincerely,
D. LLOYD GEORGE.

Sir Campbell Stuart agreed to act as chairman until December 31, 1918, by which date the business of the Department was wound up.

If an epitaph of the Department is required, it was provided by the *Kölnische Volkszeitung*, which said: "Unfortunately, we cannot deny that Lord Northcliffe attained all his aims, and he can leave the political arena in triumph."

LIBRARY OF THE BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY

LIBRARY OF THE BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC

CHAPTER CCCXV.

FRANCE AND THE PEACE CONFERENCE.

INTERNAL POLITICS OF FRANCE IN 1917-8—THE POSITION OF M. CLEMENCEAU—FRANCE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS—ANALYSIS OF THE COVENANT—FRANCE'S DEMAND FOR SECURITY—THE MILITARY TERMS—THE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE SAAR VALLEY—ECONOMIC GUARANTEES—THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS—RATIFICATIONS EXCHANGED—THE AMERICAN SENATE'S AMENDMENTS—MOTIVES OF AMERICAN CRITICISM—LORD GREY'S LETTER TO "THE TIMES."

A GENERAL account has already been given (in Chapter CCCIX.) of the work of the Peace Conference, more particularly as it affected British interests and sentiments, or as the British representatives took a leading part in the shaping of the Treaty of Peace. The work of the Conference has now to be examined from the point of view of France, who saw the problems of the peace from a somewhat different angle. The war had been decided principally on her territory, and the marks of its suffering were to be seen most plainly on her body. Whereas to the United States, and to some extent to Great Britain also, the settlement presented itself mainly as an adjustment of political ideas, to France it was primarily a physical problem. All nations were crying out for security; but France, having suffered the physical punishment on her own body, thought first of physical guarantees of future protection. Moreover, the part of her territory that had suffered from the enemy's invasion was the industrial north, and security for her required not only military and political but also economic guarantees. Lastly, the history of her internal politics in the last two years of the war differed very markedly from that of British and American war-politics, and this difference necessarily influenced the attitude of her representatives at the Conference. To the internal politics of France, therefore, we must first turn in order to understand the psychology of the French attitude at the opening of the Conference.

For France the war divided itself into two parts, the first part ending with the Battle of the Somme in which she was waiting for Great Britain to develop her full military power and herself sustained by far the greater burden of the land campaign in the west; the second part, beginning with the Somme and ending with the armistice, in which Great Britain was an equal or more than equal partner and France had to rebuild afresh her moral belief in victory. It was M. Clemenceau who recreated French belief in victory, without which Marshal Foch could never have led the combined Allied Armies to triumph. M. Clemenceau became Premier in November, 1917. That had been a year of grave political unrest in France. An increasingly large number of prominent men known as the *défaitistes*, had given up the war as lost, or at any rate had abandoned all hope of military victory, and come to think that the only chance of France's salvation from ruin was in some accommodation with Germany. Most of those who held those views were perfectly honest men, but a few there were who were not honest and were acting as agents

of the enemy. Their constant agitation had a very damaging effect on the resolution of the country. After the defeat of General Nivelle's offensive on the Aisne in the spring of 1917

GENERAL LYAUTEY,
Minister of War in M. Briand's Government.

there had been a mutiny amongst the troops which some attributed to political intrigue, though the misconduct of the operations was a sufficient explanation in itself. For the rest of the year the French Army took no part in any general offensive, but was content after the spring defeat to make local attacks—some of which were brilliantly successful—and to leave the major operations to the British Army. On military grounds there was much to be said for a policy of economy in men after the waste of the two previous years, but the signs of military exhaustion and the outbreak of the Russian revolution made it the more necessary to maintain the political front intact. French political *moral* was never so low as in the spring and summer of 1917. The *Union sacrée* of French political parties was broken up. From March to November there were four changes of Government and a prolific crop of political scandals which all showed how deep and widespread the influence of the *défaitistes* was.

The Ministry of M. Briand fell in consequence of a measure by General Lyautey, Minister of War, calling up exempted men for re-examination and abolishing the exemption of priests. M. Briand was succeeded by M. Ribot, with M. Painlevé as his Minister of War. On March 21 the new Premier announced his policy and pledged the Government to continue to fight until Alsace-Lorraine had been restored. The Chamber returned to Alsace-Lorraine in a debate on June 5 and passed a vote of confidence in the Government's determination to continue the war until these provinces had been recovered, and to this end the resolution of the Chamber expressed the hope that the Government would work "by the co-ordinated military and diplomatic action of all the Allies." About this time, as we know from the Memoirs of Ludendorff, Austria was urging on Germany that she might obtain a peace with France by some arrangement with regard to Alsace-Lorraine and the suggestion was conveyed to France. The motive was to arrange a separate peace with France on a basis which should make political concession to France in Alsace-Lorraine but maintain German dominance in Belgium. From the sea to the Alps

M. RIBOT,
French Premier in 1917.



M. CLEMENCEAU IN HIS EIGHTIETH YEAR.

there was to be a row of buffer States subject to the commercial hegemony of Germany. France had declined a suggestion which involved the abandonment of her Allies, and the phrasing of the Chamber's resolution about Alsace-Lorraine, while it did not abandon the idea of diplomatic cooperation with the command in the field, made it clear that the peace must be general not separate, and the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine absolute. 'It was then, when all hope of a separate peace with France had gone, that Kühlmann made his celebrated declaration that these provinces would never be given back.

These overtures gave very great importance to the debates among the French Socialists whether they should attend the meeting of the Internationale at Stockholm, and to the accusations made against the Government in the French Press that it had given a scandalous amount of latitude to disloyal and traitorous associations with the enemy. M. Malvy, Minister of the Interior, was the chief object of these attacks and in August he resigned. Seven days later M. Ribot resigned too, owing to the withdrawal of Socialist support over the Stockholm business and to the attacks on M. Malvy for his excessive indulgence to traitorous intrigue, and M. Painlevé became Premier, only to be himself defeated two months later in an interpellation on the Government's course of action in dealing with these same scandals.

The chief of the scandals which brought

VISIT OF KING GEORGE V. TO PARIS, NOVEMBER 28, 1918.
The Scene at the Arc de Triomphe.

about the fall of two successive Governments were those of the *Bonnet-Rouge*, of Bolo Pasha, and of M. Caillaux. The *Bonnet-Rouge* was a *défaitiste* newspaper, whose proprietor, M. Duval, made frequent journeys to Switzerland, where he received large sums of money from German sources. The editor of the paper, one Almeyreda, was accused of complicity and strangled himself in prison. Bolo Pasha was an impudent adventurer, an agent of the German Government, kept liberally supplied with money, which he undoubtedly had from German sources and used to corrupt society and the Press in the German interest. M. Malvy knew both Almeyreda and Bolo, the first named very well, and though there is no proof that his association was corrupt, he was certainly most negligent, to say the least, in his defence of French interests. Much more important, however, was the case of M. Caillaux. He was not only a *défai iste* but fundamentally disloyal to the objects of the Entente, and he continued during the war his old pre-war policy of seeking an understanding with Germany. For him not Germany but Great Britain and Russia were the real enemies. In December, 1916, he told M. Martini, an ex-Minister of the Colonies in Italy, that France and Italy could get surprisingly good terms of peace from Germany, that what Germany wanted was the road to the East, which conflicted with no interest of France's, that as soon as peace was signed France would conclude a treaty with Germany, Italy and Spain against England and Russia, and so on. Early in 1918 Caillaux was arrested, and it appeared, on evidence furnished by the United States representative at Buenos Aires, that he had been engaged in negotiation with the German Government through its representative there, Count Luxburg. Caillaux has still not been placed on trial. But Bolo was executed in April, 1918, and Malvy was sentenced to banishment.

M Clemenceau came into power, then, because France was convinced that there was no settlement except on the basis of complete military victory, and that to obtain that victory the country must be absolutely united. If the country had not been with him in condemning, as he had been doing all through the spring and summer of 1917, the methods of accommodation pursued by previous Ministries, he could never have maintained his position till the end of the war. No compromise either with the enemy in the field or with the enemy at home, was the very breath of his political power, and it was necessary to summarize, however briefly, the history of French domestic

politics in 1917 in order to understand his attitude at the Peace Conference. To expect a politician of his temperament, who in 1917 had seen the causes that France had been fighting for imperilled by German intrigue and French disloyalty, suddenly to become a moderating force and to advocate in victory the accommodations that he had assailed when his country's fortunes were low, was to ask the impossible. It was inevitable in the conditions that M. Clemenceau should demand the utmost guarantees, military, political, and economic, for the security of his country in the future.

The attitude of the United States towards the settlement was fundamentally different. For them—and the same is true to a lesser extent of this country—the war was a war for an idea and not for security, still less for interests. It was easy for the United States at so great a distance from danger to take a detached view of political problems and to trust to the growth of a new spirit in international affairs to give better security than armaments could give. No educated Frenchman is indifferent to the value of an idea or slow to catch its drift, and M. Clemenceau was certainly not opposed to the project of the League or to the hopes that it held out of a new political world. But the League, to his mind, must be the crown not the foundation of the edifice. Its institutions must take time to develop and in the meanwhile France must be protected. The United States had the protection of distance, Great Britain of naval power, but France was a part of the European military and economic system and unless she had ample material guarantees she ran very grave risks if the League should turn out not to work successfully. There was no lack of sympathy between France and the United States; the difference between them was one of angle not of substance, of the order in which problems should be tackled, not of ultimate aims. The two points of view were supplementary, not opposed, and much depended on whether Mr. Wilson had sufficient knowledge of European politics and sufficient willingness to learn how to make a practical application of his ideals.

Between the armistice and the beginning of the Conference Paris gave itself up to a round of festivities and state visits. Most of the

KING GEORGE IN PARIS WITH M. POINCARÉ,
On the occasion illustrated on the opposite page.

Allied crowned heads were seen in Paris in these days, but by far the most notable visits were those of King George and Mr. Wilson. The visit of King George was fitly made the occasion of a great popular celebration of the Entente and its achievement, and the bad weather—it drizzled with rain most of the time—did not affect the enthusiasm of the crowds. The King, who was with two of the Princes, came to Paris from British Headquarters on November 28, dined with the President, M. Poincaré, at the Elysée, and on the following day was received at the Hôtel de Ville. The speeches were of more than ceremonial importance. The King at the Elysée said that our common efforts in the war had "created a union of hearts and an identity of interests" which he trusted "would grow closer and contribute materially to the consolidation of peace and to the advancement of civilization." The President spoke in the same vein. "Together we have fought, together we have suffered, together we have conquered. We are united for ever." Even more notable was the warmth of the French Press. M. Hervé, after speaking of the "thin crust of ice" which concealed in Englishmen abroad "their treasures of enthusiasm, their exquisite feeling, and all the solid qualities of the British soul," went on :—

> Parisians, and especially Parisiennes, will find a way to melt this slight crust of ice, and draw out, in spite of themselves, these silent sons of Great Britain whose friendship, won once and for all time, is perhaps for us the most precious and most priceless blessing yielded by the world-war.

The warmth of French feelings towards us could not have been put more gracefully than in these words, and nearly all the commentators made the point that the work of Anglo-French friendship was not over but only just beginning. "Now is the time," wrote "Pertinax" in the *Echo de Paris*, "to organize the political, military and economic Entente Cordiale."

In some ways the welcome given to Mr. Wilson in the week before Christmas was even more remarkable. King George was the representative of a nation whose friendship had been tried in four years of war, but it was Mr. Wilson who had expressed with most fervour the aspirations of the people for the reign of peace in the future. It was perhaps not altogether to his advantage that the politicians of the Left showed a tendency to make him their protégé, for political feeling was strong in Paris, and it did not help Mr. Wilson's cause that he should seem to be welcomed as a counterpoise to the

KING ALBERT DRIVING WITH M. POINCARÉ, DECEMBER 1918.

ARRIVAL OF PRESIDENT WILSON AT THE BOIS-DE-BOULOGNE STATION, DECEMBER 14, 1918.

Where he was received by M. Poincaré. He is here seen escorting Mdme. Poincaré, while the French President follows with Mrs Wilson.

official policy of France represented by M. Clemenceau. There had been already a great deal of discussion in France of the League of Nations, and some of the critics discovered in the speeches at the Elysée differences of opinion in regard to it between the two Presidents, particularly with regard to the admission of Germany. But the *Temps* argued that these differences were more apparent than real. After quoting Mr. Wilson, it continued:—

> This is precisely what M. Poincaré had proposed to do when he said, "We have defended together the vital principles of free societies; we are now to build together a peace which shall not allow the direct or underhand reconstruction or organization of conquest and oppression." When this goal shall have been reached, then and then only it will be a question of knowing what reply shall be made to Germany if she asks to be admitted to the League of Nations.

But there was no doubt that Mr. Wilson for the moment had made a complete conquest of the French proletariat. "Alone amid the rulers," wrote *Humanité*, "he has known how to speak, in spite of universal hatreds let loose, the language of goodwill, of international justice, of humanity; alone he has protested with the Socialists against Imperialism in all quarters. He has formulated in chiselled terms the objective of the odious war; it must be the last war; it is necessary to secure this, to build up a family of nations, disarm the peoples for ever, disband the standing armies, establish treaties of commerce which will respect for all the liberty of transactions. Because he has sustained these elevated ideals Wilson has conquered the generous heart of the workers of the world." So high were the hopes formed of President Wilson, so rosy the dawn of peace to these high-souled idealists. Whether these dithyrambs were quite consistent with the appeals that M. Clemenceau was making for national union is another and more debatable matter.

The Conference opened on January 18 at the French Foreign Office on the Quai d'Orsay, in an uncomfortable and an over-decorated room known as the Clock Room, with hangings of crimson and cream. The first meeting has been described as a pageant of the Alliance, and the opening speeches, being formal and without political significance, have appeared in detailed official reports. The official interpreter into Eng-

lish of the French speeches was Professor Mantoux, of the London University, and on the opening day he made his solitary mistake. Mr Lloyd George had spoken of M. Clemenceau as the Grand Young Man of France, in allusion to the youthfulness of his old age, and M. Mantoux, through a too great familiarity with English phrases, translated it "The Grand Old Man of France," which caused both Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau to protest simultaneously, and so made the first crease in the rigidity of the ceremonial. It is interesting to record the placing of the various representatives at this opening ceremony. At the head of the horse-shoe table sat M. Poincaré, the President, who opened the Conference in a speech of some 25 minutes. On his right was President Wilson with the American delegation, Mr Lansing, Mr. White and General Bliss. Colonel House, the fourth and in many ways the ablest and most influential member of the American delegation, was absent through illness. On the right of General Bliss began the French representatives, M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon, Marshal Foch, M. Klotz, M. Tardieu and M. Jules Cambon. Then came the Italians with three places, Signor Orlando being absent. On the president's left was the British Prime Minister, and in successive places down the table Mr. Balfour, Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. Barnes and Sir William Lloyd, of Newfoundland, the Dominion representative for that day under the panel system. The Canadians, Australians, South Africans, one New Zealander and two Indians were on the outer side of the horse-shoe. The Belgians next to the Italians, Brazilians, one Cuban, two Greeks, one representative apiece from Haiti and Peru, two Portuguese, three representatives of Serbs, Yugo-Slavs and Croats, one from Uruguay, two Siamese, two Rumanians, two Poles, representatives of Liberia and Panama, Feisul, one Ecuadoran and one Guatemalan, two Chinese, a Bolivian, and the Japanese connected in the order named the two sides of the horse-shoe. Such a council was far too clumsy and heterogeneous to transact the business of a Conference, and the real work was done first by a Council of 10 and later by the "Big Four," Mr Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, M Clemenceau and Signor Orlando.

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, QUAI D'ORSAY.
This photograph shows the exterior of the Salon de l'Horloge.

No coherent idea of the Conference could be obtained by attempting to follow its work from day to day, and it is better to drop the chronological order of the discussions and arrange the work under its subject headings.

The topics of exceptional importance to France were as follows :—

1. The League of Nations.
2. Alsace-Lorraine.
3. Military Security.
4. The Sarre Valley, Reparation, and Economic Safeguards.
5. Belgium.
6. Russia and Prinkipo.

These subjects do not by any means exhaust the work of the Conference. But of the remainder some have already been discussed in detail in the former chapter on Britain's share in the Conference ; others—and these not the least difficult and contentious—will be discussed in a later chapter. In this latter category fall the Adriatic settlement, Poland and the Baltic States, Austria-Hungary, the Russian complications, and Turkey. Some other topics—such as the question of the Freedom of the Seas—will be discussed later in this chapter in the estimate of American policy at the Conference. For the present we are interested primarily in the subjects that were of particular concern to France

The League of Nations.

It has already been observed that such differences of opinion as existed between France and the United States on the League of Nations related not to the ideal that was aimed at but to the sequence of ideas and the order of their development. France wanted security first and then, when that had been gained, the loftier the superstructure of international justice that could be erected upon it the better she would be pleased. The United States, on the other hand, maintained that the League was the best security that France could have, and that if its principles were recognized as binding, especially if Germany came into the League, the motive of attack on France would disappear and give way to a new international world. This conflict of view took many different forms. In the first instance, it affected the procedure of the Conference. France would have preferred the territorial and economic settlement to be taken first, and then the drafting of the League Covenant could have followed at leisure. The United States, on the other hand, were anxious that the constitution of the League should first be settled, because if the settlement were satisfactory it would make other matters much easier. On the whole the view of Mr. Lloyd George and the British representatives inclined to the American side of the argument ; and though the material guarantees were referred to committees the

GERMAN GUNS IN THE PLACE DE LA CONCORDE, PARIS.

early energy of the Conference was given to the drafting of the League Covenant. The result was to hold up the other work of the Conference until the very difficult problems of the League had been agreed upon. The work of the Conference was in consequence much delayed, and when week after week went by and no results were apparent, the people both in England and France grew impatient. In France criticism of the delays almost invariably fastened on the preference given to the League project as the principal cause, and the same view was taken by many in England.

A League of Nations no doubt might theoretically have been constructed which would have given France (and other members) the security for which they asked. Had the League been a super-State with power to command the material resources of its constituent members to enforce its policy of peace, the League would have given an ideal form of protection. But the idea of making a super-State, if it was ever entertained, was soon abandoned. France was certainly not prepared to surrender the control of her army to such a League, nor England the control of her navy, and on the other hand it is clear from what happened later that neither would the United States have been willing to abandon any fraction of its national independence to any international object, however lofty. In these circumstances, the creation of a super-State was out of the question. A suggestion was made by France which would have gone a long way to strengthening the physical authority of the League, and so have made its creation in some sort a substitute for the physical guarantees of peace and security. It was that the League should be equipped with a General Staff, whose business it should be to think out the military problems that might confront the League in enforcing its policy and in disciplining the incalcitrant, and prepare plans for mobilizing rapidly the necessary force. This project, however, was opposed by both the British and the Americans, and had to be dropped.

The details of the Covenant are subject for jurisprudence rather than for historical narrative, and, it will suffice here to give the broadest outlines of its legislation. The Covenant is a document containing 26 articles. Article 22 lays down the principle of the mandate, which was discussed in the former chapter on Britain's part in the Peace Conference. This article had especial relevance to the settlement of the East, when that should be finally laid down. Articles 23 to 26 relate to the Labour Department of the League, which was also an especial interest of Great Britain. The remaining operative provisions of the Covenant deal with the League constitution (Articles 1–7), the provision of arbitral and other machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes (Articles 9 and 11 to 15), the enforcement of the disciplinary and coercive power of the League (Articles 10, 16 and 17), and the reduction of armaments article (Article 8). Each of these divisions was the subject of keen and prolonged debate, and France took a particular interest, for reasons that have already been explained, in the clauses relating to the disciplinary power of the League. These, as will be seen, are the weakest section of the Covenant, and their weakness arises in great measure out of the defeat of the French arguments at the Conference.

The Government of the League is placed in the hands of two bodies, an Assembly, consisting of representatives of all the members of the League, each member to have not more than three representatives exercising one vote between them; and, secondly, a Council, to consist in the first instance of nine members, five representing the Great Powers (France, the United States, Great Britain, Italy and Japan), and four representatives of other members, the first four of these members to be Belgium, Brazil, Spain, and Greece. The admission of members to the League depends on the applicant for admission gaining the votes of two-thirds of the Assembly; and the applicant State must also "give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations" and "shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments." No definition, however, is attempted in the Covenant of what are to be considered "effective guarantees" of good intentions. The Council of the League (as distinguished from the Assembly) has the assistance of a Secretariat, and must formulate plans "for the reduction of armaments" and for a number of other objects. In other respects, the duties and powers of the League seem to be exercisable either by the Assembly or by the Council, and there is no provision made for the resolution of differences between the two bodies. Yet, differences of opinion are very likely between bodies so differently constituted. The general

effect of these provisions is to set up two Committees side by side with powers very loosely defined and with concomitant jurisdiction over many subjects, but to make the Council of Nine into an Executive Committee, on which the five Great Powers are in a majority. But this majority is unstable, and would disappear if one of the five disagrees or drops out. The difficulty that the Conference had to face, of reconciling the theoretical equality of all sovereign States with the rights of the great Powers, on whom most of the responsibilities for the work of the League would fall, is evident in every line of this constitution, and it is equally evident that it has not been solved.

[Manuel.

THE FIFTH PLENARY SITTING OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE, FEBRUARY 15, 1919.
President Wilson, standing before the central window, is reading the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The arbitral provisions follow on the lines of the Hague Conventions, and the functions are exercisable either by the Council or by the Assembly if either party within 14 days of the submission of the dispute wishes to have it referred to the Assembly. But there are two important developments on the provisions made by the Hague Conventions for arbitration and inquiry. In the first place, members of the League not only agree to refer disputes to inquiry by the Council or the Assembly, but undertake in no case to resort to war until three months elapse after the award of the arbitrators or the report of the Inquiry by the Council or Assembly. The greatest value was attached by the Conference to this undertaking, which imposes a compulsory period of delay between even an unsuccessful attempt at arbitration and the striking of the first blow. In the second place, if the arbitral award or the report of the inquiry is made unanimously by all members other than the actual parties, then the beginning of war by the dissentient party on a party that accepts the award or the finding is declared to be an act of war on the League, and the members reserve to themselves the right "to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice." This again is a wholly new principle, but its practical value depends entirely on the power of the League to take efficacious coercive action.

And that brings us to the section of the Covenant to which France gave so much attention. If the employment of force is

PRESIDENT POINCARE, DURING HIS FORMAL TOUR THROUGH ALSACE-LORRAINE, PRESENTING GENERAL PETAIN WITH THE BATON OF A MARSHAL AT METZ, DECEMBER 8, 1918.

On the left are Marshals Joffre and Foch (General Weygand standing behind the latter), Generals Haig, Pershing, Gillain (Belgian), Albricci (Italian), and Haller (Polish). On the right, MM. Poincaré and Clemenceau.

contemplated in certain contingencies, then, said France at the Peace Conference, it is necessary to take measures beforehand for securing that the employment shall be effective. It was the same principle that she asserted in 1906, with our fullest concurrence, when the first military conversations began between England and France. For this reason France advocated at the Conference the establishment of a League General Staff, but found the majority of opinion against her. What, then, are the coercive powers of the League under the Covenant ?

These are contained in Articles 16 and 17. By the first of these articles members of the League agree to institute a financial and commercial boycott against any member of the League committing an "act of war" upon the League. And this boycott is to be set up not only by the members of the League against the offender but enforced between the offender and all other states. The punishment of an "act of war" on the League is thus "the prevention of all financial, commercial and personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any other state, *whether a member of the League or not*." In other words, neutrality, for the purposes of this punitive blockade, is abolished. That, so far as it goes, is a very powerful weapon, but it could hardly by itself be expected to be efficacious. The offending state might then attack one of the League states or one of the neutral states which was joining in the blockade. In that case it would be the duty of the members of the League to "preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of the state attacked" (Article 10). How ? By counter military measures. But no provision is made in the Covenant for concerting these measures or for carrying them into execution. They are all, apparently, left to be concerted when the danger arises, and the result would be to give the aggressor a start in his wrong-doing. Here is the great weakness of the provisions, and if France was cool and critical towards the project, it was not for lack of faith in its ideals but because she herself had just emerged from a war in which she had been the principal sufferer owing to a lack of proper preliminary organization between the Allies. The weakness of the Covenant in these sections justified her argument—that it was not sufficiently deterrent of political crime, and needed supplementing by separate military and naval agreements and by special measures of precaution, both military and economic. Almost all the criticisms of French policy at the Conference overlook these defects in the Covenant.

France's claim to security not having been met by the League Covenant, it was necessary to meet it by special provisions in the rest of the Treaty. Before we pass to these guarantees, the settlement of Alsace-Lorraine must be

THE QUAINT ALSATIAN COSTUME AS WORN AT KAYSERSBERG.

noted as standing in a special political category of its own. Its restoration to France did not offend against the Wilsonian principle of "no annexations" because, in equity, the original annexation by Germany having been unjust, the sovereignty in the country had always remained with France. The cession of Alsace-Lorraine to France was not annexation but only a confirmation of a legal sovereignty which had never ceased to exist. This view was taken unanimously at the Conference, and it is one of the few subjects settled there on which no disagreement of opinion manifested itself. No passage in the peace had so much joy in it as the re-entry of France into her old heritage. The formal entry of Marshal Foch into Strasbourg was made on November 26. On the day before the crape and other symbols of separation had been removed from the famous statue in the

Place de la Concorde in Paris, and at night two searchlights from the Automobile Club near played upon the monument. After the entry of Marshal Foch into Strasbourg a proclamation was posted upon its walls which for its eloquence and truth must be given in full :—

To the inhabitants of Strasbourg.
To the soldiers of the Fourth Army.

The day of glory has arrived. After forty-eight years of the direst separation, after fifty-one months of war, the sons of Great France, our brothers, are united once more. This miracle has been worked by you, people of Strasbourg and Alsatians, because you kept in your faithful heart the sacred love of the Mother Country through all the vexations and ill-treatment of the odious yoke—history will hardly furnish another instance of this admirable fidelity. This miracle has been worked by you, soldiers, who have fought heroically the hardest battles ever seen and issued from them covered with immortal glory. The redoubtable barrier has fallen ; the eagles of the frontier posts have been laid low for ever.

France comes to you, people of Strasbourg, as a mother to her darling child lost and found again. Not only will she respect your customs, local traditions, religious beliefs, economic interests, but she will dress your wounds and in these difficult days will ensure your food supplies. At this solemn and magnificent hour, which proclaims the triumph of right, justice and liberty over brutal force, let us unite, liberated Alsatians and liberating soldiers, in this same love. Vive la France ! Vivé l'Armée ! Vive la République !

The French President visited Metz on December 8 and Strasbourg on December 9 in the course of a formal tour through the redeemed provinces which he made in the company of M. Clemenceau, Marshals Foch, Joffre and Pétain, Sir Douglas Haig, General Pershing, and others. Everywhere they were received with the greatest enthusiasm, and many and touching were the incidents of noble patriotic emotion. The recovery of Alsace-Lorraine stirred Frenchmen everywhere out of their normal political moods, and they seemed to feel, even more than the exhilaration of the triumph, a deep sense of gratitude and responsibility. M. Clemenceau in one of his speeches struck a note that was new to him, and betrayed an emotion that had gone into the silent depths of his nature below the usually troubled and stormy surface. The old gladiator counselled moderation. In the Chamber, after describing on his return from Alsace-Lorraine the scenes that he had witnessed there, he said :—

It is a great lesson—a lesson in unity. In a small village I saw amidst a group of old men and children an aged nun, her eyes downcast beneath her *coif*, singing the Marseillaise. It is a lesson—let me use the word—in moderation, moderation in the sense that we must understand so to co-ordinate our effort that the effect may be such as we have a right to expect.

The recovery of Alsace-Lorraine was an

PRESIDENTIAL FETE AT METZ.

Officers of the 156th Artillery at the foot of the statue of a "Poilu" (his foot on a German helmet), which replaces that of Wilhelm I, erected by the Germans.

PRESIDENT POINCARE PLACING A WREATH OF ROSES AT THE FOOT OF THE STATUE OF KLEBER, STRASBOURG, DECEMBER 9, 1918.

inevitable measure of political justice, but it did not increase the military security of France. On the contrary, it diminished it, and there were many Frenchmen who desired to retain permanently in the possession of France the principal bridge-heads across the Rhine. Marshal Foch is believed to have been among their number, and it is obvious that on purely military grounds there is everything to be said for the Rhine frontier. But the political objections to the acquisition of the territory west of the Rhine, which is indisputably German in its population and its sympathies, are insuperable, and it is to the credit of the French Government that the military arguments were not pressed and that the annexation of these German districts was never part of its official policy. At the same time this moderation in her territorial demands strengthened her moral claim to especial guarantees of her security over and above those which studious avoidance of an aggressive policy and her own magnificent army could give her. To these guarantees we must now turn

They were of several kinds. First, there was the vague obligation imposed on members of the League by Article 10 of the Covenant to make common cause with each other against aggression upon any of their number This guarantee France, and with excellent reason, regarded as insufficient. Secondly, and more important, there were the provisions made in the body of the Treaty limiting the armaments of Germany. These have a whole section to themselves (Part V, Articles 159-202), and their terms must be given.

The principal provision of the Treaty under this head is contained in Article 160, which limits the strength of the German Army after March 31, 1920, to 100,000 effectives, with a total strength in officers of not more than 4,000. The French took the view that what makes most difference to the power of suddenly increasing an army is the number of the officers and the organization of the cadres, and they gave great pains in drafting the details of Headquarters and Divisional Staffs so as to prevent the Germans from forming a skeleton military organization which on the outbreak of trouble could be rapidly filled out into a great army. They drew out tabular statements (embodied in the Treaty) of the maximum strength of Headquarters and Divisional Staffs : and of the maximum armament establishment for seven infantry divisions, three cavalry divisions, and two Army Corps Headquarters' Staffs, and of maximum stocks of rifles, carbines, machine-guns, mortars, and field artillery. All arms,

munitions, and war material in excess of these schedules must under the Treaty be surrendered within two months after the coming into force of the Treaty, importation of all arms and war material of every kind is prohibited, and the domestic manufacture of military material is to be restricted to certain works approved of by the Allies, who retain power to prohibit new armament works. The difficulty in making detailed regulations of this kind is that it is

PRESIDENTIAL FETE AT MULHOUSE, DECEMBER 10, 1918.

almost impossible to draw a hard and fast line between civil and military factories, for the same plant with a little adaptation, as we discovered in the war, can be made to serve both purposes. This difficulty the Treaty can hardly be said to face, and the only contribution it makes is an article forbidding the manufacture of asphyxiating or other gases, and also of tanks. This clause, however, is little more than a gesture of disapproval, for its framers knew quite well that the only way to make such a prohibition effectual would be to suppress the dye-making industry of Germany. Much more valuable are the provisions for the dismantling of all fortified and field works in a zone 30 miles broad on the east bank of the Rhine, but here, too, the line between military and civil works is not easy to draw, and most civil buildings can readily be adapted to military use. The really formidable fortifications in the war were field works which do not take long to construct. Still, it was a gain to the military security of France that Germany should have no great place of arms to cover concentrations of troops nearer than 50 miles to the frontier. Germany also agrees by the Treaty that if and when she becomes a member of the League, she will abide by the decisions of the Council with regard to her armaments. Her position in this respect differs from that of original members of the League who, apparently, under Article 8 of the Covenant, can please themselves whether they adopt the plans for the reduction of their armaments formulated by the Council but, having adopted, must faithfully observe. Germany surrenders this option.

Into the details of similar restrictions on Germany's naval and aerial armaments it is not necessary to enter. But the important provisions in Article 173, abolishing universal compulsory military service in Germany and substituting voluntary enlistment, must be noticed. This Article was inserted, it is believed, at the instance of Mr. Lloyd George, whose view that a small long-service professional army

is less dangerous to the peace than a short-service army raised by conscription, is natural to an Englishman, though not one that every Continental would accept. The object of the further provision that the period of service should be for 12 years was to prevent Germany from passing large numbers of men rapidly through a short period of military service into the reserve, as Prussia did under Napoleon. There are also provisions in the Treaty limiting the number of employees in the civil services to the numbers employed in 1913, with permission to increase only in proportion with the growth of the population, the idea being to prevent Germany making a great army and calling it police or civil guards, or by some fancy name. This was undoubtedly done in the first year after the Armistice, nominally as a safeguard against Spartacist revolution, and *The Times* pointed out that in August, 1919, there were not far from a million men in Germany either under arms or with access to arms. These volunteer bodies—organized under all sorts of names—were only not an infringement of the Treaty because its provisions had not then come in force.

The meticulous care with which these provisions are drafted in the Treaty betrays the nervousness of the framers lest they should leave some loophole by which a Germany disloyal to the spirit of the Treaty may escape from the meshes of the letter. But if there is the will to escape from a Treaty, no care in drafting will prevent it, and at the end of all these elaborate precautions the French representatives seem to have felt that they might after all not be effectual. And it has been already explained that France felt no confidence in the power of the League of Nations to restrain an offender. Accordingly, a supplementary Treaty was concluded by Great Britain and America to furnish France with the additional safeguards for which she was asking. The position of France was clear and logical. "On France," she said, in effect, "will fall the first blow of any failure of the Covenant and disarmament section of the Treaty to act. France will again be the whipping-boy of civilization. You cannot ask her to endure this punishment without some promise of assistance. Engage, therefore, that if France is attacked as a result of the violation you will come to her assistance." Great Britain and the United States gave this engagement in a special Treaty

MALMEDY, CEDED TO BELGIUM UNDER THE PEACE TREATY.
The photograph shows British transport passing through the town to the British zone of occupation East of the Rhine.



MAP SHOWING THE WESTERN FRONTIERS OF GERMANY UNDER THE PEACE TREATY.



FLENSBURG: AN EXCITED CROWD DISCUSSING THE QUESTION OF NATIONALITY.

independent of the main Peace Treaty. The first Article of this Treaty must be quoted, for it reveals the logic of the French argument on all the provisions of the Treaty designed to secure her protection, and, indeed, confesses that the guarantees in the Peace Treaty are not in themselves adequate. Article 1 runs as follows :—

> In case the following stipulations relating to the left bank of the Rhine contained in the Treaty of Peace with Germany signed at Versailles the 28th of June, 1919, by the British Empire, the French Republic and the United States of America among other Powers :—
>
> "Article 42.—Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometres to the east of the Rhine.
>
> "Article 43.—In the area defined above, the maintenance and assembly of armed forces either permanently or temporarily and military manœuvres of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden.
>
> "Article 44.—In case Germany violates in any manner whatsoever the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against the Powers signatory of the present Treaty, and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world."
>
> may not at first provide adequate security and protection to France, Great Britain agrees to come immediately to her assistance in the event of any unprovoked movement of aggression against her being made by Germany.

The wording of the Clause, it will be seen, is very cautious. Suppose, for example, that France had intervened to save Poland from a Russo-German combination, and that Germany had then retaliated by moving troops within the disarmament zone of the Rhine, would that be "unprovoked aggression" within the words of the Treaty, and would the obligation to succour France then arise? It is not certain. Further, the obligation under the Treaty will not arise at all unless America agrees to do the same; Article 2 says that the Treaty is not in force until the United States have ratified a Treaty in similar terms for the same purpose. It does not require much exercise of the imagination to reconstruct the arguments between France, Great Britain, and America which led to this grudging admission that the guarantees of the main Treaty may not be sufficient, and to the conclusion of this cautious supplementary Treaty

Before passing to the provisions for reparation, and to the economic guarantees of the Treaty it is convenient to notice here some slight changes made in the frontiers of Belgium. Early in the history of the Conference a Commission was appointed to examine the Treaty of 1839, which guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium. The Commission reported that revision was necessary, and more particularly that the regulations of the Treaty of 1839 prevented the defence and provisioning of Antwerp in time of war, and that the configuration of the Dutch frontier in the province of Limburg prevented the line of the Meuse from being held against an army advancing from Germany. It was agreed that the whole question of the



THE SAAR VALLEY.

revision of the Treaty of 1839 should be gone into by representatives of the Allies and of the Netherlands Government, Germany agreeing that the Treaty "no longer conforms to the requirements of the situation," and undertaking to accept the modifications that might be arranged with the Netherlands Government. In addition, Germany ceded to Belgium the territory of Moresnet, west of the road from Liége to Aix-la-Chapelle and the districts of Eupen and Malmedy (see map p. 378). This was the only cession of territory made in Western Europe to any belligerent power. For Alsace-Lorraine, as has been seen, was not regarded as cession or annexation, but only as confirmation of French rights which had never lapsed in spite of the German usurpation. Here, too, should be noted the provision made in the Treaty for rectifying the frontiers of Denmark and Germany. By Article 109 of the Treaty the inhabitants of Schleswig, north of Flensburg, are to hold a plébiscite to determine by a majority vote their political allegiance. This again was not annexation, but liberty given to reverse an act of annexation.

We pass now to the provisions for reparation, of which by far the most important for France are those relating to the Saar basin. No part of the Peace Treaty has been so much debated or so widely misrepresented as this, and it is necessary to an understanding of the French position that the provisions should be explained in some detail.

The Saar Basin is at the north-east corner of Lorraine, and the district comprised within that term in the Peace Treaty is about 30 miles

square, stretching from Mettlach to Zweibrucken and from Birkenfeld to Forbach. Along the course of the Saar are the towns of Mettlach, Saarlouis, Saarbruck, and Sarreguemines, which is just on the French side of the border. The whole district is one of great mineral richness, and the coal mines have brought other industries there, such as glass, pottery and iron. The mines were first worked by Frenchmen, but the population of the whole district, numbering about 650,000 people, is now mainly German both in race and in sympathy. That the French never coveted this region would be too much to say, but certainly its annexation was never part of official French policy at the conference. The reasons which led to the exceptional treatment given to this district in the Peace Treaty are neither political nor military but purely economic. During their long occupation of northern France the Germans not only deprived the French of the coal from the Lens and Belgian frontier district but in many cases wantonly destroyed the workings so that they will take long to repair. By these illegal acts they inflicted great economic loss on France and also embarrassed Great Britain, causing a great increase in France's demand from us and sending up the price of coal for the British manufacturer and householder. The American principle with regard to the damage done by the Germans by their warlike operations was a simple one. There was to be reparation but no indemnities; damages were to be paid but they were not to be punitive or consequential damages. France had a good right to compensation for the destruction of her coal mines, and her Ally England had a common interest with her that this reparation should be paid in kind. The provisions of the Treaty therefore with regard to the Sarre Valley are to be considered solely as an enforced but just contribution by Germany to the reparation due from her to France for the destruction of her coal mines.

The chief of these provisions is that the property in the mines should be vested in France absolutely for a period of fifteen years. The value of the property thus ceded will be determined by the Reparation Commission and credited to Germany in part payment of the amount due for reparation. The yield of the mines in 1913 was between 13 and 14 million tons, but as the mines were not fully exploited by the Germans this yield would probably be greatly increased by energetic exploitation which had not the interests of the Westphalian mines to think of. Roughly about 30 per cent. of the yield is consumed locally, and under the Treaty France undertakes that the requirements of local consumption shall be met on that basis



THE SAAR VALLEY: SAARBRUCK.



THE SAAR VALLEY: SAARBURG.

before any coal leaves the district. Assuming therefore that the output could be raised to 20 millions annually, the vesting of the property of these mines in France represents a subsidy to her general needs of some 14 million tons a year, or some 210 million tons in the 15 years. It is a large amount, but no one could say that it is in excess of the damage done by the German occupation to the coal fields of Northern France. No political rights whatever are ceded to France in this region, nor is France given any rights of taxation or of altering the laws or their administration in any way. So far as France is concerned the change begins and ends with the vesting with her of the property of the mines. And yet, one must presume by people who have never read the provisions of the Treaty, on this instalment of the reparation due to France the most amazing charges have been based.

The Government of the territory is vested by the Treaty in a resident Commission of five members representing the League of Nations. Of these five, to be chosen by the Council of the League, one is to be a citizen of France, one a native inhabitant of the Saar Basin not a citizen of France, and the other three are to be drawn from three countries other than France and Germany. In this Commission are vested all the powers of government formerly belonging to Germany, including the right of taxation, but the inhabitants are to retain their German nationality, their local assemblies, their religious liberties, their schools and their language. There is to be no military service in the territory and the erection of fortifications is forbidden. At the end of the 15 years there is to be a plebiscite of the inhabitants on a three-fold option: first, whether they will continue the regime of the League of Nations; second, union with France; and third, union with Germany. If the electors decide in favour of the last choice, Germany is to purchase France's rights in the mines, the price to be fixed by three experts, two representing France and Germany and a third belonging to neither country, and the payment is to go to the reparation account. Unless the allegation be that the League of Nations cannot be trusted to administer German territory, and that it would act in collusion with France to defeat the principle of liberty and the right of self-determination when the time comes for the inhabitants of the basin to vote on their future political allegiance, it is difficult to understand what can be the basis of the very bitter attacks that have been made in England on this section of the Treaty. The financial provisions in this section cannot be attacked, unless it is also contended that Germany ought not to make reparation in kind for the injury done to French mines or that an administration under the League and plébiscite under its authority, though good enough for other territories, is not good enough for German. Yet surely no serious person would make himself responsible for these contentions, and, in fact, the condition of the inhabitants under League control will in many respects be exceptionally favoured.

There remain to be considered the purely economic clauses of the Peace Treaty. These are closely bound up with the reparation provisions, a vast and complicated subject which it would require a whole chapter of this History to summarize adequately. The Peace Treaty lays down two principles on the subject of reparation: first (Article 231) that Germany accepts the responsibility for causing all the

loss and damage caused to the Allies, Governments and nationals, by the war, and secondly (Article 232) that the resources of Germany are not equal to repair all these losses, but that she must make compensation for all damage to the civilian populations and to their property done in the course of her aggression. An annex to this section of the Treaty defines this damage as follows :—

1. Damage to injured persons and to surviving dependents by personal injury to or death of civilians caused by acts of war, including bombardments, or other attacks on land, on sea, or from the air, and all the direct consequences thereof, and of all operations of war by the two groups of belligerents wherever arising.

2. Damage caused by Germany or her allies to civilian victims of acts of cruelty, violence, or maltreatment (including injuries to life or health as a consequence of imprisonment, deportation, internment or evacuation, of exposure at sea or of being forced to labour by Germany or her allies), wherever arising and to the surviving dependents of such victims.

3. Damage caused by Germany or her allies in their own territory or in occupied or invaded territory to civilian victims of all acts injurious to health or capacity to work, or to honour, as well as to the surviving dependents of such victims.

4. Damage caused by any kind of maltreatment of prisoners of war.

5. As damage caused to the peoples of the Allied and Associated Powers, all pensions and compensation in the nature of pensions to naval and military victims of war (including members of the air force), whether mutilated, wounded, sick, or invalided, and to the dependents of such victims, the amount due to the Allied and Associated Governments being calculated for each of them as being the capitalized cost of such pensions and compensation at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty on the basis of the scales in force in France at such date.

6. The cost of assistance by the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers to the prisoners of war and to their families and dependents.

7. Allowances by the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers to the families and dependents of mobilized persons or persons serving with the forces, the amount due to them for each calendar year in which hostilities occurred being calculated for each Government on the basis of the average scale for such payments in force in France during that year.

8. Damage caused to civilians by being forced by

THE VICTORY FETES IN BELGIUM, JULY 1919.
Cardinal Mercier receiving President Poincaré and King Albert in the porch of the Cathedral of Malines.

Germany or her allies to labour without just remuneration.

9. Damage in respect of all property wherever situated belonging to any of the Allied or Associated States or their nationals, with the exception of naval and military works or materials, which has been carried off, seized, injured, or destroyed by the acts of Germany or her allies on land, on sea, or from the air, or damage directly in consequence of hostilities or of any operations of war.

10. Damage in the form of levies, fines, and other similar exactions imposed by Germany or her allies upon the civilian population.

The normal procedure would have been for the Allies at Paris to make an estimate of the amount of this damage and to present Germany with a demand for the total. This total would have been reparation pure and simple, not indemnity, which usually includes punitive or consequential damages, and it would have been left to Germany to decide how she would pay. For a variety of reasons this course was not followed, and instead there was set up a Reparation Commission whose duty was not only to keep accounts and to assess the amounts due, but also to estimate Germany's capacity to pay. Many of the grievances alleged against the financial and economic clauses of the Treaty have arisen in consequence of the Allies' taking upon themselves the burden which should rightfully have been Germany's of deciding how the money should be paid. The method, however, had its conveniences. As the amount, by the lowest computation, could not be paid in a short time, the method saved the Allies the cost of and trouble of maintaining armies of occupation for an indefinite period, for it enabled them to devote to the service of what Germany owed them all the assets that were in Allied hands. Such were "all property, rights and interests belonging to German nationals" in the colonies, in Alsace-Lorraine (except in so far as the French Government chooses not to exercise this lien) or within the territories of the Allies. This property, be it noted, is not confiscated but devoted to the discharge of Germany's indebtedness for reparation. Further, the Reparation Committee may require the German Government to expropriate its nationals and deliver to the Commission "any rights and interests of German nationals in . . . any concession in Russia, China, Turkey, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria." These rights are in substitution of the military occupation which would be the normal security for an unpaid debt. It is not pretended by anyone that the value of these assets approaches the amount of the reparation due.

Germany, therefore, had a large balance of debt to meet by realizing her industrial assets, and of these coal was the most important. Without coal France was not in a position to begin her industrial reconstruction, and it was natural that she should take payment in the commodity of which she had most need and without which she would, economically speaking, have been at the mercy of Germany. The payments in coal imposed on Germany towards the reparation account were heavy but not unjust. France, in addition to the yield of the Saar basin, is to receive for a period of ten years an amount equivalent to the yield of the mines in the parts of Northern France occupied by Germany in the year before the war, and further, in addition, 7 million tons annually for 10 years. Belgium is to be paid 8 million tons annually for 10 years, Italy an amount rising from 4½ million tons in the early years of the decade to 8½ million tons later. It is said that this tribute of coal will cripple German industry and prevent her recovery from the war. But Mr. Keynes, who gives much space to this grievance in his recent book, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, admits that the issue is between German industry on the one hand and French and Italian industry on the other. "It may be admitted that the surrender of the coal will destroy German industry; but it may be equally true that its non-surrender will jeopardize French and Italian industry. In such a case must not the victors, with their Treaty rights, prevail, especially when much of the damage has been ultimately due to the wicked acts of those who are now defeated?" Whatever be the value of the writer's arguments about the sound policy for Europe as a whole, these sentences show that Allied industry was still in danger of defeat in the end of the war in spite of the victory in the field, and illustrate what France meant by her demand for economic as well as military security.

The policy of the Conference towards Russia does not fall within the scope of this chapter. But it is pertinent here to observe that the early displays of powerlessness to enforce its ideals which did such injury to the League would have been avoided if the League had been equipped with some organization for enforcing the will of the League against a recalcitrant. Had it been realized that peace as well as war demands a strategy of its own, many of the errors and vacillations of Allied policy in Russia would have been avoided. But



THE FIRST FOURTEENTH OF JULY FETE IN STRASBOURG.
Illumination of the Cathedral by Searchlights.

while France strongly supported more vigorous methods of dealing with the Bolshevists, it is just to add that there were no more signs of popular approval in France of a forward policy in Russia than there were in England. It is fair to recall that French sailors in the Black Sea hoisted the Red Flag, and that this mutiny and the refusal of the French troops to fight at Odessa were the causes of the first breakdown of Allied policy in Russia.

The passages of the Treaty which were of more immediate interest to France have now been

described and discussed. For reasons that have been indicated M. Clemenceau found himself in frequent opposition to Mr. Wilson. The two men were temperamentally unlike. The one was hard-bitten with fact, the other lived in a rarefied atmosphere of ideas and showed an extraordinary inability to translate his aspirations into the vernacular of European politics. Throughout the Conference Mr. Wilson was steadily losing the immense prestige which he

M. CLEMENCEAU.

enjoyed when he first came to Europe. He disappointed both parties to the controversy. The Labour and Socialist parties, which had hailed him at the outset as the champion of their own views, were bitterly angry at his signing a Treaty of which they strongly disapproved. On the other hand, his opposition to the more realistic policy of Clemenceau made the Right severely critical, and though Mr Wilson did inestimable service in holding aloft the banner of the ideal, it has to be admitted that he failed lamentably in the constructive work of the Conference. His influence is visible in many clauses, but it makes, as a rule, for weakness rather than strength, for ineffective compromise rather than for the clear, logical application of a general principle which his admirers expected of him.

The reasons of President Wilson's comparative unsuccess have often been analysed, and by none so unsparingly as by those who sympathized most strongly with the views with which he was identified. The fault was not in his political ideals but in his inability to apply them to the conditions of European politics. M. Clemenceau was a man of the finest European culture, with an unassailably logical position to defend and an unrivalled knowledge of foreign affairs. Mr. Lloyd George had genius, a chameleon adaptability to his environment, an exquisite sensibility to the thoughts of his company which could divine the arguments that would be used, and was ready with the reply before they could be uttered. The combination between these two men in council was irresistible, even by a master of the arts of diplomacy. Mr. Wilson was anything but that. The admirers of his gift of generalization and his fine idealism were compelled to admit that he lacked patience in details and, noble orator as he was, that he was faulty in debate and incapable of those subtle modifications and adaptations of his position which are necessary for those who wish to persuade and get their way. Mr. Keynes, who had the liveliest sympathy with Mr. Wilson's principles, is severer than almost any other European has been in his judgment of his failure in Council. He writes :

> It was commonly believed at the commencement of the Paris Conference that the President had thought out, with the aid of a large body of advisers, a comprehensive scheme not only for the League of Nations, but for the embodiment of the Fourteen Points in an actual Treaty of Peace. But in fact the President had thought out nothing ; when it came to practice his ideas were nebulous and incomplete. He had no plan, no scheme, no constructive ideas whatever for clothing with the flesh of life the commandments which he had thundered from the White House. He could have preached a sermon on any of them or addressed a stately prayer to the Almighty for their fulfilment, but he could not frame their concrete application to the actual state of Europe. . . . . His mind was slow and unadaptable. The President's slowness amongst the Europeans was noteworthy. He could not in a minute take in what the rest were saying, size up the situation in a glance, frame a reply, and meet the case by a slight change of ground ; and he was liable to defeat by the mere swiftness, apprehension, and agility of a Lloyd George.

That there is much truth in this severe

criticism is not to be denied, and apparently it is the reading of the course of the debates that is commonest both here and in America. But it does an injustice both to the President and to those with whom he worked. The British Prime Mininster has supernormal gifts in negotiation, but he worked very honestly with the President, and to represent the President as a constant victim to his wiles is unfair to both. On the League of Nations they were in close sympathy, and it was Mr. Lloyd George's support of his view that carried it against the critics. In the Prinkipo proposals, again, the two were in close association, and when the League discussions were drawing to an end and the Conference came to settle the details of the general peace, Mr. Lloyd George's cooperation with the President exposed him to severe criticism on the ground of lack of sympathy with the French claims. It would be just as true to say that the President used Mr. Lloyd George to further his ideas as the reverse. Mr. Lloyd George, faced with a rising storm of indignation at home, was compelled to modify his views, but so also was Mr. Wilson. Mr. Wilson was as principled and as obstinate as a Scottish theologian, and he was difficult to move from a position once taken up. At one time he was so hopeless of carrying his views that he sent for the *George Washington* and threatened to go back to America. He wanted at one time to take the part of China against Japan, and his indignation over the Italian claims at the expense of the Jugo-Slavs was expressed in a strongly worded statement, published over the heads of the Conference, and led to the departure of the Italian representatives from the Conference. If so obstinate a man gave way, therefore, it was not out of considerations of policy but because he was convinced. The assumption on which Mr. Wilson is so frequently praised for his principles and attacked for his performance is that the actual Treaty was a violation of the principles. But the truth is that the Treaty, with all its faults, was not only not inconsistent with the Fourteen Points, but was, so far as the Western settlement was concerned, an honest attempt to equate them with the facts of European politics and of human nature. These faults were not in the Western but in the Eastern settlement, and did not lie in the actual provisions or aspirations of the Treaty, but in the refusal to face the obvious fact that the League ideals had bitter enemies, to see who those enemies were, and to take the steps necessary for their defeat.

The removal of one very old cause of controversy between England and America from politics was a notable achievement, the practical importance of which has not been generally realized. This was the old dispute between England and America about the laws of naval warfare, which was summed up in America in the phrase "the freedom of the seas." By a sea that was "free" America meant one over which all neutrals had a right of way which no belligerent operations ought to stop, and though theoretically the belligerent right of blockade was not denied, still, inasmuch as blockade under modern conditions must be conducted at a distance from enemy ports, the American rule that the sea outside territorial waters was a great international common was inconsistent with the maintenance of an

PRESIDENT WILSON.

effective blockade. Whatever claim a neutral had to trade with belligerents on the American view, he had an undoubted right to trade with another neutral, but the right of overseas trade between say America and Holland would have made impossible any effective blockade of Germany or of any Power that had a neutral neighbour with a sea-frontier. When the United States entered the war she saw that the strict theory of the "free sea" was unworkable. And as blockade was one of the instruments to be used by the League for the assertion of its rights, in order to make that blockade effective, the Covenant in effect abolished the right of any neutral to serve both God and Mammon, to get the commercial advantages of free trading in war, and while others were fighting to maintain the rule of law, to succeed to all the advantages of others' trials without having done anything itself to attain that end. In future, under the Covenant every member of the League is bound not only itself to have no intercourse with an offender against its authority, but, so far as it can, to prevent



THE VICTORY MARCH OF THE TROOPS IN PARIS, JULY 14, 1919.
The procession passing through the Arc de Triomphe.

anyone else having any intercourse. There was no subject in which Americans at the beginning of the Conference were more interested than this of the freedom of the sea. To many Americans, England's "navalism" was the counterpart at sea of German militarism on land. But the time came, after the famous Article 16 of the Covenant had been drafted, when President Wilson could truthfully say to the American journalists that the old controversy was obsolete. It might survive in small wars in which the League took no interest and had no policy. But these "small wars" are not ordinarily those in which sea power or the laws of war at sea assume any importance. On all important wars, the League would have a policy, and in these wars—the only wars in which naval power plays any part—there will be no neutrals, and therefore there can be no dispute between belligerents and neutrals about their respective rights in the great common of the sea.

As a contribution to Anglo-American friendship the importance of having this ancient ground of quarrel removed has not been sufficiently realized. Unfortunately, its value depends entirely on America's membership of the League and on her willingness to take her share in the enforcement of its policy.

MARSHALS JOFFRE AND FOCH IN THE VICTORY MARCH.

Perhaps the most important work done by America in Europe after the Armistice was that of Mr. Hoover, in what may be called the reconstitution of the supply of food and of raw materials to Europe. This work properly belongs to a history of the peace rather than of the war, but some brief note should be taken of the work done by this remarkable man. It was Mr. Hoover who organized the relief work done by the Americans in Belgium from 1914 until they entered the war. The work was conspicuously successful and carried out in the face of much obstruction from the German Army of occupation. One of the shortest and best-known speeches of the war was that made by Mr. Hoover after the Armistice, in reply to a request for an interview by Baron von der Lancken and Dr. Reith. The speech was telegraphed. It ran:

> You can describe two and a half years of arrogance towards ourselves and cruelty towards the Belgians in any language you may select, and tell the pair personally to go to hell, with my compliments. If I have to deal with Germans, it will not be with that pair.

When the United States came into the war, Mr. Hoover was recalled in 1917 to take the post of Food Controller in the United States. The harvest of 1917 had been below the average, and there had been a great drain of American foodstuffs before her declaration of war.

FIELD-MARSHAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG LEADING THE BRITISH EMPIRE TROOPS IN THE PARIS VICTORY MARCH.

America was not ready immediately to take the field with a large army, and all that she could do was to send supplies of war materials and food to Europe. These last could only be forthcoming by the exercise of voluntary abstinence by the American people, and this, in some ways the most imaginative of the services rendered to the Allied cause, was accomplished under Mr. Hoover's administration. During the twelve months ending July, 1918, America exported to Allied countries 10,000,000 tons of food. No less remarkable was Mr. Hoover's success in dealing with profiteering, which had been rampant in America. He succeeded in reducing prices—the packing houses' profits, for example, were got down to 7½ per cent.—and at the same time he increased production, the normal yield of 720 million bushels of grain rising to 920 millions in 1918. In March, 1919, he was appointed, by the Supreme Council of Paris, Director-General of American Relief Administration in Europe, and twenty millions were allotted for this purpose. With him worked Sir William Goode, representing the British Government, Major Fillioux the French, and Captain Caetani the Italian, and of their work Mr. Hoover spoke in terms of the greatest admiration. From the Armistice up to August, 1919, upwards of 10,000,000 tons of foodstuffs had been shipped to Europe, three and a half millions in relief of Central and Eastern Europe, the rest to Allied countries. Mr. Hoover diagnosed the economic problem of Europe in a remarkable Memorandum which was published in the August number of the *British National Food Journal*. He summed it up in the phrase "demoralized productivity." He calculated that in Europe some 15 million families were receiving unemployment allowance in one form or another, and were being paid by constant inflation of the currency. The population of Europe was 100 millions greater than could be supported without imports, and must live by the production and distribution of exports. But in production Europe was not only far below the war standard, but below the maintenance of health and life. He noted a great relaxation of effort, the reflex in many cases of physical exhaustion, the reaction from the mental and physical strain of the war. He criticized the continuance of the blockade—owing to the slowness of the Conference's work and the uncertainty that prevailed to the very last moment whether Germany would accept the terms of peace; and while relief was a necessary temporary measure of relief, the maladies of

Europe could only be cured by increased production and the most rigid avoidance of waste, public or private. Every experiment in Communism had resulted in a diminution of production. "Whatever the economic theory or political cry, it must embrace the maximum individual effort; for there is no margin of surplus productivity in Europe to risk revolutionary experimentation." To stimulate production the limitations in the reward of the actual producer must be avoided.

Production could not increase if political incompetence continues the blockade, embargoes, censorship, mobilization, large armies, navies, and war. Mr. Hoover promised that the Western Hemisphere would approach the question of assistance during a certain temporary period with a high sense of human duty and sympathy, but urged that the service would be best performed by the insistence that its aid would not be forthcoming to any country that did not resolutely set in order its internal financial and political situations, that did not devote itself to the increase of productivity, that did not curtail consumption of luxuries and the expenditure upon armaments, and did not cease hostilities, and did not treat its neighbours fairly.

If these conditions were complied with, he concluded, it was the duty of the West to put forth every possible effort to tide Europe over this period of temporary economic difficulties. But without the fulfilment of these conditions, the effort is hopeless.

In these words, we have the economic counterfoil of the political principles for which the President contended at the Conference.

In France, as in England, the delays of the Conference, the lack of publicity, and the general ignorance of the motives of the negotiators and of the relation of the issues to current politics, produced a strong reaction from the early enthusiasm. This reaction was at first even more marked in England than in France, and it is noticeable that the French General Elections held in the autumn of 1919, produced the same sort of result as the English General Elections, held before the Conference began to sit. In France, however, the issue at the elections was not so much the work of the Conference as the labour problem, and the decisive repudiation of old pacifists and of the extreme semi-Bolshevist policy of French labour politicians raised no presumption that the French people approved so whole-heartedly of the results of the Peace Conference and still less of its methods. M. Clemenceau undoubtedly suffered in popu-



BRITISH COLOURS IN THE PARIS VICTORY MARCH.

larity in the interval between the Armistice and the conclusion of the Peace. At a critical point in the discussions, when it was doubtful whether the French demand for security would be satisfied so far as it actually was, an anarchist assassin greatly increased M. Clemenceau's popularity and influence in the

THE ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE M. CLEMENCEAU, FEBRUARY 19, 1919.
Seven pistol shots pierced the motor car, and a bullet struck M. Clemenceau, lodging in his shoulder.

councils by an attempt to murder him On February 19, as the French Premier left his house to drive down to the Foreign Office, one Cottin emptied a Browning pistol into the car. One bullet struck M. Clemenceau. "Ce n'est rien, ce n'est rien," he said, as he walked back to his house, leaning on the arm of an orderly and the bullet, which entered below the shoulder-blade, had not touched either the lungs or the spine. But any wound is a serious matter for a man of M. Clemenceau's years, and his indomitable spirit, though it increased admiration, must have been the despair of his doctors. After the attempted assassination, the presentment of the French case seemed to gain adherents, and Cottin did a service to France of a kind that he did not intend. After the ratification of the Peace Treaty, M. Clemenceau was a candidate for the Presidency in succession to M. Poincaré, but he was beaten by M. Deschanel on the first votes and M. Deschanel was elected. M Clemenceau's defeat was due to a combination between M. Briand's party and the Socialists, with some elements of the Right, discontented with what were regarded as the two great concessions that M. Clemenceau had had to make at the Conference. But in any case, so pugnacious and trenchant a statesman as M. Clemenceau is not of the type which attracts the majority of votes in a contest that is apt to turn more on the fewness of a man's enemies than on the number of his friends.

The Peace Treaty came into operation at 4.15 on Saturday afternoon, January 10, 1920. By the last clause of the Treaty it was required that the ratifications should be deposited in Paris, and that the Treaty should come into force as soon as a *procés-verbal* of the ratifications by Germany and three Allied Powers had been drafted. By January, among the great Powers Germany, Italy, Great Britain, France and Japan had all ratified. The signatures were placed opposite the seals of the plenipotentiaries, headed by that of M. Clemenceau, followed by those of Mr. Lloyd George; Signor Nitti; and Baron Matsui for Japan; Baron von Lersner signed for Germany, adding the phrase: "Acting in the name of the German Empire and in the name of all the States composing it, and of each one in particular." Thus the Great War with Germany ended. The date on the *procés-verbal* was 6.15 In fact, it was signed at 4.15. The signing took place in the Clock Room of the

THE ARREST OF THE WOULD-BE ASSASSIN.

French Foreign Office, where the full meetings of the Conference were held, and the ceremony was all over in three minutes.

The United States did not ratify the Treaty. and some account must be given of the reasons for this, incomparably the greatest disappointment of the Peace. President Wilson, though he did not get his way on many matters, took a very important part in shaping the Treaty It was based throughout on the assumption

that the United States would take a prominent part in working the Covenant of the League and in supporting the territorial and military settlement, and if Europe had known when the Conference opened that this help from America might not materialize, the Treaty might, and probably would, have taken a very different form. What were the causes that led to this disappointment? The first and most important no doubt was that the Treaty became the subject of controversy between the parties, which might have been avoided had Mr. Wilson associated with him at Paris some prominent members of the Republican party. Still, party spirit could not have kindled so fierce a flame if the Treaty had not provided it with inflammable material.

On September 4 Mr. Wilson opened, at Columbus, Ohio, a tour of campaigning on behalf of the Treaty. He defended the League of Nations as the only conceivable arrangement which would prevent the sending again of American citizens abroad to fight in Europe. If it was not to be this arrangement, what arrangement would his critics suggest to secure the peace of the world? It was, he said, a case of "put up or shut up." He described

M. MILLERAND.
French Prime Minister, 1920.

the devastation produced in France and Belgium by the German invasion. He defended the severity of the terms to Germany on the ground that they were just, and that the German people were responsible for what their Government did. He spoke with power and conviction, and his arguments produced an evident effect on American public opinion. Unfortunately, Mr Wilson was taken ill in the middle of his campaign and even now he is not sufficiently recovered to take an active part in politics. Thus the Treaty was deprived of its most powerful champion in the United States just at the time when his advocacy was most needed and might, if it could have been continued, have produced a reaction in its favour.

M. DESCHANEL.
French President, 1920.

There is a long history of constitutional controversy between the Senate and the President in the department of foreign affairs, and more particularly in the shaping of treaties. If the Treaty had been as unimportant as it was important, it might still, in the circumstances in which it was concluded, count on having to run the gauntlet of strong criticism in the Senate, and Mr. Wilson, by not taking prominent Republicans more into his confidence, had made it certain that the old constitutional quarrel between the Senate and the President would be exploited to the full. A treaty, in order to be ratified, requires the support of two-thirds of the members of the Senate present when the vote is taken. There are 96 Senators, of whom, when the Treaty came under discussion, 49 were Republicans and 47 Democrats. On November 19, 1919, the American Senate refused to ratify the Treaty as it stood by 53 votes to 38. From that moment the only

question was how much modification the Senate would insist on, and whether the President would accept the amendments that they made, or consider that rather than accept them it would be best to hold the Treaty up until after the next Presidential election had enabled the country to pronounce its own opinion on

[Russell.

VISCOUNT GREY.
British (Temporary) Ambassador to the United States, 1919.

its provisions. Senator Lodge, the leader of the Republican party in the Senate, proposed to accept the Treaty, subject to some fifteen reservations, and as these reservations throw a great deal of light on the workings of American politics in regard to the Treaty it is helpful to give some account of their substance.

It was first to be a condition of ratification that at least three out of the four principal Powers should accept the reservations made by the United States. The third reservation was that the United States should "assume no obligation to preserve the territorial independence of any other country, or to interfere in controversies between nations, or to employ the military and naval forces for any purposes, unless in any particular case the Congress, which under the Constitution has the sole right to declare war or authorize the employment of the military and naval forces of the United States, shall by act or joint resolution so determine." This reservation, it will be observed, is a constitutional one, and is inspired not by dislike of the provisions of the Treaty but by the fear that the President might abuse his great power as head of the executive. This same fear dictated the fourth reservation that no mandate should be accepted except by the action of Congress. The sixth reservation refused to accept arbitration or the authority of any outside body on the Monroe Doctrine. Clause 21 of the Covenant, expressly inserted to meet American sensibility about the Monroe Doctrine, and providing that "nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of . . . regional understandings, like the Monroe Doctrine," did not satisfy the Senate



SENATOR LODGE.
Who led the Opposition in the United States to the terms, as drafted, of the League of Nations.

critics. A seventh reserve declined to accede to the arrangements of the Treaty with regard to Shantung, which were undoubtedly unfair to China, and an eighth asserted the right of the Senate to revise the list of names of any Americans appointed to discharge any functions under the Treaty. A tenth reservation required an Appropriation Bill to authorize the incurring of any expenditure for the League of Nations, the eleventh reservation denied the right of the League to control the armaments of the United States against their will, the twelfth demurred to the compulsory boycott of Article 16 of the Covenant against the

THE VICTORY FETES IN PARIS: M POINCARE DECORATING FRENCH HEROES IN FRONT OF THE HOTEL DE VILLE, JULY 14, 1919.

nationals of a Covenant-breaking State who resided within the United States, and the last refused to be bound by any arrangements which allowed votes to the British Dominions as well as to Great Britain. These reservations are all of them important, but it is not true that the adoption of any would kill the Treaty. The most serious, perhaps, is the last; and having given the Dominions national status and a right to vote in the League meetings—a right they have fully earned by the work that they have done in the war—this country could in no case consent to a cancellation. But the bulk of the reservations are inspired not by dislike or fear of the authority of the League, but by the desire to control the unfettered discretion of the executive. They are passages in the domestic and constitutional history of the world, and need not, if handled with care, bar America's participation in the great work of maintaining international peace.

Lord Grey, of Fallodon, who was appointed British Ambassador at Washington in 1919, wrote to *The Times* shortly after his return to this country, a letter in which he sought to interpret America's position to the world. Although his views were given, as he was careful to state, as those of a private individual, and not of an Ambassador, the greatest importance attaches to them, and his arguments are a wholesome corrective to the view that was hastily taken that the action of the Senate had killed the Treaty and ruined all hope of America's assisting in the great work of the League. He points out that behind the action of the Senate there is a long tradition of abstention from foreign and particularly from European entanglements. "Even for nations which have been used to European alliances the League of Nations is felt to be a new departure. This is still more true for the United States, which has hitherto held aloof from all outside alliances." He analyses the constitutional conflict between the Senate and the executive, and shows that under the United States Constitution it would be possible, if the Covenant stands, for the President in future years to commit the United States through the American representative on the League to a policy of which the legislature might at that time disapprove. The contingency, Lord Grey thinks, could not arise in this country, where the executive is in

closer touch with Parliament, and can be turned out at any moment. Perhaps Lord Grey ignores unduly the great distrust that prevails even here of the action of the executive, particularly in foreign affairs. But at any rate the danger, whether it be great or small here, is far greater in the United States, where the power of the President, during his term of office, does not depend on the votes of Congress; and Lord Grey is fully justified in warning us not to regard serious constitutional objections on the part of the Senate as evidences of a selfish or hostile spirit. He acknowledges, further, that it is only natural for the United States to object to a system of voting which seems to give to Great Britain and the Dominions six votes to the American one. "Our object," he says, "is to maintain the status of the self-governing Dominions, not to secure a greater British than American vote; and we have no objection in principle to an increase in the American vote." Lord Grey continues:

It would be a mistake to suppose that the American people are prepared or wish to withdraw their influence in world affairs. Americans differ among themselves as to whether they could or ought to have entered the war sooner than they did. It is neither necessary nor profitable for foreigners to discuss this point now. What is common to all Americans and to all foreigners who know the facts is the unselfish, whole-hearted spirit in which the American nation acted when it came into the war. The immediate adoption of compulsory military service, and even more the rationing of food and fuel in those millions and millions of households over such a vast area, not by compulsion, but by purely voluntary action, in response to an appeal which had no compulsion behind it, is a remarkable and even astonishing example of national spirit and idealism. That spirit is still there. It is as much part of the nature and possibilities of the American people as any other characteristic. It is not possible for such a spirit to play such a part as it did in the war and then to relapse and be extinguished altogether. It would be a great mistake to suppose that because the citizens of the United States wish to limit obligations they therefore propose to themselves to play a small part in the League of Nations. If they enter the League as a willing partner with limited obligations, it may well be that American opinion and American action inside the League will be much more fruitful than if they entered as a reluctant partner who felt that her hand had been forced. It is in this spirit, in this hope, and in this expectation that I think we should approach, and are justified in approaching, consideration of American reservations. I do not deny that some of them are material qualifications of the League of Nations as drawn up at Paris, or that they must be disappointing to those who are satisfied with that Covenant as it stands, and are even proud of it; but those who have had longest experience of political affairs, and especially of treaties, know best how often it happens that the difficulties which seem most formidable in anticipation and on paper never arise in practice. I think this is likely to be particularly true in the working of the League of Nations. The difficulties and dangers which Americans foresee in it will probably never arise or be felt by them when they are once in the League, and in the same way the weakening and injury to the League which some of its best friends apprehend from the American reservations, would not be felt in practice. If the outcome of the long controversy in the Senate has been to offer cooperation in the League of Nations, it would be the greatest mistake to refuse that cooperation because of the conditions attached to it; and when that cooperation is accepted, let it not be accepted in the spirit of pessimism. The most vital considerations are that the representatives should be appointed to the Council of the League of Nations by all the nations that are members of the Council, that these representatives should be men who are inspired by the ideals for which we entered the war, and that these representatives should be instructed and supported in that same spirit of equity and freedom by the Governments and public opinion of the countries who are now partners in peace. If that be the spirit in which the Council of the League of Nations deals with the business that comes before it, there need be no fear that the representative of the United States on that Council will not take a part in realizing the hopes with which the League has been founded.

If the League of Nations were to fail to work, the greater part of the labours at Paris would have been wasted, and American cooperation, if not absolutely indispensable to the success of the League, is in the highest degree desirable. The work of the Conference in Eastern Europe has been justly criticized, but the settlement in the West and, above all, the Covenant of the League, should be assured of permanence; and in encouraging us to go on hoping for success and explaining the American position, Lord Grey has done a very great public service.

CHAPTER CCCXVI

THE SETTLEMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE

ALLIED POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA—THE BULLITT MISSION—PRINKIPO—MR. LLOYD GEORGE'S VIEWS—THE POLES AND DANZIG—THE BALTIC STATES—THE TERRITORIAL CHANGES IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY—REPARATION AND DISARMAMENT—THE BOLSHEVIST REVOLUTION IN BUDA-PEST—THE ADRIATIC PROBLEM—D'ANNUNZIO'S RAID ON FIUME—THE BULGARIAN TREATY.

THE last chapter of this History described the settlement in Western Europe more particularly as it affected France, and the next and final chapter will deal with the settlement of the old Ottoman Empire. This chapter deals with the settlement on the Eastern front (including the Baltic and the Adriatic) of the Central Alliance. The subject is not only complicated in its detail, but politically difficult, for the history of the settlement, 18 months after the Armistice, is still in the making and involved in some of the keenest controversies of our day. Within the scope of this chapter fall the hotly disputed question of Allied policy towards Russia; the Baltic settlement and the revival of the old State of Poland, with which is connected the grave general problem of the future relations between Germany and Russia; the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which was not the doing of the Treaty but already an accomplished fact when the Treaty came to be framed, and made it necessary for the Conference to redraw the whole map of South-East Europe, to call into existence a new Northern Slav State of Czecho-Slovakia and a Southern Slav State in which the Serbs are united with their kinsmen of Bosnia and Croatia and the Adriatic coastline. In addition, the boundaries of Rumania had to be extended, and there was the difficult three-party dispute in the Adriatic to settle, as well as the future boundaries of Bulgaria in Macedonia and in Thrace.

It is obvious that such numerous and complicated problems can be discussed in outline only within the compass of a single chapter, and a deficiency rather than an excess of detail is to be preferred, provided that the main issues of policy are clearly brought out. The object of this chapter, then, is to take a general survey of the problem and to provide a few clues by which the reader can explore for himself the vast wilderness of details.

The first and most important clue is the policy of the Allies at Versailles towards Russia. At the Armistice the German Armies were pushed far into Russia, but the defeats on the Western front and the revolution at home had completely disorganized them, and though it was a condition of the Armistice that they were to stay where they were until they were recalled, it is doubtful whether their officers at this time had any control over them. At any rate, they fell back rapidly before the weak Bolshevist forces, and by the end of February, 1919, they had abandoned all Esthonia to the Russians. Apart from the Germans, there were no

organized forces at this time to oppose the Bolshevists, and the fear in most minds was that they might infect the Baltic States and all Poland with their revolutionary ideas. Had they had no preoccupations they might in the first few months of the Armistice have been able to overrun all Russian Poland. But they



SKETCH MAP illustrating the advance of the Bolshevist troops.

had many other things to think about. Over large parts of Russia there was famine, not because there was any shortage of food in the country, but because transport had completely broken down, and the farmers, who hated the Bolshevist Government, had set up a virtual food blockade of the towns. In addition, the Bolshevists were in a state of war with Finland, and there was at Archangel an Allied force. In the South of Russia was Denikin with a "white" army, and in the East was a great army under Koltchak based on Omsk. Although the Allies had been fighting with Koltchak against the Bolshevists in Siberia, and had an army at Archangel and in the Murmansk, they were there not because they wished to take sides in Russian politics, but in order to re-establish the "Eastern front," which had broken down since the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Now that Germany had fallen out of the war and the military reasons for our action in Russia had disappeared, we were left without a clearly defined policy. There was very general nervousness lest Bolshevism should spread, and though the absence of Russia from the Conference was felt to impair its authority, there could be no question of admitting to its councils a Government that was not only stained with crime, but was fundamentally out of sympathy with the ideals of law which the Allies hope to establish. It was in these circumstances that Mr. Lloyd George first raised the question of the policy that the Conference ought to pursue towards Russia. We have the minutes of the Conference at the Quai d'Orsay on January 16, 1919, in the papers which Mr. Bullitt, a member of the staff of the American Peace Commission in Paris, put before the Senate Committee, and one passage, in spite of its length, is worth quoting, not only for its intrinsic interest, but also because these are the only minutes of the proceedings at the Conference that have been made public.

Mr. Lloyd George stated that there seemed to be three possible policies:

1. Military Intervention. It is true that the Bolsheviki movement is as dangerous to civilization as German militarism, but as to putting it down by the sword, is there anyone who proposes it? It would mean holding a certain number of vast provinces in Russia. The Germans with one million men on their Eastern front only held the fringe of this territory. If he now proposed to send a thousand British troops to Russia for that purpose, the armies would mutiny. The same applies to U.S. troops in Siberia; also to Canadians and French as well. The mere idea of crushing Bolshevism by a military force is pure madness. Even admitting that is done, who is to occupy Russia? No one can conceive or understand to bring about order by force.

2. A Cordon. The second suggestion is to besiege Bolshevik Russia. Mr. Lloyd George wondered if those present realized what this would mean. From the information furnished him Bolshevik Russia has no corn, but within this territory there are 150,000,000 women and children. There is now starvation in Petrograd and Moscow. This is not a health cordon, it is a death cordon. Moreover, as a matter of fact, the people who would die are just the people that the Allies desire to protect. It would not result in the starvation of the Bolsheviki; it would simply mean the death of our friends. The cordon policy is a policy which, as humane people, those present could not consider.

Mr. Lloyd George asked who was there to overthrow the Bolsheviki? He had been told there were three men, Denikin, Koltchak, and Knox. In considering the chances of these people to overthrow the Bolsheviki, he pointed out that he had received information that the Czecho-Slovaks now refused to fight; that the Russian Army was not to be trusted, and that while it was true that a Bolshevik Army had recently gone over to Koltchak it was never certain that just the reverse of this would not take place. If the Allies counted on any of these men, he believed they were building on quicksand. He had heard a lot of talk about Denikin, but when he looked on the map he found that Denikin was occupying a little backyard near the Black Sea. Then he had been told that Denikin had recognized Koltchak, but when he looked on the map there was a great solid block of territory between Denikin and Koltchak. Moreover, from information received, it would appear that Koltchak had been collecting members of the old régime around him,

GENERAL DENIKIN.

and would seem to be at heart a monarchist. It appeared that the Czecho-Slovaks were finding this out. The sympathies of the Czecho-Slovaks are very democratic, and they are not at all prepared to fight for the restoration of the old conditions in Russia.

Mr. Lloyd George stated that he was informed that at the present time two-thirds of Bolshevik Russia was starving.

Institutions of Bolsheviki are institutions of old Czarist régime. This is not what one would call creating a new world.

3. The third alternative was contained in the British proposal, which was to summon these people to Paris to appear before those present, somewhat in the way that the Roman Empire summoned chiefs of outlying tributary States to render an account of their actions.



PRINKIPO.

Mr. Lloyd George pointed out the fact that the argument might be used that there were already here certain representatives of these Governments; but take, for instance, the case of Sazonoff, who claims to represent the Government of Omsk. As a matter of fact Sazonoff cannot speak from personal observation. He is nothing but a partisan, like all the rest. He has never been in contact, and is not now in direct contact, with the Government at Omsk.

It would be manifestly absurd for those who are responsible for bringing about the Peace Conference to come to any agreement and leave Paris when one-half of Europe and one-half of Asia is still in flames. Those present must settle this question or make fools of themselves.

Mr. Lloyd George referred to the objection that had been raised to permitting Bolshevik delegates to come to Paris. It had been claimed that they would convert France and England to Bolshevism. If England becomes Bolshevist, it will not be because a single Bolshevist representative is permitted to enter England. On the other hand, if a military enterprise were started against the Bolshevik, that would make England Bolshevist; and there would be a Soviet in London. For his part, Mr. Lloyd George was not afraid of Bolshevism if the facts are known in England and the United States. The same applied to Germany. He was convinced that an educated democracy can be always trusted to turn down Bolshevism.

The subject was again discussed on January 21, and a modification of the original proposal was adopted by which, instead of coming to Paris, the Bolshevist delegates were to meet the other Russian groups at Prinkipo, an island in the Sea of Marmora. M. Clemenceau did not conceal his dislike of the proposal, but gave way in the interests of unity. According to Mr. Bullitt, the French Foreign Office communicated with the Ukrainian and other anti-Soviet Governments in Russia, encouraging them to refuse the proposal. However that may be, the manner in which the proposal was launched destroyed any chance that it would be adopted. The representatives of the anti-Soviets in Paris were not consulted beforehand and the Soviet Government of Russia first heard of the proposal through the newspapers. The atmosphere was so unfavourable that the proposal was allowed to drop for the time being. It was revived later. The Prinkipo Conference was to have begun on February 15, and about that date Mr. Bullitt left Paris for Russia on a semi-official mission from the American representatives. He had discussed possible terms both with them and with Mr. Lloyd George's secretaries, and he brought back with him not only a report on the general situation in Russia, but also a draft project of peace which he said that Lenin had undertaken to accept provided that the Allies made the proposals not later than April 10. The Americans, according to Mr. Bullitt, agreed that it was highly desirable that peace should be made on this basis. Mr. Lloyd George, on the other hand, was nervous about public opinion in England. According to Mr. Bullitt, Mr. Lloyd George wished that some report could be made by a prominent Conservative who was above suspicion of sympathy with Bolshevism. Then the world would be brought to a better frame of mind.

He then said, "I wonder if we could get Lansdowne to go?" Then he immediately corrected himself and said, "No, it would probably kill him." Then he said, "I wish we could send Bob Cecil, but we have got to keep him for the League of Nations." And he said to Smuts, "It would be splendid if you could go, but you have got the other job"—which was going down to Hungary. Afterwards he said that he thought the most desirable man was the Marquis of Salisbury, Lord Robert Cecil's brother; that he would be respectable enough and well known so that when he came back and made the same report it would go down with British public opinion. Mr. Lloyd George then urged me to make public my report. He said it was absolutely necessary to have publicity given to the actual conditions in Russia, which he recognized were as presented.

Mr. Lloyd George has denied this conversation. But it is obvious that Mr. Bullitt went to Russia in circumstances which implied that he was to be disowned if that was more convenient, and Mr. Bullitt had no grievance in this matter either against Mr. Lloyd George or against Mr. Wilson. Although Mr. Lloyd George advised the publication of the report, Mr. Bullitt failed to get any member of the American Commission to take the responsibility of sanctioning publication of the report and the proposals that he had brought back, and Mr. Wilson, when the matter was referred to him, said that he did not want them given out. It is evident that whatever they may have thought of the Bullitt proposals on their merits, neither Mr. Lloyd George nor Mr. Wilson was willing to take the responsibility for them. The main reason was that the military situation had completely changed in Russia. Early in the year the Bolshevists, weak as they were, were stronger than anyone else in Eastern Europe. By April Koltchak had crossed the Urals and was carrying everything before him. In the following month his left was near Samara, his centre was threatening Kazan, and his right was almost in touch with the Allied forces at Archangel. Earlier in the year Mr. Lloyd George had been seriously alarmed by the Labour opposition to the British military operations in Northern Russia, but in April the outcry amongst his own supporters against the policy of negotiation seemed much more serious, and, of course, if Koltchak was going to overthrow the Soviet Government it would be the gravest of blunders to recognize the Bolshevists. He returned to England and made a speech in the House of Commons on April 16. He denied that there was any question of recognizing the Bolshevists. "It has never been discussed. . . . The Bolshevist Government has committed great crimes against Allied subjects which have made it impossible to recognize it, even if it were a civilized Government. And the third reason is that at this very moment they are attacking our friends." The Russian "loyalists" had done great service to the cause of the Allies in the war by their constancy. "They are offering a real resistance, and since we asked them to take this step, since we promised support to them if they took this step, and since by taking this stand they contributed largely to the triumph of the Allies, it is our business to stand by our friends." At this time the Prime Minister believed that Bolshevism had not long to live. "When Bolshevism as we know it, and as Russia to her sorrow has known it, disappears, then the time

TYPES OF KOLTCHAK'S RAGGED ARMY.

will come for another effort at re-establishing peace with Russia, but the time is not yet." Mr. Lloyd George was constant in his determination to withdraw our forces from Archangel at the earliest possible moment. For the rest he wavered between recognizing the Bolshevists, giving active support to the anti-Bolshevist leaders, and the "cordon," the three policies that he had outlined in January in the speech at the Quai d'Orsay. And he leaned to one or other of these policies according as victory inclined to the Soviet Government or to its opponents. Koltchak was acknowledged by the Allies in April, about the time when the Prinkipo proposals were dropped. No sooner had he been acknowledged than his defeats began. By the end of July his army had been driven back to the Urals. Profiting by the concentration against Koltchak, and wishing also to relieve the pressure upon him, General Denikin won a number of signal victories over the Bolshevist troops in Southern Russia, and at one time was within a couple of hundred miles of Moscow. But the Bolshevists held him, and continuing the offensive against Koltchak, re-entered Siberia and captured Omsk in November. Koltchak retired on Irkutsk. Between Omsk and Irkutsk Czech troops captured by Russians during the war, freed by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk but unable to reach home, were echeloned along the line. The Bolshevist troops demanded the surrender of Koltchak, which the Czech troops refused, but later, with the authorization of

THE RETREAT OF KOLTCHAK'S ARMY IN SIBERIA.

OMSK: KOLTCHAK'S ARMY EVACUATING THE TOWN.

General Janin, the head of the French Military Mission, they handed him over to the Provisional Government formed at Irkutsk. This Government was overthrown by a Bolshevist revolution, and on February 7, 1920, Koltchak was shot by the orders of the Bolshevist Military Junta at Irkutsk.

General Denikin's offensive began in May, 1919. In the middle of that month the guns at the front could be heard at Novo Tcherkask, near the mouth of the Don river, and the whole of the rich mineral basin of the Donetz was in the hands of the Soviet Government. At the end of the first week in June the Donetz basin had been recovered; on the right General Wrangel had won a no less notable victory and was within 70 miles of Tsaritsin, on the Volga, and there had been victories hardly less remarkable on his left. A month later Denikin's armies held a front some 1,200 miles long and the population behind their advancing line numbered 20 millions. At the beginning of August Poltava fell, Odessa was occupied on August 25, and Kieff at the beginning of September. Three weeks later the Bolshevists were developing an attack on his right, but the capture of Kursk on September 21 brought Denikin within 280 miles of Moscow, and the capture of Orel early in October brought him within 200 miles of Moscow. By this time the Bolshevist attack on the right wing had been definitely checked. This was the high-water mark of his success. In November the Bolshevists began a strong attack on his centre and in the middle of December Denikin's army was in full retreat. Kieff was lost on the 16th, and before the end of the year the Bolshevists had again entered the Donetz basin. Tsaritsin and Taganrog were both lost in the first week of January, and in the following month the whole of his conquests had crumbled to nothing. The causes of the defeats were partly military and, it is just to admit, partly the excellent leading of the Bolshevists, and still more the energy with which Trotzky devoted himself to the reorganization of his broken armies. But still more important were the political causes. General Denikin was a sincere patriot and not without democratic and liberal instincts, but he had no real political ability, and he was surrounded by men who prejudiced his cause and revived the popularity of the Bolshevists. A check before

ADMIRAL KOLTCHAK.
Shot by order of the Bolshevist Junta at Irkutsk, February 7, 1920.

Moscow was to be expected considering how rapidly Denikin had advanced, but if the political reorganization of the recovered districts had been well done, the check would not have led as it did to wholesale defections. Denikin was defeated mainly by his political failures—behind his lines, not in front of them. By April, when

GENERAL YUDENITCH.
Commanded Anti-Bolshevist forces in Russia.

General Denikin came to England, the Bolshevists had recovered all European Russia except the Crimea, where General Wrangel kept on the struggle.

Meanwhile, by the end of September, 1919, the last British soldier had been withdrawn from Archangel, which, held for a time by a Constitutionalist Government under M. Tchaykowski, was abandoned to the Bolshevists in the following February. Throughout the summer the British Navy had been blockading the Bolshevist ports in the Baltic, and in October, 1919, when Denikin was at the height of his successes, an attempt was made to reach Petrograd by General Yudenitch at the head of a force based on Reval. General Yudenitch was a soldier of great distinction, and his enterprise, which began with excellent prospects of success, carried him on October 17 to Tsarskoe Selo, some 15 miles from Petrograd. He got no farther, and at the end of the month a Bolshevist thrust against his right flank endangered his line of retreat and forced him to fall back towards Esthonia. Here, again, the causes of the failure were as much political as military. In August a provisional and anti-Soviet Russian Government had been formed for the provinces of Pskoff, Novgorod and Petrograd under M. Lianozoff. This Government agreed to recognize the independence of Esthonia, and in return the Esthonian Army was to cooperate with General Yudenitch in an attempt to recover Petrograd. There is no doubt that a real entente between Finland, Esthonia and General Yudenitch would have commanded sufficient force to capture Petrograd. But, as with Koltchak, Finland and Esthonia distrusted the Russian constitutionalists and their help amounted to very little more than a benevolent neutrality. It was the political basis of the enterprise that was at fault.

This series of defeats had their effect on Allied policy. Mr. Lloyd George had abandoned the Prinkipo project partly from considerations of domestic policy but mainly because in the spring the Bolshevists were thought to be on the eve of a complete military collapse. But during the summer the Labour Party, which was bitterly opposed to any entanglements in Russia, seemed to be steadily growing in power, and its protests increased in volume. The alarming condition of the national finances again brought fresh objections on the ground of expense. The money cost of our policy in Russia from the Armistice to the end of October, 1919, was nearly £80,000,000. Of this sum £27,125,000 went on military operations in Murmansk and Archangel, on the maintenance of our army in the Caucasus, and on naval operations in the Baltic and Black Seas. The cost of our assistance to the Russian Armies, which took the form of munitions of war and some technical Services, was £17,385,000, of which about £8,500,000 went to Koltchak, £7,775,000 to Denikin, and the rest to the Baltic States. These were considerable figures, and there were no political assets to put against them. And when the Bolshevists in the summer and autumn made their remarkable military rally Mr. Lloyd George decided that his first thoughts had been best and that we should be well advised, not only to cease direct military operations on our own account in Russia, but also to withdraw our financial support from the Russian Constitutionalists. The announcement of the new policy was made by the Prime Minister at the Guildhall banquet

in November. He reviewed the changes in the military situation, and said that he "dreaded an interminable series of swaying campaigns, devastating a country which is essential to the prosperity of the world. . . . The world cannot afford it." There could be no peace until peace was established in Russia. And he went on to recall his early efforts in February and to express the hope that the time was not far distant when they might be renewed with better prospects of success. He developed these ideas in a speech on November 17 in the House of Commons, remarkable both for the vigour with which he attacked Bolshevism and for the persistence with which he argued that we could do nothing effectual to combat it. Two days before Mr. James O'Grady, M.P., had left for Copenhagen to negotiate with M. Litvinoff, representing the Soviet Government, for the exchange of war prisoners, civil and military. It was widely believed that he was going to talk about other matters besides the exchange of prisoners, and on January 16 it was announced in Paris that it had been decided to raise the blockade of Russia and to give facilities to the Russian cooperative organizations to import goods in exchange for grain, flax and other commodities. These organizations were entirely under the control of the Soviet Government, and though the Allies persisted that they would not enter into direct relations with that Government, a political boycott obviously could not be kept up for long with active commercial intercourse going on. Our policy in Russia was one of the principal subjects discussed at the Peace Conference in London in February, 1920, and on the 24th of that month a Memorandum was published defining the conclusions reached. The first conclusion was that "if the States bordering on Soviet Russia were to ask the advice of the Supreme Council," it could not take the responsibility of advising them not to make peace, and still less to pursue a policy of aggression towards Russia. The second conclusion was that the Council could not enter into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government "until they have arrived at the conviction that Bolshevist horrors have come to an end, and that the Government of Moscow is ready to conform its methods of diplomatic conduct to those of all civilized Governments." It was evident from certain observations made by Mr. Lloyd George in Parliament a fortnight earlier that, so far as he was concerned, that conviction was not far off. "There is no doubt," he then said, "that the Bolshevists in their readvance have learned a great deal from the blunders they committed the first time, and they are not repeating them to the same extent and alienating the popula-

BRITISH EVACUATION OF NORTHERN RUSSIA.
The last of the British Force embarking for England.

tions." The refusal to enter into direct diplomatic relations with them was probably no more than a concession to the French, made in the full expectation that it would prove to be untenable and would have to be withdrawn later. The third conclusion was that it was highly desirable to obtain impartial information on the present conditions in Russia. The Council noted with satisfaction that the International Labour Bureau was proposing to send a Commission of Investigation to Russia, but thought that the inquiry would be still more authoritative if it were made under the supervision of the Council of the League itself, and accordingly invited the League Council to take action to that end.

Such, in the barest outline, is the history of Allied relations with Russia from the Armistice. From the first there was a conflict of opinion between the British and French Prime Ministers. Mr. Lloyd George was early convinced that our

MR. JAS. O'GRADY, M.P.
Negotiated with the Representative of the Soviet Government of Russia for the exchange of prisoners.

best policy was to make peace with the Bolshevists, and if he receded from that policy from time to time it was for tactical reasons of domestic policy or because he thought that their opponents in Russia might win. He waited on the course of military events in Russia but made no serious attempt to influence them, and he had to disguise his real policy by a succession of devices framed to conciliate opposition at home or in France. On the other hand, France was interventionist from the outset. But the mutiny of the French troops in Southern Russia convinced her that there could be no question of taking an active part in the civil war in Russia, and her policy therefore was to combat Bolshevism by cooperating with its enemies in Russia and organizing the border States against it. France in 1919 indulged hopes of the early triumph of Koltchak and Denikin, and when their reverses came, recognizing that the only chance left was to organize the border States, she devoted herself to the improvement of the Polish Army, and in the meantime was satisfied if only the Allies refrained from recognizing the Soviet Government. Hence the necessity which Mr. Lloyd George felt himself under, even to the end, when he had a strong ally for his policy in Signor Nitti, of camouflaging his real views of the best settlement. The failures of Allied policy in Russia were not due to the fact that one course of action was adopted rather than another. It is probable that a very small amount of material force thrown into the scale at the right moment on behalf of Koltchak or Denikin or Yudenitch might have overthrown the Soviet Government; perhaps consistent moral support without wavering would alone have sufficed. On the other hand, the policy of peace with the Bolshevists, though not reconcilable with the duty acknowledged by Mr. Lloyd George of standing by our friends who had been loyal to us in the war, might have eased the situation and enabled the Allies to effect a speedier, though it could not have been a lasting, settlement. But actually what the Allies did was to pursue several policies at one time, and to disguise their real meaning from each other and from their own people. It was this vacillation and confusion of distinct policies that made failure certain and perplexed people at home here, as in Russia, making friends of no party and enemies in all.

But the failure in Russia was bad not only for Russia and our relations with her, but also for the border States in Europe and Asia. Evidence of the mischief that it did will be forthcoming in the next chapter on the Turkish settlement. But the evidence was no less flagrant in Europe. Any policy that was founded on a clear principle might have had some chance of doing good. But a policy of mere expediency, variously camouflaged from time to time, did much to destroy faith in the League of Nations and to revive those conceptions of *Realpolitik* which had made the war,

M. LITVINOFF (wearing glasses) AND OTHER RUSSIANS AWAITING DEPORTATION.

Litvinoff claimed to act as Representative in London of the Soviet Government of Russia, but was deported for abusing his position for propaganda purposes.

and which the war, men hoped, had overthrown for ever.

It remains now to trace the settlement that was made of the border countries on the marches between Russia and Germany; and first of the new Eastern frontiers of Germany drawn by the Treaty of Versailles.

The arrangements as to the Western frontier of Germany have been described in the last chapter.

Article 27, Section 7, of the Treaty of Versailles defines in detail the new Eastern frontier of Germany to the new State of Poland. Here (unlike the west, where no real German territory was annexed) the great province of Posen was transferred from the German sovereignty to form part of the new State of Poland. The arguments for the creation of a new Poland were very strong. The old Polish State had been partitioned by an alliance in which Prussia was the most active member, and there could be no doubt that the Polish nationality was still vigorous and deserved recognition on the principles laid down by Mr. Wilson. In Poland "real-policy" was in agreement with the ideals formulated by President Wilson In his history of the war General Ludendorff expounds at some length the interests of Germany on her Eastern front and the measures that he would take to secure them. He argued that Germany's economic vitals were so near her political frontiers that they needed some protective covering. His idea was to create a number of buffer States, of which Poland should be the chief, between Germany and Russia, this new Poland to be formed out of Russian and Austrian Poland but not to include German Posen, to be nominally independent under an Austrian or a German Prince, but really subject to Germany and a tool of her world policy. Russia, too, when she entered Poland, proclaimed that her object was the liberation of the country, though she, like Germany, never made it clear how far the new Poland was to be really independent and whether it should include the Russian share in the spoils of the old partition or be restricted to the German and Austrian spoils. She, too, realized the value of a buffer State between herself and Germany. It was natural that France should do the same. She had an old tradition of friendship with Poland, and now



POLAND.

And the re-adjustment of boundaries in East Prussia and Silesia.

that her alliance with Russia had disappeared she wished it to be replaced by a new State in Eastern Europe, friendly to herself and capable of diverting Germany's energies from a too exclusive attention to the Western front. Ideals and interests alike counselled the creation of a new buffer State of Poland between Germany and Russia. France had particular reason to fear that Germany might seek to revive her old power of mischief by an alliance with Russia. She had narrowly won a war in which Russia had been a very powerful



M. PADEREWSKI.
The famous pianist; Prime Minister of the new Poland, January 1919.

ally. But if Russia were in future to be an ally of Germany's her second state would be worse then the first. Against this danger Poland was to be an insurance, and in order that the new State should be a source of strength and not an additional responsibility she naturally wanted the new Poland to be as large and powerful as she could be made.

Unfortunately, populations do not sort themselves out in a way that makes the application of political principles easy. It would have been more convenient if the Poles had been numerically stronger in East Prussia and the Germans in Western Prussia. The reverse, however, was the case, and—an additional complication—Danzig, the port of a West Prussia in which the Poles were in the ascendant, was predominantly German. It was one of the Wilsonian principles that a nationality should not be denied its natural access to the sea, but Danzig could not be given to Poland without putting a large German population, estimated at three millions, under an alien rule. For that reason the British Prime Minister rejected the report of the Polish Committee assigning to the new Poland not only Posen and West Prussia, in which the Poles were in an indisputable majority, but also the port of Danzig. On the other hand, without Danzig Poland was denied its natural port, and the Committee therefore refused to modify its recommendations. Eventually a compromise was reached by which Danzig was made a Free City, to be placed under the protection of the League of Nations, the Allies engaging to negotiate a treaty between Poland and the City, giving Poland without restriction the free use of all waterways, wharves and docks at Danzig, and providing that the foreign relations of the city should be under the control of Poland. The Free City of Danzig included a territory on both banks of the Vistula about 20 miles square. East Prussia was divided into two parts, the northern half being left to Germany, the allegiance of the southern half (including the towns of Marienburg, Allenstein and Tannenburg, where Hindenburg won his great victory) to be

decided by a plebiscite of all adults, men and women, of 20 years and over. Germany was also deprived by the Treaty of Memel and of a considerable tract of country behind it. The resultant map of these countries is certainly

GENERAL JOSEPH PILSUDSKI.
Provisional President of Poland, 1919.

very remarkable. First there comes a narrow coast line of Polish territory just west of Danzig, connected with Posen by a gradually widening bridge of territory known as the "Polish Corridor." Then farther east comes the Free City of Danzig with its territory. Then farther east again, a strip of coast-line whose allegiance has to be settled by vote. Then the German province of East Prussia, with its capital Königsberg, then a narrow strip of territory about Memel which is to be Polish, and then begins Lithuania. So difficult is it to reconcile natural economic frontiers with racial divisions. There was much protesting against the total separation of East Prussia from the rest of Germany, but it did not avail, except perhaps to assist in the insertion of a clause providing for the transit of all traffic to and from German East Prussia across Polish territory without unfavourable discrimination. That a military eye must look with disfavour on this territorial settlement goes without saying, and the narrow Polish corridor between the sea and the interior seems almost to invite a hostile combination between the enemies of Poland. It is certain to have a strange military history in the future.

These do not exhaust the territorial changes in the Eastern German frontier. South of Breslau, and between that place and Cracow, is a large pear-shaped district, part of the old province of Silesia, in which the inhabitants under the Treaty are to decide by plebiscite whether they will belong to Poland or Germany. By Article 93 of the Treaty Poland agrees to make a Treaty with the Allied Powers protecting the rights of minorities in race, language and religion within her jurisdiction, and the same Treaty is to "protect freedom of transit and equitable treatment of the commerce of other nations." The German troops evacuated Danzig on January 23, 1920, to the strains of *Heil dir in Siegeskranz* and cries of *Auf Wiedersehen*. "It was an impressive military spectacle. For a brief hour at least Danzig forgot that it was a free city severed from the Empire. . . . The march past was followed by the laying of a wreath on Kaiser Wilhelm II.'s monument in the Heumarkt, and an oration by the Oberburgermeister from a balcony in the main square."

Before we pass to the Austrian Treaty something must be said of the relations of the Baltic States to their neighbours. In the demoralization which followed the armistice the German troops retreated rapidly before the Bolshevists, abandoned the Esthonians to their



PRINCE EUSTACE SAPIEHA.
Polish Minister in London, appointed June 1919.

fate, and only rallied when they came to Courland. Here the landowning class are mainly German—the so-called Baltic barons—and the bulk of the population is Lettish. There were at the beginning of 1919 two Governments in the country, a Soviet Republic of Latvia in close alliance with Russia and a provisional Government, under M. Ulmanis, which was anxious to combat Bolshevism and to achieve complete national independence for Latvia.



ALLIED TROOPS ARRIVE IN DANZIG TO MAINTAIN ORDER.
The British Contingent entering by the Grüne Tor.

At first the German assistance was useful. But when von der Goltz, the "liberator" of Finland, took command of an army now recruited from an entirely new class of military adventurers, the Germans became as dangerous to the Letts as the Russians. The ambition of the Germans was to turn these Baltic countries into home colonies, and the reward for their service against the Bolshevists was to be the grant of land for the German mercenaries, who would enormously strengthen the political grip of the Baltic barons over the country. The Allies at Paris were only too glad that the Germans should fight the Bolshevists, and indeed there was a school of opinion which held that the Germans were the best agents not only for preventing the spread of Bolshevism to the neighbouring countries but for achieving its overthrow in Russia. Von der Goltz and his new army had no difficulty in forcing the Bolshevists back, and they could have taken Riga, but preferred to consolidate their political position in Western Courland. The policy of using the Germans against the Bolshevists was leading straight to the establishment of a new German Baltic province and to the subversion of the hard-won Lettish liberties. It is alleged on good authority that the Berlin Government was an accomplice of the designs of von der Goltz, and it was only after the Allies had delivered several ultimatums and finally threatened to reimpose the blockade on Germany, that it insisted on the withdrawal of the German troops and agreed to the appointment of an Allied Commission to superintend the withdrawal of the German troops from Lithuania and Courland. It was these Baltic troops who gave such trouble later in the Kapp *Putsch*.

The Allies never concerned themselves with the Eastern frontiers of these Baltic States, but encouraged them to make their own peace with the Bolshevists. A great deal of advice was tendered on the need of a common policy between Esthonia, Latvia and Finland, but unity of policy was never completely achieved.

The lack of a clearly defined Allied policy

KÖNIGSBERG, CAPITAL OF EAST PRUSSIA,
Which remains German.

towards Russia made the first year of the new Polish State a very troubled one. Had the Allies settled the Russian problem betimes, they would have been parties to the settlement of the eastern frontiers of Poland. As it was, after a year's desultory war with Russia, Poland completely failed to arrange terms of peace with her, and negotiations were broken off early in 1920. But these events belong to the history of Poland that is now in the making rather than to the story of the settlement. The fault of the Allies was that, though they called Poland into existence, they contributed so little to the settlement of her problems.

We pass to the Treaty with Austria. Austria had many friends in this country, and there was

DANZIG: THE LANGENMARKT AND THE TOWN HALL.

no great popular indignation with the part that she had taken in bringing about the war, the general idea being that she had been the dupe of German ambition and not a willing partner. Moreover, throughout 1917 there had been an undercurrent of negotiation with Austria for a settlement, and though these conversations had led to nothing Austria had shown a certain willingness to peace which made some anxious to give her considerate treatment. The first question before the Allied Powers in relation to Austria was whether she had a claim to especially lenient treatment owing to her conduct before and during the war, and whether that claim, supposing it were admissible, could be reconciled with the claims of others. On both points the Conference was compelled to decide against Austria. In the Note accompanying the text of the Treaty sent to the Austrian delegates at St. Germain there was a letter which reviewed the apologies for Austria and rejected them. It pointed out that the Ultimatum to Serbia was no more than an insincere excuse for beginning a war which the late autocratic Government in Vienna, in close association with the rulers in Germany, had long prepared, and went on to quote the presence of Austrian guns at Liège and Namur as evidence of this preparation. "Had the people of Austria," it continued, "in the years preceding the war endeavoured to curb the militarist and domineering spirit by which the Hapsburg Monarchy was animated, had they made any effectual protest against the war or refused to assist their rulers in prosecuting it, some attention might now have been paid to this plea. But the fact that the war was acclaimed on its outbreak in Vienna, that the people of Austria were its ardent supporters from the start to the finish and that they did nothing to dissociate themselves from the policy of their Government and its Allies until they had been beaten in the field, makes it clear that according to any canon of justice they must be held to bear their full measure of responsibility for the crime which had brought such misery on the world."

But even if the guilt of the Austrian people had been less clear than it was, the dissolution of the Austrian Empire was a political necessity in view of the principles of the Allies. It was an "ancient and effete autocracy," which had continued to exist only because it maintained the supremacy of the Germans and Magyars over the majority of the inhabitants. If that ascendancy continued to be recognized the Allies would betray the objects for which they had fought the war. The non-German and non-Magyar inhabitants of the Empire had already broken away, and any settlement must

M. ULMANIS.
Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of Latvia.

recognize their national rights. If the punishment of the Austrian Empire seemed greater in a territorial sense than that of Germany, the reason was that it had less intrinsic merit to justify its survival. The prime object of the Conference, then, was to abolish racial ascendancy in the Empire, and to confirm in their rights of nationhood the Poles, the Czechs, and the Yugo-Slavs. A secondary object was to draw the new boundaries with some regard to military and economic security. The Allies at Paris wrangled about most subjects in issue, but apart from the settlement of the Adriatic territories there was no serious difference of opinion either as to the principles of the Austrian settlement or as to their application.

The Treaty defines the frontiers of Austria with Italy, with the new states of Czecho-Slovakia, with Yugo-Slavia (described in the Treaty by the cumbrous name of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State) and with Rumania. The changes made are complicated, and the reasons for them are sometimes strategical, sometimes historical, and sometimes ethnographic. The following is a summary of the changes and of

PRESENTING THE TREATY OF PEACE TO THE AUSTRIAN DELEGATES AT ST. GERMAIN.
Dr. Renner, head of the Austrian delegation, speaking. He is standing in the foreground.

the reasons for them. The mass of geographical detail with which the changes are overlaid in the Treaty is here suppressed for the purposes of clearness.

The old frontiers of Italy towards Austria were unfair for two reasons. They included within Austria districts like the Trentino, some 250,000 Germans of the finest peasant stock. This part of the Treaty has been much criticized as an infraction of the principle that national frontiers should correspond as far as possible with racial divisions. The justification of a cession so extensive, if one is to be found, must be military. In the debate in the House

THE AUSTRIAN DELEGATES LEAVING THE CHATEAU OF ST. GERMAIN.
Dr. Renner carries the Treaty in a portfolio.

which were indisputably Italian in their population; and, secondly, they were unfavourable to Italy in a military sense. In particular the great wedge of the Trentino thrust into Northern Italy severed the plains of Lombardy and Venice and greatly increased the difficulty of Italian defence. Even if the population of the Trentino had not been dominantly Italian, this strategic injustice would have had to be remedied. The Treaty not only gives the whole of the Trentino to Italy, but draws the new frontier of Italy as far north as the Brenner, and continues roughly in that latitude as far as the Dreiherrn Spitz, from which point it trends in a south-easterly direction along the crest of the Carnic Alps towards Klagenfurt. Roughly about one-third of the Austrian province of the Tyrol is assigned to Italy, and though in the Trentino region the population is Italian, there are in the portions of the Tyrol ceded to Italy of Lords it was argued that a sound strategic frontier for Italy could have been found without including so large a German population; and that is the view also of Mr. Seton-Watson. But according to Lord Milner military opinion was unanimous that nothing south of the Brenner gave Italy the strategic security to which she was entitled with her two thousand years old history of invasions from the north.

The new state of Czecho-Slovakia was formed out of Bohemia and Moravia, and the formation of this state had the effect of cutting Austria from contact with Germany, except for the strip of front between Bavaria, the Tyrol and Upper Austria. Austria thus became a German promontory stretching into a sea of Slav, Czech and Magyar populations and connected with the German mainland by the isthmus of the Bavarian Highlands. Czecho-Slovakia makes a great bay on the north side of this pro-

THE PARTITION OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: SHOWING THE BOUNDARIES AS DEFINED IN THE TREATIES.

montory, the new state of Yugo-Slavia a similar bay on the south side, and between them flows the Danube, opening out on to the plains of Hungary at Pressburg, some 30 or 40 miles downstream from Vienna. The Conference had considerable difficulty with the frontiers between Austria and Yugo-Slavia at the north-western end, in the neighbourhood of Klagenfurt. The arrangement finally reached was that there should be a plebiscite of the inhabitants to decide whether they should belong to the Austrian or the Yugo-Slav allegiance. The district was divided into two zones, one to be occupied by Austrian troops, the other by Yugo-Slavs, and the whole was placed under an Allied Commission to see that the plebiscite was fairly held. In the area occupied by the Austrian troops there is only to be a plebiscite if the vote for the other half of the Klagenfurt district goes in favour of Yugo-Slavia. But though the frontiers of Yugo-Slavia are thus carefully delimited on the side of Austria, the boundaries on the side of Hungary are not fixed, though presumably they will follow the old administrative frontiers of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, thus connecting with Serbia the whole. This new state of Yugo-Slavia is a country of rich promise, and its chief frontier difficulties were with Italy. But this trouble will be discussed later in this chapter.

The Austrian Treaty draws the frontiers of Austria with Hungary in detail, but such modifications as are made are not important, and are in the nature of compensation for the loss of Southern Tyrol. On the other hand the frontier of Hungary on the east towards Poland is (like the western frontier towards Yugo-Slavia) left undefined. Poland, in fact, is mentioned only once, and that incidentally, in the Austrian Treaty, presumably because the new state of Czecho-Slovakia completely cuts off Austria from Polish Galicia. The eastern frontiers of Poland towards the Ukraine again are left undefined like her frontiers towards Russia farther north. This was a corollary of the failures and vacillations of our Russian policy—for Poland an inconvenient and dangerous corollary.



YUGO-SLAV SOLDIERS WHO HAVE FOUGHT ON MANY FRONTS.

On the other hand important changes were made in the frontiers of Rumania. By Article 50 Austria renounces all claims to the Duchy of Bukovina in favour of Rumania, but the exact extent of the Rumanian sovereignty in this direction and of the cessions to Rumania in Transylvania still remains to be determined.

The general effect of these territorial rearrangements then is to create out of Austria a new inland state of Czecho-Slovakia islanded between Austria, Germany, Poland and Hungary, to make out of Austria and Hungary a

PROFESSOR T. G. MASARYK.
First President of Czecho-Slovakia.

KING PETER OF YUGO-SLAVIA.
Formerly King of Serbia.

new Slav Adriatic state extending from the Macedonian Balkans to the Eastern Tyrols and to aggrandize Rumania at the expense of Hungary. Hungary shrinks to the land of the Magyars—a just punishment for her tyrannical policy of racial ascendancy over the Croats, Slovenes and other alien peoples. Austria is stripped of her empire over non-German race and becomes a purely German state. The natural fate of Austria would in these conditions seem to be to unite with Germany. But this the Treaty forbids except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Clause 88 in the Treaty containing this provision runs :

> The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Consequently Austria undertakes in the absence of the consent of the said Council to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence, particularly, and until her admission to membership of the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another Power.

This provision has been more discussed than any other clause in the Treaty. There were two opposing opinions at the Conference, and the clause as it stands is obviously a compromise between them. One opinion held that Austria, reduced as she was, had no political future as an independent Power and that she would do best as a member of the German State system. The second view, which was that of France, was strongly opposed to this reinforcement of German power. She preferred an independent Austria which, instead of assisting future German ambitions in south-eastern Europe, should oppose them and act as a break on the ambitions of Prussia as Saxony did in the days of Napoleon. With Austria part of Germany there was a gap in the ring-fence round Prussian militarism, and France was anxious to see that gap closed. In Austria as in Poland, she was anxious to create in Eastern Europe the equivalent of the heavy weight of Russia in the European balance of power. English opinion has never quite realized how grave a matter to France was the loss of the alliance with Russia, which had enabled her to lift her head after the defeats of the war with Prussia. The clause as it stands accepts the French view until such time as the League of Nations was in working order and Austria was a member of it. Then we should have some substitute for the old balance of power, and if Austria then wished to join Germany the precautions might, with the consent of the Council of the League, be relaxed. Till then the prohibition must hold. But it is a provisional not an absolute prohibition.

Austria had never indicated any desire for union with Germany, but Germany had not concealed her wishes. Paragraph 2 of Clause 61 of the German Constitution had made express provision for the participation of Austria in the German Imperial Councils. The Council at once protested and threatened to prolong

their occupation of the Rhine bridgeheads if this paragraph were not expunged from the Constitution. On September 5 Germany protested that the paragraph in the Constitution was not inconsistent with Clause 80 of her Treaty by which she agreed to respect the independence of Austria and that this independence should be inalienable except with the consent of the League of Nations. The clause of the Constitution was inoperative except with that consent. The German Note also complained that the threat to extend the occupation of the Rhine bridgeheads was a "deeply regrettable act of violence." But on September 22 Germany signed a declaration that all the provisions of the new German Constitution were null in so far as they conflicted with the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and that "the admission of Austrian representatives to the Reichstag could only take place after the Council of the League of Nations had consented. In consequence of this correspondence the prohibition in the Austrian Treaty was made more stringent and made to cover "participation" in the affairs of another Power.

In its provisions for reparation and disarmament the Austrian Treaty follows the model of the German Treaty very closely. Universal military service is abolished and the strength of the Austrian Army is limited to 30,000 men, including officers. As in the German Treaty there are very elaborate provisions fixing the composition of an infantry division, limiting the number of military schools, the manufacture of armaments and war material, prohibiting air forces naval or military, providing for the surrender of war material in excess of the permitted quantities, and so on. The execution of all the disarmament clauses is entrusted to the control of Commissions specially appointed for that purpose by the Allied Powers. The Austrian warships were to be surrendered, her auxiliary cruisers to be disarmed and converted into merchant ships, and all warships under construction to be broken up. The construction or acquisition of any submarine for any purpose whatever was forbidden. Austria also recognized the right of the Allied Powers to bring to a military trial those who were accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war.

The provisions for reparation, too, followed those of the German Treaty. Austria accepted the responsibility for the loss and damage caused to the Allies by the war, but as her resources are not adequate to discharge this liability the Reparation Commission was to determine for her as well as for Germany what she should pay. A schedule of payments prescribing the manner and time of payments, to be complete

PEASANT WOMEN OF DETTVA, CZECHO-SLOVAKIA.

THE FIRST PUBLIC SESSION IN LONDON OF THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: ST. JAMES'S PALACE, FEBRUARY 13, 1920.
Front row, left to right: M. Caklamanos (Greece), Senhor Da Cunha (Brazil), Mr. Matsui (Japan), M. Léon Bourgeois (France), Mr. Balfour (Britain, presiding), Sir Eric Drummond (Secretary General), Signor Ferraris (Italy), M. Hymans (Belgium), Señor Quinones de Leon (Spain).

within 30 years, is to be drawn up by the Reparation Commission, which is to contain representatives of Poland, Rumania, Czecho-Slovakia and Yugo-Slavia as well as of the great Powers. In addition the policy of "ton for ton" enforced against Germany is also enforced against Austria, and as the whole Austrian tonnage is much less than the Allies lost in consequence of the submarine campaigns, the whole of the seagoing merchant shipping of Austria is escheated. Further, Austria undertakes to restore out of her resources animals, machinery and equipment of the Allies confiscated or destroyed by her in her military operations, and as an immediate advance on this reparation account she undertakes to deliver 6,000 milch cows, besides sheep and heifers to the Italian, Rumanian and Yugo-Slav Governments. She also undertakes to restore works of art and crown jewels taken from Italy by the Hapsburgs in the eighteenth century. These and a mass of detailed provisions for reparation were criticized on the same grounds as the corresponding clauses in the German Treaty.

It was recognized by the Allies that the dissolution of the Austrian Empire must have serious economic consequences, for though the political unity of the Austrian Empire was highly artificial the economic unity of these countries was real. It so happened that Austria was economically dependent on the provinces that had been taken from her for her supplies of food and raw material. The whole of her mineral wealth and her principal manufactures were in Bohemia, which was now the new State of Czecho-Slovakia; Poland, Hungary and Croatia again were important sources of her food supplies. The separation of these provinces and the destruction of the old Zollverein, coming at the end of a war which had caused a greater destruction of wealth than any previous visitation in history, was exceedingly grave. Austria became a Republic, and in October, 1919, a Coalition Ministry under Dr. Renner was formed which seemed to have some prospect of permanence. But the only politics that mattered for the moment in Austria were the politics of getting food to eat and clothes to wear. The plight of Vienna in the years following the armistice was very pitiable. A correspondent in Vienna drew in *The Times* of October 13, 1919, a moving picture of her sorrows.

"War, which has left a defeated Germany still a mighty country with potentialities the extent of which we cannot gauge, has shattered

Austria beyond repair, and left that part of it of which Vienna is head bankrupt, boneless, dissatisfied and inert. And the city itself reflects the spirit of the change. Austria is 'down and out,' and Vienna realizes the fact, and from the abyss into which the Hapsburgs, Berchtold, and Co. have plunged their country is it to be wondered at that many Viennese cast their glances towards fusion with Germany to save them from inevitable bankruptcy ? Austria sees her hereditary foe, Italy, planting her new frontier-posts far within her former territories. She watches the birth around her of new and not very friendly States which formerly owed her allegiance. She has to beg her coal of Teschen, feed her babies on condensed milk from Italy, look to the neighbouring Republic of Hungary for her bread and meat, and to a vindictive Rumania and an unwilling Poland for oil.

FUEL FOR FIRELESS GRATES IN VIENNA, WINTER OF 1919-20.
Poor people who have been to gather wood in the "Wiener Wald," the ex-Emperor's ancient preserved forest, waiting for tram-cars to carry their spoils to the city.

"Vienna itself is a changed city. The outer shell remains, beautiful as ever : the Stefansturn still raises its proud head as heretofore, the palaces still gleam in the sunshine, the Danube is still blue ; but the old gaiety is gone, the Ringstrasse lacks its old-time animation, the children seem to have forgotten how to laugh and play, and poverty and want haunt the streets. There are no local trains, no trams, the cafés, restaurants, theatres, and even private houses close at 8 p.m. There is no coal for heating, and even the Bristol Hotel cannot offer its guests more than one hot bath a week. Electric light is reduced to the barest necessities, and the standards at night are lit only at long intervals. Demobilized soldiers in rags tramp the streets, pictures of misery, begging as they go ; and to remind the Viennese that they are a conquered race, military cars of the Entente Powers, flying the flags of their respective countries, dash through the streets using a distinctive whistle not permitted to ordinary mortals. Italian officers in large numbers parade the Ringstrasse or sip Ersatzkaffee in the restaurants once so beloved of the Viennese.

"And perhaps the bitterest pill of all is the adverse exchange. The pound sterling, which in pre-war days was worth 24 crowns, to-day commands no less than 280, and prices for the Viennese are prohibitive. A plain luncheon for two at a West-end restaurant costs 500 crowns, a carriage to or from the station 100

crowns, or by the hour 80 crowns. On the Austrian Derby Day 1,200 crowns were asked for a fiacre for the day. Ladies' boots cost from 500 to 600 crowns per pair, and clothes are in proportion. On the poor the high price of living falls with increasing severity, and the prospects for the coming winter, with the absence of coal, are alarming for the working classes."

DR. KARL RENNER.
Austrian State Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1919.

In December, 1919, Dr. Renner, the Austrian Chancellor, issued an appeal for help. Child mortality had reached appalling figures; the weight of school children between 10 and 12 years was found to be two-thirds less than that of children of the same age before the war. The food supplies in the country would only last until the third week in January. The ration of meal and bread had been cut down to 3½ oz. a week and Austria was living so much from hand to mouth that when a grain ship from Argentina failed to arrive owing to a breakdown the ration throughout the country had had to be cut down by half. Facts like these were the burden of most of the criticism that was heard of the Treaty in this country. The Allies were not indifferent. On November 21 the Allies had contributed some £10,000,000 in relief of distress, of which the share of this country was £3,500,000. Moreover, this country was prepared to do still more, provided that the United States, too, would join with us. "We cannot," said Mr. Lloyd George on November 20 and on other occasions, "assume the whole responsibility for the work of relief." But it is not fair, as some critics did, at any rate by implication, to accuse either Great Britain or her Allies of apathy to suffering.

Nor, again, is it fair—and this was the best reply made by the Government to its critics in the House of Commons—to lay the blame for the suffering on the Allies for the hard Treaty that they imposed upon Austria. There were two alternatives to the Treaty. The Allies might have tried to keep alive the unity of the old Austrian Empire in some form or another and arrest the dismemberment of the country. That would have been a breach with our friends in Austria, who—and with very good reason—were resolved to be content with nothing less than complete independence. It was not the Treaty that dismembered Austria, but Austria's past follies and crimes. The Treaty, in fact, did very little more, so far as territorial changes went, but acknowledge accomplished facts; and to attempt to reverse them would have been to be false to all the political principles professed by the Allies in the war. As for the indemnity—and this is a second alternative to the policy actually adopted—the Allies might have compelled the new States to share with Austria the reparation for which, as ex-members of the Empire, they were, at any rate technically, partly liable. But, as Mr. Seton-Watson has justly observed, that would have been "a wanton transference of the burden from an enemy to Allies, and would be contrary to every canon of justice." You cannot challenge the economic clauses of the Treaty without repudiating the political principles of self-determination on which the territorial changes are made.

The Treaty, alike in its political and economic clauses, attempts to reduce the risks of injustice. Article 51 runs as follows:—

"The Serb-Croat-Slovene State accepts and agrees to embody in a Treaty with the principal Allied and Associated Powers such provisions as may be deemed necessary by these Powers to protect the interests of inhabitants of that State who differ from the majority of the population in race, language or religion.

"The Serb-Croat-Slovene State further accepts and agrees to embody in a Treaty with the principal Allied and Associated Powers such provisions as these Powers may deem necessary to protect freedom of transit and

equitable treatment of the commerce of other nations."

These provisions, very similar to provisions made in regard to Poland, are repeated in the sections relating to Rumania and Czecho-Slovakia. They were not popular with the new States, who regarded them as limitations of their full independence; and their presence in the Treaty is proof that the Treaty was not punitive in spirit, but framed with a sincere desire to establish fair political conditions for all races. A whole section of the Treaty (Articles 62-69) is given up to similar provisions for the protection of the rights of minorities in Austria itself. Further, there are clauses binding the new States not to impose restrictions on the exportation of their products to Austria, and in the case of coal guaranteeing a minimum export from Czecho-Slovakia and Poland. One article goes so far as to invite the

STARVING VIENNA.
A queue at the American Food Commission's offices, winter of 1919-20.

old members of the Empire to set up a new Zollverein, which may give preference as against the Allies themselves. Article 222 runs as follows :—

"Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 217 to 220, the Allied and Associated Powers agree that they will not invoke these provisions

COUNT MICHAEL KAROLYI.
Prime Minister of Hungary, October 1918 to March 1919.

to secure the advantage of any arrangements which may be made by the Austrian Government with the Governments of Hungary or the Czecho-Slovak State for the accord of a special customs régime to certain natural or manufactured products which both originate and come from those countries, and shall be specified in the arrangements, provided that the duration of these arrangements does not exceed a period of five years from the coming into force of the present Treaty."

In the light of these clauses, no charge against the Allies could be more unjust than that of selfish indifference to the economic consequences of the political changes made in the Treaty.

The politics of Hungary during the period of the armistice were more eventful than those of Austria. Already, in February, there was street fighting in Budapest with the Communists, and their leader, Bela Kun, was arrested. The Communists up and down the country were guilty of pillage and arson. A mob broke into the house of Count Andrassy, cut a Vandyke out of its frame, and flung it into the Danube. The same mob tore down 13 Gobelins tapestries and cut them up into petticoats. The Communist disturbances in some places took the form of Chauvinist protests against the conduct of the Allied troops in the country. There were three Allied Armies—a Czech Army in the north, a Rumanian advancing across Transylvania, and a Franco-Serbian Army in the south-west. And the Magyar Government was under some suspicion of encouraging these protests for its own purposes. It was decided at Paris that a neutral zone should be formed between the Magyar and Allied armies, and on March 19 a note was drawn up at Belgrade defining this zone, which was roughly about 140 miles wide and 40 miles deep, and included the towns of Szegedin, Grosswardein, Arad, and Debreczin. The Magyars were required to withdraw to the west of this line, but civil government within this district was to be exercised by Hungarian civil officers under Allied control. The Note created no presumption of the way in which the Allies proposed to draw the future boundaries of Hungary, and was designed solely in the interests of order; but Count Karolyi announced that his Government "was not in a position to recognize the decision of the Peace Conference and to assist in carrying it through," and resigned. His Government, doubtless by arrangement, was succeeded by a Bolshevist Government under Bela Kun.

The new Soviet Government in Hungary imitated the Russian Soviet in methods and objects. The Revolutionary Council decreed the socialization of large properties, mines, industries and banks; death penalties were proclaimed for all who resisted; measures were taken for raising armies to fight capitalists, Rumanian bojars and Czech bourgeois. On March 22 the Entente Missions left Budapest, which had become unsafe for them. Among the measures which the Soviet Government adopted were the suspension of all courts of justice and their replacement by a revolutionary tribunal; the confiscation, without indemnity, of all personal property above a certain amount (which in the case of men's clothing was two suits of clothes and four shirts); abolition of religious education in schools, and solution of

BELA KUN DRIVING IN BUDAPEST.

the housing problem by a system of billeting the proletariat on the bourgeoisie. Great attention was given to propaganda through the newspapers, but all free expression of opinion was suppressed. A message sent by Bela Kun to the Soviet in Berlin declared that "as regards illegitimate children, we have given them the air, the light, the cleanliness, which were formerly the privilege only of the children of the bourgeoisie; made the theatre and kinema free and accessible to the children of the proletariat, and opened the cultivation of the fine arts to the proletariat." In foreign affairs Bela Kun's policy was to form a close military alliance with Russia, and the relations between Budapest and Moscow were so cordial that in April Lenin telegraphed his intention of visiting Budapest at the close of the elections in order to preside at an International Communist Conference. Bela Kun also attempted, but without success, to seduce Austria into a Bolshevist revolution.

The Bolshevist revolution in Hungary had an especial interest for Germany, and its fortunes were closely studied by the reactionaries there. Would it be possible, by doing as Russia did, to have the advantage of Allied vacillations, to form a new triple alliance of Russia, Germany and Hungary, and perhaps to evade some of the consequences of defeat? If it were possible, were the risks of acquiescing in a Soviet Government for the time being, too great? What were the chances of recovering power for the "old gangs" when the Bolshevist revolution had run its course to the inevitable unpopularity and fall? Such were the thoughts that were in the minds of the German militarists and reactionaries in the middle of 1919, and the Bolshevist revolution in Hungary must be regarded as in the nature of a great experiment. Had the results been satisfactory it would have been imitated in Berlin, and the German reactionaries would have thrown in their lot with the Communists in the hope that when the Communists had tricked the Allies they might come back to power on the wave of the reaction.

On April 3 it was announced that General Smuts was on his way to Hungary to investigate problems arising out of the armistice, and accounts more or less authentic appeared in the Budapest newspapers. He is said to have renewed, with modifications, the proposal for a neutral zone made by the Note of March 19, to have given an undertaking that these lines had nothing whatever to do with the permanent frontiers that would be drawn in the Treaty of Peace, and to have engaged to urge at Paris that before these political frontiers were finally drawn, the representatives of the Hungarian Government should be summoned to Paris to formulate their views at a conference under Allied chairmanship, with representatives, of Czecho-Slovakia, Yugo-Slavia, and German Austria. Whatever the terms suggested no agreement was reached, and General Smuts

JOSEPH CZERNY (left), Chief of the Cadets of Lenin, and OTTO KORVIN-KLEIN, President of the Revolutionary Tribunal under Bela Kun.

abruptly left Paris. Military action was not difficult, for there were three Allied armies in Hungary (any one of which was capable of occupying the capital), and the country districts were hostile to the Soviet Government. But Paris hesitated to use force. The Czech army halted—in the first week of May—some 50 miles north of the capital, and the Rumanians at the same time were on the line of the Theiss. Three more months passed before the Rumanians reached the suburbs of Budapest. Bela Kun fell on the last day of July, and his Government was succeeded by a Socialist Cabinet. The Rumanian troops could have reached Budapest in May, and the only effect of the Allies' vacillation—the counterpart of their policy towards Russia—was to encourage the Soviet Government and to prolong its tyranny

ADMIRAL VON HORTHY (in naval uniform with hand uplifted), TAKING THE OATH AS PROVISIONAL CHIEF OF THE STATE IN THE PARLIAMENT HOUSE AT BUDAPEST, March 1, 1920.

Bela Kun was afterwards placed on his trial for incitement to murder one Captain Mildner, and was afterwards confined in a sanatorium.

It remains before leaving Austria to discuss the problem of the Adriatic, perhaps the most troublesome of all the questions that came up at the Peace Conference. The diplomatic history of this Adriatic question is a long one and goes back to the agreement of April 26, 1915, concluded just before the entry of Italy into the war. Article 4 of that Treaty gave Italy the Trentino and Southern Tyrol, with its geographical and natural frontier (the Brenner frontier), as well as Trieste, the counties of Gorizia and Gradisca, all Istria as far as the Quarnero. The Treaty with Austria, as already explained in this chapter, though it was not based on this article, carried out its terms. The Austrian frontier east of Klagenfurt soon ceases to be contiguous to Italy and marches with that of Yugo-Slavia. There was, therefore, no frontier dispute between Austria and Italy, for Austria was completely cut off from the Adriatic, first by Italy and then farther south by the Yugo-Slav State. There was never the slightest question that Istria, including Trieste and Pola, should be ceded to Italy. The difficulty was as to the boundaries of the new Italian territory and that of the Yugo-Slav State on the eastern shores of the Adriatic south of Istria.

The delimitation in the Treaty of 1915 was as follows. Beginning at Volosca, immediately to the west of Fiume, all Croatia, as far as Dalmatia, was to go to the new Croat-Serb State. This coast line included of course the port of Fiume. The whole of Dalmatia north of Cape Planca was assigned to Italy, the southern part including the harbours of Spalato, Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno, and St. Jean de Medua to go to the Southern Slavs. Farther south still, Italy was to have Valona and a sufficient area round it to ensure its defence. Durazzo was to be the port of an Independent State of Albania.

These terms by consent were exceedingly unfair to the Slavs, and included in Italian territory a population that was overwhelmingly Slav. The main object of the Treaty was to induce Italy to enter the war, but it soon became apparent that, owing to the revulsion of feeling which the terms of this Treaty caused amongst the Slavs, any assistance that Italy was able to give was more than neutralized by their intense opposition. The Slavs, who up to now had hated the Austrian rule, and were ready to revolt, became strong supporters of the Dual Monarchy, whose cause was now, owing to this Treaty, identified with the defence of their national soil. Between Italy and the Southern Slavs the relations became exceedingly



SIGNOR NITTI.
Prime Minister of Italy, 1919-1920.

embittered. Anxious to detach Austria from the Central Alliance, and as a means to that end the Austrian Slavs from their allegiance to Vienna and Budapest, the Allied War Council made many efforts to repair the mischief done at London by the Treaty of 1915 and in July 1917, by the Declaration of Corfu, the claims of the Italians and of the Slavs in the Adriatic seemed to have been completely reconciled. Then followed the defeat of the Italian army at Caporetto and the negotiations between Austria and the Entente Powers strengthened the desire of the Italians to come to terms with the Slavs, and it was the collapse of Austria, due in large measure to the skilful political propaganda of the Allies, that led to German overtures for an armistice and ended the war. Unfortunately, Italy was able when the armistice came, to occupy most of the territory in dispute and when the Conference began at Paris it soon became clear that her representatives, so far from being in the mood for compromise, were determined to insist on the full pound of flesh. The keenest champion of the rights of the Southern Slavs was Mr.

Wilson, who had the support of Mr. Lloyd George. Mr. Wilson could see nothing in the Italian demands in Dalmatia but lust of annexation, and he felt it his duty, as the champion of self-determination, to resist them. The reversion of Alsace-Lorraine to France was, to his mind, not annexation but only the undoing of an annexation made by Germany which never had any legal force, and the occupation of the Saar Valley was only security for reparation. The detachment of Posen from Germany to make the new Poland, the creation of the new States of Czecho-Slavia and Yugo-Slavia, though they involved the transfer of populations to another allegiance, were not annexations made against their will, but examples of the working of the principle of self-determination. The same reasons that made him support the creation of these new States made him resist with the utmost determination the pretensions of Italy to Dalmatia.

Malleable on other subjects, he was inflexible on this. In April, 1919, tired of argument in conference and fearing that some agreement contrary to his principles might secretly be concluded, he issued his Adriatic memorandum of April and threatened to leave the Conference. The Italians then withdrew from the Conference.

The efforts of the British and French for some time were devoted to bringing the Italians and Americans together again, which they succeeded in doing, and by October a considerable measure of agreement had been reached. The principal heads of the agreement were: (1) that Italy should withdraw from Dalmatia on the understanding that Zara, a coast town with a large Italian population, should be given self-government under the League of Nations, (2) that a Buffer State should be created between the Italian territory in Istria and Yugo-Slavia under the control of the League of Nations and including Fiume, and (3) that Italy should be given a mandate for Albania.

Meanwhile the Italian poet, D'Annunzio, had led a filibustering expedition to Fiume and occupied it in the name of Italy. He had had recruiting officers for his volunteers in most of the big towns of Italy, but his occupation of Fiume on September 12 seems to have come as a complete surprise to the Italian Government, now under Signor Nitti, a statesman much less uncompromising than his predecessor, Signor Orlando, and the late Foreign Minister, Signor Sonnino, who had set the tone of the Italian negotiations at the Conference. Disowned by Signor Nitti, D'Annunzio persisted in his occupation and defied his Government. There were many elements of comedy in the occupation, but there could be little doubt that he had the sympathy of great masses of Italians, and

D'ANNUNZIO ADDRESSING AN ENTHUSIASTIC CROWD FROM THE BALCONY OF THE GOVERNOR'S PALACE AT FIUME.

Signor Nitti's task in working for a compromise was no easy one. A statesman of the Left and quite free from the taint of Imperialism, he was eager to arrive at a compromise and he accepted the view of his Allies persistently urged upon him that it was to Italy's own interest to establish friendly relations with the Southern Slavs, and that it could not be in Italy's interest to hold territory which would make that friendship impossible. At the same time he had to move warily in the face of popular opinion and the negotiations dragged on. Had D'Annunzio been as wise as he was picturesque, he might have carried the Italian people with him and made inevitable a rupture between Italy and her Allies. But his proclamations were wild and raving, and he drifted into a bitter hostility to the cause for which he had worked so hard in the war. A passage from a proclamation of his may be quoted, partly for its intrinsic interest (for this raid on Fiume by D'Annunzio will probably be the act in 1919 that lasts longest in popular memories) and as illustrating by its wildness the badness of his case and the causes of his failure. The passage is bitterly hostile to England.

> The voracious Empire which has possessed itself of Persia, Mesopotamia, of the new Arabia, of a great part of Africa and which is never glutted, can send down upon us those same aerial slaughterers who, in Egypt, were not ashamed to massacre insurgents bearing no other arms than the branches of trees. The greedy Empire which is lying in wait for Constantinople, which disguises the possession of at least one-third of China's vastness . . . can adopt against us the same means of execution adopted against the worn-out people of the Punjab, and denounced by the poet Rabindranath Tagore as "such as have no equal in the history of civilized governments." Yet we shall always be victorious. All the insurgents of all the races will gather together under our standard. . . . Therefore your cause is the greatest and most beautiful that to-day is opposed to the dementia and to the vileness of that world. It extends from Ireland to Egypt, from Russia to the United States, from Rumania to India, it gathers together the white races and the coloured races: reconciles the Gospel and the Koran, Christianity and Islam, and rivets in one sole will as many men as possess in their bones and in their arteries salt and iron sufficient to feed their plastic action.

Literary genius can surely never have packed so much nonsense in so small a space.

Italy would have been wise to accept the American proposals as they stood, but she still stood out for the detachment of the city of Fiume (admittedly mainly Italian in population, though the country at the back was almost entirely Slavonic) from the buffer State of Fiume and for the annexation to Italy of the island of Lagosta, opposite the south end of Dalmatia. Her arguments were mainly strategic, and in particular she argued that a hostile Power in the southern Adriatic would be able to raid the Italian coast and get back

GABRIELE D'ANNUNZIO.
Italian poet and leader of the Fiume adventure.

before the Italian Navy in the north, based on Trieste and Pola, could intercept the raiders. In January, 1920, Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau proposed a fresh compromise by which Fiume city was to be separated from the State of Fiume, and the boundaries of that State contracted so as to give some 50,000 Slavs to Italy and to unite 200,000 Slavs (who under the Wilson scheme would have been separated) with their brethren of Yugo-Slavia. This proposal was later withdrawn in view of American criticism, and it was agreed that the Italians and the Yugo-Slavs should confer and arrange their own treaty. America undertook to accept any arrangement that they might agree upon. In the event of their failure to agree the Treaty of London would have to come into force—a Treaty much less favourable to the Slavs than anything proposed since, for though this Treaty gave Fiume to Yugo-Slavia it deprived her of a large part of Dalmatia and of many of the islands.

The Draft Treaty with Bulgaria was handed to the Bulgarian delegates on September 19 at the Quai d'Orsay, and was signed by them rather more than two months later, on Novem-

ber 27. The Covenant of the League of Nations, the Penalties section (Clauses 118-120) on the trial of war criminals, and the sections dealing with aerial navigation and on the Labour Convention are identical with the corresponding sections in the Austrian Treaty.

BULGARIA, AS DELIMITED BY THE PEACE TREATY.

The provisions for the protection of minorities are also adopted bodily from the Austrian Treaty; and there are the clauses similar to those in the Austrian Treaty by which Bulgaria recognizes the new State of Yugo-Slavia, the British Protectorate of Egypt, and the French Protectorate of Morocco, and all the arrangements made by the Allies within the territory of the old Russian Empire as it existed on August 1, 1914, or with the Central Alliance. The distinctive provisions of the Treaty relate to the new frontiers of Bulgaria, to disarmament and to reparation.

The changes in the boundaries of Bulgaria are best seen on the accompanying map. On the northern boundary towards Rumania there was no change, but on the west and south Bulgaria lost territory to Serbia and to Greece. The most important cession to Serbia was a block of territory round Strumnitza; the two strips farther north, though small in area, took away from Bulgaria territory which was indisputably inhabited by Bulgars. The motive of all these changes was presumably to improve the Serbian frontier in a military sense. Bulgaria, however, still retained some of the fruits of the Balkan War, for a large block of territory on the Upper Struma, including Nevrokop and Djumaia, remained in her hands. To Greece the losses of Bulgaria were more considerable. The whole of the coast line from the mainland opposite Thasos to Enos was ceded to Greece, with a hinterland varying in depth from some 50 miles opposite Thasos to nearly 90 miles from Enos towards Adrianople up the valley of the Maritsa. It was a serious blow to Bulgaria to be cut off from the Ægean; on the other hand, the population of these ceded regions was

not for the most part Bulgarian but Greek in the main on the coast and Turkish inland. The future of Adrianople, which was ceded to Bulgaria by the Treaty of London, up to the Enos Midia line, and lost again by the Turkish treaty of 1913, was left to be determined later by the settlement with Turkey.

Part IV. of the Treaty fixed the size of the Bulgarian Army at a maximum of 20,000 officers and men, to be recruited on a voluntary basis, and, in order to prevent the Bulgarians from forming a large reserve, it was provided that no officer should be retired before the age of 40, and that the period of service for non-commissioned officers and men should not be less than 12 years. In addition, however, Bulgaria was allowed to maintain a force of not exceeding 10,000 armed men for the service of the customs and police. Bulgaria was to have only one military school, and the usual elaborate provisions for fixing the number of guns and the amount of ammunition. All arms and ammunition above the authorized quantity were to be handed over to the Allies, and the manufacture of arms and ammunition was restricted to one single factory controlled and owned by the State, whose output was to be limited to the amounts sanctioned. These military provisions were placed under the control of inter-Allied

M. STAMBULINSKI.
Prime Minister of Bulgaria, appointed October 1919.

TSAR BORIS III.
of Bulgaria, succeeded on the abdication of his father, October 1918.

Commissions appointed for the purpose with complete liberty of inspection and power to demand documents and information; the cost of these Commissions to be borne by Bulgaria.

The amount of reparation was not left open as in the case of Germany and Austria but fixed at 2,250 millions of francs, payable in half-yearly instalments, beginning on July 1, 1920, with interest at the rate of 5 per cent. on the capital outstanding, the payments to be remitted through an inter-Allied financial commission consisting of three members, one British, one French, and one Italian. The Commission was given the right, in case of default in the payments, to assume full control of the taxes

and other revenues earmarked for the service of the debt.

The terms were severe, but not unduly severe, and though some protests were made by the many friends of Bulgaria in England, they were formal and perfunctory rather than of substance. Even the Bulgarian protests against the terms did not allege that they were excessive by comparison with the injuries that Bulgaria had done to the Allies by joining the Central Powers. They were content to plead that the beginning of the war by Bulgaria was against the wishes of the majority of the people and the act of a party government under the influence of the Court, that Bulgaria did not desire the political mastery of the Balkans, and that the ambitions of her neighbours were also to blame for what had happened. M. Clemenceau, in his reply, pointed out that it was not until the Bulgarian Army was conquered in the field and forced to lay down its arms that Bulgaria had asked for peace, and that "by ranging herself on the side of the Central Empires and by remaining in that alliance until the moment when their defeat seemed certain, Bulgaria broke the principal line of communication between Russia and her Allies, opened to Germany the road to the East, and thus rendered inevitable the prolongation of the war." At the same time M. Clemenceau was careful to point out that the Treaty was not inspired by motives of vengeance, and sought merely to establish a peace which should be just and consequently durable and fertile.

CHAPTER CCCXVII.

THE BREAK-UP OF TURKEY

BEGINNINGS OF TURKISH NATIONALISM—MUSTAFA KEMAL PASHA—HIS SUPPORTERS—HIS METHODS—THE CALIPHATE AGITATION—THE BREAK-UP OF TURKEY—BRITISH ADMINISTRATIONS—PALESTINE—MESOPOTAMIA—RESULTS OF DELAYING THE SETTLEMENT—THE FRENCH IN SYRIA—ARAB NATIONALISM—THE FRENCH IN CILICIA—TURKS AND ARMENIANS—THE GREEKS IN ANATOLIA—ISLAM AND BOLSHEVISM—ALLIED OCCUPATION OF CONSTANTINOPLE—THE TREATY OF PEACE—PARTITION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE—ECONOMIC CONTROL OF TURKEY—THE COMMISSION OF THE STRAITS—ENFORCEMENT OF THE CONDITIONS OF PEACE.

THE period between the signature of the armistice with Turkey, which came into effect on November 1, 1918, and the publication of the Peace Treaty on May 12, 1920, formed an interregnum during which a variety of forces came into play. The Allies, who had been kept well together during the continuation of actual hostilities, began to consider the claims of their respective national policies, and cherished in their now uncensored newspapers ambitions which often appeared to be incompatible with those of their friends. The long delay in effecting the settlement and the bargaining and intrigue which rose out of that delay, and, indeed, in no small degree contributed to its prolongation, went far to weaken, in the eyes of the Turks, the once impressive and overpowering position of the Allied representatives in Constantinople. This reaction from the state of awed collapse in which the Turks had welcomed the Allies as deliverers from the exactions of Germans and Germanophile committeemen of the Committee of Union and Progress (*Ittihad*) was hastened by the behaviour of the Greeks in Smyrna. This stung many Turks into enthusiasm for the cause of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his "Nationalist" campaign, which first came into prominence as a definitely anti-Greek movement in the Vilayet of Aidin about the middle of March.

Mustafa Kemal, reported by some to be of Salonika Jewish descent, only joined the Nationalist movement openly in June, 1919. He had been sent from Constantinople to repress brigandage in the Samsun and Trebizond areas, and at the end of the month declined to obey orders from the Seraskierate, or War Office, in Stambul. He is said to have then resigned his commission in the Turkish Army, but, in any case, was dismissed from the service and outlawed by the then Grand Vizier, Damad Ferid Pasha, on July 11. Mustafa Kemal, who had gone to Erzrum, found numerous supporters among the Turkish troops which had arrived there after evacuating Azerbaijan and other Caucasian territories, and paid no heed to the action of the Government which was locally attributed to Allied insistence.

The defection of Mustafa Kemal and the military support which he obtained at once rendered the "Nationalist" campaign a formidable menace to a peaceful settlement of the Turkish situation.

This campaign was fostered by soured members of the C.U.P., which had suffered a serious political reverse when the Sultan and his Itilaf, or Liberal-Unionist, Ministry, acting under Allied pressure, arrested some 40 of its most prominent members at the end of January, 1919. It appealed to a certain class of people,

who, as Turks, considered that their once dominant race had been humiliated, and foresaw that the drastic reductions in the size of the Turkish Empire would mean a lack of employment for Turkish civil servants, owing to a lack of provinces for them to administer. Others were attracted by the Pan-Islamic propaganda which was directed against the Allies as enemies of the Caliph-Sultan and of the Moslems. There is reason to believe that the Nationalist leaders were in communication not only with German reactionaries, but also with the Moscow Soviet, through the Tartars of Azerbaijan, for whose benefit a Pan-Turanian propaganda was maintained. They also made the most of the difficulties of the French in Syria in order to represent themselves to the Arabs and Syrians, not as the hated Turks and oppressors of the past, but as fellow Musulmans, equally engaged with them in resisting the penetration and influence of Frankish *giaurs*, and, as such,

ABDUL MEJID EFFENDI.
Heir to the Turkish Throne.

willing to make common cause in defence of the Faith.

Turkish patriotism, where it exists, manifests itself in a devotion to the person of the Sultan, and rallies to the support of the House of Othman as symbolizing the existence and continuity of the dominions acquired by the conquering princes of that family. The fact that the Sultan was in Constantinople and not with the Nationalists in Sivas was inconvenient to Mustafa Kemal's policy. The absent Sultan was swayed by men who might be personally opposed to him and his schemes and could use the Imperial influence at their discretion. Furthermore, the Sheikh-ul-Islam was also in Constantinople, and with him lay the power of issuing those Fetvas, or religious sanctions and prohibitions, which are so important in a country devoted to the Sheriat, or Moslem sacred law. It was important for the success of his scheme that Mustafa Kemal should not allow himself to be compelled to appear as a rebel

MAHOMED VI.
Sultan of Turkey.

against his Sovereign, and become thereby the target for temporal attack and spiritual fulminations. He was supported, it is true, by a most important ecclesiastical functionary, Abdul Halim Effendi, the Chelebi of Konia, the principal Abbot of the Dancing Dervishes of that former capital of the Seljuk Turks. In the person of this great Moslem ecclesiastic ancient usage has vested the power of girding each new Ottoman Sultan with the Sword of Mahomet, a ceremony which, in the eyes of the vulgar, implies a recognition of his title to be a successor of the Prophet and Commander of the Faithful.

In consequence of this the Nationalist leader had to play a very careful game. He relied for some time upon intrigues in Constantinople and upon the support of those adherents of the Committee of Union and Progress who still remained in the capital, to enable him to influence the policy of cabinets nominally hostile, and to

counteract the personal wishes of the Sultan, who was known to look upon the C.U.P. as the source of all the woes which afflicted the "Guarded Realms," as old-fashioned Turks still called the Ottoman Empire. Within a week of his outlawry Mustafa Kemal had the pleasure of learning that his enemy, Damad Ferid Pasha, had resigned (July 17), in spite of his enjoyment of the Sultan's favour and support. At the same time, however, a plot against the Sultan's life was discovered, and this may have enabled the outgoing Grand Vizier to return to office, but hardly power, with a non-party Cabinet (July 21).

While labouring to undermine the Ittilaf Party in the capital, the C.U.P. convoked a "National Assembly" in Angora, which declared for "free elections" (July 26), and "Nationalist" spirits were raised by some fresh fighting against Greeks in the Aidin and Aivali areas, where the Turks had some 2,000 regulars and 15,000 irregulars in the field. There was reason to believe that Mustafa Kemal was by then already in relations with the Soviet of Moscow, and his authority was gradually extending in Anatolia.

The growth of the Nationalist power in Erzrum and Angora was materially facilitated by the withdrawal of British troops from the occupied districts of Armenia and Caucasia, which began on August 16, and Nationalist influence in Constantinople is supposed to have been strong enough to arrange the escape from imprisonment of two war criminals, Halil Pasha, of Kut, Enver's uncle, and Kuchuk Talaat Pasha, on August 11. This led to the resignation of the Minister for War, and was, unhappily, followed almost at once by the escape of Nuri Pasha, Enver's brother, from British custody in Batum.

Early in September the heir to the throne, Abdul Mejid Effendi, allowed it to be known that he, unlike his kinsman and sovereign, was a strong supporter of the C.U.P. In spite of this the "National Congress" held at Sivas (September 13) is understood to have favoured the formation of an Anatolian Republic with Mustafa Kemal as President. By the end of September the Nationalist leader appears to have controlled a great part of Asia Minor—Sivas, Angora, Kastamuni, Erzrum, Konia, Diarbekr, and part of Kharput; but any ambitions which he may have had to figure as the President of a republic were studiously repressed, as it became abundantly apparent as time went on that the Sultan's name was still potent. In spite of the growth of his power, the Nationalist leader had to walk warily, as the internal condition of his territories was precarious.

The necessity for providing for his troops and armed partisans in the absence of any substantial financial organization led to requisitions, and the peasants, accustomed to exact gold for their produce, even from Germans or the undiminished might of the Ottoman Government during the war, were indignant at receiving payment in paper money of doubtful status. Many, while quite ready to take arms against

HALIL PASHA.
Escaped from prison in Constantinople August 11, 1919.

Greeks, were unwilling to feed gratis hordes of fellow Moslems, or serve for any length of time away from home, or run the risk of being considered rebels in any way against their Padishah. In view of these considerations many Turks greatly preferred to join "Free Companies" of brigands, owning no allegiance to Mustafa Kemal, but quite ready to co-operate with him against Greeks only when opportunity favoured inclination.

NURI PASHA.

Younger brother of Enver Pasha. Escaped from Batum where he had been confined by the British Military Authorities, charged with infractions of the laws of war.

In October some of these brigands were reported to have fought against a Nationalist detachment; in November Mustafa Kemal began to levy men for compulsory service or enforce the payment of an exemption tax, a fertile source of revenue as the number of times that the tax can be collected is only limited by the taxpayer's resources. In Sivas, however, Kurds preferred to take arms against his authority.

It is difficult to follow precisely the steps by which Mustafa Kemal Pasha built up the Nationalist power in face of the manifold difficulties under which he laboured owing to the initial lack of the machinery of government and of material resources. Even in the vilayets which owned his authority recalcitrant minorities frequently took arms against his exactions, and many of his adherents continued to be lukewarm in their attachment to his cause. Yet it prospered. His intrigues had as positive effect among Syrian and Arab Moslems as among their Turkish and Tartar co-religionists The outbreaks against the French in Cilicia, the attacks upon the British along the Euphrates, were instigated and probably organized by Nationalist emissaries and Turkish officers. The massacres of Armenians in Cilicia, which were carried out with a dreadful thoroughness, at once rallied many bigots to his support and stamped Mustafa Kemal as a worthy successor of Abdul Hamid both in his policy and his methods. In spite of his open hostility to the Allied cause, certain financial combinations in Allied States did not hesitate to maintain more or less secret relations with him and openly oppose the policy of those who wished to crush his power. Even more than this was done by the official representatives of another Power, who did not scruple to facilitate the exit from Anatolia of his agents and winked at the presence of Turkish war criminals within the zone of their authority. Outside Anatolia, Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the Nationalist Turks had powerful allies in the Moscow Soviet and in the organizers of amazing expressions of opinion among certain inhabitants of India, where some clever wire-pullers actually persuaded a number of Hindus to manifest their belief in a fundamental unity of the Indian nation by expressing a deep enthusiasm for the person and temporal power of a Moslem Caliph who, if a good Musulman, had been taught to regard them as idolators damned to all eternity and their sacred kine as proper victims for the slaughter-house. This declaration was widely exploited by the persons who sought to make political capital out of what came to be known as the Caliphate agitation, and a special Mission was sent to London to communicate directly with Ministers on the subject, while arrangements were made to enforce the arguments conveyed in the spoken and the written word by means of boycotting and other passive measures whereby a determined civilian population can impress authority without exposing itself to the arm of the law. This policy of brag and bluster did not greatly impress the British public, and the Prime Minister declined to yield to the energetic Indian gentlemen to whom he accorded an interview on March 19, during which he said:—

. . . I do not understand Mr. Mohamed Ali to claim indulgence for Turkey. He claims justice, and justice she will get. Austria has had justice. Germany has had justice—pretty terrible justice. Why should Turkey escape? Turkey thought she had a feud

1 2 3 4 5

TURKISH "NATIONALIST" CHIEFS AT ANGORA.

Photographed at prayer: 1 Ibrahim Effendi, cadi of Angora; 2 General Ali Fuad Pasha, commanded the 20th Corps; 3 Mustafa Kemal Pasha; 4 Colonel Mahmoud Bey, commanded the 24th Division of the 20th Corps; 5 Yaya Galib Bey, vali of Angora.

with us. What feud had Turkey with us? Why did she come in to try and stab us and destroy liberty throughout the world when we were engaged in this life and death struggle? Is there any reason why we should apply a different measure to Turkey from that which we have meted out to the Christian communities of Germany and Austria? I want the Mahomedans in India to get it well into their minds that we are not treating Turkey severely because she is Mahomedan: we are applying exactly the same principle to her as we have applied to Austria, which is a great Christian community.

What are those principles? They are the principles of self-determination applied to Empires which have forfeited their title to rule. The Arabs have claimed independence. They have proclaimed Feisal King of Syria. They have claimed that they should be severed from Turkish dominion. Is it suggested that the Arabs should remain under Turkish dominion merely because they are Mahomedans? Is not the same measure of independence and freedom to be given to Mahomedans as is given to Christians? Croatia has demanded freedom, and we have given it to her. It is a Christian community. Syria has demanded it, and it is given to her. We are applying exactly the same principles in Christian places, and to impose the dominion of the Sultan upon Arabia, which has no desire for it, is to impose upon Arabs something which we certainly would not dream of imposing upon these Christian communities. . . .

I am not going to interfere in a religious discussion where men of the same faith take a different view. I know of Mahomedans, sincere, earnest, zealous Musulmans, who take a very different view of the temporal power from the one which is taken by Mr. Mohamed Ali to-day, just as I know of Catholics who take one view and other Catholics who take a different view of the temporal power of the Pope. That is a controversy into which I do not propose to enter. All I know is this. The Turk will exercise temporal power in Turkish lands. We do not propose to deprive him of Turkish lands. Neither do we propose that he should retain power over lands which are not Turkish. Why? Because that is the principle we are applying to the Christian communities of Europe. The same principles must be applied to the Turk.

Although relying for the most part upon force of arms and the influence of intrigue, the Nationalists did not neglect more constitutional methods. In December new elections were held for the Turkish Chamber, a body which has unfortunately never exercised any control over the governments or destinies of the country, and was on this occasion foredoomed to more than its usual helplessness. In the face of wholesale abstentions among both Moslem and Christian voters the *Ittihad* or party of the C.U.P. carried eleven seats in Constantinople, and in its Press much was made of the victory. It was, however, somewhat barren of result, as when the Chamber came to be opened on January 12, when the Minister of the Interior read the Speech from the Throne on behalf of the absent and indisposed Sultan, the Nationalists, although protected by armed adherents in the city from any action on the part of the Government, were unable, in the absence of a quorum, to carry their proposal

that the Chamber should transfer itself to Angora.

Within the territories nominally subject to the jurisdiction of the Nationalist leader conditions went from bad to worse. With the growth of the Nationalist movement many Christians, who had perhaps unwisely reposed confidence in the power of the Allies to make the Armistice respected and had returned to their homes inland, began to move down to the coast, but in some cases the journey proved fatal. In August a brigand, operating near Yozgad, murdered an Armenian dentist who had been active in securing the release of Christian girls forcibly detained in the harems of their Moslem purchasers at Amasia, together with a party of women and children travelling in his company. Other parties in the same neighbourhood were also done to death, and there was no redress for the survivors or the kinsfolk of the victims. The brigand chief, moreover, is reported to have become subsequently an ornament of Mustafa Kemal's army. Later in the year attempts were made in some districts to enforce a "white massacre" upon the non-Moslem population by preventing any Christian from tilling his fields or obtaining employment, and even in a coastal district within reach of foreign assistance Christians were terrorized into paying the value of half their crop to Turkish blackmailers.



[*Russell.*

BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR GILBERT F. CLAYTON, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G.
First Chief Administrator of Palestine, 1917-18.

In the territories comprised within the Ottoman Empire in 1914 a variety of different administrations arose as a result of the defeats suffered by that Empire during the war, and several attempts were made to secure international recognition for racial organizations in different parts of its territory. The more formal governments were those set up by the British in Jerusalem and Baghdad, by the French in Beirut, and by the Greeks in Smyrna. The Armenian Government in Erivan at times exercised authority within the old Turkish frontiers, while at others armed Turks and Kurds made any attempt at Armenian administration impossible in those areas. A Nationalist Turkish Government was set up in Angora in actual opposition to that of the Sultan, whom its sponsors affected to consider as being under restraint but otherwise worthy of every veneration and respect. The Greeks of Trebizond endeavoured to form a Republic of Pontus, which was to emulate the glories of the famous Comnenian Empire of the Faithful Romans which outlived its Byzantine parent in Constantinople. Then, amid the mountains near Mosul certain Christian clans of Assyrians, who had preserved their race and religion amid every shock and change, asked for recognition for their nationality and a territorial allotment under the *ægis* of a mandatory Power. Their neighbours, the picturesque and truculent Kurds, also had friends who put forward similar claims on behalf of their *protégés*. Farther south, the Arab Government in Damascus found itself awkwardly placed, as it had to keep the peace in spite of the Syrian dislike for the Patriarchalists of the Desert, who at times considered that they had conquered the city in the name of the King in Mecca, of the Nationalist dislike of foreign interference, and of the existence of the Sykes-Picot agreement between Great Britain and France, containing provisions at variance with promises made to the leaders of the Arab Army. The long delay between the Armistice and the settlement of the details for the final Treaty materially increased the difficulties of the administrators of occupied enemy territory in all parts of the Ottoman Empire, and afforded breathing space which enabled forces hostile to a peaceful settlement to gather strength and make trouble.

Of the administrations set up by the Allies on former Ottoman territory that in Syria was at first wholly under the control of Lord Allenby, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army which had driven the Turks and their administration out of the country. In view, however, of the existence of certain obligations and preferences, from the very first French officers were employed in the area afterwards included in the French mandatory area, and Arab officers in that in which the Arab Army under the Emir Feisal had played a prominent part in the work of liberation. The districts into which the Occupied Territory was divided were Southern (roughly Palestine), Northern (afterwards called Western), which was the Syrian littoral, and Eastern—the Syrian hinterland from the Red Sea to the Euphrates.

Brigadier-Gen. G. F. Clayton, C.B., C.M.G., was the first Chief Administrator of O.E.T.A. South. He was succeeded in April, 1918, by Major-Gen. Sir A. W. Money, K.C.B., C.S.I., who about a year later was succeeded by Major-Gen. Sir L. J. Bols, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., who had been Chief of Staff to Lord Allenby. Col. de Piépape, C.B., the first Chief Administrator of the French area, was followed in October, 1919, by General Gouraud, who had been seriously wounded in Gallipoli. In the Arab area the first native governor of Damascus, Shukri Pasha el Ayyubi, a descendant of the famous Saladin, who had reigned there as Sultan more than seven centuries before, was followed as Chief Administrator by Ali Riza Pasha el Rikabi, but by degrees Damascus tended to become more and more the headquarters of the Emir Feisal himself.

In Mesopotamia the international obligations were less pressing, and no division of Occupied Enemy Territory into zones of influence was necessary.

The British Military Administration in Palestine has been blamed for manifesting a lack of elasticity which is considered by some to have impeded the development of the country. It must be remembered, however, that according to the rules and usages of war a military administration of Occupied Enemy Territory is strictly limited as to its fiscal powers, and, in view of the natural uncertainty of the political future of the territory for which it is responsible it can take no far-reaching measures for its development should these require such expenditure as cannot be met out of revenue. Palestine, when it came under the control of General Clayton, its first British Chief Administrator, was an exhausted country. Its urban populations were weak from underfeeding, disease and lack of fuel, its rural populations were suffering from military unpaid requisitions of foodstuffs and farm animals, the destruction of trees and the lack of man-power. The exchange for Ottoman paper against the Egyptian currency introduced by the Army was so unfavourable that everybody, as far as possible, started afresh

[Elliott & Fry

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR LOUIS BOLS, K.C.B.
Last Chief Administrator of Palestine, 1919–1920.

and tried to build up prosperity by selling to, or working for, the Army. Even so, there was a certain prejudice against Egyptian paper, and on many occasions the exactions of civilian vendors, even of the simplest wares, aroused the indignation of the troops and could best be explained as attempts to obtain payment in Egyptian piastres at 97½ to £1 for prices quoted in Turkish piastres at 1,000 or 1,200 to £1. There was known to be a certain amount of hard money and of concealed grain in the country, but the peasants were unwilling to accept paper in exchange until that paper would buy the trade goods which they required. But the country was stripped of trade goods, and the congestion on the military railway across the desert from Egypt, owing to its being the sole source of supply for a large army and a starving urban population, made the authorities

unwilling to burden it further by sending trucks full of trade goods when ammunition and every sort of army store were urgently required. However, a few truck loads of trade goods now and again were brought up, the contents were put on sale, and commerce, frozen into immobility under the cold breath of war, gradually thawed. Foodstuffs of local origin once more came into the market, thereby obviating the necessity for importing the equivalent from Egypt. The additional train space thus available was used to bring up more trade goods, and life, freed from the vicious economic circle, tended to become normal. But even so, for more than a year 900 tons of cereals had to be imported monthly for the benefit of refugees alone.

But the situation of the Government could not become normal. The revenues from an exhausted country needed humane collection. In many districts the Turks had collected them in advance, in other districts the revenues were mortgaged to the service of the Ottoman Debt or for the payment of the kilometric guarantee enjoyed by certain railway companies, notably the German-controlled Baghdad Railway, in distant parts of the Ottoman Empire. The Military Administration, bound by the Laws and usages of war, had to collect these mortgaged revenues and bank them for the ultimate benefit of the beneficiaries. It was not allowed to spend them, even to promote the welfare of an impoverished and war-stricken country.

The figures for the first Budget for Palestine, for the year ending October, 1918, prepared while Major-Gen. Sir A. W. Money was Chief Administrator, showed a revenue from Direct Taxes £E160,000, from Customs and Excise £E122,000, and from other normal sources some £54,000. The artificial revenue of £324,000 drawn from the operation of the services of Relief for Refugees, failed to balance their cost, £E331,000; consequently the Revenue for purposes of ordinary administrative expenditure amounted to £E337,000, and the expenditure to £E407,000. Even in the impoverished state of the country, there would have been a surplus but for the fact that £E141,000 of mortgaged revenues, collected by the Administration, had to be withheld for the service of the Ottoman Debt and the kilometric guarantee. It should also be remembered that, while the Government had to meet the expenses of administering Northern Palestine, the greater part even of the normal and unhypothecated revenues from those districts had vanished with the Turks.

The necessarily temporary character of the Administration and the uncertainty as to the nature of the Government which was to "take over" from it made it impossible for any Chief Administrator to sanction the large outlay required to put sanitation and public works in Palestine on a permanently satisfactory footing. Even the celebrated supply of drinking water to Jerusalem was a *bakshish* given by the Royal Engineers under the generous pretence that the work was purely a military necessity. Palestine was taxed to the extent of only £E10 for her share in the construction and maintenance of that great work of civilization. Somewhat on the same principle Palestine has drawn permanent benefit from the roads constructed for the temporary convenience of the Army, partly because the roads, beautifully engineered and built, remain, and partly because of the immense sums disbursed by the Army for the hire of the local labour engaged on them. Maintenance of roads no longer kept up by the Army as being of no further military necessity in regions away from the front or lines of communication in 1917-18 cost Palestine some £E2,350, which, if spent on new construction, would only have produced a few miles of track. In the same way Mesopotamia, hard hit by war and famine, has been able to turn to permanent advantage much of the work undertaken and paid for by the Army, as, for example, in the case of irrigation works, where over £330,000 worth of Army expenditure was taken over gratis and a number of bridges were obtained at half price. This was eminently desirable, as the Mesopotamian Treasury during the early years of the British Administration appears to have yielded ridiculously inadequate revenue—the net income for 1915-16 being £130,000, that for 1916-17 £270,000 and that for 1917-18 only £100,000. In 1918-19 the figures were more hopeful and amounted to £189,000, and Lord Curzon, speaking in the House of Lords (25th June), gave the figures for 1919-20 as £244,000.

In the case of Mesopotamia, however, the pressure of necessity was so great that the present had to be redeemed at the expense of the future, no matter how problematical that might be. The cost of these works—for the development of the food-producing capacity of the country—was for the time borne by the Army, although a greater part of it was obviously capital expenditure and destined to preserve the civil population from famine. The farmers,

1. Talaat Pasha, 6 February, 1917—29 September, 1918. 2. Ahmed Tewfik Pasha, 10 October, 1918—15 October, 1918, and 11 November, 1918—3 March, 1919. 3. Izzet Pasha, 15 October, 1918—10 November, 1918. 4. Damad Ferid Pasha, 5 March, 1919—30 September, 1919, and reappointed 3 April, 1920. 5. Ali Riza Pasha, 5 October, 1919—3 March, 1920. 6. Salih Pasha, 7 March, 1920—25 March, 1920.

flayed by the Turks, had to be provided with money to buy gear and hire labour, with seed-corn to sow, and men had to be hired to clear out the water-courses and canals required for the irrigation and no less important drainage of the 600,000 acres of land put under the primitive plough of the country to produce 280,000 tons of indispensable cereals. A considerable expenditure had also to be incurred at Basra, where substantial wharves and powerful cranes were erected in order to make it suitable as the base for an Army and the sole port of a great province. Then, as in Palestine, there were railways, some of which, not required for civil purposes, were taken up and used more economically elsewhere. Thus Mesopotamia has been able to get the advantage of what would ordinarily be considered a "loan expenditure" to the amount of over £2,000,000, while Palestine was less fortunate. It must be remembered, however, that private charity came to the assistance of the Palestine Administration in dealing with civilian destitution and the needs of refugees. The sums provided in this way were considerable—the American Red Cross supplying for a considerable time no less than £E40,000 *per mensem*—and materially eased what would otherwise have been a very serious prime charge upon an impecunious Treasury.

NATIVES OF PALESTINE AWAITING THE DISTRIBUTION OF WATER BY THE BRITISH MILITARY AUTHORITIES.

Mesopotamia, where a larger population—2,849,282 in 1920, of whom 1,146,000 were Sunni Moslems, 1,494,000 Shiah Moslems, 87,000 Jews (more than in Palestine), and 78,000 Christians—and a wider extent of territory than in Palestine required administration and policing, was also more exposed to hostile influences than the smaller country. The Acting Commander-in-Chief, Sir George MacMunn, in May, 1919, drew attention to the effect of Moslem unrest in India, the growth of Wahabism in Central Arabia and among the tribes on the lower Euphrates, Kurdish unrest, pan-Arab activity, and the quantities of arms held by certain Arab tribes. Soon after this came the intrigues and propaganda of the Turkish Nationalists and the Bolshevists.

In May, soon after the dispatch of this report, an outbreak occurred near Nasiriyah, where a certain Sheikh named Badr set himself up as a local tyrant and had to be suppressed by land, water and air.

Almost at the same moment a certain Sheikh Mahmud, a leading chief of Southern Kurdistan, who had actually been put in authority by the British Government, rose in revolt, arrested all British officials, seized public monies and cut telegraph wires. It at once became apparent that the revolt was the local equivalent of a "test case" for British power, and wild rumours were carefully circulated by hostile agents through Mesopotamia. The Government replied by sending Major-Gen. Fraser with two brigades to cope with the difficulty. An effective victory was won in the Bazyan Pass, when Sheikh Mahmud was

wounded and captured, his forces broken up, and British prisoners released, and after two months the whole insurgent area was traversed by troops and the civil administration completely restored.

Further outbreaks occurred in Central Kurdistan, where the Government was trying to reorganize the Moslem and Christian clans immediately to the north of Mosul. On July 16, 1919, two British officers and some Christian gendarmes were murdered by Moslem civilians and gendarmes at Amadia. Three months were required to instil into the hearts of the lawless Kurds some sort of respect for the *Pax Britannica*, but Major-Gen. Cassels was finally successful. with the help of two brigades of British and Indian troops and of a distinct Assyrian battalion raised among the Christian refugees at Bakuba. The total British casualties in these two series of operations amounted to 10 British and 4 Indian officers killed, 7 British and 12 Indian officers wounded, 8 British and 115 Indian other ranks killed, and 14 British and 267 Indian and other ranks wounded and 9 missing.

Later in the year, however, Nationalist Arabs on the Western frontier made common cause with Nationalist Turks, although the domestic policies of both were mutually antagonistic. Ramadan ibn Shallash, the recently-appointed Arab Kaimmakam or Military Governor of Rakka, on the Euphrates, appointed by the Arab Government in Damascus, broke out, and, in company with a famous local freebooter, Ibrahim Pasha Milli, attacked a British post at Deir-ez-Zor, on December 11, plundered and apparently occupied the town, and imprisoned British officers and native officials. This was reported about December 16, and he was immediately disowned and dismissed by the Emir Feisal (December 21), and others of the chiefs of the Milli Kurds, who were hostile to the Turks, withdrew the support they had formerly given while Ramadan had been a loyal Arab.

Ramadan, on hearing that he had been denounced by his own Government, refused any longer to recognize it, and apparently looked for instructions to the Turks, for whom he had once been a secret service agent, having, indeed, been captured and sentenced to death (and pardoned) when in that capacity. His efforts to stir up trouble among the tribes on the British side of the Khabur, at that time the provisional boundary between the areas of Arab and British administration, were incessant, and he even demanded the surrender of a post at Abukemal. Troops were sent against him from Mesopotamia in the middle of January, and by February 12 he had retired to Aleppo, but not before he had been either directly or indirectly responsible for the murder of a British Y.M.C.A. official, Mr. C. A. Fleming, near Deir-ez-Zor.

His successor as Governor of Rakka, Maulud Pasha, was no better. He also, in defiance of the policy of his Government, incited the tribes throughout Mesopotamia to revolt, and appeared to be well supplied with money wherewith to back his arguments; he threatened to murder British Political officers, and tried to kidnap one of them near Abukemal, and repudiated the agreement constituting the Khabur the temporary frontier.

In March a certain Mohamed Amin, being then master of Deir-ez-Zor, raised 400 Arabs from the desert in the neighbourhood of Meyyadin, raided British caravans and convoys, caused 30 casualties, and had to be suppressed by troops sent for the purpose, and a considerable sum of money was exacted by way of fines and compensation. The constant propaganda and the money supplied to corrupt doubtful loyalty, however, resulted in yet another outbreak, in which Sherifian officers were implicated. On June 3 some 300 Shammar Arabs under the leadership of these men attacked Telafar, which is only 40 miles west of Mosul and well to the east of the Khabur. They murdered the Political Officer, Major J. E. Barlow, D.S.O., and three other Englishmen, and also the crews of two armoured cars which unsuspectingly entered the town next day. A punitive column was immediately dispatched into the disturbed area, which extended up to the Tigris between Kalaat Shergat and Mosul. In their collisions with British authority the tribesmen lost 135 killed in action announced on June 11, and all necessary measures were taken at Tel Afar to bring offenders to justice.

In spite of these mountain wars and desert raids the British Administration was able to do a great deal to improve the lot of the ordinary inhabitants of the country. In Mesopotamia it was not only necessary but possible to do more for the reorganization of agriculture than in rocky and mountainous Palestine, where only about 1,000 square miles were under cultivation, and the Department of Agriculture could be run by Colonel V. Gabriel, in conjunction with the Treasury, the Municipalities, and

the care of Pious Foundations (Wakfs). Mr. C. C. Garbett organized the development of agriculture in Mesopotamia, and was so successful in the execution of his schemes that a subdivision of the immense work of his department had to be made soon after the Armistice.

In other directions progress was rapid under the rule of Sir Percy Cox, afterwards British Minister in Teheran, and Colonel A. T. Wilson. In both Mesopotamia and Palestine the British Administration found itself obliged to maintain the Ottoman code, tempered and modified

[*Official photograph.*

A STREET IN BAGHDAD.

where necessary by proclamations issued by the respective commanders-in-chief. This might well have proved a formidable task but for the fortunate fact that Englishmen had already become accustomed to Turkish law in Cyprus, and a learned Chief Justice in that island had published a monumental and authoritative textbook upon the subject. Civil courts were set up; but in Palestine at first no cases concerning land were heard, nor were any transactions in land titles permitted. This was necessary for two reasons: first, the Turks had removed all legal registers, and until these were recovered or a new cadaster had been made no one could prove a clear title; second, the transfer of land as between Moslems, Christians or Jews might readily have acquired a political complexion and given rise to uneasiness among the civil population.

In accordance with the pledge of the Allied Governments to confirm or restore indigenous institutions where possible, municipalities have been revived and invigorated, and in Mesopotamia tribal councils have been set up for tribal districts. These latter are developing into more formal shape; and certain divisional councils have begun to cope with a variety of delegated duties, such as the expansion of railways, the standardization of weights and measures, public health, education, agriculture and local police work, and there is reason to hope that the British administrators have, by their work during the brief Occupation, done much to lay the foundations of that self-government to which the fortunes of the country will be entrusted after the evacuation which was announced as impending at the end of June, 1920.

Undoubtedly matters are mending in Mesopotamia, and if due protection can be afforded against the incursions of the lawless raiders of the desert, who from time immemorial have been accustomed to prey upon the labour of the settled populations, there is good reason to anticipate a satisfactory return for private enterprise. Already the trade passing through the port of Basra is more than six times what it was six years ago, and a valuable market for Manchester goods is being opened up. A school of law has been opened in Baghdad in continuation of the school closed by the Turks in 1914; and the railway ran its first through train, starting from Basra at midnight, January 13/14, and arriving in Baghdad on the afternoon of January 15, 1920. The results already achieved by the irrigation policy show that Mesopotamia can be made one of the most important sources for supplying the raw cotton to Manchester, and the date industry is being developed with an eye to the manufacture of fuel-alcohol from low-grade dates which would otherwise be of little commercial value. The prospects for tobacco growing are also favourable and satisfactory crops are obtained.

The Arabs in Damascus and the French in Syria and Cilicia also had serious difficulties to face, the more so because neither were able to benefit so largely as Palestine from the labour and expenditure of the Army. Roads were built for military purposes—notably the remarkable rock-cut highway which now enables wheeled vehicles for the first time in all history to pass from Acre to Tyre—but they were not numerous. The population of the Lebanon was more hunger-stricken than that of Palestine,

SCENE IN THE MARKET PLACE AT AINTAB, NORTHERN SYRIA.

because it is normally less self-supporting ; yet it benefited less than Palestine from the prolonged presence of an army with money to spend. Syria was a richer country, more civilized, more artificial than Palestine, therefore it had been more closely shorn by Turkish tax-gatherers, and suffered more severely from the economic pressure of the war. Furthermore, although outside financial help was forthcoming for the suffering Syrian populations, it is doubtful whether it was on so substantial a scale as that sent by the adherents of three great religions to the people of the land which is holy to all of them.

Had the political future of Palestine and Syria been definitely and publicly settled before they were liberated, it is probable that the countries would have settled down almost immediately with profound sighs of relief under whatever form of government the liberators found best for their varying needs. As it was, however, everyone was told that the settlement would not be made until the Peace Conference should decide ; and everyone was also told that self-determination was a cardinal point in the policy to be adopted by that conference. Over and above this there was Mr. Balfour's celebrated declaration to the Zionists about the future status of Palestine as a home for the Jews ; there was also the dislike for the Zionist schemes felt by many "Orthodox" Jewish residents ; there were the unitary aspirations of some Syrian Nationalists, the federal schemes of others ; the theory of conquest held by many of the Meccan aristocracy who had influence with King Hussein and his sons, the Emirs Feisal and Abdullah ; the unwillingness of some British officers to abandon Syria, under the Sykes-Picot Convention, to the French, whom the Arabs said they would not welcome ; the dislike of many Frenchmen to consider a compromise with either British, Jews or Arabs on the subject of the traditional interests of France in Syria, which were based on memories of the Crusades, when French princes and French civilization were actually sovereign and dominant over the whole country from the confines of Egypt to the mountains of Armenia. Apart from all these warring factors, there was the uneasy fact that the British Government, or different departments thereof, had given contradictory and mutually incompatible undertakings to the French and to the Arabs—undertakings well known to both parties, at a time when the pressure of necessary cooperation against a common enemy had just been dissolved by overwhelming victory, in the achievement of which the Arabs had undoubtedly played a more important part in the eyes of the Syrians than had the French. In consequence of this the French were faced from the very beginning of their administration

A SITTING OF THE SAN REMO CONFERENCE, APRIL, 1920.
Left to right, on the farther side of the table: MM. Berthelot, Millerand, Signori Scialoja and Nitti, Mr. Lloyd George, Lord Curzon, Mr. Matsui.

with overwhelming difficulties and a very stubborn opposition. Attempts to give effect to their authority were met by armed resistance, certain of their agents played them false, and both in Cilicia and Syria they bore the brunt of Turkish nationalism, Pan-Islamic agitation, anti-Armenian traditional hatred, and Syrian and Arab nationalism. Yet, in spite of the trouble caused to the forces of France in the field by the activities of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his adherents in Cilicia and in the neighbourhood of Aintab, a section of the French press gave signs of supporting his other campaign against the troops of the Constantinople Government.

The evacuation of O.E.T.A., North and West, by the British portions of the Army of Occupation began on November 4, 1919, when the garrisons of certain posts in the Taurus mountains and at Aintab handed them over to the French. The process went on continuously, and on December 12 the 7th Indian Division and the 5th Cavalry Division, both of which had won splendid laurels during the September advance in Palestine in 1918—apart from great achievements in France and Mesopotamia—began to embark from Beirut. By noon on January 19, 1920, the last British troops had left Cilicia and Syria.

Troubles soon began. The Arab administration had no very perfect control over the semi-independent tribes, the more so as numbers of rifles had been issued to the tribesmen to arm them against the Turks, or had been gained by them as legitimate prizes of war from killed or captured Turks and Germans. Baalbek was the scene of the first encounter between French troops and disorderly Arabs—there was fighting there about Christmas time, 1919.

An attempt on the part of a French force to advance to El Kuneitrah on the road into the Hauran was resented by a neighbouring tribe, and a good deal of fighting ensued both there and in the Merj Ayun, where the French had some casualties in January. The Latakia district, on the coast north of Tripolis, was also disturbed about the same time, but Baalbek was reoccupied before the end of the month. In February the French garrison at Alexandretta was attacked, and on March 1 a Jewish colony, Tel Hai, near Metuallah, in the French zone of Upper Galilee, was attacked by Arabs, who killed six of the inhabitants, but were beaten off after a stout resistance. Early in March, 1920, the situation was complicated by the action of the Syrian National Congress in Damascus, which proclaimed and installed the Emir Feisal as King of Syria. His elder brother, the Emir Abdullah, was simultaneously proclaimed King of Irak, but during his subsequent visit to Cairo the latter does not seem to have been treated as being an independent sovereign. With the Emir Feisal the case was different; he was undoubtedly at the head of a government, and had considerable resources at his command, and the Allies did not gain in prestige when the Emir declined to comply (March 27 and May 8) with two successive summonses to

explain his conduct in person in Paris. The Government of Damascus was, however, represented by General Nuri Pasha (not to be confused with Nuri Pasha, brother of Enver Pasha) during the San Remo Conference in the last week of April.

The proclamation of a Syrian King was followed by a fresh outbreak of Arab Nationalist enthusiasm directed against all and sundry. Antioch was taken from a French detachment on March 20, and although the municipality of Tripolis, which was secure behind a French garrison, and Lebanese and Syrian Committees in the United States protested against the action of the Syrian National Congress in Damascus, and the Council of the Lebanon declared its independence and hoisted its own flag, relying upon French protection, there was anti-foreign trouble from end to end of the country. In the frontier district of Beisan the Ghazawiyeh tribe made a series of raids into the British zone during April and carried off 119 head of cattle and 259 sheep and goats. Two thousand Arabs attacked the British force at Semakh on April 24, and although they brought down a British aeroplane within our lines, wounding the pilot and killing another British officer, they left some 100 casualties behind them.

In Jerusalem this trouble took the form of determined anti-Jewish riots on the occasion of the Nebi Musa celebrations on Easter Sunday. These celebrations had been officially encouraged in the days of the Turks as a deliberate policy for bringing Moslem pilgrims to Jerusalem at the time of the Christian Easter and the Jewish Passover in order that the three religions should act as mutual checks upon one another. On this particular occasion the religious procession was exploited as a manifestation of nationalist and Arab sentiment which was quite ready to be directed against the Jews, more particularly Zionists, by reason of a somewhat unwise and tactless propaganda undertaken by some of the more enthusiastic among them. Public statements were made which Arabs could easily misunderstand and represent as threats against their own undisturbed possession of their ancestral properties, and a counter propaganda tending to make all Arabs agree to refuse to sell any land to either Jew or Christian had played its part in making the crowd ready to take advantage of any opportunity to show its resentment towards the Jewish immigrants An unfortunate symptom of the strength of Arab feeling against the Jews was apparent in the behaviour of certain of the native police, who, instead of enforcing the law impartially, appear to have assisted their fellow-Moslems in illtreating Jews. The riots took place on two separate days, April 4 and 5, and British and Indian troops had to restore order and maintain the peace, which was several times endangered owing to the violence of racial feeling. According to a statement made by Mr. Bonar Law in the House of Commons on April 14, the casualties were 2 killed and 186 more or less seriously wounded. The correspondent of *The Times*, who was on the spot, telegraphing on April 9, estimated the total casualties at 5 Jews and

THE EMIR ABDULLAH (in centre) AND SUITE IN CAIRO.



American Colony, Jerusalem.

MOSLEM ARAB VILLAGERS WITH HOLY FLAGS AT THE DOME OF THE ROCK ON THEIR WAY TO THE TOMB OF MOSES.

4 Moslems killed, 211 Jews, 22 Moslems and 2 Christians wounded.

A number of arrests followed, and among the Jews sentenced, as Mr. Churchill explained in the House of Commons on April 29, for "possessing firearms, instigation to disobedience by arming the populace, conspiracy, and preparing means to carry out acts of riot," was Mr. Vladimir Jabotinsky, who had played a distinguished part in raising Jewish battalions for the British Army. His sentence was very materially reduced a few days afterwards. Several Moslems were sentenced for rape, or for possessing firearms. Happily the intervention of the British authorities was in time to prevent the perpetration of any atrocities comparable with those which attended the anti-Christian raids in Northern Galilee. Here, in the first week of May, 1920, at a point far from the nearest available French force at Tyre, a tribe of Mutawili, described as Moslem schismatics of Shiah origin, held the Christian villages of Ain Ibl, Dibl and Alarmash to ransom. The Christians, having obtained rifles from the French, refused to pay, but after a stout resistance were overcome by greatly superior numbers. Two churches, a monastery, and the house of a Jew were burned, and the village of Ain Ibl looted. Eye-witnesses report that some 200 of the inhabitants, of all ages and sexes, were killed by gun-fire, throat-cutting, or burning, and describe the "most favoured method of killing," which was to swathe the victim's head in a coat, pour on paraffin, and set it on fire. In one house nine women and a child were killed; another woman was seen running holding the head of her decapitated child in her hands. As a result of this refugees to the number of some 2,700 persons hastened south into the British area.

Almost at the same time a formidable force of Rowallah Arabs, estimated at 4,000 men, with machine-guns and two field-pieces, is reported to have destroyed a French post at Banias, which overlooks the sources of the Jordan, and a detachment of this body also attacked a British post on the frontier of Palestine near Beisan.

The tribes also made raids into Palestine, seeking for outlying or exposed Jewish colonies, but for the most part the Administration was able to keep the peace and secure the inhabitants from their own disorderly elements as well as from their turbulent neighbours across the Jordan. Signs of progress are visible; the Hebrew University began to gather funds, arrangements for sending and housing 30,000 Jewish immigrants were made, and the Zionist Executive Committee set about raising a general fund of £25,000,000 for the financing of emigration to Palestine, the establishment of the necessary institutions and the foundation and maintenance of schools. Even archæology revived, and a British School of Archæology in Jerusalem was started under the direction of Professor John Garstang, M.A., D.Sc., B.Litt., of Oxford and Liverpool, who went to Palestine in April and undertook the excavation of Ascalon in conjunction with the Palestine Exploration Fund.

In June, although the identity of Mandatory Powers was not revealed in the text of the Turkish Peace Treaty, it became known that Great Britain would assume responsibility for Palestine. The Right Hon. Sir Herbert Samuel, G.B.E., who had already visited the country in January for the purpose of studying its problems, was appointed High Commissioner of Palestine (announced June 14), and promulgated the following declaration on the subject of this term of office, which was to begin on July 1, 1920:

Complete religious liberty will be maintained in Palestine. The Places sacred to the great religions will remain in the control of the adherents to those religions. A civilian Administration for the country will be at once established. The higher ranks will consist of British officials of ability and experience. The other ranks will be open to the local population, irrespective of creed. Order will be firmly enforced. The economic development of the country will be actively promoted.

In accordance with the decision of the Allied and Associated Powers, measures will be adopted to reconstruct the Jewish National Home in Palestine. The yearnings of the Jewish people for two thousand years, of which the modern Zionist Movement is the latest expression, will at last be realized. The steps taken to this end will be consistent with a scrupulous respect for the rights of the present non-Jewish inhabitants.

The country has room for a larger population than it now contains; and Palestine, properly provided with roads, railways, harbours, and electric power, with the soil more highly cultivated, the waste-lands reclaimed, forests planted, and malaria extirpated, with town and village industries encouraged, can maintain a large additional population not only without hurt, but on the contrary with much advantage to the present inhabitants. Immigration of the character that is needed will be admitted into the country in proportion as its development allows employment to be found.

Above all, educational and spiritual influences will be fostered, in the hope that once more there may radiate from the Holy Land moral forces of service to mankind. These are the purposes which, under the high superintendence of the League of Nations, the British Government, in the exercise of its mandate for Palestine, will seek to promote.

Cilicia, in which was situated that kingdom of Little Armenia which was known favourably to the Crusaders for the military qualities of

its inhabitants, who intermarried on terms of equality with the Franks of Syria and Cyprus, only lost its independence under the assaults of the Mamluks of Egypt in 1735, and became a Turkish province after the conquest of Egypt, four centuries ago. It is now, racially speaking, one of the most mixed regions of Asia Minor. There is a compact block of Arab peasants of the non-Moslem Ansairieh sect in the district of Missis on the northern shore of the Gulf of Alexandretta; villages of Afghans may be found near Adana; there are Greeks in and about Mersina; Kurdish clans in the Amanus mountains at the eastern end of the province; imported Circassians from the country round Kars and Ardahan in the hill country of the Jebel Bereket, Turcomans in the east and south-east, Ismailians (formerly infamous as the "Assassins" of Crusading chroniclers) here and there, Yezidis who adore the Malix-I-Taus or the Devil in the form of a Peacock, and some Syrian and Armenian Protestants. But the bulk of the population is Turk and Armenian. The former are poor specimens of their race, being excitable, more than usually ignorant and notoriously treacherous, the latter are for the most part adherents of the Gregorian or national Armenian Church, which regards the Patriarch of Etchmiadzin as its spiritual head, and respect the local authority of the Catholikos of Sis. Many of these people were armed, and by arrangement between Colonel Bremond, the French Administrator of Cilicia, and the British military authorities, attempts were made to effect a disarmament before the withdrawal of the British troops which began in October. The news unhappily leaked out, and many Turks hid their weapons, which gravely endangered the security of those Armenians who surrendered theirs.

At the beginning of November, 1919, withdrawal of the British troops under Lord Allenby's command from Cilicia was completed, and their places were taken by French detachments. Unfortunately, however, the forces at the disposal of the French authorities were not sufficiently numerous to enable them to deal with such firmness with the local Turks and other Moslems who were daily becoming more and more influenced by Nationalist propaganda and anti-Armenian incitements. It has also been pointed out by Europeans then in the country that the presence of Armenian companies of the French Legion d'Orient, which had done good service in Palestine was a weakness rather than a strength to the new Army of Occupation, as Moslems resented having to acknowledge even French authority when supported and enforced by men whom they regarded as rebellious Ottoman subjects of a race long despised and detested by members of the former dominant religion. There was, moreover, reason to believe that some of these Armenian legionaries took advantage of their position to exact vengeance for the horrible atrocities done to their families or friends by the Turks during the war. The satisfaction of these private injuries did harm to the reputation of France and provoked the Moslems to rally for their own protection, while the conciliatory attitude of the French authorities, who disbanded many of the Armenian legionaries soon after the occupation, was interpreted as weakness. A defiant attitude was assumed towards all French troops, whether of Armenian origin or not, and this facilitated the work of Mustafa Kemal's agents who were reported to be very active and truculent in December, and isolated revolts of Tchetes took place and Turkish flags were hoisted.

Early in January Armenian villagers and travellers were murdered on the road between Marash and Osmanieh, and the Nationalists began to appear as an organized force armed with machine guns and based on prepared positions with communications open to Mustafa Kemal's strongholds at Nigde, Eregli and Malatia. French troops were engaged in minor skirmishes before the middle of the month, and after the outbreak at Marash had given the signal for general revolt, Zeitun, Firnuz, Fundijak, and other Armenian villages were attacked and some 1,500 of the inhabitants massacred amid scenes of brutality habitually associated with Turkish treatment of these people. A survivor from one of these villages who had lain wounded under a pile of corpses tells how the Turks drove about 140 Armenians, mostly children, into a farm-house and opened fire upon them through the windows; they then entered and completed their work with axes. One Turk deliberately "blooded" his 10-year old son by making him cut the throat of an Armenian baby and drink its blood "in order to become a brave man."

When General Allenby liberated Palestine and Syria, he made a rule that in the areas administered by European officers under his command no national flags of any sort might be flown on official or unofficial buildings. In this way numerous occasions for the giving and

taking of offence were avoided. This rule apparently was not maintained by the French Chief Administrator in Cilicia, and it was a "flag-incident" which was made the excuse for the Turkish outbreak at Marash in January. A French flag habitually flew over the Konak or Serail of the Military Governor. This was struck without authority, and the white Crescent and Star on a red ground of the Sultan run up in its stead. Captain André, who, from all accounts, was a just and impartial administrator, and as such was disliked by the more fanatical Turks, pulled down the enemy ensign. On this the crowd interfered, his second in command was hustled, his Turkish gendarmes deserted and Captain André had to leave the town, to return later with a reinforcement of native troops whose entry into Marash was resisted by the Turks.

In the interval the local insurrectionaries had been joined by Nationalist bands, and on January 21 the French were surrounded and besieged by overwhelming forces which comprised the deserters from the gendarmerie. The garrison was compelled in self-defence to bombard the town from which it was being persistently sniped, and this action drove the Armenians from their houses and exposed them to the rifle fire of the Turks. Multitudes were massacred and many tortured in order to extract descriptions of the places where treasure had been buried. An American who was besieged with the French noted in his diary that the outcry of the tortured could be plainly heard a mile away.

The French were not numerous enough for a sortie, nor had they food or arms to spare for the refugees who thronged into their stronghold; they had no means of obtaining help, and no knowledge whether or no this was a local rebellion, or whether the Turks were up all over the country. Five Armenian soldiers were sent out on January 23 in hopes of getting through to other French garrisons, and by January 25 the greater part of the town was burning. During the next twelve days the small garrison, almost helpless, was obliged to witness the horrible scenes of massacre enacted all around, and was able to shelter and protect only a few wounded, and often mutilated, victims who had by their own efforts been able to escape from the butchery. One woman, who had stood for eight hours in water hiding from the Turks, emerged at last to make a dash for safety, only to be shot as she ran; another witnessed the slaughter of nearly a hundred persons in a cellar by Turks who first treacherously accepted their surrender and then fell upon them with axes; others crawled into safety wounded by expanding bullets. On the very day that help arrived, 80 girls were murdered at the Rescue Home, which was burned over their heads. Owing to lack of ammunition, and ignorant of the fact that the Turks were depressed by the 3,000 casualties inflicted upon them, the

[*Manuel.*

LEADERS OF THE TURKISH DELEGATION TO RECEIVE THE TREATY OF PEACE.

The two men in front are Tewfik Pasha (right) and Reshid Bey. The terms of the Treaty were handed to them at Versailles, May 11, 1920.

relieving force withdrew during the night of February 10-11, taking the remnant of the garrison and numerous refugees. The line of retreat was to Islahieh on the Baghdad railway in bitter winter weather. During this terrible retreat the French lost heavily, bringing the casualties of the defence, where 158 were killed and 189 were missing, and relief up to some 800, while more than 1,300 of the 4,000 refugees who accompanied the French perished on the way.

Dr. Kennedy, the agent of the Lord Mayor's Fund working for the relief of refugees at Adana, estimated 18,000 as the number of Armenian victims of these massacres, which came as a cruel counterblast to the action of the Allies in formally according recognition to the Armenian Republic of Erivan as a *de facto* government. It is also worthy of note that the authority of the Nationalist Administration was enhanced, and its propaganda invigorated, as a result of these striking manifestations of cruelty and bigotry, which were not confined to Cilicia, but had their counterparts soon afterwards in other parts of Anatolia. This fact was recognized by the Porte in the action of the Minister of the Interior, who, on March 12, informed the Armenian Patriarchate in Constantinople that he could no longer control "manifestations of national sentiment" in any part of Anatolia, except the Ismid district. A week later Zeitun and Hadjin, in Cilicia, were attacked by Nationalists, who failed to be impressed by, or were still ignorant of, the Allied occupation of distant Constantinople, and at the same time it was announced that isolated French garrisons in Urfa, beyond the Euphrates [the Edessa of classical times and the Rohez of the Crusaders], Birijik on that river, and Aintab to the north of Aleppo, were still being besieged by Mustafa Kemal's forces. On April 7 it became known that the French were unable to move to the relief of Hadjin, and had been obliged to abandon it to its fate. They were, however, able to bring the Armenians of Sis down in safety to Adana, and General Gouraud made every effort to enable Armenians to withdraw entirely from Cilicia and proceed to Erivan, where, by means of this immigration of refugees, it was hoped that a compact Armenian population might be built up sufficiently numerous to be able to protect itself. This was the more necessary, as outlying Armenian populations in the Gokhthan district had been massacred in December, 1919, by the Tartars of Azerbaijan, who frequently followed the worst examples set by the Turks, and delighted, in spite of British remonstrances, to harbour Turkish war-criminals like Nuri Pasha and Halil Pasha, who had indeed themselves directed massacres in the village of Akoulis.

ANGORA.

The Seat of Mustafa Kemal's Nationalist Administration.

Later in the month Aintab was relieved (April 10), after a prolonged engagement which cost the Turks over 1,000 casualties, but they rallied, and the town was again invested on the withdrawal of the relieving force. A second relief became necessary, and was effected by April 26. Unfortunately, however, in the meantime, Urfa had to be abandoned under cover of a flag of truce. During the retreat of the 700 French troops the column, which was still entitled to the protection of the terms of capitulation, was treacherously attacked by the Nationalists and lost over 400 men, who were massacred. At the same time the Baghdad railway was cut in two places, and the Armenians of Char, to the north of Hadjin, were massacred to the number of some 300.

In these circumstances it is hardly to be wondered at that the League of Nations, which had

no armed force or substantial financial resources at its disposal, should have found it necessary to decline the responsibility of accepting a Mandate for Armenia, as had been proposed by the Supreme Council at the end of March. The possibility of the Netherlands assuming a burden from which greater and richer Powers shrank back was discussed in the Press, but it was generally considered that the only possible Mandatory would be the United States. Here the issue was complicated by the fact that the United States had not entered the League of Nations, and had a long tradition in favour of non-intervention abroad. It was, moreover, increasingly apparent that the estimate of the number of troops and of the probable expense of such a task made by General Harbord's Mission, which had been sent to inquire into the question, although immense, was by no means exaggerated. It was, therefore, a foregone conclusion, even when President Wilson proposed, on May 24, that he should be authorized by Congress to accept the Mandate for Armenia, which had just been congratulated on its independence by the Senate, that he would meet with a refusal. This was not long delayed, as on June 1 the Senate rejected the scheme by 62 votes to 12, and the unhappy country was left to sink or swim by its own unaided exertions, unless it was prepared to accept the overtures and offers of qualified assistance made to it by the Bolshevists, who had begun to overrun Transcaucasia at the end of May. The abandonment was made the more complete when the British Government withdrew its forces from Batum at the end of June, thus ceasing to be responsible for the last door through which the Armenians, and their more reasonable neighbours, could hope to keep in touch with the centres of civilization. In Cilicia the result of the loss of the inland towns by the French had its effect in the clauses of the Peace Treaty wherein the area within which France was to have the responsibilities of a mandate were considerably restricted. In this area the Armenians, with French approval, did their best to form a nucleus of national resistance by constituting the Republic of the Amanus (June 21).

The occupation of Smyrna on May 14, 1919, by Greek troops under General Zaphiriou gave rise to a series of distressing incidents, which undoubtedly did much to inflame Turkish national consciousness against the Greeks and their Allies, and aroused so much comment and criticism that an international commission was sent to hold an inquiry. This met in Smyrna on August 24, 1919, and the suppression, on a technicality, of its report, which was unfavourable to the Greeks, had a bad effect on Turkish and Moslem sentiment. The Greek High Commissioner, M. Stergiadis, however, worked hard to improve the state of affairs, in spite of the inefficiency and helplessness of the Turkish officials and the undisciplined habits and lack of political sense among many of the local Greek Vayahs, which at first did much to handicap his efforts for the restoration of justice, efficiency, and commerce. His execution of two Greeks for the murder of Turks did much to calm the excited exuberance of the Christian population in Smyrna, and it was generally considered to be unfortunate that a similar strictness was not everywhere enforced within the area of Greek occupation. This area was almost immediately enlarged so as to include Aidin and Kassaba; Aivali (May 29) and Odemish (June 1) were soon added. Denizli and Nazli followed, but were evacuated by June 19 under pressure of the Turkish Nationalists, who resented this invasion, and, in some force, attacked the Greeks near Odemish on June 23. A more serious affair led to the evacuation of Aidin under conditions discreditable to both parties. The sniping and guerilla warfare to which they were exposed caused some Greeks to get out of hand near Menemen at the beginning of July, and a long account of Turkish outrage and oppression was vindictively liquidated. Further fighting ensued on July 14 near Aidin, and by July 22, when the area to be occupied by Greece was provisionally limited to the sanjak of Smyrna and the Kaza of Aivali, no less than 50,000 Greek troops were stated to have landed. A rough estimate of the Nationalist forces engaged in guerilla warfare against the Greeks in this area placed the number of regular Turkish troops at about 2,000 and of irregulars at some 15,000, of whom many were Arnauts and Circassians, and others professional brigands of local origin habitually opposed to any form of government which was likely to be orderly or otherwise antipathetic to their methods of gaining a livelihood.

The cessation of what was called a policy of competitive occupation enabled M. Stergiadis to produce better administrative results, take measures to counteract the sedulous intrigues of those interests which were hostile to the

presence of the Greeks in Smyrna, and show reason to the local foreign firms for abating their opposition. The control of the shipping and the customs passed into his hands at the end of July; and on August 6 General Sir G. F. Milne, formerly in command of the British Salonika Army, who was now in command of all Allied Forces in Western Anatolia, arrived for the purpose of delimiting the area of Greek occupation, which, at least, made it easier to avoid friction with the Italians, who had occupied Adalia on March 29, 1919, and Scalanova on May 14, and generally gave the impression during several months of following a local policy of their own which often had the appearance of being at variance with the general policy of the Allies towards the Turks.

The partial restoration, on November 12, 1919, of the Capitulations, which the Porte had professed to abolish by proclamation in September, 1914, was accompanied by the extension of this privileged status to the nationals of Serbia and Greece, two countries which had hitherto not enjoyed any extra-territorial judicial jurisdiction in Turkey. This was the first step to the introduction of Greek law, which, after the publication of the Treaty, was applied to the whole area allotted to Greece in Western Anatolia on the same terms as in Greece proper.

The Greek grip of the territory occupied in Asia was materially strengthened; and although the Nationalists were by no means passive, and many Turks withdrew from the area, there was little serious fighting, except near Odemish in November and again in January, 1920, and in the Bos Dagh region in March.

The growth of the Nationalist power in Anatolia was marked by a corresponding decline in the authority of the Porte, which was content for the most part to pursue a policy of *laisser faire* except when compelled by Allied pressure to make a few half-hearted attempts to prevent the Nationalists from establishing themselves on the coast of the Marmora. On the one hand the Nationalists were energetic in establishing communications with Bolshevists and Arabs and in heartening their followers with massacres as enumerated above; on the other they sought eagerly to arm themselves by raiding dumps in Gallipoli and to annoy the Allies and impress the people by feats of arson in the neighbourhood of the capital The prestige of the Allies was repaired by the process of compelling the Porte to hand over equivalent stocks of arms and ammunition as compensation for those abstracted by Nationalist raiders, but this did nothing to detract from the strength of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who by degrees became so formidable that Cabinet changes in Constantinople were at

SMYRNA.
Occupied by the Greeks, May 14, 1919.

times submitted for his approval. It is true that the Allies sometimes made their authority felt, and they scored a success in February when the Sheikh-ul-Islam delivered himself of the following pronouncement against Mustafa Kemal's Bolshevist allies, whose theory and practice was distasteful to many pious Moslems and many honest Turks:

Bolshevism is at present engaging the attention of those who control the destinies of nations. It is the duty of Islam, which directs a great portion of humanity and reflects their sentiment, to proclaim its attitude to all Mahomedans, and to the world in general. Whatever may be the basic principles of Bolshevism, the fact that their application is harmful to humanity, to social life, and to the rights of individual property makes it quite impossible to reconcile them with the principles of Islam. Since the birth of Islam until now attacks upon life and property, theft, massacres, pillage, and rape have always been condemned, and our sacred literature not only condemns but imposes penal sentences for such acts.

Islam requires general progress, tranquillity, and happiness. It, therefore, forbids the taking of the life and the property of others, and ensures most emphatically the rights of property of individuals and communities. Consequently Islam rules that each individual has a complete right to bequeath his property, during his lifetime or after his death.

Islam being unable to tolerate the spendthrift, and with a view to preventing the spendthrift from squandering his riches to the detriment of those who are left destitute, requires that the fortune be divided partly among the relatives and partly among the poor. It is to the interests of Islam that all its strength and influence should be concentrated to oppose the Bolshevists, as a danger threatening civilization, justice, and right.

Opinion in Western Europe and in America largely favoured the complete expulsion of the Turks from Europe, but a few voices were raised in protest against this policy on the ground that it might inflame Moslem sentiment, as Constantinople has for nearly four centuries been associated with the Caliphate inasmuch as that dignity was acquired by the Ottoman Sultans from the last Abbaside Caliph after the conquest of Egypt by Sultan Yawuz Selim. In view of the outbreak of the massacres of Armenians in Cilicia and of the unsatisfactory behaviour of the Turks, both in Constantinople, which Lord Curzon in the House of Lords on March 11 described as the head and forefront of the offending, and in Anatolia, it was considered necessary to manifest the existence of Allied authority in some notable fashion in order to recall to the Turks the fact that the Allies intended quite definitely to be the masters of the situation.

Accordingly, therefore, in the very early hours before the dawn of March 16, Allied detachments began to search for the numerous Nationalists of importance who had impudently relied upon the weakness of the Porte to stir up trouble in the Capital under the very noses of the High Commissioners of the Powers. Numbers of these gentry were laid by the heels, an Imperial Prince and his wife, both subsequently released, Jemal Pasha, not of Syrian fame, Jevad Pasha, a former Chief of Staff, and many others. The only resistance was made by a few members of the staff of Cholak Kemal Pasha, commanding the 10th Turkish Division,



[*Manuel.*

M. VENIZELOS.
Prime Minister of Greece.

who opened fire on some British Indian troops sent to arrest him. The resistance cost the lives of two of the patrol and of nine Turks, but the Pasha and his officers were taken.

At 10 o'clock the Grand Vizier, Salih Pasha, was served with the writ of the Allies in the form of a joint Note from all the High Commissioners announcing the decision of the Supreme Council that Constantinople was to be occupied, provisionally, by Allied troops, and calling upon the Porte to disavow the Nationalist leaders and all their works. Immediately after the communication of the Note Allied troops and naval landing parties, of whom no less than 4,000 were British bluejackets and marines from the Fleet, occupied the Seraskierate in Stambul and the Admiralty across the Golden Horn at Cassim Pasha. The telegraph and telephone offices were already in safe keeping, all trains were stopped on the suburban railways and the Chirket steam-ferries across the Bosporus held up. At many points along the shore lay units of the imposing Allied Fleet cleared for action with their guns trained



H.M.SS. AJAX (Flagship), REVENGE, RESOLUTION, ROYAL SOVEREIGN, ROYAL OAK, AND RAMILLIES LYING OFF CONSTANTINOPLE FEBRUARY 22, 1920.

on important targets. The British First Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir Sidney Fremantle, lay off the Christian quarter of Galata dominating Turkish Stambul less than a mile to the south and south-west and the Arsenal far up the Golden Horn. Other battleships and cruisers prolonged the line towards San Stefano, seaplanes and armed picket boats patrolled by air and sea. Later a proclamation was issued warning all and sundry in Turkish, Armenian, Greek, French and English, to keep the peace and abstain from meddling with the means of communication, the water supply or the lighting service, under pain of suitable penalties, and a *communiqué* was issued through the Press, pointing out that all the trouble had arisen through the machinations of the uneasy C.U.P. of evil record and unpopular memory, and informing the public that Constantinople would be left to the Turks provided that no more Christians were massacred and that the population loyally obeyed the Sultan, who enjoyed the support of the Allies. There was a brief panic in Stambul, where shops were closed and the inhabitants hid in their houses, but after a little the new situation was quietly accepted by an impressed populace, although a few obstinate Nationalists, too unimportant to have been arrested, muttered that the Powers were only bluffing and that a time would come.

Thus for the second time Constantinople passed into the military possession of the soldiers of the West, and the historian cannot forbear from contrasting the orderly and appropriate occupation of March, 1920, with the destructive desolation inflicted upon the city in April, 1204, when the ancestors of those sailors and soldiers took and sacked the Byzantine capital under the command of the Doge Dandolo, of Baldwin Count of Flanders and Boniface of Montferrat.

The Army of Occupation, under Major-General Sir H. Wilson, was attached to General Sir G. F. Milne's Western Anatolian command, but, as being in Turkey-in-Europe, was under the supreme authority of the French General Franchet d'Esperey, Commander-in-Chief of all Allied troops in Rumelia, as he had been of the Allies in Macedonia against the Central Empires in his successful campaign in 1918.

It is worthy of note that although the occupation was announced to be provisional both by the High Commissioners in Constantinople and by Mr. Bonar Law in the House of Commons on March 17, the terms of the Treaty, as

published a couple of months later, appear to provide for its permanent extension, as Constantinople is included within the zone of the Straits which is to be garrisoned by an Inter-Allied force on behalf of the League of Nations. The apparent inconsistency may perhaps be explained on the ground that the Nationalists did not in any way restrain their excesses in Anatolia, Cilicia, or Northern Syria during the intermediate period. Even in Turkish Thrace the authority of the Allies and the Porte alike was flouted by Jafar Tayar Bey, the former commander of the Turkish Ist Army Corps, who tried hard to form a Moslem Republic at Adrianople in opposition to the Franks and Greeks. Although he proclaimed a general mobilization and proceeded to levy taxes, forced loans and exemption payments in the best Nationalist mode, his measure of success, like his resources, was limited, and his movement soon collapsed from lack of support.

The occupation of Constantinople enabled Mustafa Kemal Pasha to regularize his position, which had been somewhat affected in the eyes of loyal Turks by his outlawry and by the subsequent declarations of the Sheikh-ul-Islam on the nature of his rebellion as a spiritual offence, and of the penalties to which his supporters had rendered themselves liable. In the second week of April, therefore, the plea was advanced that the Sultan was *sakat* or in a state of duress, and consequently unable to exercise his sovereignty. Accordingly, Jemal-ed-Din Pasha, a prince of the house of Othman, was constituted Naib es Sultan, or Regent, and it was announced (May 8) that Mustafa Kemal was a sort of Deputy Sadr-Azam of a Cabinet of Wakils or Deputy Ministers. This gave a flavour of legality to the government in Angora, and after the presentation of the Treaty of Peace (May 12) a tendency manifested itself in certain quarters to negotiate with Angora as being the only government which enjoyed real authority over the Turks

The terms of the Treaty, which was made public on May 12, 1920, were very drastic to the defeated Turks, and attempts were made by certain Indian Moslem organizations and political bodies associated with them to get them mitigated, or even annulled, on the ground that pious Moslems could not conscientiously accept any territorial diminution of the temporal power of their spiritual chief, the Sultan Caliph. This theory, however, found no wide measure of support among the Arab and Syrian Moslems, who had actually been in arms against their former Sovereign and had no wish to be again subjected to a Turkish administration.

The Political Clauses of the Turkish Treaty, some of which were put into immediate effect by the beneficiaries without awaiting the formality of the signature of this instrument, settled a number of outstanding questions,



H.M.S. BENBOW, WITH GUNS TRAINED ON THE OTTOMAN MINISTRY OF WAR, PROTECTING THE ALLIED TROOPS LANDING IN CONSTANTINOPLE MARCH 16, 1920.

ADRIANOPLE, NOW CEDED TO GREECE.

regularized some *faits accomplis* and provided for some arrangements which may be difficult of execution. Among the outstanding questions settled is the recognition by the Porte of the French Protectorate over Tunis as from May 12, 1881, and that over Morocco as from March 30, 1912; the renunciation of all rights reserved to the Sultan in his capacity as Caliph by the Treaty of Lausanne of October 12, 1912, over the Italian possessions in Libya; and the surrender to Italy of all rights and sovereignty over Rhodes, the other islands of the Dodecanese and Castellorizo; and the recognition of British sovereignty over Cyprus as from November 5, 1914, the renunciation of all rights and titles over Egypt and the Sudan, and the recognition by the Porte of the British Protectorate over Egypt as from December 18, 1914. All these renunciations and recognitions are also recognized by the other High Contracting Powers as well.

Faits accomplis were regularized by the recognition of the independence of Armenia, the Hejaz, Syria, Mesopotamia, and of the special status of Palestine. In the case of the three last-named countries, a temporary necessity for tutelage was recognized, and arrangements were made for the issue of mandates to Powers to undertake that tutelage on behalf of the League of Nations.

New departures were to be found in provisions for the autonomy of an indeterminate area of Kurdistan, east of the Euphrates, under the Turkish Sultan, an autonomy which is to be capable of ripening into complete independence at a moment to be determined by the Council of the League of Nations. In such case, Kurds living within the confines of the former Vilayet of Mosul, which was otherwise to form part of mandatory Mesopotamia, are to be permitted to adhere, if they so desire, to the independent Kurdish State. The frontiers of autonomous Kurdistan are to depend on the line to be drawn by President Wilson as the future boundary of independent Armenia within the area of the Turkish vilayets of Trebizond, Erzrum, Bitlis and Van. Further, an autonomous State was formed to include Smyrna, Odemish, Magnesia, the Clazomene peninsula and Aivali. This was placed under the administration of Greece, subject to a theoretical Turkish sovereignty to be manifested, in the former Cretan manner, by the flying of a Turkish flag on one fort. At the end of five years, the Parliament of this protected autonomous State will have the right either to perpetuate that sovereignty or to determine it by voting for annexation to Greece, subject to the approval of the Council of the League of Nations. Such a vote, and the stipulated approval, appear to be regarded as foregone conclusions, as the Porte has to agree,

by the terms of the Treaty, to the expected incorporation.

In Europe a portion of Western Thrace, containing the tobacco fields of Xanthi (the Eskije of the Turks and Sketche of the Bulgarians), the town of Gumuljina (the Gkioumoultzina of the Greeks), and the wretched roadstead of Dedeagatch, which was bombarded by the British squadron on October 21, 1915, was ceded to the Allies by the Treaty of Neuilly; and its former Bulgarian possessors, who had held it from 1912, hoped that it, together with the remnant of Turkish Thrace, would permanently be controlled by the League of Nations, which had set up a provisional administration under a French general, and issued appropriate postage stamps.

The hopes of the Bulgarians were, however, dashed, and the enthusiasm of the Greek adherents of the μεγάλη ἰδέα was greatly uplifted by the decision, embodied in the Turkish Treaty, to award to Greece all Turkish territory west of a line so drawn as to leave Chatalja and the Derkos Lake and waterworks area to the Porte. This contained Adrianople, which the Bulgarians greatly desired to obtain as Odren and the Turks greatly resented to lose as being their ancient capital of Edirne. Colonel Jafar Tayar Bey, a Nationalist Turk, who at one time had commanded the First Army Corps, having failed to form a Thracian Republic in March and April, 1920, at least succeeded in arousing a certain measure of Turkish resistance to the advance of the Greek Army of occupation in May and June, when it arrived to "take over" from the French.

Later the actual advance of Greek troops in June galvanized it into some sort of renewed existence, but the Bulgarian Government prudently did all in its power to prevent any assistance reaching the Turk from the north, and, as he was cut off from Asia, Jafar Tayar Bey was soon faced with the necessity of realizing that he was, after all, merely the counterpart of the frog in the fable.

The acquisition of all Turkish Thrace, in addition to the Allied portion of Western or former Bulgarian Thrace, enabled the Greek Kingdom to rival in territorial extent the provincial dominions of the tenth century Byzantine Empire in Europe. At the same time the somewhat indeterminate status of the Ægean Islands administered by Greece since 1912 was definitely regularized. These considerable acquisitions of continental territories and islands were, however, not all on the same tenure. The littoral of the Marmara, the Gallipoli Peninsula, Mytilene, Lemnos, Tenedos, Samothrace and Imbros were subjected to the control of an International Board, to be called the Commission of the Straits, so far as military occupation and coast and harbour administration are concerned; consequently, although Hellenic subjectivity will be enjoyed by the native-born inhabitants of these territories under Hellenic law and taxation administered by the Hellenic civil service, the sovereignty of King Alexander will be less complete than in Adrianople, Gumuljina, Macedonia or Old

[Manuel.

KING ALEXANDER OF GREECE.

Greece. His troops may not enter the area in question, and his warships will not, strictly speaking, be in home ports in Mudros, Port Iero or Rodosto, as they will be subject to regulations drawn up by an international body and applicable equally to the warships of all other Powers and States.

The terms of the Treaty provided for the cession of all Ottoman rights over the Dodecanese to Italy, but by a subsequent agreement, which was almost immediately published, Italy made over nearly all these Ægean islands to Greece, retaining only Rhodes with its memories of Frankish knights, Savoyard prowess and the mediæval chivalry of the Order of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem and the distant isle of Castellorizo, long occupied by

the French during the war. This enabled the Hellenic Monarchy to include within its boundaries Stampalia (Astypalæa) and Leros with their splendid harbours, Kos (Istankeui) with its famous plane-tree and memories of ancient fame, the sponge-fisheries of Kalimnos, Patmos of the Revelation of St. John, Syme of the Great Taxiarch of Heaven, St. Michael, and Nisyros, Charki and Scarpanto (Karpathos) in pleasing ethnographical and geographical completion of the acquisition of Crete and Samos in 1912 and 1913. The population of these islands is exclusively Greek, and there is no substantial minority of long-settled Turkish peasants (as in Cyprus) to protest against union with Greece. A statement was made at the same time as the transfer was announced, to the effect that Italy would continue to hold Rhodes with its western and Latin traditions as long as Great Britain should retain Cyprus, conquered long ago by Richard Cœur de Lion, and famous for centuries as the outpost of French and Italian civilization and commerce in the Levant.

The area of the "protectorate" of Smyrna and the other territorial gains of Greece are shown on the adjoining map, which also clearly illustrates the steps by which during the first century of her revived independence she has won back province after province of the former Byzantine Empire from their Turkish conquerors.

Before the war the distribution of the Armenian population in Asia Minor justified the advocacy of a scheme for special treatment for Armenians in what was then known as the

THE GROWTH OF THE GREEK KINGDOM, 1830-1920.

"Six Vilayets" of Sivas, Mamuret el Aziz (the country round Kharput), Trebizond, Erzrum, Bitlis and Van, and representations were also made on behalf of the Armenians in the vilayet of Adana and the sanjak of Marash, which contained Zeitun, where for many years a stout-hearted Armenian clan maintained itself in a state almost approximating to independence. The exhaustive massacres of Armenians undertaken during the war, however, so reduced the numbers of that unhappy people that it was considered unwise to award to their independent government territories wherein, if not entirely extinct, they were at least in so inconsiderable a minority as to be unable to control the hostile elements of the population. The adjoining map shows the territory, within the former frontiers of Russia, actually administered by the Armenian Government at Erivan and also the limit of the former Turkish territory which may be awarded to Armenia in conformity with the Treaty which entrusts President Wilson with the difficult task of drawing a frontier for the new States somewhere within the confines of the four most northern and eastern of the six vilayets. This potential Armenian territory can readily be compared with the extent of that which the Armenian Delegation to the Peace Conference hoped to obtain for independent Armenia. The Treaty, however, provides for free access to the Black Sea for Armenian trade through Trebizond should that port not be included within the boundaries to be drawn by President Wilson.

A further political provision stipulates that the Porte shall cease to have any right of suzerainty or jurisdiction over Moslems who have become subject to the sovereignty or protectorate of other States as a result of the Treaty. This is a particularly important act of renunciation, as it clearly cuts to the root of the claim that the spiritual authority of the Sultan as Caliph entitles him to expect some sort of temporal allegiance from the Moslem subjects of foreign Powers.

For the greater safety and ease of its subjects and neighbours in the future, the Porte has to limit its army to a gendarmerie of 35,000, a corps of technical troops of 15,000 men, and an Imperial Bodyguard of 700, a total of 50,700, which is to include a maximum number of 2,500 officers. The latter are to serve for not less than 25 years, the former for not less than 12 consecutive years, and all are to be recruited on a voluntary, non-racial and non-religious basis. This force will not be allowed to use the more terrifying engines of modern warfare, such

ARMENIA.

as tanks, *flammenwerfer*, poison gas or armoured cars; its munitions are to be limited, their manufacture controlled and their importation prohibited. Furthermore, the Turkish Navy is abolished, and no military or naval aeroplanes will be tolerated. This reduction and control over Turkish armaments may make it possible for the League of Nations to see that the provisions of the Treaty for the protection of racial and religious minorities in Turkey do not become a dead letter, as so many well-intentioned schemes of similar purport have in the past, when left to the unaided execution of an uncoerced and still formidable Ottoman Administration.

If the above stipulations tend to remove opportunities for misdemeanours and war crimes in the future, special provision is made for the punishment of those guilty of such offences in the past, and for those in particular implicated in the massacres of Armenians and other defenceless Christian populations during the war.

Another means of control for the future is provided by the powers accorded to the Allies to exact payment of debts and damages and to supervise in a most thorough-going fashion the finances of Turkey. A Financial Commission, composed of French, British and Italian members, with a Turkish Assessor for consultative purposes, is set up for the purpose of examining Turkish Budgets, which may not be applied until approved by the Commission, of authorizing existing and future taxation, financial legislation, customs regulations, loans and concessions. The Commission will also decide how much of the Ottoman Debt is to be assigned to those States which have acquired former Turkish territories by the terms of the Treaty and regulate the payments to be made for the expenses of the Armies of Occupation.

Economic clauses in the Treaty enable the Allies to eliminate at their pleasure the financial interests and economic penetration of the subjects of the Central Empires and to compel payment of pre-war debts owing to Allied nationals at pre-war rates of exchange, and future commerce will be facilitated by the specially devised arrangements which have been made to that end. Equality of treatment, particularly with regard to charges and commercial facilities, is secured for all members of the League of Nations in the ports of Constantinople and its Asiatic suburb, Haidar Pasha,

TREBIZOND: THE WATER FRONT.

RHODES: THE COMMERCIAL HARBOUR.

Smyrna, Haifa, Alexandretta, Basra and Trebizond, where "free" zones will be provided wherein no customs dues or analogous charges will be levied, and Turkey is specially granted equal privileges with these favoured States in Smyrna and is allowed to lease a "free" zone in perpetuity in that port. For the same purpose, the facilitation of trade, Turkey has to adapt her railway rolling stock to European requirements, and has to surrender an equitable proportion of rolling stock to go with the railways in ceded territories. As some sort of recompense, Turkey will enjoy freedom of transit to and from the ports in these lost provinces.

One of the most interesting sections of the Turkish Treaty is that group of articles contained in Part II. providing for the establishment of an international "Commission of the Straits," which is to control the waterways leading from the Ægean into the Black Sea. These waterways are in future to be open in peace and in war alike to all shipping, whether merchantmen or men-of-war, and to military and commercial aircraft, without distinction of flag; they are not to be subjected to blockade, and no belligerent right is to be exercised nor any act of hostility committed upon them except in pursuance of a decision of the Council of the League of Nations. In order to give effect to this neutralization of the Straits the Military Clauses contained in Part V. of the Treaty provide for the demolition of all military works, fortifications and batteries within a zone of 20 kilometres (12½ miles) on either shore of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles and from both coasts of the Sea of Marmara. The islands in that sea and those of Mytilene (with Port Iero), Tenedos, Imbros (with Kephalo), Samothrace and Lemnos (with Mudros and Kondia) are also to be included in the "zone of the Straits." Within this zone no military works or roads or railways suitable for the rapid transport of mobile batteries will be constructed, and neither Greece nor Turkey will be permitted to keep troops within the zone. An exception is made in favour of the Sultan's bodyguard, which is limited to 700 officers and men. France, Italy and Great Britain will supply the troops necessary for maintaining international authority within this zone; but these, together with any Greeks or Turks employed as gendarmes, will be at the disposal of the Inter-Allied Command of the Army of Occupation, which will be separate from the "Commission of the Straits."

This body, which is analogous to that other International Commission which in the past



FORTS ON THE DARDANELLES, NOW DEMOLISHED.

has so successfully managed the navigation of the Lower Danube, is to consist at first of representatives of the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, with two votes apiece, and of Greece and Rumania, each with one vote. Should the United States, Russia and Bulgaria join the League of Nations the two former will be represented with two votes each and the last-named will have one vote.* Thus the Commission of the Straits will start work with 10 votes divided among 6 States, and may grow so as to have 15 votes divided among 9 States.

The Commission is to exercise its authority in complete independence and will have its own flag, budget and administrative organization. The Commission will undertake any works necessary for the improvement of the channels or approaches to harbours; it will control lighting and navigation marks, pilotage and anchorages, salvage and lighterage. It may buy or build any property or permanent works and control the execution of the Treaty so far as that concerns the free port areas within its jurisdiction. It will impartially, and without discrimination of flag, collect dues from all shipping, control health, docks, and life-boat service and have its own police, but offenders against its bye-laws will be prosecuted in the appropriate Courts upon the mainland, whether Hellenic, Ottoman or Consular.

The question of the enforcement of these terms remained in abeyance for more than a month, and when the Porte conformed to its traditional policy by asking for more time suggestions were made in Constantinople that it would be better to treat with Angora. Mustafa Kemal had, however, declined to recognize the Treaty in any way, and, not content with attacking the French in Cilicia, where his aggression was so strong as to merit the conclusion of an armistice in June, and arranging for raids against Mesopotamia, he began a movement against Ismid in hopes of being able to reach Constantinople. With the intention of making it more easy for the Grand Vizier, Damad Ferid Pasha, to make up his mind to accept the Treaty, the Boulogne Conference (June 22) decided that Mustafa Kemal was to be crushed by armed force. For this purpose the offer made by M. Venizelos to march against the Nationalists with six divisions of Greeks was accepted, and it was announced that the French and British would cooperate from Cilicia and Ismid respectively.

It is perhaps not inappropriate to conclude the History of the Great War on the threshold of a new war about to rise out of it.

* According to an alteration approved by the Allies on July 17, 1920, Turkey will be allotted one vote on the Commission of the Straits should she join the League of Nations.

THE END.



THE MOSQUE OF ST. SOPHIA, NICOSIA, CYPRUS.

Formerly a Gothic Cathedral where the Lusignan Kings of Cyprus used to be crowned.

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